

Type, Model, Series

Accident Number

P84/4-C-119

53-5-15-2

FORM 14 DEFICIENCY SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: The correct use of this form is of the greatest importance in eliminating duplication of effort, minimizing administrative handling, and obtaining maximum efficiency in processing the accident report. Requested actions or actions taken to obtain missing documents will be identified as to the activity making the request (R&S, R&A, Med Safety, Engineering etc.) and the initials of the individual making the request and the date of the request. Actions taken will be similarly recorded to show the activity taking the action, initials of the responsible individual and the date of the correspondence. As the Form 14 is processed all deficiencies detected in it will be recorded, indicating a request for action or action taken on the deficiencies, to provide a complete record of all discrepancies.

PART I DEFICIENCIES ON WHICH ACTION IS REQUESTED. R&S WILL TAKE ACTION.
(If item is checked, initialed and dated R&S will initiate correspondence for missing item)

ITEM'S	REQ ACTIVITY, DT & INITIALS	DT OF R&S CORR	DT DOCU REC	REMARKS
Form 14				
A				
B				
C				
D				
E				
F				
G				
Letter of Transmittal				
Miscellaneous Forms or Attachments (Form 1, DD Form 175, Photographs, Rebuttal etc.) SPECIFY				
UR (Specify Component)				
AMC ACTION ON UR				
DIR (Specify Component)				
AMC ACTION ON DIR				

PART II DEFICIENCIES ON WHICH ACTION IS TAKEN BY ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN R&S.

ORIGINATED BY:	OTHER CORRESPONDENCE SUBJECT	DATE PREPARED AND INITIALED	COPY IN FM 14 (Check)
R & A			
MED SAFETY			
ENGINEERING			
OTHER I & SE			
BRANCHES (IDENTIFY)			
R & S			
OTHER			

24-4-53

New Deficiency Sheet.

FORM 14, DEFICIENCY SHEET

53-5-15-5

INSTRUCTIONS: The correct use of this form is of the greatest importance in eliminating duplication of effort, minimizing administrative handling, and obtaining maximum efficiency in processing the accident report. Requested actions or actions taken to obtain missing documents will be identified as to the activity making the request (R&S, R&A, Med Safety, Engineering etc.) and the initials of the individual making the request and the date of the request. Actions taken will be similarly recorded to show the activity taking the action, initials of the responsible individual and the date of the correspondence. As the Form 14 is processed all deficiencies detected in it will be recorded, indicating a request for action or action taken on the deficiencies, to provide a complete record of all discrepancies.

PART I DEFICIENCIES ON WHICH ACTION IS REQUESTED. R&S WILL TAKE ACTION.

(If item is checked, initialed and dated R&S will initiate correspondence for missing item)

ITEM'S	REQ ACTIVITY, DT & INITIALS	DT OF R&S CORR	DT DOCU REC	REMARKS
Form 14				
A				
B	✓ 6/17/53	DR		Copy 14 included
C				Request 14 to be on column
D				element, Ray, Thompson
E				Submittal on aircraft #51825
F				Form 14 submitted on figg
G				
Letter of Transmittal				
Miscellaneous Forms or Attachments (Form 1, DD Form 175, Photographs, Rebuttal etc.) SPECIFY				
UR (Specify Component)				
AMC ACTION ON UR				
DIR (Specify Component)				
AMC ACTION ON DIR				

PART II DEFICIENCIES ON WHICH ACTION IS TAKEN BY ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN R&S.

ORIGINATED BY:	OTHER CORRESPONDENCE SUBJECT	DATE PREPARED AND INITIALED	COPY IN FM 14 (Check)
R & A			
MED SAFETY			
ENGINEERING			
OTHER I & SE			
BRANCHES (IDENTIFY)			
R & S			
OTHER			

24-4-53

24-4-53

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AFM 63-14 and AF Manual 63-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheets and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

1. PLACE OF ACCIDENT: State, county, nearest town—Distance and direction to accident Germany, Mannheim 10 Miles N.E.			2. NEAREST AIRPORT Suitable for landing this plane—Distance and direction to accident Rhein Main 31 Miles North		
3. ELEVATION ABOVE S. L. at accident scene 500 Ft	4. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 53	5. HOUR AND TIME ZONE 1550Z	6. DAY ☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK	7. LAST NUMBERS OF ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT INVOLVED (For separate Form 14 for each aircraft) 51-8235 - 8241 - 8249 - 8259	
8. CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENT: ☒ Major ☐ Minor	9. CLEARANCE: ☐ VFR ☐ Local ☐ Other	10. IF OTHER— From: Bitburg Landstuhl To: Bitburg		11. THIS WAS A: ☐ CAP FLIGHT ☐ AIR RESERVE FLIGHT ☐ AND FLIGHT ☒ OTHER	
12. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF Bitburg		13. DURATION OF FLIGHT 0:25		14. ACTIVITY AIRCRAFT WAS ENGAGED IN JUST PRIOR TO ACCIDENT Formation Flight	

Section B—AIRCRAFT

1. AIRCRAFT No. 51-628A	2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK No. F-84E-30RE	3. ORGANIZATION REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-120 REPORT MAJOR COMMAND: USAF AFE SUBCOMMAND: 12th Air Force AF WING: FB 36th Ftr Bnr		
4. TECHNICAL ORDERS affecting this aircraft were not complied with at time of accident. (List number and title of these T. O.'s on separate sheet.)		GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE 36th Ftr Bnr	SQUADRON OR UNIT 22nd Ftr Bnr	BASE Bitburg E-19

Section C—OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)

1. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) CHILTON	FIRST NAME James	MIDDLE NAME W.	GRADE 1/Lt	COMPONENT USAF	SERIAL No. 20878A	NATIONALITY AND RACE US White	YEAR OF BIRTH 1928
2. ASSIGNED BASE Bitburg	MAJOR COMMAND USAF	SUBCOMMAND 12th Air Force	AF WING 36th Ftr Bnr	GROUP No. AND TYPE 36th Ftr Bnr	SQUADRON OR UNIT 22nd Ftr Bnr		
3. ASSIGNED BASE FOR FLYING E-19	MAJOR COMMAND AFE	SUBCOMMAND 12	AF WING FB	GROUP No. AND TYPE FB	SQUADRON OR UNIT FB		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 23 June 1950		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 23 June 1950		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT 1124 A			
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD White				8. EXPIRATION DATE 24 Nov 53			
9. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) Hours 1249:00				10. TOTAL 1ST PILOT HOURS 31.5 934:00			
11. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 79:10				12. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS 28:15			
13. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-25, F-51, etc.) 804:05				14. OTHER PILOT HOURS (OF, C, SC) THIS MODEL —			
15. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS THIS MODEL 70:00				16. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS THIS MODEL 28:35			
17. TOTAL TIME SPENT IN AIR DURING 30 DAYS PRIOR TO ACCIDENT 0:00				18. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE? ☒ No ☐ Yes ☐ HOOD ☐ WEATHER If above answer is "Yes" or if accident occurred at night or during IFR weather or unknown conditions, fill in items below.			
19. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS				20. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD HOURS			
21. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hours Last 6 Months				22. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hours Last 30 Days			
23. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS				24. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 60 DAYS			

Section D—PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident	NAME (Last name first)	Type of Airo. Rating (Symbol)	SERIAL No.	GRADE AND BRANCH OF SERVICE	COMPONENT (See AFM 63-5)	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT—Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base	Fatal, Major, Minor, Home, Missing		Parachute Used	
							(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
P	Chilton, James W.	P	20878A	1/Lt USAF	USAF	USAF, 12th AF, 36th Ftr Bnr Gp Bitburg, Germany	2	A	X	

RESTRICTED

Section E—RATED PERSONNEL AT OTHER SET OF DUAL CONTROLS (Instructor, Copilot, etc.)

1. LAST NAME (JR., II, etc.)	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	GRADE	COMPONENT	SERIAL NO.	NATIONALITY AND RACE	YEAR OF BIRTH
2. ASSIGNED BASE	MAJOR COMMAND	SUBCOMMAND	AF WING	GROUP NO. AND TYPE		SQUADRON OR UNIT	
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING	MAJOR COMMAND	SUBCOMMAND	AF WING	GROUP NO. AND TYPE		SQUADRON OR UNIT	
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED			5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED			6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT	

FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including Civilian)		21. LAST BY TYPE AND MODEL: ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (e.g., B-26, IP, 50 hrs.)
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT - CARD	EXPIRATION DATE	Fill in items below if Instrument and Night Experience of Operator was listed in Section C
8. TOTAL PILOT (Inc P, JR., Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) HOURS		
9. TOTAL 1ST PILOT HOURS		
10. TOTAL HOURS, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C (Check applicable one)		
11. PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS		
12. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS		
13. HOURS LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C		
14. PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS		
15. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-26, F-81, etc.)		
16. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL		
17. HOURS THIS MODEL, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C		22. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS
18. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS		23. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD HOURS
19. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS		24. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HRS. LAST 6 MONTHS
20. HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C		25. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HRS. LAST 90 DAYS
		26. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS
		27. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS
		28. NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MOS., ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C
		29. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS
		30. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS
		31. NIGHT HRS. THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C

Section F—DAMAGE

1. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY IN GENERAL TERMS THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE, ENGINES, AND PROPELLERS.		2. CHECK PROPER DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION
Destroyed		
3. ☒ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS RETURNED TO AN AF BASE ☐ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS LEFT AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT		NONE ☐ MINOR ☐ SUBSTANTIAL ☐ DESTROYED ☒
4. IS PLANE DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMICAL REPAIR? ☒ Yes ☐ No		
5. IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED, GIVE ENGINEERING OFFICER'S ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED FOR REPAIR: _____ Man-Hrs.		
6. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGED? ☒ Yes ☐ No		
7. GIVE BELOW A CONSIDERED ESTIMATE OF COST OF THIS ACCIDENT TO THE AIR FORCE:		
COST OF DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT \$ 158,870		
COST OF DAMAGE TO OTHER GOVERNMENT PROPERTY \$		
COST OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY \$ 330		
COST OF INJURIES \$ 250		
COST—OTHER (Repair) Pick-up \$ 150		
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF ACCIDENT \$ 159,600		
8. IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES ON SEPARATE SHEET.		

Section G—SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. Check items of special equipment which affected the accident.			
☐ RADIOS	☐ ARMAMENT	☐ DE-ICEES	☐ EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR VISION FROM COCKPIT
☐ INSTRUMENTS	☐ FIRE EXTINGUISHING EQUIPMENT IN PLANE	☐ JATO	
2. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE, NONUSE, MISUSE, OR ABSENCE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AFFECTED THE ACCIDENT			

Section H—WEATHER (At time and place of accident)

CLOUDS	VISIBILITY	WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	TEMP.	DEW POINT	OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS
9500	10	SW 10	21°C	9°C	Alt. 1015.9 (Heidelberg, 1600Z)

If wind or other than unfavorable wind conditions for takeoff, landing, or taxiing was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer describing conditions and how they probably contributed to accident.

Section I—CHECK LIST FOR ATTACHMENTS

☒ FORM 1	☒ CLEARANCE	☒ PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ FORM 14C
☒ FORM 1A	☒ CREW MEMBERS' STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14A	☐ FORM 14D
☒ LIST OF T.O.'s NOT C/W	☒ WITNESS STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14B	☒ FORM 14E
☒ Diagrams			

Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE		Section M—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS	
PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Check one accident type as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary."		Check one specific cause as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary." (See AFM 62-6 for definitions)	
☐ GROUND OR WATER LOSS ☐ WINGTIP LANDING ☐ WHEEL-UP LANDING ☐ HARD LANDING ☐ COLLAPSE OR RETRACTION OF LANDING GEAR ☐ UNDERSHOOT ☐ OVERSHOOT ☐ NOSE UP OR NOSE OVER ☒ COLLISION WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT ☐ COLLISION WITH GROUND OR WATER ☐ OTHER COLLISIONS ☐ SPIN OR STALL ☐ FIRE ON GROUND ☐ FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSION IN AIR ☐ AIRFRAME FAILURE IN FLIGHT ☐ ABANDONED AIRCRAFT ☐ PROX OR JET BLAST ACCIDENT ☐ OTHER (List): ☐ UNDETERMINED	☒ 1. ERRORS OF AIR CREW ☐ MISSED POWER PLANT OR POWER PLANT CONTROLS ☐ MISSED BRAKES AND/OR FLIGHT CONTROLS ON GROUND ☐ IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT CONTROLS IN AIR ☐ EXCEEDED STRESS LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT ☐ INATTENTIVE TO FUEL SUPPLY OR FUEL SELECTOR VALVE ☐ FAILED TO EXTEND OR RETRACT LANDING GEAR PROPERLY ☐ SELECTED UNSUITABLE TERRAIN OR RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF OR LANDING ☐ FAILED TO COMPENSATE FOR WIND CONDITIONS ☐ Miscalculated DISTANCE ☐ FAILED TO LEVEL OFF PROPERLY ☐ FAILED TO OBSERVE OTHER AIRCRAFT OR OBSTACLES ☐ FAILED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLYING SPEED ☐ BRAKES LOST (Weather surface or above) ☐ CONTINUED VFR FLIGHT INTO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER ☐ IMPROPER OPERATION OF AUTHORIZED INSTRUMENT FLIGHT ☐ OPERATED AIRCRAFT IN RECKLESS MANNER ☐ MADE INADEQUATE FLIGHT PREPARATIONS ☐ ATTEMPTED FLIGHT BEYOND ABILITY OR EXPERIENCE ☐ FAILED TO USE OR INCORRECTLY USED MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ☐ OTHER (List):	☐ 5. MATÉRIEL FAILURE—LANDING GEAR ☐ MAIN LANDING GEAR ☐ NOSE WHEEL OR TAIL WHEEL ☐ LANDING GEAR POSITION INDICATORS ☐ BRAKES ☐ TIRES ☐ OTHER: ☐ UNDETERMINED	
Section K—PHASE OF OPERATION (Check only ONE)		☐ 2. ERRORS OF OTHER PERSONNEL ☐ AIRCRAFT INADEQUATELY MAINTAINED ☐ AIRCRAFT IMPROPERLY CLEARED FOR FLIGHT ☐ WEATHER INCORRECTLY FORECAST ☐ IMPROPERLY OPERATED AIR/NAVIGATION FACILITIES ☐ IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Ground Personnel) ☐ IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Flight Personnel) ☐ OTHER (List):	☐ 6. MATÉRIEL FAILURE—EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES ☐ AUTOMATIC PILOT ☐ RADIO EQUIPMENT ☐ ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ☐ HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ☐ OXYGEN OR PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM ☐ SAFETY EQUIPMENT ☐ INSTRUMENTS ☐ COCKPIT, SEAT, CANOPY, FITTINGS, DOORS, HATCHES ☐ ARMAMENT ☐ OTHER:
☐ TAKING INCIDENT TO FLIGHT ☐ TAKE-OFF ☒ IN FLIGHT ☐ LANDING ☐ GO AROUND ☐ ENGINE RUNNING—NOT TAXING ☐ GROUND OPERATIONS ☐ UNDETERMINED	☐ 3. MATÉRIEL FAILURE—POWER PLANT ☐ COOLING SYSTEM ☐ LUBRICATING SYSTEM ☐ FUEL SYSTEM ☐ ENGINE STRUCTURE (Includes Jet Engines) ☐ ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM ☐ PROPELLER AND PROPELLER ACCESSORIES ☐ SUPERCHARGER (Reciprocating Engine only) ☐ IGNITION SYSTEM ☐ ENGINE ACCESSORIES ☐ OTHER: ☐ UNDETERMINED	☐ 7. WEATHER ☒ LOW CLOUDS ☒ SMOKE—HAZE ☐ RAIN—FOG ☐ SNOW—HAIL ☐ Icing CONDITIONS ☐ UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS FOR LANDING, TAXING, OR TAKEOFF ☐ TURBULENCE IN FLIGHT ☐ WINDS ALOFT ☐ THUNDERSTORMS ☐ DOWNDRAFT—UPDRAFT ☐ OTHER:	
Section L—CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACCIDENT (Check all applicable)		☒ Formation Leaders failed to observe other aircraft See Narrative.	☐ 8. LANDING AREA ☐ WET ☐ SOFT ☐ SNOW ☐ ICE ☐ HOLES ☐ GLASSY ☐ RUNWAY TOO SHORT ☐ OTHER HAZARD:
☐ IMMEDIATE FORCED LANDING ☐ PRECAUTIONARY LANDING ☐ FUEL EXHAUSTION ☐ ENGINE STOPPAGE ☐ LOSS ☐ PERTINENT T.O.'s NOT COMPLIED WITH ☐ OTHER (List):	☐ 9. GROUND EQUIPMENT ☐ AIRPORT FACILITIES ☐ AIRWAY FACILITIES ☐ ARRESTING DEVICES ☐ LAUNCHING DEVICES ☐ OTHER:	☐ 10. MISCELLANEOUS ☐ BIRD IN FLIGHT PATH ☐ SPOT-OFF TARGET IN FLIGHT PATH ☐ OTHER:	
Section M—VULNERATIONS (Check all applicable)		☐ 4. MATÉRIEL FAILURE—AIR FRAME ☐ FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM ☐ WINGS, ROTORS, AND FLAPS ☐ COWLING AND FAIRING ☐ FUSELAGE ☐ OTHER: ☐ UNDETERMINED	☐ 11. UNDETERMINED

Section D--DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

Tell in narrative form, in as much detail as necessary, everything that is known about the accident. Make certain that items checked on reverse side are justified by this narrative. If fire was involved in accident, explain in detail its origin and progress and steps taken to extinguish it.

On 12 May 1953 Headquarters Twelfth Air Force published Operations Order Number 156-53, copy of which is attached to this report. This Operations Order listed the requirements for participation of subordinate units in an aerial and ground review to be held at Landstuhl Air Base, Germany, on 15 May 1953.

The operations order, which was sent to six fighter, fighter bomber, light bomber and troop carrier wings, listed times over the target (Landstuhl Air Base) and provided both altitude and time separation over the target. In addition the order specified that the marshalling area or IP for all aircraft would be Landstuhl outer Beacon (Ladenberg Beacon) and provided altitude separation for four of the wings at that point.

Specifically, the 60th and 317th Troop Carrier Wings (C-119's) were to marshal at 5,000 feet over the Ladenberg Beacon, with the 317th Troop Carrier Wing leading from that point to the target. The 36th and 48th Fighter Bomber Wings (F-84's) were to marshal at 15,000 feet over Ladenberg Beacon with the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing leading from there to the target.

60th Troop Carrier Wing Operations Order Number 11-53 dated 13 May 1953 established the mission requirements for the 60th Troop Carrier Group, and, in addition, specified that there would be other aircraft participating in the review. It did not indicate the assigned altitudes of other aircraft over the Ladenberg Beacon. However, a copy of the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order was made available to the 60th Troop Carrier Group Operations Office and the mission commander was briefed that jet aircraft would be over the Beacon at 15,000.

48th Fighter Bomber Group Operations Order Number 5-18, dated 14 May 1953 established the mission requirements for the 492nd and 493rd Fighter Bomber Squadrons. The order did not indicate the presence and altitude of other aircraft participating in the review. The mission commander saw a copy of the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order but read only that portion which pertained to the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing.

36th Fighter Bomber Group Operations Order Number 50-53, dated 14 May 1953 did not indicate the presence and altitude of other aircraft to be over the Ladenberg Beacon. The mission commander did not see a copy of the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order and was not advised that other aircraft would participate.

See Continuation

RECOMMENDATIONS for action to prevent similar accidents:

a. That commanders insure that formation leaders are carefully and completely briefed prior to each mission and are fully aware of their responsibilities while leading formations. Emphasis should be placed on the need for constant vigilance, particularly in areas of reduced visibility and when other aircraft are known or suspected to be in the area. All pilots in formation flights should make a practice of notifying their leaders of the presence of other aircraft approaching the formation.

See Continuation

Section P--AUTHENTICATION (Each investigating board member must sign below)

1. ☒ PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN OFFERED OPPORTUNITY OF REBUTTAL ☐ NO REBUTTAL HE'D ☐ REBUTTAL STATEMENT(S) ATTACHED

2. PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF: ☐ DEATH ☐ CRITICAL INJURY ☐ OTHER (Explain)

NAME SUBMITTING REPORT

Rhein Main Air Base,
Germany

STEWARDS (Name and Grade)

Harmon E. Burns
HARMON E. BURNS, Lt. Colonel

MEDICAL OFFICER (Name and Grade)

John B. Logan
JOHN B. LOGAN, Major

PROSECUTOR (Name and Grade)

Clarence L. Schmid
CLARENCE L. SCHMID, Colonel

ADJUTANT GENERAL (Name and Grade)

Joseph T. Ehlinger
JOSEPH T. EHLINGER, Lt. Colonel

RECORDS (Name and Grade)

John H. Freeman
JOHN H. FREEMAN, Captain

Continuation of Section C of AF Form 14

At 1100 local hours on 15 May the mission commander for the 48th Fighter Bomber Group made a weather reconnaissance flight over the route to be flown by the F-84's. He found several cloud layers with tops at 16,000 feet. Upon returning to his base he conferred with the weather officer and decided that a rendezvous at 15,000 feet would be impractical. He then called the 36th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations Office and informed personnel there that the F-84 formations would rendezvous below the overcast between 3000 and 4000 feet. This information was transmitted to the mission commander for the 36th Fighter Bomber Group.

Personnel of both the 48th Fighter Bomber Group Operations Office and 36th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations had read the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order and were aware of the decision to change the rendezvous altitude. This change was not coordinated with either the Troop Carrier Wings or with the Twelfth Air Force Project Officer for the mission.

For purposes of this narrative the various formations and organizations will be referred to by their radio call signs as follows:

36th Fighter Bomber Group (F-84's)	call sign "Cousin"
48th Fighter Bomber Group (F-84's)	call sign "Gallahad"
60th Troop Carrier Wing (C-119's)	call sign "Lakeside"
317th Troop Carrier Wing (C-119's)	call sign "Hi Jinx"

At 1540Z on the 15th of May the formations of aircraft involved were approaching the Ladenberg Beacon. (See diagram) Weather at the scene of the accident has not been accurately determined, as there was no official observation and pilot reports differed widely. A summary of the various observations indicates that there were 5/8 broken clouds at 9500 feet, 2/8 cumulus clouds at 5000 feet in a layer of haze. Visibility reports varied from 3 to 15 miles. It is believed that the in-flight forward visibility at 5000 feet at the scene of the accident was 3 to 4 miles looking towards the sun and 6 to 8 miles in other directions. Slant visibility forward and along the ground was better than 10 miles.

"Lakeside" formation (C-119's) approached the Ladenberg Beacon from the northeast at 5000 feet while the "Hi Jinx" formation (C-119's) approached from the southeast at 4500 feet. As these formations sighted each other Lakeside turned to a heading of approximately west and started a 360° turn to the right in order to join formation with "Hi Jinx". "Gallahad" and "Cousin" formations (F-84's) approached from the west

and slightly northwest. As "Callahad" passed south of the Beacon the leader sighted a formation of C-119's, apparently "Hi Jinx". He then called "Cousin" leader and advised that he would descend to 4000 feet in order to stay below the C-119's in the area. This call was acknowledged but "Cousin" leader stated later that he did not hear mention of C-119's in that transmission. As "Lakeside" started a 360° turn to the right north of the Beacon, "Cousin" passed south of the Beacon and started a 180° turn to the left. During this turn the "Cousin" formation passed through or near some small scattered cumulus clouds. Within one minute after passing the clouds, when approximately 180° to 200° of turn had been completed, "Cousin" Green leader sighted the "Lakeside" C-119's at 12 o'clock level and reported them to "Cousin" leader, who acknowledged. Approximately 5 seconds later "Cousin" leader sighted the "Lakeside" C-119's on a collision course and called for his formation to break right.

At this time the "Lakeside" formation was on a heading of approximately 110°. The "Cousin" formation was heading approximately 270°. The altitude was about 5000 feet.

"Cousin" formation was slow in breaking to the right as the aircraft were in a close show formation and there was a strong possibility of collisions during the break. With the exception of one F-84, which flew under the C-119's, "Cousin" leader and the first two flights of the formation broke to the right and up. (See diagrams of formations). Of the 3rd and 4th flights, four F-84's went over the C-119's. Three others, narrowly missing the C-119's, broke to the right or down.

The pilot of "Cousin" Green 3 (F-84 Number 51-628A) attempted to break to the right but found the Number 4 aircraft still on his right wing in close formation. At the same time he saw a C-119 approaching almost head on and in an effort to miss it he banked hard left and applied back pressure.

It is believed that this F-84 struck the right wing tip of the lead C-119 (51-8235). In a steep bank the F-84 then collided with the Number 2 aircraft (51-8241). Apparently the fuselage of the F-84 passed just over the left wing root of the C-119 while the left wing cut diagonally upward through the forward end of the C-119 fuselage. The F-84 then snapped out of control to the left and the pilot ejected, parachuting to the ground with minor injuries.

The number 2 C-119 (51-8241) apparently exploded instantly, blowing the radio operator and engineer out of the aircraft. Both parachuted to the ground with major injuries. Bodies of the pilot and co-pilot were found in the wreckage. The lead C-119 (51-8235) turned and rolled to the right with the nose dropping until the aircraft was in an almost

vertical dive, at which angle it struck the ground and exploded. The engineer, who was in the lower compartment, heard the alarm bell and parachuted from the right paratroop door. Bodies of the other crew members were recovered in the wreckage but not individually identified. Since the aircraft was completely demolished it was not possible to determine exactly the nature and extent of the damage incurred in the collision. Witnesses stated that a 3 to 5 foot section of the right wing tip was bent upward and crumpled. In addition it is possible that the tail surfaces were struck by flying debris from the explosion of 51-8241.

C-119 aircraft 51-8249 and 51-8259 were struck by debris from the aircraft which collided. Both aircraft suffered substantial damage but were flown back to Rhein Main Air Base, where safe landings were made. The pilot and crew chief of 8249 received minor injuries from fragments. Crew members of 8259 were uninjured.

Following the collision aircraft of the 60th Troop Carrier Wing returned to Rhein Main Air Base while other formations completed the mission.

Personnel who parachuted to the ground were given an emergency treatment by German physicians and later were taken to US Military Hospitals.

Fires on the ground were extinguished by personnel from Rhein Main Air Base.

FINDINGS OF THE ACCIDENT BOARD. (Continuation of Section C of AF Form 14)

1. After considering all available evidence the Board finds that the primary cause of the accident was failure of the formation leaders to observe each other in sufficient time to take effective evasive action. It is believed that they did not see each other due to haze, particularly in the direction of the sun and because they were orbiting in different directions in an attempt to join formation with their respective lead squadrons. It is not known whether the leader of the C-119 formation saw the F-84 formation or whether he would have attempted to take evasive action if he had seen it.

2. Secondary causes:

a. Due to weather the mission commander of the 48th Fighter Bomber Group decided to change the F-84 rendezvous altitude over the Ladenberg Beacon from 15,000 feet to below the clouds (3000 to 4000 feet). This officer saw a copy of the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order, but failed to read the entire order.

b. Personnel of the 48th Fighter Bomber Group Operations Office and 36th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations Office had read the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order and were aware of the change in rendezvous altitude. However this change in altitude was not coordinated with the Troop Carrier Wings or with the Twelfth Air Force Project Officer for the maneuver.

c. Operations Orders published by the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing and 36th Fighter Bomber Wing did not indicate the presence of other aircraft to be over the marshalling area. The formation leaders of these organizations were not briefed on this information.

d. Statements and testimony were received indicating that the formation of F-84 aircraft from the 36th Fighter Bomber Wing flew through scattered clouds in the vicinity of Ladenberg Beacon shortly before the accident. After considering all available evidence the Board finds that any alleged flight through scattered clouds at this time was not a factor in the accident.

Continuation of Section C of AF Form 11, RECOMMENDATIONS

F b. That any proposed deviation from specified altitude provisions of an operations order published by the Higher Headquarters be coordinated with the originator of the order.

F c. That all wings review the procedure for transmission of Operations Orders to insure adequate dissemination of information to the mission commander for planning and briefing purposes. Specifically in this case the lower echelons were not given information regarding the participation of other aircraft.

F d. The Board believes that definite altitude separation is necessary in marshalling areas, particularly when diverse types of aircraft are involved. Wherever possible separate marshalling areas should be used for different types of aircraft.

F e. That a central control system be established to provide complete control of future operations of this type. Such a control system should include adequate ground to ground, air to ground, and air to air communications.

F f. That under marginal weather conditions each unit assigned to fly in combined missions will send one or more aircraft on a weather reconnaissance flight over the route to be followed by the formation at the assigned altitude for that unit. Pilots of these aircraft will report weather along the route, over the assembly point and over the initial point. Weather reports will be transmitted to a central control point and to the mission commander of the unit concerned.

R g. That Jet fighter pilots be furnished adequate protection against flash burns and loss of helmet in the form of P-3 helmets with visor.

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A - GENERAL INFORMATION

1. PLACE OF ACCIDENT: State, county, nearest town—Distance and direction to accident Germany, Mannheim, 10 MI N. E.				2. NEAREST AIRPORT Suitable for landing this plane—Distance and direction to accident Rhein Main Air Base 31 MI N.			
3. ELEVATION ABOVE S. L. at accident scene 500'	4. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 53	5. HOUR AND TIME 1550Z	6. DAY ☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK	7. LIST NUMBERS OF ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT INVOLVED (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft) 51-8241, 8249, 8259, 51-628A		8. ☒ INCIDENT TO FLIGHT ☐ NOT INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	
9. CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENT: ☒ Major ☐ Minor		10. CLEARANCE: ☐ IFR ☐ Local ☒ VFR ☐ Other		11. THIS WAS A: ☐ CAP FLIGHT ☐ AIR RESERVE FLIGHT ☐ ANG FLIGHT ☒ OTHER		12. ☐ FIRE OCCURRED BEFORE ACCIDENT ☒ FIRE OCCURRED AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ FIRE DID NOT OCCUR	
13. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF Rhein Main		14. DURATION OF FLIGHT FROM LAST TAKEOFF 0740		15. MINUTES OF FLIGHT (Use Form 14 for each aircraft) 0740		16. ACTIVITY AIRCRAFT WAS ENGAGED IN JUST PRIOR TO ACCIDENT Formation Flight	

Section B - AIRCRAFT

1. AIRCRAFT NO. 51-8235	2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK NO. C-119C	3. ORGANIZATION REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-119 REPORT			
		MAJOR COMMAND USAFE AFE		SUBCOMMAND 12th Air Force	AF WING 60th Trp Carr
4. TECHNICAL ORDERS affecting this aircraft were not complied with at time of accident. (List number and title of those T. O.'s on separate sheet.)		GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE 60th Trp Carr	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th Trp Carr	BASE Rhein Main	

Section C - OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)

1. LAST NAME (jr., II, etc.) Osborn	FIRST NAME John	MIDDLE NAME W	GRADE 1st Col	COMPONENT READ	SERIAL NO. AO 371862	NATIONALITY AND RACE US CAU	YEAR OF BIRTH 1916
2. ASSIGNED BASE Rhein Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th T.C.Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th T.C.Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th T.C. Sq		
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING Rhein Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE AFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th T.C.Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th T.C.Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th T.C. Sq		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 5 October 1938		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Senior Pilot 31 Dec 1942		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT Commanding Officer 60th T.C.G.			

OPERATOR'S FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including Civilian)

7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD Green	EXPIRATION DATE 19 Nov 53	17. LIST BY TYPE AND MODEL 1st PILOT EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (e.g., B-25, 50 hrs.) C-82 99
8. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) HOURS 3165	18. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE? ☒ NO ☐ YES ☐ GOOD ☐ WEATHER	19. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS
9. TOTAL 1st PILOT HOURS 1127	If above answer is "Yes" or if accident occurred at night or during IFR weather or unknown conditions, fill in items below.	
10. 1st PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 51	20. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD HOURS	
11. 1st PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS 17	21. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS	
12. 1st PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-25, F-51, etc.) C-119	22. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HOURS LAST 90 DAYS	
13. OTHER PILOT HOURS (CP, C, SC) THIS MODEL 7	23. 1st PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS	
14. 1st PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS THIS MODEL 51	24. 1st PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS	
15. 1st PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS THIS MODEL 17		
16. TOTAL TIME SPENT IN AIR DURING 24 HRS. PRIOR TO ACCIDENT 1		

Section D - PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident (1)	NAME (Last name first) (2)	Type of Aero. Rating (3)	SERIAL NO. (4)	GRADE AND BRANCH OF SERVICE (5)	COMPONENT (See AFM 62-6) (6)	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT—Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base (7)	Fatal, Major, Minor, None, Missing (8)		Parachute Used (9)	
							Yes (a)	No (b)	Yes (c)	No (d)
IP	Clement, Wesley Y	Sr P	AO 800472	Capt USAF	READ	USAFE, 12th AF, 60th Trp T.C.Gp, Rhein Main	Flt			X
PO	Osborn, John W	Sr P	AO 371862	Lt/Col USAF	READ	SAME	Flt			X
CO	Ray, Joseph H	Sr P	AO 442232	Major USAF	READ	USAFE, 12th AF, 60th Trp T.C.Gp, Rhein Main	Flt			X
NO	Thompson, Carl J	N	AO 723208	Capt USAF	READ	SAME AS CLEMENT	Flt			X
CE	Biggs, T.W.	CE	AF18315337	SSgt USAF	USAF	SAME	Major			X
R	Sohns, Dean O	R	AF 37215294	SSgt USAF	USAF	SAME	Flt			X

Section E-RATED PERSONNEL AT OTHER SET OF DUAL CONTROLS (Instructor, Copilot, etc.)

1. LAST NAME (JR., II, etc.) Clement	FIRST NAME Wesley	MIDDLE NAME Y	GRADE Capt	COMPONENT READ	SERIAL NO. AO 800472	NATIONALITY AND RACE US CAU	YEAR OF BIRTH 1919
2. ASSIGNED BASE Rhein Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th T.C.Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th T.C.Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT Hq Sq, 60th TCG		
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING Rhein Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th T.C.Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th T.C.Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT Hq Sq, 60th TCG		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 25 March 1943		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Senior Pilot 31 March 1952		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT Training Officer			
FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including Civilian)				21. LIST BY TYPE AND MODEL ☒ IP ☐ CP ☐ C EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (e.g., B-2, B-26, IP, 50 mph.)			
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD Green EXPIRATION DATE 11 Jan 54				G-82 317			
8. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) HOURS 2795				Fill in items below if instrument and night experience of operator was listed in Section C			
9. TOTAL 1st PILOT HOURS 1716							
10. TOTAL HOURS, ☒ IP ☐ CP ☐ C (Check applicable one) 602				11. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS			
11. PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 45				12. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD HOURS			
12. 1st PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 2				13. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hrs. LAST 6 MONTHS			
13. HOURS LAST 90 DAYS, ☒ IP ☐ CP ☐ C 43				14. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hrs. LAST 90 DAYS			
14. PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS 30				15. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
15. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-26, F-5L, etc.) C-119 64				16. 1st PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
16. 1st PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL 8				17. NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MOS., ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			
17. HOURS THIS MODEL, ☒ IP ☐ CP ☐ C 46				18. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS			
18. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS 45				19. 1st PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS			
19. 1st PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS 2				20. NIGHT Hrs. THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			
20. HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☒ IP ☐ CP ☐ C 43							

Section F-DAMAGE

1. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY IN GENERAL TERMS THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE, ENGINES, AND PROPELLERS. Destroyed		2. CHOOSE PROPER DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION
		NONE
		MINOR
		SUBSTANTIAL
		DESTROYED ☒
3. ☒ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS RETURNED TO AN AF BASE ☐ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS LEFT AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT		7. Give below a considered estimate of cost of this accident to the Air Force:
4. IS PLANE DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMICAL REPAIR? ☒ Yes ☐ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT \$572,193.
5. IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED, GIVE ENGINEERING OFFICER'S ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED FOR REPAIR: _____ MAN-HRS.		COST OF DAMAGE TO OTHER GOVERNMENT PROPERTY \$
6. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGED? ☒ Yes ☐ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY \$330.
IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES ON SEPARATE SHEET.		COST OF INJURIES \$221,815.
		COST-OTHER (Explain) Pickup Guards \$1,225.
		TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF ACCIDENT \$795,563.00

Section G-SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. Check items of special equipment which affected the accident.			
☐ RANGES	☐ ARMAMENT	☐ DE-ICE	☐ EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR VIEWS FROM COCKPIT
☐ INSTRUMENTS	☐ FIRE EXTINGUISHING EQUIPMENT IN PLANE	☐ JATO	
2. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE, NONUSE, MISUSE, OR ABSENCE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AFFECTED THE ACCIDENT			

Section H-WEATHER (At time and place of accident) See F-84B 51-628A

CLOUDS	VISIBILITY	WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	TEMP.	DEW POINT	OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS

If weather other than unfavorable wind conditions for takeoff, landing, or taxiing was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer describing climatic conditions and how they probably contributed to accident.

Section I-CHECK LIST FOR ATTACHMENTS

☒ FORM I	☐ CLEARANCE	☐ PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ FORM 14C
☒ FORM 1A	☐ CREW MEMBERS' STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14A	☐ FORM 14D
☒ LIST OF T.O.'s NOT C/W	☐ WITNESSES' STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14B	☒ FORM 14E

Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE		Section N—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS	
PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Check one accident type as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary."		Check one specific cause as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary." (See AFM 62-5 for definitions)	
GROUND OR WATER LOST	☒	1. ERRORS OF AIR CREW	☒
WINGED LANDING	☐	MISSED POWER PLANT OR POWER PLANT CONTROLS	☐
WHEEL-UP LANDING	☐	MISSED BRAKES AND/OR FLIGHT CONTROLS ON GROUND	☐
HARD LANDING	☐	IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT CONTROLS IN AIR	☐
COLLAPSE OR RETRACTION OF LANDING GEAR	☐	EXCEEDED SPEED LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT	☐
UNDERSHOOT	☐	INATTENTIVE TO FUEL SUPPLY OR FUEL SELECTOR VALVE	☐
OVERSHOOT	☐	FAILED TO EXTEND OR RETRACT LANDING GEAR PROPERLY	☐
NOSE UP OR NOSE OVER	☐	SELECTED UNSUITABLE TERRAIN OR RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF OR LANDING	☐
COLLISION WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT	☐	FAILED TO COMPENSATE FOR WIND CONDITIONS	☒
COLLISION WITH GROUND OR WATER	☐	MISJUDGED DISTANCE	☐
OTHER COLLISION	☐	FAILED TO LEVEL OFF PROPERLY	☐
SPIN OR STALL	☐	FAILED TO OBSERVE OTHER AIRCRAFT/OBJECTS	☐
FIRE ON GROUND	☐	FAILED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLYING SPEED	☐
FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSION IN AIR	☐	BECAME LOST (Weather, instrument, etc.)	☐
AIRCRAFT FAILURE IN FLIGHT	☐	CONTINUED VFR FLIGHT INTO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER	☐
ABANDONED AIRCRAFT	☐	IMPROPER OPERATION OF AUTHORIZED INSTRUMENT FLIGHT	☐
PROT OR JET BLAST ACCIDENT	☐	OPERATED AIRCRAFT IN RECKLESS MANNER	☐
OTHER (List):	☐	MADE INADEQUATE FLIGHT PREPARATIONS	☐
UNDETERMINED	☐	ATTEMPTED FLIGHT BEYOND ABILITY OR EXPERIENCE	☐
Section K—PHASE OF OPERATION		2. WEATHER	
(Check only ONE)			
TAKING INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	☐	LOW CLOUDS	☐
TAKE-OFF	☒	SMOG—Haze	☐
IN FLIGHT	☐	RAIN—FOG	☐
LANDING	☐	SNOW—HAIL	☐
GO AROUND	☐	ICE CONDITIONS	☐
ENGINE RUNNING—NOT TAKING	☐	UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS FOR LANDING, TAKING, OR TAKEOFF	☐
GROUND OPERATIONS	☐	TURBULENCE IN FLIGHT	☐
UNDETERMINED	☐	WIND ALIGHT	☐
Section L—CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACCIDENT		2. GROUND EQUIPMENT	
(Check all applicable)			
IMMEDIATE FORCED LANDING	☐	WET	☐
PRECAUTIONARY LANDING	☒	SOFT	☐
FUEL EXHAUSTION	☐	ROUGH	☐
ENGINE STOPPAGE	☐	ICE	☐
LOST	☐	ROCKS	☐
PREVIOUS T.O.'s NOT COMPLIED WITH	☐	GLASS	☐
OTHER (List):	☐	RUNWAY TOO SHORT	☐
Section M—VIOLATIONS		3. MISCELLANEOUS	
(Check all applicable)			
IMPROPER TAKING PROCEDURES	☐	AIRPORT FACILITIES	☐
FAILURE TO USE CHECKLIST	☒	AIRWAY FACILITIES	☐
UNAUTHORIZED LOW FLYING	☐	ARRIVING DEVICES	☐
INSTRUMENT FLYING ON VFR CLEARANCE	☐	LAUNCHING DEVICES	☐
UNAUTHORIZED FORMATION	☐	OTHER:	☐
OTHER (List):	☐	11. UNDETERMINED	
Section N—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS			
(Check one specific cause as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary.")			
1. ERRORS OF AIR CREW		2. MATERIAL FAILURE—LANDING GEAR	
MISSED POWER PLANT OR POWER PLANT CONTROLS		MAIN LANDING GEAR	
MISSED BRAKES AND/OR FLIGHT CONTROLS ON GROUND		NOSE WHEEL OR TAIL WHEEL	
IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT CONTROLS IN AIR		LANDING GEAR FUEL/INJUNCTION	
EXCEEDED SPEED LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT		BRAKES	
INATTENTIVE TO FUEL SUPPLY OR FUEL SELECTOR VALVE		TIRES	
FAILED TO EXTEND OR RETRACT LANDING GEAR PROPERLY		OTHER:	
SELECTED UNSUITABLE TERRAIN OR RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF OR LANDING		UNDETERMINED	
FAILED TO COMPENSATE FOR WIND CONDITIONS		6. MATERIAL FAILURE—EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES	
MISJUDGED DISTANCE		AUTOMATIC PILOT	
FAILED TO LEVEL OFF PROPERLY		RAID EQUIPMENT	
FAILED TO OBSERVE OTHER AIRCRAFT/OBJECTS		ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	
FAILED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLYING SPEED		HYDRAULIC SYSTEM	
BECAME LOST (Weather, instrument, etc.)		OXYGEN OR PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM	
CONTINUED VFR FLIGHT INTO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER		SAFETY EQUIPMENT	
IMPROPER OPERATION OF AUTHORIZED INSTRUMENT FLIGHT		INSTRUMENTS	
OPERATED AIRCRAFT IN RECKLESS MANNER		COCKPIT, SEAT, CANOPY, FITTINGS, DOORS, HATCHES	
MADE INADEQUATE FLIGHT PREPARATIONS		ARMAMENT	
ATTEMPTED FLIGHT BEYOND ABILITY OR EXPERIENCE		OTHER:	
FAILED TO USE OR INCORRECTLY USED MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT		7. WEATHER	
OTHER (List):		LOW CLOUDS	
2. ERRORS OF OTHER PERSONNEL		SMOG—Haze	
AIRCRAFT INADEQUATELY MAINTAINED		RAIN—FOG	
AIRCRAFT IMPROPERLY CLEARED FOR FLIGHT		SNOW—HAIL	
WEATHER INCORRECTLY FORECAST		ICE CONDITIONS	
IMPROPERLY OPERATED APT/AIRWAY FACILITIES		UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS FOR LANDING, TAKING, OR TAKEOFF	
IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Ground Personnel)		TURBULENCE IN FLIGHT	
IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Flight Instructors and Flight Leaders)		WIND ALIGHT	
OTHER (List):		THUNDERSTORMS	
3. MATERIAL FAILURE—POWER PLANT		DOWNDRAFT—UPDRAFT	
COOLING SYSTEM		OTHER:	
LUBRICATING SYSTEM		8. LANDING AREA	
FUEL SYSTEM		WET	
ENGINE STRUCTURE (Includes Jet Engines)		SOFT	
ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM		ROUGH	
PROPELLER AND PROPELLER ACCESSORIES		ICE	
SUPERCHARGER (Reciprocating Engine only)		ROCKS	
IGNITION SYSTEM		GLASS	
ENGINE ACCESSORIES		RUNWAY TOO SHORT	
OTHER:		OTHER HAZARD:	
UNDETERMINED		9. GROUND EQUIPMENT	
6. MATERIAL FAILURE—AIR FRAME		AIRCRAFT FACILITIES	
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM		AIRWAY FACILITIES	
WINGS, ROTORS, AND FLAPS		ARRIVING DEVICES	
COVERING AND FARNING		LAUNCHING DEVICES	
FUELAGE		OTHER:	
OTHER:		10. MISCELLANEOUS	
UNDETERMINED		BIRD IN FLIGHT PATH	
		SQUAWK TARGET IN FLIGHT PATH	
		OTHER:	
		11. UNDETERMINED	

Section D—DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

Tell in narrative form, in as much detail as necessary, everything that is known about the accident. Make certain that items checked on reverse side are justified by this narrative. If fire was involved in accident, explain in detail its origin and progress and steps taken to extinguish it.

While flying in the lead position of a formation near Mannheim, Germany, 15 May 1953, this aircraft was struck on the right wing tip by F-84E 51-628A. The aircraft turned and rolled to the right and the nose went down until the aircraft struck the ground in an almost vertical dive. During this dive the crew chief, who was in the lower compartment, heard the alarm bell and parachuted from the right rear paratroop door. Other crew members were killed in the crash.

Since the aircraft exploded on impact and was completely demolished, it was not possible to determine exactly the collision damage which occurred in flight.

For complete information see AF Form 14 and attachments concerning F-84E 51-628A attached to this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS for action to prevent similar accidents:

Section P—AUTHENTICATION (Each investigating board member must sign below)

☐ PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN OFFERED OPPORTUNITY OF REBUTTAL ☐ NO REBUTTAL REQ'D ☐ REBUTTAL STATEMENTS ATTACHED

2. PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF: ☐ DEATH; ☐ CRITICAL INJURY; ☐ OTHER (Explain)

BASE SUBMITTING REPORT	MEMBER (Name and Grade)	MEDICAL OFFICER (Name and Grade)
PRESIDENT (Name and Grade)	AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OFFICER (Name and Grade)	RECORDER (Name and Grade)

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. PLACE OF ACCIDENT: State, county, nearest town—Distance and direction to accident GERMANY, MANNHEIM, 10 Miles N.E.				2. NEAREST AIRPORT Suitable for landing this plane—Distance and direction to accident RHEIN MAIN AIR BASE, 31 Miles N.			
3. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL 500 Ft.	4. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 53	5. HOUR AND TIME 1550Z	6. DAY ☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK	7. LAST NUMBERS OF ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT INVOLVED: (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft) 51-8241-8249-8259-628		8. ☒ INCIDENT TO FLIGHT ☐ NOT INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	
9. CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENT: ☒ Major ☐ Minor	10. CLEARANCE: ☐ IFR ☒ VFR ☐ Other		11. THIS WAS AT: ☐ CAP FLIGHT ☐ AIR RESERVE FLIGHT ☒ ANG FLIGHT		12. ☐ FIRE OCCURRED BEFORE ACCIDENT ☒ FIRE OCCURRED DURING ACCIDENT ☐ FIRE DID NOT OCCUR		
13. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF Rhein Main		14. DURATION OF FLIGHT 09:10		15. MISSION OF FLIGHT (Use Form 18-100) Formation Flight			

Section B—AIRCRAFT

1. AIRCRAFT NO. 51-8241	2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK NO. C-119C	3. ORGANIZATION REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-119 REPORT MAJOR COMMAND: USAF SUBCOMMAND: 12th Air Force AF WING: 60th Trp Carr		
4. 7. TECHNICAL ORDERS affecting this aircraft were not complied with at time of accident. (List number and title of these T. O.'s on separate sheet.)		GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE 60th Trp Carr	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th Trp Carr	BASE Rhein Main

Section C—OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)

1. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) Wells	FIRST NAME Williston	MIDDLE NAME G.	GRADE Major	COMPONENT READ	SERIAL NO. AO 764846	NATIONALITY AND RACE US CAU	YEAR OF BIRTH 1922
2. ASSIGNED BASE Rhein Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAF	SUBCOMMAND 12th A.F.	AF WING 60th T.C. Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th T.C. Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th T.C. Sq		
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING " " E574	MAJOR COMMAND " " AFE	SUBCOMMAND " " 2	AF WING " " TCM	GROUP NO. AND TYPE " " TCM	SQUADRON OR UNIT " " TCM		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 7 January 1944		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Senior Pilot 23 January 1953		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT Operations Officer			
OPERATOR'S FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including Civilian)				17. LIST BY TYPE AND MODEL 1ST PILOT EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (e.g., B-26, 50 hrs.)			
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD Green		EXPIRATION DATE 27 Jun 53		18. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE? ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ Howd ☐ Weather If above answer is "Yes" or if accident occurred at night or during IFR weather or unknown conditions, fill in items below.			
8. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) HOURS 2340		9. TOTAL 1ST PILOT HOURS 565		10. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 95		11. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS 41	
12. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-26, F-61, etc.) C-119		83		13. OTHER PILOT HOURS (CP, C, SC) THIS MODEL 6		14. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS THIS MODEL 83	
15. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS THIS MODEL 41		16. TOTAL TIME SPENT IN AIR DURING 24 HRS. PRIOR TO ACCIDENT 1		19. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS		20. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD HOURS	
				21. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS		22. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HOURS LAST 90 DAYS	
				23. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS		24. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS	

Section D—PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident	NAME (Last name first)	Type of Aero. Rating (Symbol)	SERIAL NO.	GRADE AND BRANCH OF SERVICE	COMPONENT (See AFM 62-5)	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT—Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base	Fate, Major, Minor, None, Missing		Parashute Used	
							Yes (Y)	No (N)	Yes (Y)	No (N)
P	Wells, Williston G	Sr P	AO 764846	Maj USAF	READ	USAF, 12th AF, 60th T.C.Gp. (M) Rhein Main	Ft1		X	
CP	Dahl, Edwin E.	P	AO 2080333	1/Lt USAF	READ	USAF, 12th AF, 60th T.C.Gp. (M) Rhein Main	Ft1		X	
CE	Battiste, Michael (NMI)	E	AF13379551	A/1C USAF	USAF	USAF, 12th AF, 60th T.C.Gp. (M) Rhein Main	Ft1		X	
R	Cason, Charles G.	R	AF13405660	A/2C USAF	USAF	USAF, 12th AF, 60th T.C.Gp. (M) Rhein Main	Ft1		X	

Section E—RATED PERSONNEL AT OTHER SET OF DUAL CONTROLS (Instructor, Captain, etc.)

1. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) Dahl	FIRST NAME Edwin	MIDDLE NAME E.	GRADE 1/Lt	COMPONENT READ	SERIAL NO. AO 2080333	NATIONALITY AND RACE US CAU	YEAR OF BIRTH 1924
2. ASSIGNED BASE Rhein Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAF	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th TC Wg.	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th TC Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th TC Sq		
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING " "	MAJOR COMMAND " "	SUBCOMMAND " "	AF WING " "	GROUP NO. AND TYPE " "	SQUADRON OR UNIT " "		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 23 December 1944			5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Same		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT Pilot		
FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including Civilian)				21. LAST BY TYPE AND MODEL: ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (e.g., B-26, IP, 50 hrs.) C-82 19			
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD White EXPIRATION DATE 5 Mar 54				22. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS			
8. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Captain, Command Pilot, etc.) HOURS 816				23. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD HOURS			
9. TOTAL 1ST PILOT HOURS 445				24. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hrs. Last 6 Months			
10. TOTAL HOURS, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C (Check applicable in case) 105				25. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hrs. Last 90 Days			
11. PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 103				26. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
12. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 60				27. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
13. HOURS LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 33				28. NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MOS., ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			
14. PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 51				29. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS			
15. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-26, F-51, etc.) C-119 103				30. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS			
16. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL 60				31. NIGHT Hrs. THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			
17. HOURS THIS MODEL, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 33							
18. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS 103							
19. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS 60							
20. HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 33							

Section F—DAMAGE

1. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY IN GENERAL TERMS THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE, ENGINE, AND PROPELLERS. Destroyed		2. CHECK PROPER DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION None ☐ Minor ☐ Substantial ☐ Destroyed ☒	
3. ☒ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS RETURNED TO AN AF BASE ☐ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS LEFT AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT		7. GIVE BELOW A CONSIDERED ESTIMATE OF COST OF THIS ACCIDENT TO THE AIR FORCE:	
4. IS PLANE DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMIC REPAIR? ☒ Yes ☐ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT \$572,193	
5. IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED, GIVE ENGINEERING OFFICER'S ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED FOR REPAIR: MAN-HRS.		COST OF DAMAGE TO OTHER GOVERNMENT PROPERTY \$	
6. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGED? ☒ Yes ☐ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY \$ 330	
IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES ON SEPARATE SHEET.		COST OF INJURIES \$151,350	
		COST—OTHER (Explain) Pickup, Guards \$1,255	
		TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF ACCIDENT \$725,128	

Section G—SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. Check items of special equipment which affected the accident.			
☐ RADIOS	☐ ARMAMENT	☐ DE-ICERS	☐ EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR VISION FROM COCKPIT
☐ INSTRUMENTS	☐ FIRE EXTINGUISHING EQUIPMENT IN PLANE	☐ JATO	
2. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE, NONUSE, MISTAKE, OR ABSENCE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AFFECTED THE ACCIDENT			

Section H—WEATHER (At time and place of accident)

CLOUDS	VISIBILITY	WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	TEMP.	DEW POINT	OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS

If weather other than unfavorable wind conditions for takeoff, landing, or taxiing was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer describing climatic conditions and how they probably contributed to accident.

Section I—CHECK LIST FOR ATTACHMENTS

☒ FORM I	☐ CLEARANCE	☐ PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ FORM 14C
☒ FORM 1A	☐ CREW MEMBERS' STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14A	☐ FORM 14D
☒ LIST OF T.O.'s NOT C/W	☐ WITNESSES' STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14B	☒ FORM 14E
☐			

Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE		Section H—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS	
PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE Check one accident type as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary."		Section H—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS Check one specific cause as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary." (See AFM 62-5 for definitions)	
GROUND OR WATER LOOP	☒	1. ERRORS OF AIR CREW	☒
WINGS LANDING	☐	MISSED POWER PLANT OR POWER PLANT CONTROLS	☐
WHEEL-UP LANDING	☐	MISSED BRAKES AND/OR FLIGHT CONTROLS ON GROUND	☐
HARD LANDING	☐	IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT CONTROLS IN AIR	☐
COLLAPSE OR RETRACTION OF LANDING GEAR	☐	EXCEEDED STRESS LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT	☐
UNDERHOOT	☐	INATTENTIVE TO FUEL SUPPLY OR FUEL SELECTOR VALVES	☐
OVERHOOT	☐	FAILED TO EXTEND OR RETRACT LANDING GEAR PROPERLY	☐
NONE UP OR NONE OVER	☐	SELECTED UNSUITABLE TERRAIN OR RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF OR LANDING	☐
COLLISION WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT	☐	FAILED TO COMPENSATE FOR WIND CONDITIONS	☒
COLLISION WITH GROUND OR WATER	☐	MISJUDGED DISTANCE	☐
OTHER COLLISIONS	☐	FAILED TO LEVEL OFF PROPERLY	☐
SINK OR STALL	☐	FAILED TO OBSERVE OTHER AIRCRAFT OR OBSTACLES	☐
FIRE ON GROUND	☐	FAILED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLYING SPEED	☐
FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSION IN AIR	☐	BREAKE-LOST (Weather systems obsolete)	☐
AIRFRAME FAILURE IN FLIGHT	☐	CONTINUED VFR FLIGHT INTO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER	☐
ABANDONED AIRCRAFT	☐	IMPROPER OPERATION OF AUTOGUIDED INSTRUMENT FLIGHT	☐
PROP OR JET BLAST ACCIDENT	☐	OPERATED AIRCRAFT IN RECKLESS MANNER	☐
OTHER (List):	☐	MADE INADEQUATE FLIGHT PREPARATIONS	☐
UNDETERMINED	☐	ATTEMPTED FLIGHT BEYOND ABILITY OR EXPERIENCE	☐
Section K—PHASE OF OPERATION (Check only ONE)		FAILED TO USE OR INCORRECTLY USED MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	☒
TAKING INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	☐	OTHER (List):	☐
TAKE-OFF	☐	2. ERRORS OF OTHER PERSONNEL	☒
IN FLIGHT	☒	AIRCRAFT INADEQUATELY MAINTAINED	☐
LANDING	☐	AIRCRAFT IMPROPERLY CLEARED FOR FLIGHT	☐
GO AROUND	☐	WEATHER INCORRECTLY FORECAST	☐
ENGINE RUNNING—NOT TAKING	☐	IMPROPERLY OPERATED AIRPORT/AIRWAY FACILITIES	☐
GROUND OPERATIONS	☐	IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Ground Personnel)	☐
UNDETERMINED	☐	IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Flight Instructors and Flight Leaders)	☐
Section L—CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACCIDENT (Check all applicable)		OTHER (List):	☐
IMMEDIATE FORCED LANDING	☐	3. MATERIAL FAILURE—POWER PLANT	☒
PRELIMINARY LANDING	☒	COOLING SYSTEM	☐
FUEL EXHAUSTION	☐	LUBRICATING SYSTEM	☐
ENGINE STOPPAGE	☐	FUEL SYSTEM	☐
LOST	☐	ENGINE STRUCTURE (Includes Jet Engines)	☐
PERTINENT T.O.'s NOT COMPLIED WITH	☐	ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM	☐
OTHER (List):	☐	PROPELLER AND PROPELLER ACCESSORIES	☒
Section M—VIOLATIONS (Check all applicable)		SUPERCHARGER (Reciprocating Engines only)	☐
INCORPORATE TAKING PROCEDURE	☐	IGNITION SYSTEM	☐
FAILURE TO USE CHECKLIST	☒	ENGINE ACCESSORIES	☐
UNAUTHORIZED LOW FLYING	☐	OTHER:	☐
INSTRUMENT FLYING OR VFR CLEARANCE	☐	UNDETERMINED	☐
UNAUTHORIZED FORMATION	☐	4. MATERIAL FAILURE—AIR FRAME	☒
OTHER (List):	☐	FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM	☐
Section N—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS		WINGS, ROTORS, AND FLEW	☐
		COWLING AND FAIRING	☐
		FUSELAGE	☐
		OTHER:	☐
		UNDETERMINED	☐
		5. MATERIAL FAILURE—LANDING GEAR	☐
		MAIN LANDING GEAR	☐
		NONE WHEEL OR TAIL WHEEL	☐
		LANDING GEAR POSITION INDICATORS	☐
		BRAKES	☐
		TIRES	☐
		OTHER:	☐
		UNDETERMINED	☐
		6. MATERIAL FAILURE—EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES	☐
		AUTOMATIC PILOT	☐
		RAISING EQUIPMENT	☐
		ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	☐
		HYDRAULIC SYSTEM	☐
		OXYGEN OR PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM	☐
		SAFETY EQUIPMENT	☐
		INSTRUMENTS	☐
		COCKPIT, SEAT, CANOPY, FITTINGS, DOORS, HATCHES	☐
		ARMAMENT	☐
		OTHER:	☐
		7. WEATHER	☐
		LOW CEILING	☐
		SMOKE—HAZE	☐
		RAIN—FOG	☐
		SNOW—HAIL	☐
		ICE CONDITIONS	☐
		UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS FOR LANDING, TAKING OFF, OR TAKEOFF	☐
		TURBULENCE IN FLIGHT	☐
		WINDS ALONG	☐
		TEMPERATURES	☐
		DOWNDRAFT—UPDRAFT	☐
		OTHER:	☐
		8. LANDING AREA	☒
		WET	☐
		SOFT	☐
		SNOW	☐
		ICE	☐
		ROUGH	☐
		GLASSY	☐
		RUNWAY TOO SHORT	☐
		OTHER HAZARD:	☐
		9. GROUND EQUIPMENT	☐
		AIRPORT FACILITIES	☐
		AIRWAY FACILITIES	☐
		ARRIVING DEVICES	☐
		LAUNCHING DEVICES	☐
		OTHER:	☐
		10. MISCELLANEOUS	☒
		BIRD IN FLIGHT PATH	☐
		SHOT-OFF TARGET IN FLIGHT PATH	☐
		OTHER:	☐
		11. UNDETERMINED	☐

Section O—DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

Tell in narrative form, in as much detail as necessary, everything that is known about the accident. Make certain that items checked on reverse side are justified by this narrative. If fire was involved in accident, explain in detail its origin and progress and steps taken to extinguish it.

While flying in formation near Mannheim, Germany, on 15 May 1953, this aircraft was struck by F-84E 51-628A. The aircraft was cut in two by the impact and exploded in the air. The radio operator and engineer were blown out of the aircraft and parachuted to the ground. Both received major injuries. Bodies of the pilot and co-pilot were found in the wreckage.

For complete information see AF Form 14 and attachments concerning F-84E 51-628A, attached to this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS for action to prevent similar accidents:

Section P—AUTHENTICATION (Each investigating board member must sign below)

1. ☐ PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN OFFERED OPPORTUNITY OF REBUTTAL ☐ NO REBUTTAL HE'D ☐ REBUTTAL STATEMENT(S) ATTACHED

2. PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF: ☐ DEATH; ☐ CRITICAL INJURY; ☐ OTHER (Specify)

NAME SUBMITTING REPORT	MEMBER (Name and Grade)	MEDICAL OFFICER (Name and Grade)
PRESIDENT (Name and Grade)	AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OFFICER (Name and Grade)	RECORDER (Name and Grade)

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 63-14 and AF Manual 63-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A - GENERAL INFORMATION

1. PLACE OF ACCIDENT: State, county, nearest town—Distance and direction to accident Germany, Mannheim 10 Miles N.E.		2. NEAREST AIRPORT Suitable for landing this plane—Distance and direction to accident Rhein Main 31 Miles N.	
3. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL at accident scene 500 Ft	4. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 53	5. HOUR AND TIME 1550Z	6. ☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK
7. LAST NUMBERS OF ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT INVOLVED: (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft) 51-8235-8241-8259-628	8. ☒ INCIDENT TO FLIGHT ☐ NOT INCIDENT TO FLIGHT		
9. CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENT ☒ Major ☐ Minor	10. CLEARANCE: ☐ IFR ☐ VFR ☐ Other	11. THIS WAS A: ☐ CAP FLIGHT ☐ AIR RESERVE FLIGHT ☐ ANG FLIGHT ☒ OTHER	
12. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF Rhein Main	13. DURATION OF FLIGHT SINCE LAST TAKEOFF 04:10	14. NUMBER OF FLIGHTS (Use Form 14) 3-1	15. ACTIVITY AIRCRAFT WAS ENGAGED IN JUST PRIOR TO ACCIDENT Formation Flight

Section B - AIRCRAFT

1. AIRCRAFT NO. 51-8249	2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK NO. C-119C	3. ORGANIZATION REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-110 REPORT MAJOR COMMAND USAFE AFE		SUBCOMMAND 12th Air Force	AF WING 60th Trp Carr
4. 7. TECHNICAL ORDERS affecting this aircraft were not complied with at time of accident. (List number and title of those T. O.'s on separate sheet.)		GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE 60th Trp Carr	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th Trp Carr	BASE Rhein Main	

Section C - OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)

1. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) Zack	FIRST NAME Anthony	MIDDLE NAME H	GRADE Capt	COMPONENT READ	SERIAL NO. AO 705513	NATIONALITY AND SERVICE US CAU 1920
2. ASSIGNED BASE Rhein Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th T.C.Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th T.C.Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th T.C.Sq	
3. ASSIGNED BASE FOR FLYING " " E574	MAJOR COMMAND " AFE	SUBCOMMAND " 12	AF WING " TCM	GROUP NO. AND TYPE " TCM	SQUADRON OR UNIT " TCM	
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 7 Jan 1944		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Sr Pilot 30 Oct 1952		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT Chief Pilot & Flight Leader		
OPERATOR'S FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including Civilian)				17. LAST BY TYPE AND MODEL 1st PILOT EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (i.e., B-25, B-26, etc.) C-82 480		
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD Green EXPIRATION DATE 20 Oct 53				18. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE? ☒ No ☐ Yes ☐ Good ☐ Weather		
8. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) Hours 2208				19. If above answer is "Yes" or if accident occurred at night or during IFR weather or unknown conditions, fill in hours below.		
9. TOTAL 1st PILOT Hours 113H 1074				20. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER Hours		
10. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 90 DAYS 84				21. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hours LAST 6 MONTHS		
11. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 30 DAYS 37				22. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hours LAST 90 DAYS		
12. 1st PILOT Hours THIS MODEL (B-25, F-51, etc.) C-119 85				23. 1st PILOT NIGHT Hours LAST 6 MONTHS		
13. OTHER PILOT Hours (CP, C, SC) THIS MODEL 5				24. 1st PILOT NIGHT Hours LAST 90 DAYS		
14. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 90 DAYS THIS MODEL 83						
15. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 30 DAYS THIS MODEL 37						
16. TOTAL TIME SPENT IN AIR DURING 24 HRS. PRIOR TO ACCIDENT 3						

Section D - PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident	NAME (Last name first)	Type of Aero. Rating (Symbol)	SERIAL NO.	GRADE AND BRANCH OF SERVICE	COMPONENT (See AFM 62-5)	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT—Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base	Fatal, Major, Minor, Missing	Parachute Used
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
IP	ZACK, Anthony H	SR P	AO 705513	Capt USAF	READ	USAFE, 12th AF, 60th T.C.Gp, Rhein Main	3	X
CP	MULLER, Francis L	P	AO 711782	Capt USAF	READ	USAFE, 12th AF, 60th T.C.Gp, Rhein Main	None	X
CE	Froese, Orville M	CE	AF 18358568	A/1C, USAF	USAF	Same	Minor	X

Section E-RATFD PERSONNEL AT OTHER SET OF DUAL CONTROLS (Instructor, Copilot, etc.)

1. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) Muller	FIRST NAME Francis	MIDDLE NAME L.	GRADE Capt	COMPONENT READ	SERIAL NO. AO 711782	NATIONALITY AND US CAU	YEAR CT 1924
2. ASSIGNED BASE Rhine Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th TC Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th TC Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th TC Sq		
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING Rhine Main	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th T.C.Wg	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th T.C.Gp	SQUADRON OR UNIT 10th T.C.Sq		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot 8 February 1944		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Same		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT Pilot			
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD white EXPIRATION DATE 16 May 1906				21. LAST BY TYPE AND MODEL ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (S.E., B-26, IP, 50 hrs.) No model similar C-119			
8. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) HOURS 1906				22. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS			
9. TOTAL 1st PILOT HOURS 977				23. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT GOOD HOURS			
10. TOTAL HOURS ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C (Check applicable one) 670				24. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Good) HRS. LAST 6 MONTHS			
11. PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 63				25. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Good) HRS. LAST 30 DAYS			
12. 1st PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS 40				26. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
13. HOURS LAST 90 DAYS ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C				27. 1st PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
14. PILOT HOURS LAST 30 DAYS 29				28. NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MOS. ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			
15. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-26, F-61, etc.) C-119				29. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 60 DAYS			
16. 1st PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL 23				30. 1st PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 30 DAYS			
17. HOURS THIS MODEL ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 6				31. NIGHT HRS. THIS MODEL LAST 30 DAYS ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			
18. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS 29							
19. 1st PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 30 DAYS 23							
20. HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 6							

Section F-DAMAGE

1. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY IN GENERAL TERMS THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE, ENGINE, AND PROPELLERS. Numerous, wide-spread holes of various sizes, left wing surfaces, leading edge, flaps and ailerons; left boom; left and right cowling; left side and bottom of fuselage; left and vertical stabilizers. Both propellers have damaged blades.		2. CHECK PROPER DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION ☐ NONE ☐ MINOR ☒ SUBSTANTIAL ☐ DESTROYED	
3. ☒ PLANE OR WING WAS RETURNED TO AN AF BASE ☐ PLANE OR WING WAS LEFT AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT		7. Give below a considered estimate of cost of this accident to the Air Force:	
4. IS PLANE DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMIC REPAIR? ☐ Yes ☒ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT \$ 9,060.00	
5. IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED, GIVE ENGINEERING OFFICER'S ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED FOR REPAIR: 5000 MAN-HRS.		COST OF DAMAGE TO OTHER GOVERNMENT PROPERTY \$	
6. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGED? ☐ Yes ☒ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY \$	
IF "Yes," DESCRIBE DAMAGES ON SEPARATE SHEET.		COST OF INJURIES \$ 195.00	
		COST-OTHER (Explain) \$	
		TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF ACCIDENT \$ 9,255.00	

Section G-SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. Check items of special equipment which affected the accident.			
☐ RADIOS	☐ ARMAMENT	☐ DE-ICERS	☐ EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR VISION FROM COCKPIT
☐ INSTRUMENTS	☐ FIRE EXTINGUISHING EQUIPMENT IN PLANE	☐ JATO	

2. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE, NONUSE, MISUSE, OR ABSENCE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AFFECTED THE ACCIDENT

Section H-WEATHER (At time and place of accident) See F-81E 51-6284.

CLOUDS	VISIBILITY	WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	TEMP.	DEW POINT	OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS
If weather other than unfavorable wind conditions for takeoff, landing, or testing was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer describing climatic conditions and how they probably contributed to accident.					

Section I-CHECK LIST FOR ATTACHMENTS

☒ FORM 1	☐ CLEARANCE	☒ PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ FORM 14C
☒ FORM 1A	☒ CREW MEMBERS' STATEMENTS	☐ FORM 14A	☐ FORM 14D
☒ LIST OF T.O.'s NOT C/W	☐ WITNESSES' STATEMENTS	☐ FORM 14B	☐ FORM 14E

Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE		Section N—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS	
PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE Check one accident type as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary."		Section N—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS Check one specific cause as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary." (See AFM 42-6 for definitions)	
GROUND OR WATER LOOP	☒	1. ERRORS OF AIR CREW	1. MATERIAL FAILURE—LANDING GEAR
WINGTIP COLLISION	☐	MISSED POWER PLANT OR POWER PLANT CONTROLS	MAIN LANDING GEAR
WHEEL-UP LANDING	☐	MISSED BRAKES AND/OR FLIGHT CONTROLS ON GROUND	NOSE WHEEL OR TAIL WHEEL
HARD LANDING	☐	IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT CONTROLS IN AIR	LANDING GEAR POSITION INDICATORS
COLLAPSE OR RETRACTION OF LANDING GEAR	☐	EXCEEDED STRESS LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT	BRAKES
UNDERCART	☐	INATTENTIVE TO FUEL SUPPLY OR FUEL SELECTOR VALVES	TIRES
OVERCART	☐	FAILED TO EXTEND OR RETRACT LANDING GEAR PROPERLY	OTHER:
NOSE UP OR NOSE OVER	☐	SELECTED UNSUITABLE TERRAIN OR RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF OR LANDING	UNDETERMINED
COLLISION WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT	☐	FAILED TO COMPENSATE FOR WIND CONDITIONS	2. MATERIAL FAILURE—EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES
COLLISION WITH GROUND OR WATER	☐	MISJUDGED DISTANCE	AUTOMATIC PILOT
OTHER COLLISION	☐	FAILED TO LEVEL OFF PROPERLY	RADIO EQUIPMENT
SPIN OR STALL	☐	FAILED TO OBSERVE OTHER AIRCRAFT OR OBJECTS	ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
FIRE ON GROUND	☐	FAILED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLYING SPEED	HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSION IN AIR	☐	BECAME LOST (Weather, terrain, etc.)	OXYGEN OR PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
AIRFRAME FAILURE IN FLIGHT	☐	CONTINUED VFR FLIGHT INTO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER	SAFETY EQUIPMENT
ABANDONED AIRCRAFT	☐	IMPROPER OPERATION ON AUTHORIZED INSTRUMENT FLIGHT	INSTRUMENTS
PROP OR JET BLAST ACCIDENT	☐	OPERATED AIRCRAFT IN RUCKLESS MANNER	CANOPY, SEAT, CANOPY, FITTINGS, DOORS, HATCHES
OTHER (List):	☐	MADE INADEQUATE FLIGHT PREPARATIONS	ARMAMENT
UNDETERMINED	☐	ATTEMPTED FLIGHT BEYOND ABILITY OR EXPERIENCE	OTHER:
Section K—PHASE OF OPERATION (Check only ONE)		FAILED TO USE OR INCORRECTLY USED MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	3. WEATHER
TAKING INCIDENT TO FLIGHT	☐	OTHER (List):	LOW CEILING
TAKE-OFF	☒	2. ERRORS OF OTHER PERSONNEL	SMOKE—HAIR
IN FLIGHT	☐	AIRCRAFT INADEQUATELY MAINTAINED	RAIN—FOG
LANDING	☐	AIRCRAFT IMPROPERLY CLEARED FOR FLIGHT	SNOW—HAIL
ON GROUND	☐	WEATHER INCORRECTLY FORECAST	ICING CONDITIONS
ENGINE RUNNING—NOT TAXING	☐	IMPROPERLY OPERATED AIRPORT/AIRWAY FACILITIES	UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS FOR LANDING, TAXING, OR TAKEOFF
GROUND OPERATIONS	☐	IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Ground Personnel)	TURBULENCE IN FLIGHT
UNDETERMINED	☐	IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Flight Instructors and Flight Leaders)	WIND ALIGHT
Section L—CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACCIDENT (Check all applicable)		OTHER (List):	THUNDERSTORMS
IMMEDIATE FORCED LANDING	☐	3. MATERIAL FAILURE—POWER PLANT	DOWNDRAFT—UPDRAFT
PRELIMINARY LANDING	☒	COOLING SYSTEM	OTHER:
FUEL EXHAUSTION	☐	LUBRICATING SYSTEM	4. LANDING AREA
ENGINE STOPPAGE	☐	FUEL SYSTEM	WET
LOST	☐	ENGINE STRUCTURE (Includes Jet Engines)	SOFT
PERMITS T.O. NOT COMPLIED WITH	☐	ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM	SNOW
OTHER (List):	☐	PROPELLER AND PROPELLER ACCESSORIES	ICE
Section M—VIOLATIONS (Check all applicable)		OVERCHARGES (Reciprocating Engine only)	ROUGH
IMPROPER TAXING PROCEDURE	☐	IGNITION SYSTEM	GLASSY
FAILURE TO USE CHECKLIST	☐	ENGINE ACCESSORIES	RUNWAY TOO SHORT
UNAUTHORIZED LOW FLYING	☐	OTHER:	OTHER HAZARD:
INSTRUMENT FLYING OR VFR CLEARANCE	☐	UNDETERMINED	5. GROUND EN. SPERM
UNAUTHORIZED FORMATION	☐	4. MATERIAL FAILURE—AIR FRAME	AIRPORT FACILITIES
OTHER (List):	☐	FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM	AIRWAY FACILITIES
11. MISCELLANEOUS		WING, ROTOR, AND FLAP	ARRRESTING DEVICES
BIRD IN FLIGHT PATH		COWLING AND FAIRING	LAUNCHING DEVICES
SHOT-OFF TARGET IN FLIGHT PATH		FUSELAGE	OTHER:
OTHER:		OTHER:	12. UNDETERMINED
UNDETERMINED		UNDETERMINED	

Section D-DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

Tell in narrative form, in as much detail as necessary, everything that is known about the accident. Make certain that items checked on reverse side are justified by this narrative. If fire was involved in accident, explain in detail its origin and progress and steps taken to extinguish it.

This aircraft was struck by fragments from F-84 51-628A and C-119C 51-8241 which collided while flying in their respective formations near Mannheim, Germany, 15 May 1953. The pilot and engineer of this aircraft received minor injuries. The aircraft was flown back to Rhein Main Air Base where a safe landing was made.

For complete information see AF Form 114 and attachments concerning F-84E 51-628A, attached to this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS for action to prevent similar accidents:

Section P-AUTHENTICATION (Each investigating board member must sign below)

1. ☐ PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN OFFERED OPPORTUNITY OF REBUTTAL ☐ NO REBUTTAL REQ'D ☐ REBUTTAL STATEMENT(S) ATTACHED
2. PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF: ☐ DEATH; ☐ CRITICAL INJURY; ☐ OTHER (Explain) _____

BASE SUBMITTING REPORT	MEMBER (Name and Grade)	MEDICAL OFFICER (Name and Grade)
PRESIDENT (Name and Grade)	AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OFFICER (Name and Grade)	RECORDS (Name and Grade)

REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. PLACE OF ACCIDENT: Place, county, nearest town—Distance and direction to accident <u>Germany, Mannheim, 10 Miles N.E.</u>		2. NEAREST AIRPORT Suitable for landing this plane—Distance and direction to accident <u>Rhein Main, 31 Miles N.</u>	
3. ELEVATION ABOVE S.L. at accident scene <u>500 Ft.</u>	4. DATE OF ACCIDENT <u>15 May 53</u>	5. HOUR AND TIME ZONE <u>1550Z</u>	6. DAY OF WEEK ☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK
7. LIST NUMBERS OF ALL OTHER AIRCRAFT INVOLVED (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft) <u>51-8235, 8241, 8249, 628A</u>	8. ☒ INCIDENT TO FLIGHT ☐ NOT INCIDENT TO FLIGHT		
9. CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENT ☒ Major ☐ Minor	10. CLEARANCE ☐ IFR ☐ Local ☒ VFR ☐ Other	11. THIS WAS A: ☐ CAP FLIGHT ☐ AIR RESERVE FLIGHT ☐ ANO FLIGHT ☒ OTHER	
12. AIRFIELD OF LAST TAKEOFF <u>Rhein Main</u>	13. DURATION OF FLIGHT SINCE LAST TAKEOFF <u>0440</u>	14. MISSION OF FLIGHT (Use Form 100) <u>Formation Flight</u>	15. ACTIVITY AIRCRAFT WAS ENGAGED IN JUST PRIOR TO ACCIDENT <u>Formation Flight</u>

Section B—AIRCRAFT

1. AIRCRAFT No. <u>51-8259A</u>	2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES AND BLOCK No. <u>C-119C</u>	3. ORGANIZATION REPORTING AIRCRAFT ON AF-110 REPORT	
		MAJOR COMMAND <u>USAFE AFE</u>	SUBCOMMAND <u>12th Air Force</u>
		AF WING <u>60th Trp Carr</u>	AF WING <u>60th Trp Carr</u>
4. TECHNICAL ORDERS affecting this aircraft were not complied with at time of accident. (List number and title of them. T.O.'s on separate sheet.)		GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE <u>60th Trp Carr</u>	SQUADRON OR UNIT <u>12th Trp Carr</u>
		BASE <u>Rhein Main</u>	

Section C—OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)

1. LAST NAME (Fr., II, etc.) <u>Sullivan</u>	FIRST NAME <u>David</u>	MIDDLE NAME <u>Pope</u>	GRADE <u>1st Lt</u>	COMPONENT <u>USAF</u>	SERIAL No. <u>AO 1910348</u>	NATIONALITY AND RACE <u>USA - W</u>	YEAR OF BIRTH <u>1928</u>
2. ASSIGNED BASE <u>Rhein Main AB</u>	MAJOR COMMAND <u>USAFE</u>	SUBCOMMAND <u>12th AF</u>	AF WING <u>60th Trp Carr</u>	GROUP No. AND TYPE <u>60th Trp Carr</u>	SQUADRON OR UNIT <u>12th TCS, (M)</u>		
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING <u>" E574 "</u>	MAJOR COMMAND <u>AFE</u>	SUBCOMMAND <u>" 12 "</u>	AF WING <u>" TCM "</u>	GROUP No. AND TYPE <u>" TCM "</u>	SQUADRON OR UNIT <u>" TCM "</u>		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED <u>Pilot - 12 May 1950</u>		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED <u>Pilot - 12 May 1950</u>		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT <u>1054-B</u>			

OPERATOR'S FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including Civilian)

7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD <u>White</u>	EXPIRATION DATE <u>9 Oct 53</u>	17. LIST BY TYPE AND MODEL 1st PILOT EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (e.g., B-26, 50 hrs.)	
8. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) Hours <u>1387</u>	18. WAS OPERATOR ON INSTRUMENTS AT TIME OF ACCIDENT OR IMMEDIATELY BEFORE? ☐ NO ☐ YES ☐ HOOD ☐ WEATHER		
9. TOTAL 1st PILOT Hours <u>764</u>	If above answer is "Yes" or if accident occurred at night or during IFR weather or unknown conditions, fill in items below.		
10. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 90 DAYS <u>95</u>	19. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER Hours		
11. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 30 DAYS <u>9</u>	20. TOTAL 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD Hours		
12. 1st PILOT Hours THIS MODEL (B-26, F-51, etc.) <u>51</u>	21. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hours LAST 6 MONTHS		
13. OTHER PILOT Hours (CP, C, SC) THIS MODEL <u>24</u>	22. 1st PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) Hours LAST 90 DAYS		
14. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 90 DAYS THIS MODEL <u>51</u>	23. 1st PILOT NIGHT Hours LAST 6 MONTHS		
15. 1st PILOT Hours LAST 30 DAYS THIS MODEL <u>9</u>	24. 1st PILOT NIGHT Hours THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS		
16. TOTAL TIME SPENT IN AIR DURING 24 HRS. PRIOR TO ACCIDENT <u>2</u>			

Section D—PERSONNEL INVOLVED (including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at time of accident	NAME (Last name first)	Type of Aero. Rating (Symbol)	SERIAL No.	GRADE AND BRANCH OF SERVICE	COMPONENT (See AFM 62-5)	ORGANIZATIONAL ASSIGNMENT—Command, Subcommand, Group Number and Type, Base	Final Major, Minor, None, Missing	Parachute Used
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
ob	Sullivan, David P.	P	AO-1910348	1/Lt USAF	READ	(USAFE, 12th AF,	None	X
05	Doheny, William E.	P	AO-577380	1/Lt USAF	READ	60th Trp Carr Gp	None	X
CE	Frenz, Carl F.	CE	AF12358751	SSgt, USAF	USAF	Rhein Main)	None	X

Section E - RATED PERSONNEL AT OTHER SET OF DUAL CONTROLS (Instructor, Copilot, etc.)

1. LAST NAME (JA, II, etc.) Doherty	FIRST NAME William	MIDDLE NAME Edward	GRADE 1st Lt	COMPONENT USAF	SERIAL NO. AO 577380	NATIONALITY AND RACE USA - W	YEAR OF BIRTH 1918
2. ASSIGNED BASE Rhein Main AB	MAJOR COMMAND USAFE	SUBCOMMAND 12th AF	AF WING 60th Trp Carr	GROUP NO. AND TYPE 60th Trp Carr	SQUADRON OR UNIT 12th TCS, (M)		
3. ATTACHED BASE FOR FLYING "	MAJOR COMMAND "	SUBCOMMAND "	AF WING "	GROUP NO. AND TYPE "	SQUADRON OR UNIT "		
4. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot - 23 May 1944		5. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING AND DATE RECEIVED Pilot - 23 May 1944		6. PRIMARY DUTY ASSIGNMENT 1051-B			
7. TYPE OF INSTRUMENT CARD White				8. EXPIRATION DATE 14 Jan 54			
9. TOTAL PILOT (1st Pilot, Copilot, Command Pilot, etc.) HOURS 1263				10. C-82 45			
11. TOTAL 1ST PILOT HOURS 312				12. LIST BY TYPE AND MODEL: ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR AIRCRAFT (e.g., B-26, F-56, etc.)			
13. TOTAL HOURS, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C (Check applicable one) 761				14. FPH in items below if Instrument and Night Experience of Operator was listed in Section C			
15. PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 43				15. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT WEATHER HOURS			
16. 1ST PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 20				16. TOTAL 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT HOOD HOURS			
17. HOURS LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 23				17. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HRS. LAST 6 MONTHS			
18. PILOT HOURS LAST 90 DAYS 9				18. 1ST PILOT INSTRUMENT (Weather and Hood) HRS. LAST 90 DAYS			
19. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL (B-26, F-56, etc.) 39				19. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
20. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL 18				20. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MONTHS			
21. HOURS THIS MODEL, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 21				21. NIGHT HOURS LAST 6 MOS., ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			
22. TOTAL PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS 39				22. TOTAL PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS			
23. 1ST PILOT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS 18				23. 1ST PILOT NIGHT HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS			
24. HOURS THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☒ CP ☐ C 21				24. NIGHT HRS. THIS MODEL LAST 90 DAYS, ☐ IP ☐ CP ☐ C			

Section F - DAMAGE

1. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY IN GENERAL TERMS THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO THE AIRPLANE, ENGINE, AND PROPELLERS. Extensive damage to sheet metal, frames, stringers and bulkheads, left side of fuselage between stations 33 and 106. Holes in leading edge of left outer wing panel and left boom.		2. CHECK PROPER DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION None ☐ Minor ☐ Substantial ☒ Destroyed ☐	
3. ☒ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS RETURNED TO AN AF BASE ☐ PLANE OR WRECKAGE WAS LEFT AT SCENE OF ACCIDENT		7. Give below a considered estimate of cost of this accident to the Air Force:	
4. IS PLANE DAMAGED BEYOND ECONOMICAL REPAIR? ☐ Yes ☒ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT \$ 2050.00	
5. IF PLANE IS TO BE REPAIRED, GIVE ENGINEERING OFFICER'S ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED FOR REPAIR: 2000 MAN-HRS.		COST OF DAMAGE TO OTHER GOVERNMENT PROPERTY \$	
6. WAS PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGED? ☐ Yes ☒ No		COST OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY \$	
IF "YES," DESCRIBE DAMAGES ON SEPARATE SHEET.		COST OF INJURIES \$	
		COST-OTHER (Explain) \$	
		TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF ACCIDENT \$ 2050.00	

Section G - SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

1. Check items of special equipment which affected the accident.			
☐ RADIOS	☐ ARMAMENT	☐ DE-ICE	☐ EQUIPMENT FOR CLEAR VISION FROM COCKPIT
☐ INSTRUMENTS	☐ FIRE EXTINGUISHING EQUIPMENT IN PLANE	☐ JATO	
2. DESCRIBE BRIEFLY HOW THE USE, NONUSE, MISUSE, OR ABSENCE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AFFECTED THE ACCIDENT			

Section H - WEATHER (At time and place of accident)

CLOUDS	VISIBILITY	WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	TEMP.	DEW POINT	OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS
If weather other than unfavorable wind conditions for takeoff, landing, or taxiing was a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer describing climatic conditions and how they probably contributed to accident.					

Section I - CHECK LIST FOR ATTACHMENTS

☒ FORM 1	☐ CLEARANCE	☒ PHOTOGRAPHS	☐ FORM 14C
☒ FORM 1A	☐ CREW MEMBERS' STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14A	☐ FORM 14D
☒ LIST OF T.O.'s NOT C/W	☐ WITNESSES' STATEMENTS	☒ FORM 14B	☐ FORM 14E
☐			

Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE		Section N—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS	
PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Section J—ACCIDENT TYPE Check one accident type as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary."		Section N—CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS Check one specific cause as "Primary." Check all others applicable as "Secondary." (See AFM 62-6 for definitions)	
☐ GROUNDED OR WATER L-UP ☐ WINGED LANDING ☐ WHEEL-UP LANDING ☐ HARD LANDING ☐ COLLAPSE OR RETRACTION OF LANDING GEAR ☐ UNDERHOOT ☐ OVERHOOT ☐ NOSE UP OR NOSE OVER ☐ COLLISION WITH OTHER AIRCRAFT ☐ COLLISION WITH GROUND OR WATER ☐ OTHER COLLISIONS ☐ SPIN OR STALL ☐ FIRE ON GROUND ☐ FIRE AND/OR EXPLOSION IN AIR ☐ AIRFRAME FAILURE IN FLIGHT ☐ AIRCRAFTED AIRCRAFT ☐ PROP OR JET MOTOR ACCIDENT ☐ OTHER (List): ☐ UNDETERMINED	☒ 1. ERRORS OF AIR CREW ☐ MISSED POWER PLANT OR POWER PLANT CONTROLS ☐ MISSED BRAKES AND/OR FLIGHT CONTROLS ON GROUND ☐ IMPROPER USE OF FLIGHT CONTROLS IN AIR ☐ EXCEEDED STRESS LIMITS OF AIRCRAFT ☐ INATTENTIVE TO FUEL SUPPLY OR FUEL SELECTOR VALVES ☐ FAILED TO EXTEND OR RETRACT LANDING GEAR PROPERLY ☐ SELECTED UNSUITABLE TERRAIN OR RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF OR LANDING ☐ FAILED TO COMPENSATE FOR WIND CONDITIONS ☐ MISJUDGED DISTANCE ☐ FAILED TO LEVEL OFF PROPERLY ☐ FAILED TO OBSERVE OTHER AIRCRAFT OR OBSTACLE ☐ FAILED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE FLYING SPEED ☐ BRAKES LOST (WHEELS SYSTEMS or skids) ☐ CONTINUED VFR FLIGHT INTO UNFAVORABLE WEATHER ☐ IMPROPER OPERATION OF AUTHORIZED INSTRUMENT FLIGHT ☐ OPERATED AIRCRAFT IN RECKLESS MANNER ☐ MADE INADEQUATE FLIGHT PREPARATIONS ☐ ATTEMPTED FLIGHT BEYOND ABILITY OR EXPERIENCE ☐ FAILED TO USE OR INCORRECTLY USED MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT ☐ OTHER (List):	☐ 2. MATERIAL FAILURE—LANDING GEAR ☐ MAIN LANDING GEAR ☐ NOSE WHEEL OR TAIL WHEEL ☐ LANDING GEAR POSITION INDICATORS ☐ BRAKES ☐ TIRES ☐ OTHER: ☐ UNDETERMINED	
Section K—PHASE OF OPERATION (Check only ONE)		☐ 3. ERRORS OF OTHER PERSONNEL ☐ AIRCRAFT INADEQUATELY MAINTAINED ☐ AIRCRAFT IMPROPERLY CLEARED FOR FLIGHT ☐ WEATHER INCORRECTLY FORECAST ☐ IMPROPERLY OPERATED AIRWAY FACILITIES ☐ IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (UPON or PRIOR to flight) ☐ IMPROPERLY SUPERVISED TRAINING (Flight Instructor and Flight Loaders) ☐ OTHER (List):	☐ 4. MATERIAL FAILURE—EQUIPMENT AND ACCESSORIES ☐ AUTOMATIC PILOT ☐ RADIO EQUIPMENT ☐ ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ☐ HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ☐ OXYGEN OR PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM ☐ SAFETY EQUIPMENT ☐ INSTRUMENTS ☐ COCKPIT, SEAT, CANOPY, FITTINGS, DOORS, HATCHES ☐ ARMAMENT ☐ OTHER:
☐ TAKING INCIDENT TO FLIGHT ☐ TAKE-OFF ☐ IN FLIGHT ☐ LANDING ☐ GO AROUND ☐ ENGINE STOPPING—NOT TAKING ☐ GROUND OPERATIONS ☐ UNDETERMINED	☐ 5. WEATHER ☐ LOW CLOUDS ☐ SMOG—HAZE ☐ RAIN—FOG ☐ SNOW—HAIL ☐ Icing CONDITIONS ☐ UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS FOR LANDING, TAKING OFF, OR TAKEOFF ☐ TURBULENCE IN FLIGHT ☐ WINDS ALOFT ☐ THUNDERSTORMS ☐ DOWNDRAFT—UPDRAFT ☐ OTHER:	☐ 6. LANDING AREA ☐ WET ☐ SOFT ☐ SLOPE ☐ ICE ☐ ROCKS ☐ GLASS ☐ RUNWAY TOO SHORT ☐ OTHER HAZARD:	
Section L—CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACCIDENT (Check all applicable)		☐ 7. MATERIAL FAILURE—POWER PLANT ☐ COOLING SYSTEM ☐ LUBRICATING SYSTEM ☐ FUEL SYSTEM ☐ ENGINE STRUCTURE (Includes Jet Engines) ☐ ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM ☐ PROPELLER AND PROPELLER ACCESSORIES ☐ SUPERCHARGERS (Reciprocating Engine only) ☐ IGNITION SYSTEM ☐ ENGINE ACCESSORIES ☐ OTHER: ☐ UNDETERMINED	☐ 8. GROUND EQUIPMENT ☐ AIRPORT FACILITIES ☐ AIRWAY FACILITIES ☐ ARRESTING DEVICES ☐ LANDING DEVICES ☐ OTHER:
Section M—VIOLATIONS (Check all applicable)		☐ 9. MATERIAL FAILURE—AIR FRAME ☐ FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM ☐ WINGS, ROTORS, AND FLAPS ☐ COWLING AND FAIRING ☐ FUSELAGE ☐ OTHER: ☐ UNDETERMINED	☐ 10. MISCELLANEOUS ☐ BIRD IN FLIGHT PATH ☐ SHOT-OFF TARGET IN FLIGHT PATH ☐ OTHER:
☐ IMPROPER TAKING PROCEDURES ☐ FAILURE TO USE CHECKLIST ☐ UNAUTHORIZED LOW FLYING ☐ INSTRUMENT FLYING OR VFR CLEARANCE ☐ UNAUTHORIZED FORMATION ☐ OTHER (List):	☐ 11. UNDETERMINED	☐ 11. UNDETERMINED	

Section C--DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

Tell in narrative form, in as much detail as necessary, everything that is known about the accident. Make certain that items checked on reverse side are justified by this narrative. If fire was involved in accident, explain in detail its origin and progress and steps taken to extinguish it.

This aircraft was struck by fragments from F-84 51-628A and C-119C 51-8241 which collided while flying in their respective formations near Mannheim, Germany, 15 May 1953. None of the crew members aboard this aircraft were injured. They were able to return to Rhein Main Air Base and make a safe landing.

For the complete information, see AF Form 14 and attachments concerning F-84E 51-628A, attached to this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS for action to prevent similar accidents:

Section P--AUTHENTICATION (Each investigating board member must sign below)

1. ☐ PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN OFFERED OPPORTUNITY OF REBUTTAL ☐ NO REBUTTAL REQ'D ☐ REBUTTAL STATEMENT(S) ATTACHED
 2. PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF: ☐ DEATH; ☐ CRITICAL INJURY; ☐ OTHER (Explain) _____

BASE SUBMITTING REPORT	MEMBER (Name and Grade)	MEDICAL OFFICER (Name and Grade)
PRESIDENT (Name and Grade)	AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OFFICER (Name and Grade)	RECORDER (Name and Grade)

MEDICAL REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 63-14 and AF Manual 63-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. STATION INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT Bitburg AF Base, Germany	2. ASSIGNED STATION OF AIRCRAFT Bitburg AF Base, Germany	3. APPROXIMATE DISTANCE OF ACCIDENT FROM INVESTIGATING STATION (Miles) 100 S.E.	
4. PLACE OF ACCIDENT Heidelberg, Germany	5. PLANE TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, SERIAL NO. F-34E 51-628A	6. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1550 Z	7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT

Original operations order specified 15,000 feet over the I.P. with a let-down and fly-by at Landstuhl. Prior to take-off and again in the air, "Callahad Leader" changed the altitude over the I.P. to 5,000 feet. "Cousin Leader" entered the area, passed the I.P., and started a gentle left turn for join-up with "Callahad". During this time a flight of C-119 aircraft was encountered causing the F-34's group to break up. Number three (3) man in the last flight of the F-34's was unable to avoid a collision. His aircraft struck the lead ship of the C-119 aircraft and disintegrated upon impact, causing both aircraft to be lost. The pilot of the F-34 received minor burns but ejected safely.

Section B—EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT FACTORS

1. SEATE	NUMBER, FIXED	0	NUMBER, EJECTION	1	NUMBER FIRED	1	2. NUMBER OF PARACHUTES PROVIDED	1	NUMBER USED	1
3. OTHER EQUIPMENT:	TYPE	SERVICED: ☒ Yes ☐ No	USED THIS FLIGHT	☒ Yes ☐ No	TYPE MASK	A13A	DID MASK FIT PROPERLY?	☒ Yes ☐ No	NO.	1
	Pres Dem	DAYS 15 May 53	LENGTH OF USE	25 min	NUMBER	1		☐ No	No.	
4. SAFETY HELMETS:	NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED	1	5. ANTI-G SUITS:	NUMBER AVAILABLE, USED	1	NUMBER AVAILABLE, NOT USED	0	☐ NOT AVAILABLE		
	NUMBER IMPROVED TYPE USED	0								

6. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal or aircraft equipment, details of structures, incidents such as being trapped in place, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)

O₂ mask, sunglasses, and gloves protected pilot from further burns.

7. SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DAMAGE TO:

COCKPIT

Destroyed

SEAT, SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELT

Unknown

CREW STATIONS (OTHER THAN COCKPIT)

NA

EMERGENCY EXIT, HATCHES

Destroyed

PASSENGER CABS

NA

2. Use following code numbers to specify result to personnel: (1) No injury; (2) Minor injury (par. 13c, Reg. 62-14); (3) Major injury (par. 13b, Reg. 62-14); (4) Killed; (5) Missing.

Recommend new type crash helmet that will stay on pilot during high speed ejection. This pilot had a FIA helmet with chin straps and screw on locks, but still lost his helmet and O₂ mask.

JOHN H FREEMAN
Captain USAF

s/ Robert P. Sturr Jr.
ROBERT P. STURR JR., CAPT, USAF (MC)

MEDICAL REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. STATION INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT Rhein/Main Air Base	2. ASSIGNED STATION OF AIRCRAFT Rhein/Main Air Base	3. APPROXIMATE DISTANCE OF ACCIDENT FROM INVESTIGATING STATION (Miles) 50 miles
4. PLACE OF ACCIDENT Mannheim, 5 miles west of Germany	5. PLANE TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, SERIAL NO. C-119C #51 8235	6. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1650
		7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT

A Jet A/C crashed into another plane of this formation, glanced off and hit the right wing of this A/C, causing it to go out of control, crash and burn.

Section B—EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT FACTORS

1. SEAT	NUMBER, FIRED	NUMBER, EJECTION	0	NUMBER FIRED	0	2. NUMBER OF PARACHUTES PROVIDED	6	NUMBER USED	
3. OXYGEN EQUIPMENT	TYPE A-10	SERVICED ☒ YES ☐ NO DATE 29 April 53	USED TWO FLIGHT	☐ YES ☒ NO	TYPE MARKER	ALLA	DID MARKER FIT PROPERLY?	☒ YES ☐ NO	No.
4. SAFETY BELT	NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED	0	5. ANTI-G SUITS	NUMBER AVAILABLE, USED	0	NOT AVAILABLE			
	NUMBER IMPROVED TYPE USED	0		NUMBER AVAILABLE, NOT USED	0				

9. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal or aircraft equipment, details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)

None

SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DAMAGE TO:

COCKPIT

Completely destroyed.

SEAT, SHOULDER HARNES, SAFETY BELT

Completely destroyed.

CREW STATIONS (OTHER THAN COCKPIT)

Completely destroyed.

EMERGENCY EXIT, HATCHES

Completely destroyed.

PASSENGER CABIN

Completely destroyed.

Section C—PERSONNEL INVOLVED—(NOTE: Form 148 must also be completed on all rated Pilots regardless of injury, and on all other personnel with fatal or major injuries, as defined in AF Reg. 62-14.)

NAME AND RANK	RATING SYMBOL	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	AT TIME OF ACCIDENT			SHOULDER HARNESS			SAFETY BELT		ESCAPE EYE USED (Designate)	RESULT (5)
				Flight Duty	Body Position (1)	Location in Plane	Available	Used	Failed	Used	Failed		
Osborn, John W	Lt.Col.	SrP	69½"	167	P	1 F	pilot seat	x			x	none	(4)
Ray, Joseph H	Major	SrP	68 3/4"	157	Pass.	2 F	on ladder to cargo compartment.					none	(4)
Clement, Wesley Y	Capt	SrP	70 3/4"	153	CP	1 F	co-pilot seat	x			x	none	(4)
Thompson, Carl J	Capt	Nav.	69"	137	Nav.	1 F	Nav. seat				x	none	(4)
Biggs, T W	S/Sgt	FE	71"	184	FE	1 F	cargo deck 1st seat				x	rt. rear door	(3)
Sohns, Dean O	S/Sgt	R/O	67"	133	R/O	1 F	radio Oper. seat				x	none	(4)

1. Use following code numbers and letters for position of body: Seated (1); Standing (2); Prone (3); Supine (4); Crouched (5)—Facing forward (F); Facing rear (R).

Examples: 2-F means Standing Facing Forward; 5-R means Crouched Facing Rear, etc.

2. Use following code numbers to specify result to personnel: (1) No injury; (2) Minor injury (par. 13c, Reg. 62-14); (3) Major injury (par. 13b, Reg. 62-14); (4) Killed; (5) Missing.

Section D—MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Robert J Schlitt
 ROBERT J SCHLITT, 1/Lt. USAF (MC)
 (SIGNATURE) (NAME AND GRADE)

HEADQUARTERS
60TH MEDICAL GROUP
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57 US AIR FORCE

19 May 1953

M E D I C A L S T A T E M E N T

On 15 May 1953, at approximately 1700 hours, near Mannheim, Germany, an F-84 type Aircraft collided with two C-119 type Aircraft at approximately 5000 ft. causing the three A/C to crash and burn. The pilot of the F-84 and three (3) of the ten (10) crew members on the two C-119s were able to parachute to safety. The remaining seven (7) crew members died when the two C-119s crashed into the ground.

Only two (2) of the dead were positively identified, on which AF Forms 14-B were filled out. The bodies of the remaining five (5), known to have been on one of the C-119s were mutilated to such an extent that it is impossible to make positive identifications.

Names of the five (5) unidentified, known to have been on one of the C-119s, are listed below:

OSBORN, John W.	Lt.Col.	(Senior Pilot)	AO-371 862
RAY, Joseph H.	Major	(Senior Pilot)	AO-442 232
CLEMENT, Wesley Y.	Capt.	(Senior Pilot)	AO-800 472
THOMPSON, Carl J.	Capt.	(Navigator)	AO-723 208
Sohns, Dean O.	S/3gt	(Radio Operator)	AF-32 215 294


ROBERT J. SCHLITZ
1/Lt., USAF (MC)

MEDICAL REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. STATION INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT Rhein/Main Air Base	2. ASSIGNED STATION OF AIRCRAFT Rhein/Main Air Base	3. APPROXIMATE DISTANCE OF ACCIDENT FROM INVESTIGATING STATION (Miles) 50 miles
4. PLACE OF ACCIDENT Karlsruhe, 5 miles west of Germany	5. PLANE TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, SERIAL NO. C-119C #51 8241	6. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1650
		7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT

An F84 Jet A/C crashed into fuselage, causing gas tanks to explode and completely destroying A/C in mid-air.

Section B—EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT FACTORS

1. SPECIES	NUMBER FIRED	NUMBER EJECTION	0	NUMBER FIRED	0	2. NUMBER OF PARACHUTES PROVIDED	6	NUMBER USED	2
3. OTHER EQUIPMENT	TYPE	SERVICES	☒ Yes ☐ No	USED THIS FLIGHT	☐ Yes ☒ No	TYPE MARK	A14A	DID MARK FIT PROPERLY?	☒ Yes ☐ No
	A-10	DATE	29 April 53	LENGTH OF USE		NUMBER	NONE		
4. SAFETY BELT	NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED	0	5. ANTI-G SUITS	NUMBER AVAILABLE, USED	0	NOT AVAILABLE			
	NUMBER IMPROVED TYPE USED	0		NUMBER AVAILABLE, NOT USED	0				

6. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal or aircraft equipment, details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)

Explosion of gas tanks.

SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DAMAGE TO:

1. COCKPIT

Completely destroyed.

SEAT, SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELT

Completely destroyed.

CREW STATIONS (OTHER THAN COCKPIT)

Completely destroyed.

EMERGENCY EXIT, HATCHES

Completely destroyed.

PASSENGER CARGO

Completely destroyed.

Section C—PERSONNEL INVOLVED—(NOTE: Form 14B must also be completed on all rated Pilots regardless of injury, and on all other personnel with fatal or major injuries, as defined in A9 Reg. 82-14.)

NAME AND RANK	RATING SYMBOL	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	AT TIME OF ACCIDENT			EJECTOR SEAT/HARNESSES			SAFETY BELT		ESCAPE EJECT USED (Designate)	RESULT (5)
				Flight Duty	Body Position (°)	Location in Plane	Avail-able	Used	Failed	Used	Failed		
Wells, Williston G	Major	SrP	69½"	179	P	1 F	pilot seat	x			x	none	(4)
Dahl, Edwin E	1/Lt.	P	73"	163	CP	1 F	co-pilot seat	x			x	none	(4)
Battiste, Michael	A/1c	FE	70"	175	FE	1 F	Nav. seat					thrown out by explosion	(3)
Cason, Charles L	A/2c	R/O	69"	181	R/O	1 R	R/O seat					" "	(3)

1. Use following code numbers and letters for position of body: Seated (1); Standing (2); Prone (3); Supine (4); Crouched (5)—Facing forward (F); Facing rear (R).

Examples: 2-F means Standing Facing Forward; 5-R means Crouched Facing Rear, etc.

2. Use following code numbers to specify result to personnel: (1) No injury; (2) Minor injury (par. 13b, Reg. 82-14); (3) Major injury (par. 13b, Reg. 82-14); (4) Killed; (5) Missing.

Section D—MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Robert J. Schmitt
 ROBERT J. SCHMITT, 1/Lt, USAF(MC)
 (SIGNATURE) (NAME AND GRADE)

MEDICAL REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. STATION INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT Rhein/Main Air Base	2. ASSIGNED STATION OF AIRCRAFT Rhein/Main Air Base	3. APPROXIMATE DISTANCE OF ACCIDENT FROM INVESTIGATING STATION (MILES) 50 miles
4. PLACE OF ACCIDENT Mannheim, 5 miles west of Germany	5. PLANE TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, SERIAL NO. C-119C #51 8249	6. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1650
		7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT

A Jet A/C crashed into two C-119's. The Flying debris caused major damage to this A/C, but the pilot was able to return to Rhein/Main Air Base and make a normal landing.

Section B—EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT FACTORS

1. SEATS	NUMBER, FIRED	NUMBER, EJECTION	0	NUMBER FIRED	0	2. NUMBER OF PARACHUTES PROVIDED	6	NUMBER USED	0
3. OTHER EQUIPMENT	TYPE A-10	SERVICES ☒ Yes ☐ No	USED THIS FLIGHT ☐ Yes ☒ No	TYPE MARKS	ALL	DID MARKS FIT PROPERLY?	☒ Yes ☐ No		
	DATE	29 April 53	LENGTH OF USE	NUMBER	none		☐ No		
4. SAFETY BELT	NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED	0	5. ANTS-G	NUMBER AVAILABLE, USED	0	☐ NOT AVAILABLE			
	NUMBER IMPROVED TYPE USED	0	6. ANTS-G	NUMBER AVAILABLE, NOT USED	0				

6. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal or aircraft equipment, details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)

None

SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DAMAGE TO:

7. COCKPIT

Damage to support brackets and glass on pilots side of cockpit.

8. SEATS, SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELTS

None

9. CANN STATIONS (OTHER THAN COCKPIT)

Total A/C received an amount of damage.

10. EMERGENCY EXIT, HATCHES

None

11. PASSENGER CAGES

Slight damage.

Section C—PERSONNEL INVOLVED—(NOTE: Form 148 must also be completed on all rated Pilots regardless of injury, and on all other personnel with fatal or major injuries, as defined in AF Reg. 62-14.)

NAME AND RANK	RATING SYMBOL	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	AT TIME OF ACCIDENT			SHOULDER HARNESS			SAFETY BELT		ESCAPE EVIT USED (Designate)	RESULT (5)
				Flight Duty	Body Position (1)	Location in Plane	Avail-able	Used	Failed	Used	Failed		
Muller, Francis L	Capt.	P	69"	175	CP	1 F	co-pilot seat		x		x	None	(1)
Zack, Anthony H	Capt.	SrP	67"	160	P	1 F	Pilot seat		x		x	None	(2)
Froese, Orville M	A/2c	F/E	68"	168	F/E	1 F	R/O seat				x	None	(2)

1. Use following code numbers and letters for position of body: Seated (1); Standing (2); Prone (3); Supine (4); Crouched (5)—Facing forward (F); Facing rear (R).

Examples: 3-F means Standing Facing Forward; 5-R means Crouched Facing Rear, etc.

2. Use following code numbers to specify result to personnel: (1) No injury; (2) Minor injury (par. 13c, Reg. 62-14); (3) Major injury (par. 13b, Reg. 62-14); (4) Killed; (5) Missing.

Section D—MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Robert J. Schlitt
 ROBERT J. SCHLITT, 1/Lt. USAF (MC)
 (SIGNATURE) (NAME AND GRADE)

MEDICAL REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 63-14 and AF Manual 62-3, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A--GENERAL INFORMATION

1. STATION INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT Rhein/Main Air Base	2. ASSIGNED STATION OF AIRCRAFT Rhein/Main Air Base	3. APPROXIMATE DISTANCE OF ACCIDENT FROM INVESTIGATING STATION (Miles) 50 miles
4. PLACE OF ACCIDENT Mannheim, 5 miles west of Germany	5. PLANE TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, SERIAL NO. C-119C #51 8259	6. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1650
7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953		

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT

A Jet A/C crashed into two C-119's. The flying debris caused major damage to this A/C, but the pilot was able to return to Rhein/Main Air Base and made a normal landing.

Section B--EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT FACTORS

1. SEATS: NUMBER, FIXED	NUMBER, EJECTION 0	NUMBER FIRED 0	2. NUMBER OF PARACHUTES PROVIDED 6	NUMBER USED 0
3. OXYGEN EQUIPMENT: TYPE A-10	SERVICED: ☒ YES ☐ NO DATE 29 April 53	USED THIS FLIGHT ☐ YES ☒ NO	TYPE MASKS A14A	DID MASKS FIT PROPERLY? ☒ YES ☐ NO
4. SAFETY HELMETS: NUMBER STANDARD TYPE USED 0 NUMBER IMPROVED TYPE USED 0		5. ANTI-G SUITS: NUMBER AVAILABLE, USED 0 NUMBER AVAILABLE, NOT USED 0	☒ NOT AVAILABLE	

6. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal or aircraft equipment, details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)

None

SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DAMAGE TO:

COCKPIT

Cockpit escape hatch damaged.

SEATS, SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELTS

None

CREW STATIONS (OTHER THAN COCKPIT)

None

EMERGENCY EJECT SEATS

Cockpit escape hatch damaged.

PASSENGER CAGES

Radio-set from A/C that exploded penetrated fuselage below cockpit.

Section C—PERSONNEL INVOLVED—(NOTE: Form 14B must also be completed on all rated Pilots regardless of injury, and on all other personnel with fatal or major injuries, as defined in AF Reg. 62-14.)

NAME AND RANK	RATING SYMBOL	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	AT TIME OF ACCIDENT			SHOULDER HARNESS			SAFETY BELT		ESCAPE EXIT USED (Designate)	RESULT (*)
				Flight Duty	Body Position (*)	Location in Plane	Available	Used	Failed	Used	Failed		
Doherty, William E	1/Lt	P	70"	190	CP	1 F	co-pilot seat	x			x	none	(1)
Sullivan, David P	1/Lt	P	683/8	155	P	1 F	pilot seat	x	x		x	none	(1)
Frenz, Carl F	S/Sgt	FE	73"	186	FE	1 F	cargo deck					none	(1)

1. Use following code numbers and letters for position of body: Seated (1); Standing (2); Prone (3); Supine (4); Crouched (5) - Facing forward (F); Facing rear (R).

Examples: 2-F means Standing Facing Forward; 5-R means Crouched Facing Rear, etc.

2. Use following code numbers to specify result to personnel: (1) No injury; (2) Minor injury (par. 13c, Reg. 62-14); (3) Major injury (par. 13b, Reg. 62-14); (4) Killed; (5) Missing.

Section D—MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Robert J. Schlitt
 ROBERT J. SCHLITT, 1/Lt. USAF (MC)
 (SIGNATURE) (NAME AND GRADE)

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Chilton, James		FIRST NAME W.		2. SERIAL NO. 20878 A		3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953		4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Pilot 23 Jun 50		5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Pilot	
6. DATE OF BIRTH 26 Oct 1928		7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: MOS 1124A		8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO		9. DATE GRANTED —		10. FOR WHAT DEFECT? —		11. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL DLK ESTIMATED 14	
12. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 5 Oct 1952				13. EXPLAIN: Result of burns							
14. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS 0		EST. 0		15. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: NA				16. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.			
17. IN QUARTERS: ACTUAL DAYS 0		EST. 0		18. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: NA				19. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: NA			

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.


After personal interview and physical examination of this pilot I find no mental or physical factors that would be contributory to this accident.




Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.



1st and 2nd degree burns



1st degree burns

1st degree burn



REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT

Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.


None

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

None

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:


JOHN H. FREEMAN
Captain USAF
Aircraft Accident Investigation Officer

DATE

18 May 53

GRADE

Capt.

ELEMENT SIGNATURE OR NAME

ROBERT P. STURR JR.

SIGNATURE

s/Robert P. Sturr Jr.

Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Biggs	FIRST NAME T.	MIDDLE NAME W.(10)	2. SERIAL NO. AF 18315337	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Non-Rated	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Flt Engineer
6. DATE OF BIRTH 3 July 1930	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: UNK		8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO	DATE GRANTED -	FOR WHAT DEFECT -	
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 6 May 1952			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL - ESTIMATED - EXPLAIN: Indefinite			
11. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS Indefinite			12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: -		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.	
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Crush fracture vertebrae T 6,7, & 9.			15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: -			

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Airman was in good mental and physical condition at time of accident.





OF 2 WAT 1-2
1000 1200/1953

Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.



Crush fracture
of T 6, 7, & 9.



REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL
Involved in an Accident

Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Crush fracture of vertebrae T 6, 7, & 9.
Lacerations, lower lip, chin & left cheek.
Cerebral concussion.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Injuries caused by flying debris, and/or impact of striking his own A/C after parachuting.

DATE

19 May 1953


GRADE

1/Lt.,

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AWE

USAF(MC) ROBERT J SCHLITZ

SIGNATURE



RESTRICTED (When filled in)

Section 2.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

None

CHLORIDE OF AMMONIUM
 EXHAUSTION: TUBAL 1937 CLINICAL CASE
 CLINICAL REPORT OF AM. ST. 1937

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook. If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Wells	FIRST NAME Williston	MIDDLE NAME Garrett	2. SERIAL NO. NO 764846	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE SrPilot-23 Jan 53	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 27 Jun 1922		7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY Operations Off.		8. WAS PILOT OR FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER ☐ YES ☒ NO	9. DATE GRANTED --	
10. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 5 May 1952		11. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL -- ESTIMATED -- EXPLAIN: --				
12. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS -- EXT. --		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: 1700, 15 May 1953		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ NO ☒ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.		
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Extensive fractures skull and face with avulsion of skull cap and extrusion of brain.		15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: Clothing & personal effects. Dental identification.				

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)


Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Officer was in good mental and physical condition at time of accident.

Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

See Section F

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE

19 May 1953

GRADE

1/Lt, USAF(MC) ROBERT J SCHLITT

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AEG

SIGNATURE



Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

Extensive fracture, skull & face with avulsion of skull cap and extrusion of brain.
Rupture pericardium & left ventricle, heart.
Laceration, liver spleen, extensive rib fractures, bilateral.
Charring of face & neck.
Fracture, simple, left humerus.
Fracture, simple, right knee.

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook. If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Dahl	FIRST NAME Edwin	MIDDLE NAME Eugene	2. SERIAL NO. 102080333	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Pilot-23 Dec 44	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Co-Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Jan 1924	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: MOE Pilot SER 1054-B		8. WAS PILOT OR FLYING STATUS WITH WINGS? ☐ YES ☒ NO	DATE GRANTED —	FOR WHAT DEFECT? —	
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 12 September 1952			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL — ESTIMATED — EXPLAIN: —			
11. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS — EST. —		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: 1700, 15 May 1953		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☐ NO ☒ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.		
14. IN QUARTERS: ACTUAL DAYS — EST. —		15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: Clothing & identification card. Dental identification.				
16. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Lacerations, heart, aorta, lungs, liver & spleen.						

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)


Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time at accident.

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

See Section F

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE
19 May 1953

GRADE
L/Lt, USAF(MC) ROBERT J SCHLITZ

SIGNATURE



Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

Multiple extensive fractures, face & skull.
Multiple rib fractures, bilateral.
Fracture vertebral column D 3-5.
Charring of face & neck which was worse in front.
Compound fracture both knees & lower legs.
Simple fracture rt. & lt. wrist.
Simple fracture left femur.
Simple fracture rt. sterno clavicle.
There were no amputations.
Lacerations heart, aorta, lungs, liver and spleen.

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Battiste, Michael		FIRST NAME (None)		2. SERIAL NO. AF-13379550	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Non-Rated	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Flt Engineer
6. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Dec 1928	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: MON -- SSN --		8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO		9. DATE GRANTED --	10. FOR WHAT DEFECT? --	
11. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 16 Oct 1952			12. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL Indefinite ESTIMATED --				
13. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS indefinite		14. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: Died - 26 July 53		15. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES		16. IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.	
17. IN QUARTERS: ACTUAL DAYS EST.		18. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Traumatic amputation, mid-lower third, left lower leg, Multiple compound fracture, rt. lower tibia & fibula, and rt. foot (Surgical Amputation).					
19. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: --							

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Airman was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.





Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

1st & 2nd degree burns



MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL

Section 1.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Traumatic amputation left leg, mid-lower third.
Multiple compound fracture, rt. lower tibia & fibula & rt. foot;
(Surgical amputation of lower rt. leg)
Laceration rt. knee including quadriceps tendon.
Multiple lacerations & abrasions, both thighs, left buttocks, and lower back.
1st & 2nd degree burns left hand & wrist.
1st & 2nd degree burns left side of forehead.
Compound fracture rt. thumb, proximal phalanx.
Surgical shock.

Section 2.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Injuries caused by flying debris and explosion.

DATE
19 May 1953

GRADE
1/Lt.,

FLIGHT SURGEON OR ASST
USAF(MC) ROBERT J SCHLIT

SIGNATURE



Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

None

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 65-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Cason	FIRST NAME Charles	MIDDLE NAME Leo	2. SERIAL NO. AF 13405660	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT STATUS AND DATE Non-Rated	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Radio Operator
6. DATE OF BIRTH 1 Jan 1931	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: NO. — SEN. —		8. WAS PILOT OR FLYING STATUS WITH WINGMAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO	DATE GRANTED —	FOR WHAT DEFECT? —	
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 13 August 1952			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL — ESTIMATED — EXPLAIN: Indefinite			
11. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS Indefinite		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: —		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.		
IN QUARTERS: ACTUAL DAYS — EST. —		14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Compound fracture rt. os calcis.				
					15. MARKS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: —	

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.


Airman was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.




Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.



1st & 2nd degree burns
of face.



Compound fracture

Simple fracture

Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Compound fracture rt. os calcis.
Chip fracture (simple) left fibular malleolus.
Contusion of back.
1st & 2nd degree burns of face.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

The injuries were caused by the explosion and flying debris.

DATE 19 May 1953	GRADE 1/Lt.	FLIGHT SURGEON OR AINE USAP(MO) ROBERT J. SCHLITZ
---------------------	----------------	--

SIGNATURE



RESTRICTED (When filled in)

Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

None

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE
 CONCLUSIONS OF THE
 AUTOPSY (ORIGINAL) AND THE
 CONCLUSIONS OF THE

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 68-1a and AF Manual 68-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Zack	FIRST NAME Anthony	MIDDLE NAME Henry	2. SERIAL NO. AO 705513	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Sr. Pilot-7 Jan 44	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Oct 1920	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: MOB 1054-B	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO		DATE GRANTED -	FOR WHAT DEFECTS -	
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 18 August 1952			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL 28 ESTIMATED - EXPLAIN: Hospitalized			
11. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS 24		EXT. -		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: - -		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Lacerations of face; concussion of brain.		15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: - -				

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.





Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

None



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Laceration of face.
Concussion of brain

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE
19 May 1953


GRADE

1/1a

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AIDE

SAP(MO) ROBERT J SCHLITZ

SIGNATURE



RESTRICTED (When filled in)

Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

None

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.


Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Muller		FIRST NAME Francis		MIDDLE NAME Leonard		2. SERIAL NO. AO 711782	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Pilot-10 Sept 51	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Co-Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 16 May 24		7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: MOB Pilot		8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO		9. DATE GRANTED —	10. FOR WHAT DEFECT? —		
11. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 15 May 1952				12. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL — ESTIMATED — EXPLAIN: None					
13. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS 0		EST. 0		14. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: —				15. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.	
16. IN QUARTERS: ACTUAL DAYS 0		EST. 0		17. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: None					
						18. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: —			

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.





Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

None



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

None

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

None

DATE

19 May 1953


GRADE

1/Lt, USAF(MC)

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AFE

ROBERT J SCHLITZ

SIGNATURE



Section B.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

None

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 63-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Proese	FIRST NAME Orville	MIDDLE NAME Max	2. SERIAL NO. AF 18358568	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Non-Rated	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Flt. Engineer
6. DATE OF BIRTH 6 Feb 1932	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY MOB. ☐ SEN. ☐		8. WAS PILOT OR FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER ☐ YES ☐ NO	9. DATE GRANTED --	10. FOR WHAT DEFECT? --	
11. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM FOR FLYING 12 March 1953			12. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL Indefinite ESTIMATED -- EXPLAIN:			
13. HOSPITALIZATION IN QUARTERS	ACTUAL DATES Indefinite	EST.	14. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH --		15. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.	
16. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Wound, lacerated, left eye, cornea. Foreign body, (Plexiglass), retained, bulbar conjunctiva, left eye. Wound, lacerated, left eye, lower eyelid.					17. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: --	

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Airman was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.





Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

None



Medical Report of an Individual

Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Wound, lacerated, left eye, cornea.

Foreign body (plexiglass), retained, bulbar conjunctiva, left eye.

Wound, lacerated, left eye, lower eyelid.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE
19 May 1953

GRADE
1/Lt.

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AWC
SAP(MC) ROBERT J. SCHLITZ

SIGNATURE



Section 7.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook. If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Sullivan		FIRST NAME David		MIDDLE NAME Pope	2. SERIAL NO. AD 1910348	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE May 50-Pilot	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 8 Oct 28	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: MOL 1054-B SSN		8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO		DATE GRANTED —	FOR WHAT DEFECT? None		
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 13 August 1952			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL 2 ESTIMATED — EXPLAIN:					
11. HOSPITALIZED:	ACTUAL DAYS 0	EST.	—		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED?	
IN QUARTERS:	ACTUAL DAYS 0	EST.	—		Not applicable		☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.	
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: None						15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: — —		

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.



Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.

Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

None



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

None

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.


None

DATE
19 May 1953

GRADE
1/Lt, USAF(MC) ROBERT J SCHLITT

FLIGHT SURGEON OF AME

SIGNATURE



Section 8.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

None

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook. If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Dohney		FIRST NAME William		MIDDLE NAME Edward	2. SERIAL NO. 40 577380	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 53	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Pilot-May 1951	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Co-Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 14 Jan 1918		7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: POS 1054-B		SEN. --	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO	DATE GRANTED --	FOR WHAT DEFECT? --	
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 26 November 1952					10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL -- ESTIMATED -- EXPLAIN: None			
11. HOSPITALIZED:		ACTUAL DAYS 0		EST. 0	12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH -- --		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.	
IN QUARTERS:		ACTUAL DAYS 0		EST. 0				
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: None						15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY:		

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.



Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.

Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree (1); 2d degree (2); 3d degree (3).

None



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

None

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

None

DATE	GRADE	FLIGHT SURGEON OR AWE	SIGNATURE
19 May 1953	1/Lt., USAF(MC)	ROBERT J SCHLITT	

Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

None

REPORT OF EMERGENCY PARACHUTE JUMP

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Answer all questions and fill in all spaces that apply to this incident giving all information that is known. If more than one answer fits the situation, check each appropriate answer. If the appropriate answer is not listed, write it in the blank space provided. If additional space is needed, use unfilled space under Section H, or use additional sheet(s) identified by proper section letter and question number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Chilton, James W.	JR. I. ETC.	FIRST NAME James W.	MIDDLE	GRADE 1st Lt	RATED ☒	INCORPORATED ☐	YEAR OF BIRTH 1928	AIR CREW DUTY Pilot
2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, AND BLOCK NO. F-84E 5-1628		3. WEATHER CONDITION AT TIME OF bailout: ☒ VFR ☐ IFR (OT) ☐ IFR (AO)			4. DATE 15 May 53		5. DAY ☒ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK ☐	
6. APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF EMERGENCY:								
7. REASON FOR JUMP: ☐ FIRE ☐ ENGINE FAILURE ☒ WINDMILL COLLISION ☐ WEATHER ☐ FUEL EXHAUSTION ☐ EXPLOSION ☐ LOSS OF CONTROL ☐ LOST ☐ OTHER (Specify):								

Section B—PROCEDURES

8. DIFFICULTIES IN LEAVING AIRCRAFT:		☐ INJURIES OR BURNS IMPEDING MOVEMENT ☐ NONE	
☐ RELEASED PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELT, OXYGEN MASK, MIRE, EARPHONES, ETC.)		☐ LACK OF TIME FOR ANY PLANNING	
☐ GETTING CHUTE OR HARNESS ON OR FASTENED		☐ DESIGNATED ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY NOT OPENING	
☐ CHUTE OR HARNESS OR CLOTHING CATCHING ON SEAT OR EQUIPMENT		☐ ANOXIA	
☐ ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY JAMMING OR STICKING		☐ INTERPHONE SYSTEM OR ALARM SYSTEM NOT FUNCTIONING	
☐ STRUCK BY CANOPY OR ESCAPE HATCH		☐ OTHER (Describe):	
☐ CENTRIFUGAL FORCE SLOWING DOWN BODY MOVEMENT			
9. BODY POSITION UPON LEAVING PLANE: ☒ HEAD FIRST ☐ FEET FIRST ☐ TUCKED ☐ UNKNOWN			
10. EXIT USED: ☒ EJECTION SEAT ☐ CANOPY: ☐ CANOPY, FRONT ☐ CANOPY, REAR ☐ WAIST OR MAIN ESCAPE HATCH			
☐ FORWARD OR MAIN BOMB BAY ☐ NOOSEWHEEL WELL ☐ SLOWED OUT BY EXPLOSION			
☐ AFT BOMB BAY ☐ GUNNER'S ESCAPE HATCH ☐ OTHER (Describe):			
☐ COCKPIT E-CAPE HATCH ☐ BOTTOM ESCAPE HATCH			
11. ATTEMPTED TO STRAIGHTEN BODY BEFORE PULLING RIPCORD: ☐ EXTENDING ARMS ☐ EXTENDING LEGS ☐ ROLLED ON BACK ☐ NONE			
12. DIFFICULTY IN FINDING OR PULLING RIPCORD: ☐ CHUTE HARNESS LOOSE OR TWISTED ☐ INJURED OR WOUNDED ☐ GLOVES WORN ☒ NONE			
☐ HANDLE STUCK ☐ HANDLE PULLED LOOSE ☐ OTHER (Specify):			
13. TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN LEAVING PLANE AND PULLING RIPCORD (IN SECONDS): ☐ IMMEDIATELY ☒ 1 TO 5 ☐ 6 TO 10 ☐ 11 TO 20 ☐ 21 TO 30 ☐ ABOVE 30 ☐ UNKNOWN			
14. BODY POSITION DURING OPENING: ☒ FEET DOWN ☐ HEAD DOWN ☐ ON BACK ☐ ON FACE ☐ TUMBLING			
15. OPENING SHOCK: ☐ VERY SLIGHT ☐ MODERATE, NO INJURY ☐ SEVERE, NO INJURY ☐ PRODUCED INJURY ☐ UNCONSCIOUSNESS ☒ NONE			
16. ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL CHUTE OR BODY POSITION AFTER OPENING: ☒ SLIPPING CHUTE ☐ TURNING BODY TO FACE DRIFT ☐ NONE			
17. EFFECTS DURING DESCENT: ☐ DIZZINESS ☐ NAUSEA ☐ ANOXIA ☐ UNCONSCIOUSNESS ☐ FROSTBITE ☐ OTHER (Describe):			
18. DIRECTION OF BODY DRIFT AT TOUCHDOWN: ☒ FORWARD ☐ BACKWARD ☐ SIDEWAYS		19. ATTITUDE AT LANDING: ☐ VERTICAL ☐ SWINGING	
20. FORCE OF LANDING EQUIVALENT TO: ☒ 10-15 FT. FREE FALL ☐ 16-20 FT. FREE FALL ☐ ABOVE 20 FT. FREE FALL			
21. EVENTS AFTER TOUCHDOWN: ☐ ROLLED FORWARD ☐ BACKWARD ☐ FELL FORWARD ☐ BACKWARD ☐ FELL SIDEWAYS, LEFT ☒ RIGHT			
☐ DRAGGED BY CHUTE _____ FT. ☐ ENTANGLED BY CHUTE _____ MINUTES ☐ OTHER (Describe):			
22. DIFFICULTY IN COLLAPSE OF CANOPY AND RELEASE OF HARNESS:		☐ CANOPY COLLAPSED WITH DIFFICULTY ☐ NONE	
☐ BUCKLES OR TRAPS HARD TO RELEASE		☐ WIND HINDERED EFFORTS	
☐ TANGLED IN HARNESS, RISERS, OR SHROUD LINES		☐ INJURY OR UNCONSCIOUSNESS DELAYED EFFORTS	
☐ JAMMING OR FAILURE OF QUICK RELEASE MECHANISM (Describe):			
☐ OTHER (Describe):			
23. FUNCTIONING OF CHUTE: ☒ PERFECT ☐ PANELS RIPPED OUT ☐ SHROUD LINES BROKE ☐ RISERS TWISTED ☐ HOLES IN CANOPY			
☐ LINE TWISTED OVER CANOPY, OSCILLATED ☐ SEVERELY ☐ SLIGHTLY ☐ OTHER (Specify):			

Section C—RESULTS TO PARACHUTIST

Check whether—BEFORE LEAVING (A); LEAVING (B); DESCENT (C); LANDING (D)

INJURIES	A	B	C	D	INJURIES	A	B	C	D	INJURIES	A	B	C	D
1. FRACTURE—SKULL AND/OR FACE					2. SPRAIN / DISLOCATION					12. BURNS				
3. FRACTURE—VERTEBRA					3. ARM OR WRIST					13. FROSTBITE				
4. FRACTURE—CLAVICLE					4. ANKLE OR KNEE					14. ABRASIONS OR CONTUSIONS				
5. FRACTURE—RIBS					5. SPRAIN OR STRAIN, BACK OR NECK					15. HOSPITALIZED (DAYS)				
6. FRACTURE—ARM OR WRIST					6. LACERATIONS, MAJOR					Explain cause of injury in full detail, using unfilled space under Section H, or additional sheets as necessary.				
7. FRACTURE—ANKLE OR LUG					7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS									

Section D—AERIAL CONDITIONS

1. APPROXIMATE HEIGHT ABOVE SURFACE IN FEET 5,000 2. IAS OF AIRPLANE AT TIME OF BAILOUT, IN KNOTS 350
 3. ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF BAILOUT: ☐ LEVEL ☒ INVERTED ☐ DIVE ☐ CLIMB 4. APPROXIMATE FREE AIR TEMPERATURE:
 BURN: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT SPIN: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT SPIRAL: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT ☐ UNKNOWN * CENTIGRADE

Section E—SURFACE CONDITIONS AT POINT OF LANDING

1. LAND: TYPE OF TERRAIN
☒ FLAT ☐ HILLY
☐ MOUNTAINOUS ☐ DESERT
☐ ICE ☐ SWAMP
☐ OTHER (Describe):
 2. HEIGHT AT WHICH LANDING SITE WAS FIRST DETERMINED (FEET) 1,000
 3. WATER: ☐ FRESH ☐ SALT APPROXIMATE DEPTH (FEET) APPROXIMATE TEMPERATURE (° F.)
 4. VELOCITY OF SURFACE WIND (KNOTS) 5. SURFACE AIR TEMPERATURE (° F.)
 GROUND CONDITIONS: ☐ SOFT ☐ HARD ☐ SLIPPERY ☐ ROCKY
☐ DITCHES OR GULLIES ☐ OTHER (Describe): open field
 GROUND OBSTRUCTIONS: ☐ TREES ☐ BUSHES
☒ POWER LINES ☐ BUILDINGS
☐ STONES, BOULDERS ☐ OTHER (Describe):
☐ NONE
 6. WATER CONDITIONS: ☐ CALM ☐ ROLLING SWELL ☐ WAVES, HEIGHT (FT.)
☐ CHOPPY

Section F—EQUIPMENT

1. SIZE OF CHUTE: ☐ 24 FT. ☐ 26 FT. ☒ 28 FT. 2. TYPE OF CHUTE: ☐ S-1 ☐ S-2 ☐ S-3 ☐ S-4 ☐ S-5 ☐ S-6 ☐ S-7 ☐ S-8 ☐ S-9 ☐ S-10 ☐ S-11 ☐ S-12 ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 3. QUICK ADJUSTABLE HARNESS: ☐ YES ☐ NO QUICK RELEASE HARNESS: ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 4. TYPE OF FOOTWEAR: ☐ LOW QUARTER OXFORD ☐ G. I. SHOES ☒ BOOTS ☐ FLYING BOOTS ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 5. EMERGENCY BAILOUT OXYGEN: ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED: ☒ NOT USED (Explain): Not high enough
 6. CRASH HELMET: ☒ STANDARD TYPE ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED: ☒ NOT USED (Explain): Not over water
☐ IMPROVED ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED: ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 7. MAE WEST: ☐ TYPE USED ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, NOT USED (Explain):
 8. HEIGHT OF PARACHUTIST (FT. AND IN.) 5'11" WEIGHT WITH EQUIPMENT (POUNDS) 180
 9. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE INSPECTION 6 April 1953 10. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE REPACK 6 April 1953
 11. LIST ALL ITEMS OF SPECIAL OR PERSONAL EQUIPMENT USED DURING BAILOUT Ejection seat, parachute, gloves, crash helmet, O₂ mask, sunglasses
 12. LIST ANY ITEMS LOST DURING BAILOUT OR DESCENT Crash helmet, O₂ mask, sunglasses

Section G—TRAINING AND PREPARATION

1. WAS CHUTE HARNESS FITTED BY QUALIFIED PARACHUTE PERSONNEL? (If not, explain):
yes
 2. WAS THE FIT OF THE HARNESS SATISFACTORY FOR THIS BAILOUT? (If not, explain):
yes
 3. PREVIOUS PARACHUTE TRAINING: ☒ LECTURES ☐ GROUND TRAINING (HARNESS RIGS, TUMBLING, ETC.) ☐ NONE NUMBER OF PREVIOUS JUMPS 0

Section H—CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Information is desired regarding the necessity for such equipment as flashlights, signal mirrors, "Very" pistol, hand flares, knife, side arms, or other items. Add any recommendations you may have for training and equipment, specifically in regard to techniques of bailout from high-speed aircraft. Valid criticism on existing equipment is invited.

R Recommend new type crash helmet that will stay on pilot during high speed ejection. This pilot had a P₁₄ helmet with chin straps and screw on locks, but still lost his helmet and O₂ mask.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

John H. Freeman
 JOHN H. FREEMAN
 Captain USAF
 Aircraft Accident Investigation Officer

SIGNATURES
(NAME, GRADE, AND
STATION)

PARACHUTIST

FLIGHT SURGEON

REPORT OF EMERGENCY PARACHUTE JUMP

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 93-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Answer all questions and fill in all spaces that apply to this incident giving all information that is known. If more than one answer fits the situation, check each appropriate answer. If the appropriate answer is not listed, write it in the blank space provided. If additional space is needed, use unfiled space under Section II, or use additional sheet(s) identified by proper section letter and question number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME BIGGS	JR., II, ETC. -	FIRST NAME T. (IO)	MIDDLE W.	GRADE Sgt	PATED ☐	HONORATED ☒	YEAR OF BIRTH 1930	AIR CREW DUTY Flt Engineer
2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, AND BUICK NO. C-119		3. WEATHER CONDITION AT TIME OF PARACHUTE: ☒ VFR: ☐ DZ (OT) ☐ IFR (AG) ☐ OTHER (Describe):				4. DATE 15 May 53		☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK
5. APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF EMERGENCY: 5 miles west of Mannheim, Germany								
6. REASONS FOR JUMP: ☐ FIRE, ☐ ENGINE FAILURE, ☒ MID-AIR COLLISION, ☐ WEATHER, ☐ FUEL EXHAUSTION, ☐ EXPLOSION, ☐ LOSS OF CONTROL, ☐ LOST, ☐ OTHER (Describe):								

Section B—PROCEDURES

1. DIFFICULTIES IN LEAVING AIRCRAFT		☐ INJURIES OR BURNS IMPEDING MOVEMENT ☐ NONE	
☐ RELEASED PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELT, OXYGEN MASK, NOSE, EARPHONES, ETC.)		☒ LACK OF TIME FOR ANY PLANNING	
☐ GETTING CHUTE OR HARNESSES ON OR FASTENED		☐ DESIGNATED ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY NOT OPENING	
☐ CHUTE OR HARNESSES OR CLOTHING CATCHING ON SEAT OR EQUIPMENT		☐ ANKLE	
☐ ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY JAMMING OR STICKING		☐ INTERPHONE SYSTEM OR ALARM SYSTEM NOT FUNCTIONING	
☐ STRUCK BY CANOPY OR ESCAPE HATCH		☐ OTHER (Describe):	
☒ CENTRIFUGAL FORCE SLOWING DOWN BODY MOVEMENT			
2. BODY POSITION UPON LEAVING PLANE: ☐ HEAD FIRST, ☒ FEET FIRST, ☐ TUCKED, ☐ UNKNOWN			
3. EXIT USED: ☐ EJECTION SEAT, ☐ CAPSULE, ☐ CANOPY, FRONT, ☐ CANOPY, REAR, ☐ WING OR MAIN ESCAPE HATCH			
☐ FORWARD OR MAIN BOMB BAY		☐ BLOWN OUT BY EXPLOSION	
☐ AFT BOMB BAY		☐ OTHER (Describe):	
☐ COCKPIT ESCAPE HATCH		At rear door	
4. ATTEMPTS TO STRAIGHTEN BODY BEFORE PULLING RIPCORD: ☐ EXTENDING ARMS, ☐ EXTENDING LEGS, ☐ ROLLED ON BACK, ☒ NONE			
5. DIFFICULTY IN FINISHING OR PULLING RIPCORD: ☐ CHUTE HARNESSES LOOSE OR TWISTED, ☐ INJURED OR WOUNDED, ☐ GLOVES WORN, ☒ NONE			
☐ HANDLE STUCK, ☐ HANDLE PEELED LOOSE, ☐ OTHER (Describe):			
6. TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN LEAVING PLANE AND PULLING RIPCORD (IN SECONDS): ☒ IMMEDIATELY, ☐ 1 TO 5, ☐ 6 TO 10, ☐ 11 TO 15, ☐ 16 TO 20, ☐ ABOVE 20, ☐ UNKNOWN			
7. BODY POSITION DURING OPENING: ☒ FEET DOWN, ☐ HEAD DOWN, ☐ ON BACK, ☐ ON FACE, ☐ TUMBLING			
8. OPENING SHOCK: ☐ VERY SLIGHT, ☐ MODERATE, NO INJURY, ☐ SEVERE, NO INJURY, ☐ PRODUCED INJURY, ☐ UNCONSCIOUSNESS, ☐ NONE			
9. ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL CHUTE OR BODY POSITION AFTER OPENING: ☐ SLIPPING CHUTE, ☐ TURNING BODY TO FACE DRIFT, ☒ NONE			
10. EFFECTS DURING DESCENT: ☐ DIZZINESS, ☐ NAUSEA, ☐ ANKLE, ☒ UNCONSCIOUSNESS, ☐ FROSTBITE, ☐ OTHER (Describe):			
11. DIRECTION OF BODY DRIFT AT TOUCHDOWN: ☐ FORWARD, ☐ BACKWARD, ☐ SIDEWAYS, ☐ ATTITUDE AT LANDING: ☐ VERTICAL, ☐ SWINGING			
12. FORCE OF LANDING EQUIVALENT TO: ☐ 15-20 FT. FREE FALL, ☐ 20-25 FT. FREE FALL, ☐ ABOVE 25 FT. FREE FALL			
13. EVENTS AFTER TOUCHDOWN: ☐ ROLLED FORWARD, ☐ BACKWARD, ☐ FELL FORWARD, ☐ BACKWARD, ☐ FELL, SIDEWAYS, LEFT, ☐ RIGHT, ☐ OTHER (Describe):			
14. DIFFICULTY IN COLLAPSE OF CANOPY AND RELEASE OF HARNESSES: ☐ BUCKLES OR SNAPS HARD TO RELEASE, ☐ CANOPY COLLAPSED WITH DIFFICULTY, ☐ NONE			
☐ TANGLED IN HARNESSES, RISERS, OR SHROUD LINES		☐ WIND HINDERED EFFORTS	
☐ JAMMING OR FAILURE OF QUICK RELEASE MECHANISM (Describe):		☐ INJURY OR UNCONSCIOUSNESS DELAYED EFFORTS	
☐ OTHER (Describe):			
15. FUNCTIONING OF CHUTE: ☒ PERFECT, ☐ PANELS RIPPED OUT, ☐ SHROUD LINES BROKE, ☐ RISERS TWISTED, ☐ HOLDS IN CANOPY, ☐ LINES TWISTED OVER CANOPY, ☐ OSCILLATED, ☐ SEVERELY, ☐ SLIGHTLY, ☐ OTHER (Describe):			

Section C—RESULTS TO PARACHUTIST

Check whether—BEFORE LEAVING (A), LEAVING (B), DESCENT (C), LANDING (D)

INJURIES					INJURIES					INJURIES				
	A	B	C	D		A	B	C	D		A	B	C	D
1. FRACTURE—SKULL AND/OR FACE					SPRAIN OR DISLOCATION:					12. BURNS				
2. FRACTURE—VERTEBRA					7. ARM OR WRIST					13. FROSTBITE				
3. FRACTURE—CLAVICLE					8. ANKLE OR KNEE					14. ABRASIONS OR CONTUSIONS				
4. FRACTURE—RIBS					9. SPRAIN OR STRAIN, BACK OR NECK					15. HOSPITALIZED (DAYS)	Indefinite			
5. FRACTURE—ARM OR WRIST					10. LACERATIONS, MAJOR					Explain cause of injury in full detail, using unfiled space under Section II, or additional sheets as necessary.				
6. FRACTURE—ANKLE OR LEG					11. UNCONSCIOUSNESS									

Section D—AERIAL CONDITIONS

1. APPROXIMATE HEIGHT ABOVE SURFACE, IN FEET 4500 2. IAS OF AIRPLANE AT TIME OF BAILOUT, IN KNOTS 150
 3. ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF BAILOUT: ☐ LEVEL ☐ INVERTED ☐ DIVE ☐ CLIMB 4. APPROXIMATE FREE AIR TEMPERATURE:
 BANK: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT SPIN: ☒ LEFT ☐ RIGHT SPIRAL: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT ☐ UNKNOWN 14 * CENTIGRADE

Section E—SURFACE CONDITIONS AT POINT OF LANDING

1. LAND TYPE OF TERRAIN: ☒ FLAT ☐ HILLY ☐ MOUNTAINOUS ☐ DESERT ☐ ICE ☐ SWAMP ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 GROUND CONDITIONS: ☐ SOFT ☒ HARD ☐ SLIPPERY ☐ ROCKY ☐ DITCHES OR GULLIES ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 GROUND OBSTRUCTIONS: ☐ TREES ☐ BUSHES ☐ POWER LINES ☐ BUILDINGS ☐ STONES, BOULDER ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 2. HEIGHT AT WHICH LANDING SITE WAS FIRST DETERMINED (FEET) Unconsciousness ☒ NONE
 3. WATER: ☐ FRESH ☐ SALT APPROXIMATE DEPTH (FEET) WATER CONDITIONS: ☐ CALM ☐ ROLLING SWELL ☐ WAVES, HEIGHT (FT.)
☐ APPROXIMATE TEMPERATURE (° F.) ☐ CHOPPY
 4. VELOCITY OF SURFACE WIND (KNOTS) 5. SURFACE AIR TEMPERATURE (° F.)

Section F—EQUIPMENT

1. SIZE OF CHUTE: ☒ 24 FT. ☐ 30 FT. ☐ 36 FT. 2. TYPE OF CHUTE: ☐ S-1 ☐ S-2 ☐ S-3 ☐ S-4 ☐ S-5 ☐ S-6 ☐ S-7 ☐ S-8 ☐ S-9 ☐ S-10 ☐ S-11 ☐ S-12 ☐ A-1 ☐ A-2 ☒ OTHER (Describe): B-TN 45-71944
 3. QUICK ADJUSTABLE HARNESS: ☐ YES ☐ NO QUICK RELEASE HARNESS: ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 4. TYPE OF FOOTGEAR: ☐ GUM QUARTER OXFORD ☒ G.I. SHOES ☐ BOOTS ☐ FLYING BOOTS ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 5. EMERGENCY BAILOUT OXYGEN: ☒ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 6. CRASH HELMET: ☐ STANDARD TYPE ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
☐ IMPROVISED ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED ☐ NOT USED (Explain): No helmets
 7. MAE WEST: ☐ TYPE USED ☒ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, NOT USED (Explain):
 8. HEIGHT OF PARACHUTIST (FT. AND IN.) 5'11" WEIGHT WITH EQUIPMENT (POUNDS) 184 & chute
 9. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE INSPECTION 6 May 1953 10. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE REPACK 28 Apr 53
 11. LIST ALL ITEMS OF SPECIAL OR PERSONAL EQUIPMENT USED DURING BAILOUT
None
 12. LIST ANY ITEMS LOST DURING BAILOUT OR DESCENT Watch, Billfold.

Section G—TRAINING AND PREPARATION

1. WAS CHUTE HARNESS FITTED BY QUALIFIED PARACHUTE PERSONNEL? (If not, explain):
Yes
 2. WAS THE FIT OF THE HARNESS SATISFACTORY FOR THIS BAILOUT? (If not, explain):
Yes
 3. PREVIOUS PARACHUTE TRAINING: ☒ LECTURES ☒ GROUND TRAINING (HARNESS RIGS, TUMBLING, ETC.) ☐ NONE NUMBER OF PREVIOUS JUMPS 0

Section H—CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Information is desired regarding the necessity for such equipment as flashlights, signal mirrors, "Very" pistol, hand flares, knife, side arms, or other items. Add any recommendations you may have for training and equipment, specifically in regard to techniques of bailout from high-speed aircraft. Valid criticism on existing equipment is invited.

☒ Suggest more training be given to personnel in use of parachute, and escape hatches.

Crush fracture of T6,7,49.

Laceration, lower lip, chin, & lower cheek.

Cerebral concussion.

Unconsciousness and injuries caused by striking A/C after parachuting.

SIGNATURE
(NAME, GRADE, AND
STATION)

PARACHUTIST

FLIGHT ENGINEER

ROBERT J SCHITT, 1/Lt., USAF(MC)

REPORT OF EMERGENCY PARACHUTE JUMP

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Answer all questions and fill in all spaces that apply to this incident giving all information that is known. If more than one answer fits the situation, check each appropriate answer. If the appropriate answer is not listed, write it in the blank space provided. If additional space is needed, use unfilled space under Section H, or use additional sheet(s) identified by proper section letter and question number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Battiste	JR., R. ETC.	FIRST NAME Michael	MIDDLE None	GRADE A/1c	RATED ☐	NOMINATED ☒	YEAR OF BIRTH 1928	AIR CREW DUTY Flt Engineer
2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, AND BLOCK NO. C-119		3. WEATHER CONDITION AT TIME OF PARACHUTE: ☒ VFR ☐ IFR (OT) ☐ IFR (A) ☐ OTHER (Specify):				4. DATE 15 May 1953		☒ DAY ☐ DAWN ☐ NIGHT ☐ DUSK
5. APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF EMERGENCY: 5 miles west of Mannheim, Germany								
6. REASON FOR JUMP: ☐ FIRE; ☐ ENGINE FAILURE; ☐ MID-AIR COLLISION; ☐ WEATHER; ☐ FUEL EXHAUSTION; ☐ EXPLOSION; ☐ LOSS OF CONTROL; ☐ LOST; ☒ OTHER (Specify): All blown out of plane.								

Section B—PROCEDURES

7. DIFFICULTIES IN LEAVING AIRCRAFT:		☐ RELEASE PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELT, OXYGEN MASK, MINE, EARPHONES, ETC.)		☐ INJURIES OR BURNS IMPEDING MOVEMENT		☐ NONE	
☐ GETTING CHUTE OR HARNESS ON OR FASTENED		☐ CHUTE OR HARNESS OR CLOTHING CATCHING ON SEAT OR EQUIPMENT		☒ LACK OF TIME FOR ANY PLANNING		☐ DESIGNATED ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY NOT OPENING	
☐ ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY JAMMING OR STICKING		☐ STRUCK BY CANOPY OR ESCAPE HATCH		☐ ANOXIA		☐ INTERPHONE SYSTEM OR ALARM SYSTEM NOT FUNCTIONING	
☐ CENTRIFUGAL FORCE SLOWING DOWN BODY MOVEMENT		☐ OTHER (Specify):					
8. BODY POSITION UPON LEAVING PLANE:		☐ HEAD FIRST; ☐ FEET FIRST; ☐ TUCKED; ☒ UNKNOWN					
9. EXIT USED:		☐ EJECTION SEAT; ☐ CAPSULE; ☐ CANOPY, FRONT; ☐ CANOPY, REAR; ☐ WAIST OR MAIN ESCAPE HATCH					
☐ FORWARD OR MAIN BOMB BAY		☐ AFT BOMB BAY		☐ COCKPIT ESCAPE HATCH		☐ OTHER (Specify):	
☐ FORWARD OR MAIN BOMB BAY		☐ AFT BOMB BAY		☐ COCKPIT ESCAPE HATCH		☒ BLOWN OUT BY EXPLOSION	
☐ FORWARD OR MAIN BOMB BAY		☐ AFT BOMB BAY		☐ COCKPIT ESCAPE HATCH		☐ OTHER (Specify): Body was straight	
10. ATTEMPTS TO STRAIGHTEN BODY BEFORE PULLING RIGGERS:		☐ EXTENDING ARMS; ☐ EXTENDING LEGS; ☐ ROLLED ON BACK; ☒ NONE					
11. DIFFICULTY IN FINDING OR PULLING RIGGERS:		☐ CHUTE HARNESS LOOSE OR TWISTED; ☐ INJURED OR WOUNDED; ☐ GLOVES WORN					
☐ HANDLE STUCK; ☐ HANDLE PULLED LOOSE; ☐ OTHER (Specify):		☒ NONE					
12. TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN LEAVING PLANE AND PULLING RIGGERS (IN SECONDS):		☐ IMMEDIATELY; ☐ 1 TO 5; ☒ 6 TO 10; ☐ 11 TO 20; ☐ 21 TO 30; ☐ ABOVE 30; ☐ UNKNOWN					
13. BODY POSITION DURING OPENING:		☒ FEET DOWN; ☐ HEAD DOWN; ☐ ON BACK; ☐ ON FACE; ☐ TUMBLING					
14. OPENING SHOCK:		☒ SEVERE INJURY; ☐ MODERATE NO INJURY; ☐ SEVERE NO INJURY; ☐ PROFOUND INJURY; ☐ UNCONSCIOUSNESS; ☐ NONE					
15. ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL CHUTE OR BODY POSITION AFTER OPENING:		☐ SLIPPING CHUTE; ☒ TURNING BODY TO FACE CRAFT; ☐ NONE					
16. EFFECTS DURING DESCENT:		☐ DIZZINESS; ☐ NAUSEA; ☐ ANOXIA; ☐ UNCONSCIOUSNESS; ☐ FROSTBITE; ☒ OTHER (Specify):					
Shock, All severely injured.							
17. DIRECTION OF BODY DRIFT AT TOUCHDOWN:		☐ FORWARD; ☒ BACKWARD; ☐ SIDEWAYS		18. ATTITUDE AT LANDING: ☒ VERTICAL; ☐ BRIDGING			
19. FORCE OF LANDING EQUIVALENT TO:		☒ 10-15 FT. FREE FALL; ☐ 16-20 FT. FREE FALL; ☐ ABOVE 20 FT. FREE FALL					
20. EVENTS AFTER TOUCHDOWN:		☐ ROLLED FORWARD; ☐ BACKWARD; ☐ FELL FORWARD; ☒ BACKWARD; ☐ FELL SIDEWAYS LEFT; ☐ RIGHT;					
☐ DRAGGED BY CHUTE _____ FT.; ☐ ENTANGLED BY CHUTE _____ MINUTES; ☐ OTHER (Specify):							
21. DIFFICULTY IN COLLAPSE OF CANOPY AND RELEASE OF HARNESS:		☐ BUCKLES OR SNAPS HARD TO RELEASE; ☐ CANOPY COLLAPSED WITH DIFFICULTY; ☐ NONE					
☐ TANGLED IN HARNESS RISERS OR SHOULDER LINES		☐ WIND HINDERED EFFORTS					
☐ JAMMING OR FAILURE OF QUICK RELEASE MECHANISM (Specify):		☒ INJURY OR UNCONSCIOUSNESS DELAYED EFFORTS					
☐ OTHER (Specify):							
22. FUNCTIONING OF CHUTE:		☒ PERFECT; ☐ PANELS RIPPED OUT; ☐ SHOULDER LINES BROKE; ☐ RISERS TWISTED; ☐ HOLES IN CANOPY;					
☐ LINE TWISTED OVER CANOPY; ☐ OSCILLATED; ☐ SEVERELY; ☐ SLIGHTLY; ☐ OTHER (Specify):							

Section C—RESULTS TO PARACHUTIST

Class whether: BEFORE LEAVING (A); LEAVING (B); DESCENT (C); LANDING (D)

INJURIES	A	B	C	D	INJURIES	A	B	C	D	INJURIES	A	B	C	D
1. FRACTURE—SKULL AND/OR FACE					2. SPRAIN OR DISLOCATION					12. BURNS				
2. FRACTURE—VERTEBRA					3. ARM OR WRIST					13. FROSTBITE				
3. FRACTURE—CLAVICLE					4. ANKLE OR KNEE					14. ABRASIONS OR CONTUSIONS				
4. FRACTURE—RIB					5. SPRAIN OR STRAIN, BACK OR NECK					15. HOSPITALIZED (DAYS)	Indefinite			
5. FRACTURE—ARM OR WRIST					6. LACERATIONS, MAJOR					Explain cause of injury in full detail, using unfilled space under Section H, or additional sheets as necessary.				
6. FRACTURE—SHOULDER OR LEG					7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS									

Section D—AERIAL CONDITIONS

1. APPROXIMATE HEIGHT ABOVE SURFACE, IN FEET 4500 2. MAG OF AIRPLANE AT TIME OF BAILOUT, IN KNOTS
 3. ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF BAILOUT: ☐ LEVEL; ☐ INVERTED; ☐ DIVE; ☐ CLIMB
 BANK: ☐ LEFT; ☐ RIGHT. SPIN: ☐ LEFT; ☐ RIGHT. SPIN: ☐ LEFT; ☐ RIGHT. ☒ UNKNOWN 4. APPROXIMATE FREE AIR TEMPERATURE: 34 ° CENTIGRADE

Section E—SURFACE CONDITIONS AT POINT OF LANDING

1. LAND TYPE OF TERRAIN: ☒ FLAT ☐ HILLY ☐ MOUNTAINOUS ☐ DESERT ☐ ICE ☐ SWAMP ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 2. HEIGHT AT WHICH LANDING SITE WAS FIRST DETERMINED (FEET) ☒ NONE
 3. WATER: ☐ FRESH ☐ SALT APPROXIMATE DEPTH (FEET) APPROXIMATE TEMPERATURE (° F.)
 WATER CONDITIONS: ☐ CALM ☐ ROLLING SWELL ☐ WAVES, HEIGHT (FT.)
 4. VELOCITY OF SURFACE WIND (KNOTS) None 5. SURFACE AIR TEMPERATURE (° F.) 70

Section F—EQUIPMENT

1. SIZE OF CHUTE: ☐ 24 FT. ☐ 30 FT. ☐ 36 FT. 2. TYPE OF CHUTE: ☐ S-1 ☐ S-2 ☐ S-3 ☐ S-4 ☐ S-5 ☐ S-6 ☐ S-7 ☐ S-8 ☐ S-9 ☐ S-10 ☐ A-1 ☐ A-2 ☒ OTHER (Describe): B-TN 45-71169
 3. QUICK ADJUSTABLE HARNESS: ☒ YES; ☐ NO. QUICK RELEASE HARNESS: ☒ YES; ☐ NO; ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 4. TYPE OF FOOTGEAR: ☐ LOW QUARTER OXFORD; ☒ OR. 1. SHOES; ☐ BOOTS; ☐ FLYING BOOTS; ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 5. EMERGENCY BAILOUT OXYGEN: ☐ NOT AVAILABLE; ☐ AVAILABLE, USED; ☒ NOT USED (Explain):
 6. CRASH HELMET: ☐ STANDARD TYPE; ☒ NOT AVAILABLE; ☐ AVAILABLE, USED; ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 7. MAE WEST: ☐ TYPE USED; ☒ NOT AVAILABLE; ☐ AVAILABLE, NOT USED (Explain):
 8. HEIGHT OF PARACHUTIST (FT. AND IN.) 5'10" WEIGHT WITH EQUIPMENT (POUNDS) 175 & chute
 9. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE INSPECTION 8 May 1953 10. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE REPAIR 7 Apr 53
 11. LIST ALL ITEMS OF SPECIAL OR PERSONAL EQUIPMENT USED DURING BAILOUT
 12. LIST ANY ITEMS LOST DURING BAILOUT OR DESCENT

Section G—TRAINING AND PREPARATION

1. WAS CHUTE HARNESS FITTED BY QUALIFIED PARACHUTE PERSONNEL? (If not, explain): Yes
 2. WAS THE FIT OF THE HARNESS SATISFACTORY FOR THIS BAILOUT? (If not, explain): Yes
 3. PREVIOUS PARACHUTE TRAINING: ☒ LECTURES; ☒ GROUND TRAINING (HARNESS RIGS, TUNNELING, ETC.); ☐ NONE NUMBER OF PREVIOUS JUMPS

Section H—CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Information is desired regarding the necessity for such equipment as flashlights, signal mirrors, "Very" pistol, hand flares, knife, side arms, or other item. Add any recommendations you may have for training and equipment, specifically in regard to techniques of bailout from high-speed aircraft. Valid criticism on existing equipment is invited.

Traumatic amputation, left lower leg.

Multiple compound fractures rt. lower tibia and fibula, and rt. foot; surgical amputation.

Laceration rt. knee including quadriceps tendon.

Multiple lacerations & abrasions both thighs, left buttocks and back.

1st & 2nd degree burns lt. hand, wrist and forehead.

Compound fracture rt. thumb proximal phalanx.

Injuries incurred by explosion and flying debris.

SIGNATURE
(NAME, GRADE, AND
STATION)

PARACHUTIST

FLIGHT SURGEON

ROBERT SCHLITZ, 1/Lt, USAF (MC)

REPORT OF EMERGENCY PARACHUTE JUMP

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." Answer all questions and fill in all spaces that apply to this incident giving all information that is known. If more than one answer fits the situation, check each appropriate answer. If the appropriate answer is not listed, write it in the blank space provided. If additional space is needed, use unfilled space under Section H, or use additional sheet(s) identified by proper section letter and question number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME CARSON	2. M. I. ETC. -	FIRST NAME Charles	MIDDLE L.	GRADE A/2c	RATED ☐	NONRATED ☒	YEAR OF BIRTH 1931	AIR CREW DUTY Radio Operator
2. TYPE, MODEL, SERIES, AND BLOCK NO. C-119		3. WEATHER CONDITION AT TIME OF RAILOUT: ☒ VFR; ☐ IFR (OT); ☐ IFR (A) ☐ OTHER (Specify):				4. DATE 15 May 1953		☒ DAY ☐ NIGHT ☐ DAWN ☐ DUSK
5. APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF EMERGENCY: 5 miles west of Mannheim, Germany								
6. REASON FOR JUMP: ☐ FIRE; ☐ ENGINE FAILURE; ☒ MID-AIR COLLISION; ☐ WEATHER; ☐ FUEL EXHAUSTION; ☐ EXPLOSION; ☐ LOSS OF CONTROL; ☐ LOST; ☐ OTHER (Specify):								

Section B—PROCEDURES

1. DIFFICULTIES IN LEAVING AIRCRAFT: ☐ RELEASE PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (SHOULDER HARNESS, SAFETY BELT, OXYGEN MASK, WING, EMBROIDERED, ETC.) ☐ GETTING CHUTE OR HARNESS ON OR FASTENED ☐ CHUTE OR HARNESS OR CLOTHING CATCHING ON SEAT OR EQUIPMENT ☐ ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY JAMMING OR STICKING ☐ STRUCK BY CANOPY OR ESCAPE HATCH ☐ CENTRIFUGAL FORCE SLOWING DOWN BODY MOVEMENT		☐ INJURIES OR BURNS IMPEDING MOVEMENT ☒ LACK OF TIME FOR ANY PLANNING ☐ DESIGNATED ESCAPE HATCH OR CANOPY NOT OPENING ☐ ANOXIA ☐ INTERPHONE SYSTEM OR ALARM SYSTEM NOT FUNCTIONING ☒ OTHER (Describe): Thrown clear by explosion		☐ NONE
2. BODY POSITION UPON LEAVING PLANE: ☐ HEAD FIRST; ☐ FEET FIRST; ☐ TUCKED; ☒ UNKNOWN				
3. EXIT USED: ☐ EJECTION SEAT; ☐ CAPSULE; ☐ CANOPY, FRONT; ☐ CANOPY, REAR; ☐ WAIST OR MAIN ESCAPE HATCH ☐ FORWARD OR MAIN BOMB BAY ☐ AFTER BOMB BAY ☐ COLLAPSE ESCAPE HATCH		☐ ROSEWHEEL WELL ☐ GUNNER'S ESCAPE HATCH ☐ BOTTOM ESCAPE HATCH ☐ EJECTED OUT BY EXPLOSION ☐ OTHER (Describe):		
4. ATTEMPTS TO STRAIGHTEN BODY BEFORE PULLING RIFCORD: ☐ EXTENDING ARMS; ☐ EXTENDING LEGS; ☐ ROLLED OR BACK; ☒ NONE				
5. DIFFICULTY IN FINDING OR PULLING RIFCORD: ☐ CHUTE HARNESS LOOSE OR TWISTED; ☐ INJURED OR WOUNDED; ☐ GLOVES WORN ☐ HANDLE STUCK; ☐ HANDLE PULLED LOOSE; ☐ OTHER (Describe):		☐ NONE		
6. TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN LEAVING PLANE AND PULLING RIFCORD (IN SECONDS): ☐ IMMEDIATELY; ☐ 1 TO 5; ☒ 6 TO 10; ☐ 11 TO 15; ☐ 16 TO 20; ☐ 21 TO 25; ☐ ABOVE 25; ☐ UNKNOWN				
7. BODY POSITION DURING OPENING: ☒ FEET DOWN; ☐ HEAD DOWN; ☐ ON BACK; ☐ ON FACE; ☐ TUMBLING				
8. OPENING SHOCK: ☒ VERY SLIGHT; ☐ MODERATE, NO INJURY; ☐ SEVERE, NO INJURY; ☐ PRODUCED INJURY; ☐ UNCONSCIOUSNESS; ☐ NONE				
9. ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL CHUTE OR BODY POSITION AFTER OPENING: ☐ SLIPPING CHUTE; ☐ TURNING BODY TO FACE DRIFT; ☒ NONE				
10. EFFECTS DURING DESCENT: ☐ DIZZINESS; ☐ NAUSEA; ☐ ANOXIA; ☐ UNCONSCIOUSNESS; ☐ FROSTBITE; ☐ OTHER (Describe):		☒ NONE		
11. DIRECTION OF BODY DRIFT AT TOUCHDOWN: ☐ FORWARD; ☐ BACKWARD; ☒ SIDEWAYS		12. ATTITUDE AT LANDING: ☒ VERTICAL; ☐ SWINGING		
13. FORCE OF LANDING EQUIVALENT TO: ☒ 10-15 FT. FREE FALL; ☐ 16-20 FT. FREE FALL; ☐ ABOVE 20 FT. FREE FALL				
14. EVENTS AFTER TOUCHDOWN: ☐ ROLLED FORWARD; ☐ BACKWARD; ☐ FELL FORWARD; ☐ BACKWARD; ☒ FELL SIDEWAYS, LEFT; ☐ RIGHT; ☐ DRAGGED BY CHUTE _____ FT.; ☐ ENTANGLED BY CHUTE _____ MINUTES; ☐ OTHER (Describe):				
15. DIFFICULTY IN COLLAPSE OF CANOPY AND RELEASE OF HARNESS: ☐ BUCKLES OR SNAPS WOULD NOT RELEASE ☐ TANGLED IN HARNESS, RISERS, OR SHROUD LINES ☐ JAMMING OR FAILURE OF QUICK RELEASE MECHANISM (Specify): ☐ OTHER (Describe):		☐ CANOPY COLLAPSED WITH DIFFICULTY ☐ WIND HINDERED EFFORTS ☐ INJURY OR UNCONSCIOUSNESS DELAYED EFFORTS ☒ NONE		
16. FUNCTIONING OF CHUTE: ☒ PERFECT; ☐ PANELS RIPPED OUT; ☐ SHROUD LINES BROKE; ☐ RISERS TWISTED; ☐ HOLES IN CANOPY; ☐ LINE TWISTED OVER CANOPY; ☐ OSCILLATED; ☒ SEVERELY; ☐ SLIGHTLY; ☐ OTHER (Specify):				

Section C—RESULTS TO PARACHUTIST

Check whether—BEFORE LEAVING (A); LEAVING (B); DESCENT (C); LANDING (D)

INJURIES	A	B	C	D	INJ. LIES	A	B	C	D	INJURIES	A	B	C	D
1. FRACTURE—SKULL AND/OR FACE					SPRAIN OR DISLOCATION					11. BURNS			☒	
2. FRACTURE—VERTEBRA					7. ARM OR WRIST					12. FROSTBITE				
3. FRACTURE—CLAVICLE					8. ANKLE OR KNEE					13. ABRASIONS OR CONTUSIONS			☒	
4. FRACTURE—RIB					9. SPRAIN OR STRAIN, BACK OR NECK					14. HOSPITALIZED (DAYS)	Indefinite			
5. FRACTURE—ARM OR WRIST					10. LACERATIONS, MAJOR					Explain cause of injury in full detail, using unfilled space under Section H, or additional sheets as necessary.				
6. FRACTURE—ANKLE OR LEG		☒			11. UNCONSCIOUSNESS									

Section D—AERIAL CONDITIONS

1. APPROXIMATE HEIGHT ABOVE SURFACE, IN FEET 4500 2. TAS OF AIRPLANE AT TIME OF BAILOUT, IN KNOTS 150
 3. ATTITUDE OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF BAILOUT: ☐ LEVEL ☐ INVERTED ☐ DIVE ☐ CLIMB 4. APPROXIMATE FREE AIR TEMPERATURE:
 BANK: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT SPIN: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT SPIRAL: ☐ LEFT ☐ RIGHT ☒ UNKNOWN 14 * CENTIGRADE

Section E—SURFACE CONDITIONS AT POINT OF LANDING

1. LAND: TYPE OF TERRAIN: ☒ FLAT ☐ HILLY ☐ MOUNTAINOUS ☐ DESERT ☐ ICE ☐ SWAMP ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 GROUND CONDITIONS: ☐ SOFT ☒ HARD ☐ SLIPPERY ☐ ROCKY ☐ DITCHES OR GULLIES ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 GROUND OBSTRUCTIONS: ☐ TREES ☐ BUSHES ☐ POWER LINES ☐ BUILDINGS ☐ STONES, Boulders ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 2. HEIGHT AT WHICH LANDING SITE WAS FIRST DETERMINED (FEET) 1500 ft. ☒ NONE
 3. WATER: ☐ FRESH ☐ SALT APPROXIMATE DEPTH (FEET) WATER CONDITIONS: ☐ CALM ☐ ROLLING SWELL ☐ WAVES HEIGHT (FT.)
 APPROXIMATE TEMPERATURE (* F.) ☐ CHOPPY
 4. VELOCITY OF SURFACE WIND (KNOTS) 5. SURFACE AIR TEMPERATURE (* F.)

Section F—EQUIPMENT

1. SIZE OF CHUTE: ☒ 24 FT. ☐ 30 FT. 2. TYPE OF CHUTE: ☐ S-1 ☐ S-2 ☐ S-3 ☐ S-4 ☐ S-5 ☐ S-6 ☐ S-7 ☐ S-8 ☐ S-9 ☐ S-10 ☐ S-11 ☐ S-12 ☐ OTHER (Describe): B-TN 45-13344
 3. QUICK ADJUSTABLE HARNESS: ☐ YES ☐ NO QUICK RELEASE HARNESS: ☒ YES ☐ NO ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 4. TYPE OF FOOTWEAR: ☐ LOW QUARTER OXFORD ☒ G.I. SHOES ☐ BOOTS ☐ FLYING BOOTS ☐ OTHER (Describe):
 5. EMERGENCY BAILOUT OXYGEN: ☒ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
 6. CRASH HELMET: ☐ STANDARD TYPE: ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED ☐ NOT USED (Explain):
☐ IMPROVISED: ☐ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, USED ☐ NOT USED (Explain): No helmets
 7. WAE WEST TYPE USED: ☒ NOT AVAILABLE ☐ AVAILABLE, NOT USED (Explain):
 8. HEIGHT OF PARACHUTIST (FT. AND IN.) 5'9 1/2" WEIGHT WITH EQUIPMENT (POUNDS) 187 & chute
 9. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE INSPECTION 6 May 1953 10. DATE OF LAST PARACHUTE REPACK 21 Apr 1953
 11. LIST ALL ITEMS OF SPECIAL OR PERSONAL EQUIPMENT USED DURING BAILOUT
Pair spectacles.
 12. LIST ANY ITEMS LOST DURING BAILOUT OR DESCENT: N N

Section G—TRAINING AND PREPARATION

1. WAS CHUTE HARNESS FITTED BY QUALIFIED PARACHUTE PERSONNEL? (If not, explain):
Yes
 2. WAS THE FIT OF THE HARNESS SATISFACTORY FOR THIS BAILOUT? (If not, explain):
Yes
 3. PREVIOUS PARACHUTE TRAINING: ☒ LECTURES ☒ GROUND TRAINING (HARNESS RIGS, TUMBLING, ETC.) ☐ NONE NUMBER OF PREVIOUS JUMPS 0

Section H—CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Information is desired regarding the necessity for such equipment as flashlights, signal mirrors, "Very" pistol, hand flares, knife, side arms, or other items. Add any recommendations you may have for training and equipment, specifically in regard to techniques of bailout from high-speed aircraft. Valid criticism on existing equipment is invited.

Compound fracture rt. os calcis.
 Chip fracture (Simple), lt. fibular malleolus.
 Contusion of back.
 1st & 2nd degree burns of face.

Injuries incurred by explosion and flying debris.

SIGNATURES
(NAME, GRADE, AND
STATION)

PARACHUTIST

WITNESS SIGNATURE

ROBERT SCHLITT, 1/Lt., USAF (MC)

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT—Part I

DATE 15 May 53	AIR FORCE OR COMMAND USAF	BASE UNIT 36th F.B. Wing	GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE 36th F.B. Group	SQUADRON NUMBER AND TYPE 22nd F.B. Sqdn	STATION APO 132
ENGINEER OR MECHANIC IN CHARGE Carney, Duane		GRADE S/Sgt	AIRCRAFT TYPE, MODEL, SERIES F-84E-30RE		AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 51-628A

PRINT PLAINLY Last Name—First Name—Middle Initial—Grade—SN—(Organization and Station if Transient)	USE AS DIRECTED LOCALLY	ENTER DUTY SYMBOL IN UPPER LEFT BOX AND FLIGHT CONDITIONS SYMBOL IN UPPER RIGHT BOX—ENTER TIME FLOWN ON LINE THEREUNDER	FLIGHT DATA	TIME
1	2	3 4 5 6 7	8	9
Kenyon, Jerry R. Jr. Capt	ALH 0:40	P 1:40	TO Local	10:00
	SCL 0:30	1	FROM	08:20
	XCM 0:30	1	MISSION 0 NO. OF LANDINGS 1	1:40
Chilton, James W. 1/Lt 20678A	GFM 0:25	1	TO Local	16:50
		1	FROM	16:25
		1	MISSION 0 NO. OF LANDINGS 0	0:25
		1	TO	1
		1	FROM	1
		1	MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS
		1	TO	1
		1	FROM	1
		1	MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS
		1	TO	1
		1	FROM	1
		1	MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS
THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY <i>John H. Freeman</i> JOHN H. FREEMAN Capt USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Officer			SUBTOTAL FORWARDED	1 2:05

ENTER TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ON REVERSE SIDE

PRINT PLAINLY Last Name—First Name—Middle Initial—Grade—SN—(Organization and Station if Transient)	USE AS DIRECTED LOCALLY	ENTER DUTY SYMBOL IN UPPER LEFT BOX AND FLIGHT CONDITIONS SYMBOL IN UPPER RIGHT BOX—ENTER TIME FLOWN OR USE THEREUNDER						FLIGHT DATA		BROUGHT FORWARD	
		DUTY 1	FLT. COND. 2	DUTY 3	FLT. COND. 4	DUTY 5	FLT. COND. 6	DUTY 7	FLT. COND. 8	9	
										TO	
										FROM	
										MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS
										TO	
										FROM	
										MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS
										TO	
										FROM	
										MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS
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										FROM	
										MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS
										TO	
										FROM	
										MISSION	NO. OF LANDINGS

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT—Part I

OPERATIONS
 CHECKED LEGIBLE
 AND CORRECT

☐

MECHANIC OR ENGINEER
 TOTAL FLIGHT TIME
 CHECKED AGAINST ON PAGE II


☐

TOTAL
 FLIGHT TIME


PAGE 1
OF 1

AF FORM 1
100 MAY 60

24 SYSTEM	25 SYM	26. PILOT'S AND MECHANIC'S REMARKS (PRINT ONE DEFECT ON ONE LINE)	27. CORRECTIVE ACTION	28A. TIME	28. SIGNATURE
16	8	(15-May-53) T.O. 01-1-372D N/C/W (Neoprene Coating)	N/A (15-May-53)	-	Carney
7	✓	(15-May-53) T.O. 01-65BJ-134 N/C/W (Rework Idle Stop)	To Part Three (15-May-53)	-	Carney
6	9	(15 May 53) T.O. 01-65BJ-148 N/C/W (Rest. A-14 Oxy Comp. with (15 May 53)		102	Carney
		Reg.)			
		#1 OK J Kenyon Capt			
THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY: <i>John H. Freeman</i> JOHN H. FREEMAN Captain USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Officer					
1	B	AFB issued 651 U.S. Gallon			Carney

DELAYED CORRECTION DISCREPANCY LIST—Part III			AIRCRAFT TYPE, MODEL, AND SERIES F-84E-30RE	AF SERIAL NO. 51-628A
28. SYSTEM NO.	29. SYM- BOL	30. DISCREPANCY	31. ENTRY APPROVED BY	32. DATE FROM PART II
3		Rework Elev. Control Rod End (2-Oct-52) T.O. 01-65BJ-66 N/C/W (awaiting kit)	Cassese	3-Oct-52
4		Inspected and replace Retracting Arm on Electrol struts (9-Oct-52) T.O. 01BJ-103 N/C/W (awaiting inspection)	Cassese	9-Oct-52
3		Reinforcement Main Spar Cap (5-Jan-53) T.O. 65BJC-76 N/C/W (awaiting kit)	Cassese	6 Jan-53
7		(8-Jan-53) T.O. 02B105CC-27 N/C/W Reset RPM to 99%	Cassese	8-Jan-53
3		(5-Mar-53) Aileron Boot deteriorated (issue slip no. 3-1544)	Cassese	5-Mar-53
6		Installed Fibre Glass Shield on Fire Detector Term (5-May-53) T.O. 01-65BJC-80 N/C/C (awaiting kit)	Cassese	13-May-53
3		Structural Reinforcement Fuselage Frame 40 (5-May-53) T.O. 01-65BJC-72 N/C/W (issue slip no. 5-2133)	Cassese	13-May-53
16		Installed Radar Wave Guide Disconnect Assy. (5-May-53) T.O. 01-65BJC-59 N/C/W (awaiting kit)	Cassese	13-May-53
6		Reinforcement Pilot's Seat (5-May-53) T.O. 01-65BJC-52 N/C/W (awaiting kit)	Cassese	13-May-53
15		(9-Apr-53) Fuel Flow Ind. o/d change	Cassese	13-May-53
17		(6-Feb-53) T.O. 01-65BJ-90 N/C/W (safety sway brace)	Cassese	13-May-53
3		(24-Mar-53) Aileron Trim Tab Actuator o/d change	Cassese	13-May-53
3		(24-May-53) Elevator Trim Tab Actuator o/d change	Cassese	13-May-53
7		(3-Mar-53) Squibs o/d change	Cassese	13-May-53
7		Rework Idle Stop (14-May-53) T.O. 01-65BJ-134 N/C/W (awaiting parts)	Cassese	15-May-53
"THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY"				
 JOHN H. FREEMAN Captain USAF Aircraft Accident Investigation Officer				

1. SYSTEM	2. ITEM	3. PILOT'S AND MECHANIC'S REMARKS (PRINT ONE DEFECT ON ONE LINE)	4. CORRECTIVE ACTION	5. TIME	6. SIGNATURE
12	✓	(12May53) Both Prop de-ice Prop circuit inoperative after 15-20 min. operation	Q/F		Amintreut, R.
2	✓	(12May53) Radio Pre-Flight due	(12May53) Comp.	1:30	Amintreut, R.
2	✓	(12May53) A/U Pre-Flight due 0800	(12May53) Comp. 0:00	1:30	Amintreut, R.
12	✓	(12May53) T.O. 09-2031-64 II/III	To Part III		Amintreut, R.
7	✓	(12May53) T.O. 19-451-4 II/III	To Part III		Amintreut, R.
2	✓	(12May53) Radio Pre-Flight due	(12May53) Comp.	00:30	Amintreut, R.
2	✓	(12May53) A/U Pre-Flight due 0800	(12May53) Comp. 0900	1:00	Amintreut, R.
6	✓	(12May53) Lt. eng. intercom, light blinks	Q/F		Amintreut, R.
(36)	✓	Co-Pilot can't get radio dial with selector switch in any position, Radio R. Lee 1/14			Amintreut, R.
4	✓	(12May53) M. out/In main gear tire out thru cord	Q/F		Amintreut, R.
2	✓	(12May53) Post-Flight due	(12May53) Comp.	7:30	Amintreut, R.
	✓	(12May53) Check #2 delayed in error	(12May53) Corrected		Amintreut, R.
This is a Certified True Copy					
Robert B. Strong					
ROBERT B. STRONG					
Captain, USAF					
Operations Officer					

24. SYSTEM	25. SYM	26. PILOT'S AND MECHANIC'S REMARKS (PRINT ONE DEFECT ON ONE LINE)	27. CORRECTIVE ACTION	27A. TIME	28. SIGNATURE
2	5	(12Mar53) Radio Post Flt due Flt 1 & 2 OK E.E. Dahl 1st Lt.	(12May53) Comp	30	Sohns D
2	3	(12May53) A/C Post Flt. due	(12May53) Comp	1:00	Battiste M.
I certify that this is a certified true copy.					
 M. MICHAEL BONNER Captain, USAF Maintenance Officer					
400 gals of 100/130 fuel serviced Battiste M.					

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT—Part I

DATE 15 May 53	AIR FORCE OR COMMAND 12th Air Force	BASE UNIT 60th T.C.Wg. (M)	GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE 60th T.C.Op (M)	SQUADRON NUMBER AND TYPE 10th T.C.Sq. (M)	STATION Rhein-Main Air Base
ENGINEER OR MECHANIC IN CHARGE Froese, O.M.		GRADE A/1C	AIRCRAFT TYPE, MODEL, SERIAL C-119 C		AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 51-8249A

PRINT PLAINLY Last Name—First Name—Middle Initial—Grade—SN—(Organization and Station if Transient)		USE AS DIRECTED LOCALLY	ENTER DUTY SYMBOL IN UPPER LEFT BOX AND FLIGHT CONDITIONS SYMBOL IN UPPER RIGHT BOX—ENTER TIME FLOWN ON LINE THEREAFTER								FLIGHT DATA		TIME	
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Muller, F.L. Captain, AO 711782		" "	P	1:00	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	FROM R/M AB	16:10
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PRINT PLAINLY Last Name—First Name—Middle Initial—Grade—SN—(Organization and Station if Transient)		USE AS DIRECTED LOCALLY	ENTER DUTY SYMBOL IN UPPER LEFT BOX AND FLIGHT CONDITIONS SYMBOL IN UPPER RIGHT BOX—ENTER TIME FLOWN ON LINE THEREUNDER										FLIGHT DATA		WROUGHT FORWARD
1		2	3		4		5		6		7		8		9
			DUTY	FLY. COND.	DUTY	FLY. COND.	DUTY	FLY. COND.	DUTY	FLY. COND.	DUTY	FLY. COND.	TO		1.00
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AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT—Part I

OPERATIONS
 CHECKED LEGIBLE
 AND CORRECT ☐

MECHANIC OR ENGINEER
 TOTAL FLIGHT TIME
 CHECKED ENTERED ON PART II ☒

TOTAL
 FLIGHT TIME
1.00

PAGE 1

AP Photo
May 4

IX. SYSTEM	X. SYM	II. PILOT'S AND MECHANIC'S REMARKS (PRINT ONE DEFECT ON ONE LINE)	IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION	VIA. TIME	VI. SIGNATURE
(7-2)	X	(12May53) Idle speed at 550 RPM #1 Engine	(15May53) Adjusted	0.30	Kelley R
(7-2)	X	(12May53) Idle speed at 500 RPM #2 Engine	(15May53) Adjusted	0.30	Kelley R
(1)	X	(17May53) Unknown noise when actuating main steering. C.F.			Harner F.J.
2	X	(19May53) A/C Preflight due 0830 hrs	(19May53) Comp 0830hrs	1:00	Fraser G.H.
(3)	X	Check Aerial collision damage F.L. Miller Captain			
I certify that this is a certified true copy: <i>M. Michael Bonner</i> M. MICHAEL BONNER Captain, USAF Maintenance Officer					

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT—Part I

DATE	AIR FORCE OR COMMAND	BASE UNIT	GROUP NUMBER AND TYPE	SQUADRON NUMBER AND TYPE	STATION												
15 May 53	12th A.F.	60th T.C. Wg	60th T.C. Gp	12th T.C. Sq	RMAB												
ENGINEER OR MECHANIC IN CHARGE Frenz, Carl F.		GRADE S/Sgt	AIRCRAFT TYPE, MODEL, SERIES C-119C		AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. 51-8259A												
PRINT PLAINLY Last Name—First Name—Middle Initial—Grade—SN—(Organization and Station if Transient)		USE AS EXPECTED LOCALLY	ENTER DUTY SYMBOL IN UPPER LEFT BOX AND FLIGHT CONDITIONS SYMBOL IN UPPER RIGHT BOX—ENTER TIME FLOWN ON LINE THEREUNDER			FLIGHT DATA	TIME										
1		2	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	5	6	7	8	9
Sullivan, David P. 1/Lt AO 1910348		12th	P		OP											TO Formation Local	17 : 10
Dooney, William E. 1/Lt AO 577380		12th	OP		P											FROM R-M	15 : 30
Frenz, Carl F. S/Sgt AF 12358751		12th	CE													MISSION 0	NO. OF LANDINGS 1
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1		2	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	DUTY	FLT. COND.	3	4
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AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT—Part I

OPERATIONS
CHECKED LEGIBLE
AND CORRECT

MECHANIC OR ENGINEER
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME
CHECKED APPROVED ON PART II

TOTAL
FLIGHT TIME 1 2:40

AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE RECORD—Part II

PAGE 1
OF 1 PAGES

10. DATE		11. CREW CHIEF		12. ORGANIZATION		13. LOCATION		14. AIRCRAFT DATA				15. INSPECTION STATUS		
								TYPE, MODEL, AND SERIES		SERIAL NO.	TYPE	DUE	COMPLETED	
15 May 53		S/Sgt G.P. Frenz		12th TCS		FMAB		C-119C		51-2859A	2nd Int	131435		
16. TIME														
AIRCRAFT		ENG NO. 1		ENG NO. 2		ENG NO. 3		ENG NO. 4		ENG NO. 5		ENG NO. 6		
TIME SINCE NEW OR O.I.R.		103:30		103:30		103:30						86:00		
WORKING TODAY		1:40		1:40		1:40						2:10		
TOTAL HOUR		105:10		105:10		105:10						88:10		
OIL CHANGE DUE		E.C.		E.C.								97:00		
17. Assignment USAFE (cc) EXCEPTIONAL RELEASE Possession 60th Wg (cc)														
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22ND FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
36TH FIGHTER BOMBER GROUP
APO 132 US AIR FORCE

16 May 1953

STATEMENT

1. The mission was to be a fly-by in honor of the retiring General Rich. We were briefed at 1500L, 15 May 1953, by Colonel Cramer, Commanding Officer of the 53rd Fighter Bomber Squadron. Our Group was putting up 16 aircraft and one spare; the 53rd leading with four, the 23rd next with four and the 22nd last with eight. I was to fly "Cousin" Green #3, the third ship in the last flight. The mission proceeded as briefed; take off was made at 1621L; the flights were joined in finger tip, in trail; then we spread into combat formation and proceeded to the I.P. (Ladenburg Beacon) at approximately 390 IAS at 3000 feet. "Galahad", the 48th Fighter Group formation, called us as we approached the IP from the WNW and informed us that he would orbit left at the IP at 5000 feet VFR, and for us to join him. Shortly before reaching the Rhine River, our group re-assembled in close show formation, flights in finger tip with the element on the right, flights in trail. From this point on it was necessary to devote most of my attention to smooth formation flying to keep from making it too difficult on my wingman, # 4. We were approximately over the IP when I saw a formation of C-119's pass low on our left. These were called out and Cousin Leader acknowledged as seeing them. "Galahad" Leader then called and informed us that he was 8 o'clock low to us and turning left. I saw his formation at this time, approximately 1000-1500 feet below and a mile behind. I do not know our attitude at this time. We executed a steep turn to the left from our previous heading of 100-120°. During this turn I remember passing through and near some very small cloud formations. The visibility below us was slightly restricted by haze.

2. As we rolled out of this turn someone, I believe it was Cousin Green Leader, called C-119's at 12 o'clock. Cousin Leader acknowledged that he had them in sight. Then only seconds later Cousin Leader called "O.K. gang break right". We started a break and I glanced ahead and saw the 3 flights close in front of us going right and up, with our flight still with them in formation. At the same time I saw one of the aircraft in front of me, a blue-tipped 23rd aircraft, drop down and start to break up to the left to get clear of our own formation. Evidently in watching to see that I cleared him, I released a slight amount of back pressure on the stick, as when I looked back I found myself about 10 feet below Cousin Green Leader. I applied more back pressure on the stick so as to get back on his level in the formation. At this time I again glanced forward and saw myself coming head on into a C-119. In the position I was in, a slight bank to the right and pulling up, a collision was unavoidable. My

Statement (Cont'd)

wingsman was still on my right wing in close formation, and a break in his direction would have meant a collision with him so I banked hard left and broke behind and under Green 1 & 2. In doing this I missed this C-119 and then saw there were more. I was pulling back hard on the stick, seeming to be clearing all the aircraft I could see when I heard something strike the underside of my aircraft. There was a loud noise of metal striking metal, a huge burst of flame and I snapped violently out of control to the left. I jettisoned the canopy and ejected myself with the same movement and had the sensation of a searing flame, rushing air, and tumbling. At the time of ejection I believe I was inverted. I pulled the ripcord, remembering that it came completely free and I dropped it. I looked up but there was no canopy. Then I realized I was still strapped in the ejection seat so I unlocked my safety belt and kicked free. The chute opened and I began to float down.

3. I looked down and estimated that I was about 2000 feet above some open green fields. Directly below me was some high tension wires so I slipped to avoid them and landed in a field. I freed myself from the harness and realized my face was burned and my right hand was numb but otherwise I seemed alright. The left shoulder of my flying coat was burned through.

4. As I was floating down I saw a lot of debris falling around me; saw the wreckage of an airplane falling and burning; and saw the tail section of my own aircraft, with its distinctive blue and white stripes, spinning down a short distance away. I also saw two parachutes about 1-2 miles East of me.

5. In ejection I lost my helmet, mask and sunglasses. My aircraft number was 51-628.

JAMES W CHILTON
1/Lt, USAF
20878A

Certified True Copy
John H. Green
USAF

STATEMENT

18 May 1953

I, Captain Anthony H. Zack AG-705513, am assigned to the 10th Troop Carrier Squadron as Chief Pilot and Flight Commander. I have been in the 10th Squadron for the past 15 months holding the position of Flight Commander for the past 12 months. I have over 14 years service of which 5 years is in the active duty. I was rated as pilot on 7 January 1944 and now hold a senior pilot rating with approximately 2200 hours of flying time.

On the 15th of May 1953 at 1200Z a briefing was held at the 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) Briefing Room covering a fly-by at Landstuhl Air Base. At this time we were briefed as to the route, formation, weather, and actual fly by. We were told that we would fly in a vee of vee's with the 10th Squadron leading the 12th Squadron. After form up, we were to climb to 5000 feet and rendezvous with the 317th Troop Carrier Wing over the Ledenburg Beacon at this altitude. From there on we were to follow the 317th in the actual flyby with our altitude being 1900 feet over the Autobahn. We were told that other units of the Air Force would also participate in the fly-by such as F-86's, F-84's and A-26's. The formation took off on schedule at 1510Z and after forming up the two Squadron's headed out on course climbing to 5000 feet. We came into the Ledenburg Beacon on a compass heading of approximately 230 degrees at 5000 feet. Our lead ship as well as myself saw the 317th formation to our left approximately 5 miles distance. We made a turn to the left and were just rolling out when I noticed a jet formation coming toward us at between 12 and 1 o'clock at a distance of approximately 4 miles at our altitude.

As they came closer I identified them as F-84's and that there were approximately 16 of them flying in a formation of Vee's in trail. At first I thought they were going to make a pass at us but as they came closer and were still heading straight for our formation I started to give a warning over the radio when I heard their lead give the command to "break to the right". The first half of the jet formation broke to the right instantly but by this time the other F-84's were so close they seemed to waiver as to not knowing just what to do. Two of the last ships started to break to the right but then broke to the left. The first of these somehow missed my plane but the second one seemed to graze the lead ship which was Able #1 and then to hit square into Able #2. Since the F-84 was coming in from my left the pieces of his ship as well as of Able #2 flew in my direction striking my plane which was Baker #1.

Anthony H. Zack
Capt. U.S.A.F.

CAPTAIN ANTHONY H. ZACK'S STATEMENT CONTINUED)

The weather in the area of the accident was hazy with no distinct ceiling level but as we were flying at 5,000 feet, I would judge it to be 6,000 feet or above. The visibility was approximately 6 miles ahead and 10 miles down. There was no sun showing and there was no horizon.

Anthony H. Zack
ANTHONY H. ZACK
Captain, USAF

Anthony H. Zack
Capt. U.S.A.F.

STATEMENT

15 May 1953

I, Captain Leland D. Albright, AO 808016, am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron, 60th Troop Carrier Group (M). My original Pilot Rating is 28 July 1943. I hold a Senior Pilot Rating and have a current Green Instrument Card. My total Flying Time is two thousand seven hundred and twenty-six (2,726) hours.

I was the Instructor Pilot of aircraft number 51-8245, Blue Charlie lead. At the time of the accident I was watching the large formation of jets approaching from twelve (12) o'clock slightly low to the lead squadron. I heard the jet lead call for a break and saw the jets blossom out into a fan shape. A second or two later one of the jets rammed one of the two ships in the lead element. One of the ships blew up and one spun on. I saw one chute and two (2) streamers appear but could not tell from which aircraft. By this time we were beyond the scene and returned in Squadron formation to Rhein Main.

Additional Statement:

At 1300L time, 15 May 1953, a briefing was held in the 60th Group Headquarters briefing room. It was very complete with the weather given enroute as hazy, visibility 7 - 10 miles, cloud cover, scattered, bases about 5200 MSL. We were briefed to form up over the field at 1500 and climb out on course to 5000 ft to meet the 317th Troop Carrier Group (M) over Ladenberg beacon, from where we were to let down to 1900 ft for the passover Landstuhl. We sighted the 317th over the Ladenberg beacon on schedule and performed a 360° turn to the right to get into position. Visibility at this time was approx. 5 miles in haze. I believe it was immediately upon completion of this 360° turn that I first sighted the jets. I do not remember the heading. I would estimate the time from first sighting to the impact was 3 to 4 seconds. They just seemed to appear out of the haze, not out of a cloud. It seemed to me at the time they were low enough to pass under safely if they had gone slightly down instead of breaking up.

This is a supplementary statement to the one I made immediately after the accident.

LELAND D. ALBRIGHT, AO 808016
Captain USAF

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

STATEMENT

I, 1st Lt Tyrus R. Lewis, AO 942831, assigned to 10th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) as a pilot (1054B). I hold a current Instrument Card, White, (AF Form C). My original pilot rating is 29 Jan 1946 and a total 1,725 flying hours.

On 15 May 1953 at approximately 1650 hours, I was flying pilot on C-119 #51-2607 in a group formation. My position in the formation was lead or "Red" Squadron, Charlie 3. I was flying at 4800 ft. indicated. As I was "rubber necking", I saw a formation of jet F-84s approach our formation at 10 o'clock from our position. Our heading at the time of the incident was approximately 190 - 200°.

The Jets, at the time I observed them "bloom" like a flower. In other words, their formation broke up, down, left, and right. Some of the jets continued straight ahead.

I saw one jet go above Red Charlie 1's wing and under our right wing with maybe 6 ft clearance.

I saw one jet strike what I believe was Red Able 2, #2 immediately burst into flame.

I also saw Red Lead do a wing-over to the right and observed his right wing tip (about 3 ft) was bent up.

The foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my observance.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT

I was briefed at 60th Group Hqs along with all other pilots participating for a "Fly-By" at Landstuhl AB. The formation was to form over Rhein Main and climb to 5000 ft. Our formation was to join the 317th formation at 5000 ft MSL at the LADENBERG BCN. With the 317th heading the formation, the "pass" over Landstuhl was to be made at 1900 ft MSL V of Vs. Both formations were to proceed on a heading of 301° until 5 minutes past the reviewing stand and turn right, climb out and return to Rhein Main.

Reported weather was 35 @ with light and scattered rain showers. Visibility was to be 6 to 10 miles in haze reduced to 2 to 3 miles in the showers. Other aircraft in the air was to be jet F-84s forming at 15,000 ft MSL, and to pass the reviewing stand 5 minutes after the C-119s.

The weather at time of accident was a 5/10 layer of strato-cumulus at about 7500 ft MSL. The visibility was from 6 - 10 miles in haze. Up until the time of the accident the formation of 60th Grp aircraft had encountered no clouds.

At the time of the accident our formation was at an altitude of 5000 ft, plus or minus 100 ft and our Heading was approximately 190° to 200°, a heading that would bring us in behind the 317th aircraft for our "form-up".

Both C-119 formations were approximately 6 minutes late at the Ledenberg BCN. At the time of planned form-up, the 60th, our formation started a 360° turn to the right from an initial heading of 300°, so as to bring our formation in behind the 317th aircraft. When our aircraft had reached a heading of approximately 180° still at 5000 ft MSL, I noticed not only the 317th formation at about 2 o'clock and 3 - 5 miles distant from our formation, but I also noticed a formation of F-84s about 3 miles distant and about 10:30 from our position. I was flying and only "noted" both of the other formations. My aircraft was number "nine" in the lead squadron, and as we were still in a turn, I was trying to maintain my position on my Flight Leader. However I did "note" the other formations. I also noted the time on the instrument panel clock as 1651 local time. As my eyes traveled back and forth from my flight lead, to the Group lead, and again to the jet formation, I heard a voice on the radio say, "(code name) formation Scatter!" At that time I noticed the jet formation at 10 o'clock our position and about 1/2 miles distant "break" and go in diverse directions - right wing aircraft going "right" and "up" and "right" and "down". Lead jet aircraft straight ahead "level" and "down". Left jet aircraft going "left" and "down" and "left" and "up". There was a time lapse of only about 3 seconds from the jet "scatter" until they were out of sight behind us. I got the impression of their aircraft going through our formation and at the same time I saw one (1) jet clip the right wing tip of C-119 51-8235 with his own right wing tip and go head-on into C-119 51-8241. Instantly 241 burst into flames, "peeled" right and the right wing section fell off. At the time of separation, the right wing and the cargo compartment of 241 was entirely aflame. The jets did not come out of any cloud within 6 miles of our formation. It appeared to me as if they intended to give our formation a "buss".

After the accident occurred, the jets could be heard on radio reforming in small groups at about 8500 ft MSL. Our own formation proceeded to descend to about 2500 ft MSL, do a turn to the left and reform, with aircraft 51-8236 assuming lead position. We then returned to Rhein Main and landed. In the process, aircraft 51-8267 with

1st Lt. Carl F. Montgomery, was heard on the radio as circling the wreckage and giving the geographic coordinates as $41^{\circ} 35' N$ and $06^{\circ} 40' E$.

There is a sketch of my impression of the participating aircraft just before impact.

Tyrus R. Lewis.

TYRUS R. LEWIS
1st Lt., USAF
AO 942831

STATEMENT

15 May 1953

I, Captain James F. Hicks, AO 790135 am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron, 60th Troop Carrier Group (Medium). My original Pilot Rating is 20 November 1944. I now hold a current White Instrument Card. My total Flying Time to date is seven hundred and fifty-nine (759) hours.

I was co-pilot on aircraft number 51-8234, flying B-lead position, 2nd Squadron (Blue), when approaching Landstuhl, Germany, for fly-over, when one of a jet type aircraft formation hit two of the aircraft in the first squadron, causing complete loss of all three aircraft. The accident occurred at about 1545Z.

The jet formation approached our formation at about 11 o'clock level. The jet formation appeared to break up formation in an attempt to avoid collision with our formation.

The jet appeared to explode immediately. One of ours appeared to have lost the left wing and tail boom. The other one of ours maneuvered into a Split-S to the right. It appeared to me that I saw five personnel jump out, two chutes open, and the last I could see, the remaining three were streaming very near the ground.

Additional Statement:

Briefing notice on 12th TCSq. bulletin board, 15 May 1953, scheduled briefing for 1300 Z. I read this notice at about 1615 Z and left for lunch. Reported back to 12th TCSq operations at about 1155 Z and noticed that none of the officers were there. The operations clerk told me that the briefing for the mission was in progress at Group Briefing Room. I proceeded immediately to the briefing, and found that it was almost finished. All the information I got was ship numbers and positions and all times, but nothing on purpose of mission, weather, other formations, etc.


Weather at the point of the accident, at our altitude was scattered cumulus with bases at approximately our level (I think 5,000 ft MSL) with considerable haze. Visibility was from 5 to 15 miles variable and about 10 miles at the point of impact with no precipitation.

I do not know our heading at the time of the accident, as we were flying formation and had been circling previously. I think our altitude at the time was about 5,000 ft. MSL.

CAPTAIN JAMES F. HICKS STATEMENT CONTINUED)

I first sighted a jet formation about 2,000 feet below us, about 2 miles to the right, flying in the same direction as we were. It was approximately 3 minutes before the accident. This sighting was reported to my pilot, Captain Marve Sellers. He and I sighted the jet formation headed toward us at the same time, approximately 3 seconds before the crash. I saw jets above and below our red lead squadron in an apparent effort to scatter. There was one at about one-fourth the span of the jet formation to my right which was in a much sharper nose high attitude than the rest. Some appeared to be in a nose low attitude below our formation. One of the jets very near the center of the span of their formation was the one that hit our ships. Its evasive action, if any, did not appear to be as sharp as the rest.

The only point I can add to my previous statement covering the actual crash and later events is as follows: Our Group Lead ship which maneuvered into a Split-S attitude, I surmise, at first was simply trying to avoid the jets by peeling off to the right, as I noticed no damage to the ship. My attention at that time, however, was split between this ship and the (Red Able-2) ship which had lost its left wing and tail boom, the jet explosion, as well as seeing that we were clear of other ships in our own formation. As I noticed the peeling ship sharpen into a split-s attitude, my attention followed it almost all the way down to impact with the ground. I was curious at the time, as yet, as to why it crashed with no more apparent damage. There was no evidence that an attempt was made by the pilot, at any time, to correct the attitude of the ship.


JAMES F. HICKS AO 790135
Captain, USAF

STATEMENT

I, Captain John M. Watson, AO 799685, am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) as a pilot.

I hold a current Instrument Card Green (AF Form 8A). My original pilot rating is March 1943. Total flying time is 5,320 hours.

On the afternoon of May 15, 1953, at 1300 hours I attended a briefing for a flyby mission at Landstuhl. We were informed that there would be some clouds in the area with the possibility of showers and that if weather worsened or looked doubtful we would be called from Landstuhl to call off the mission. Our watches were backed, radio frequencies were assigned, (we were to use 12th AF COMMON for primary) and were told to join up at 1500 ft climb to 5000 ft for cruise to rendezvous. Descent to flyby altitudes to be started on the way to the IP.


Take off was on schedule at 1610 hours, one airplane aborting from each of the two squadrons involved. The spares filled the vacant slots, giving us a full formation of 16 planes. We were to join another formation of C-119's from the 37th Group, so when, at around 1645, we started a four minute turn presumably for join up, I was not surprised to see a formation in front of us. It was almost apparent, however, that the formation was jets and closing rapidly from directly in front and level with our formation.

The visibility was not bad. Objects on the ground were plain up to 15 miles, though restricted forward and laterally in some haze to six or seven miles. The bases of the clouds were several hundred feet above us at our position and were of cumuloform. Development was such, that, though being around 5/10ths or 6/10ths coverage, not any direct sunlight was lighting up clouds or penetrating to us. The light and haze made the first sight of the jets look like black lines against a gray background. An instant after I saw them the first two Elements broke upward clearing the first squadron of our formation, and the third and fourth Elements seemed to break right, left, up and down all at once. One or two appeared to go through our first squadron by rolling their wings vertical. One of these last eight planes, I saw strike the No. 2 C-119 between the left boom and fuselage in a near vertical bank and come straight out back of it minus wings and tailbursting instantly into flame, the 119 then burst into flame around both engines and fuselage in one big orange blossom. There was a fully opened chute silhouetted directly against this burst of flame which I assumed was the pilot of the jet. The parachute and C-119 went out of sight below me and I could see the fuselage of the jet still completely enveloped in flame go by me on the right. Then I saw another C-119 appear from directly below me about 150 feet down on a heading about 10° to the right of my course. This

C-119's right wing slowly dipped and the nose went down till its belly faced in my direction of travel and the nose was straight down. It never deviated from this attitude, but went straight in, exploding on impact. A few seconds before it hit four or five objects came out the two open back doors of the aircraft, I could not see what they were. I saw no chutes open other than the one mentioned earlier in this statement.

Our squadron remained in formation and returned directly to Rhein Main. Five aircraft of the 10th Squadron were ahead of us, also returning to Rhein Main.

This is a true statement to the best of my belief and knowledge.


JOHN M. WATSON
Captain, USAF
AO 799685


STATEMENT

I, Captain Joe H. Canion, AO 692659, am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) as a pilot.

I hold a current Instrument Card White (AF Form 8). My original pilot rating is 1 Oct 43. Total flying time 1,425 hours. At 1300 hrs 15 May 1953, the Group Operations Officer briefed the crews of the 18 aircraft which were to participate in the flyby. The weather given to the crews at briefing was 3/8 at 5000 ft, visibility 15 miles. The 60th TC Group was to meet the 317th TC Group at LADENBERG BCN. The flight from Rhein Main to LADENBERG was uneventful, we made contact with the 317th on 135.9 mc as briefed. At approximately 1655 hours, the 60th TC Group passed over Ladenberg BCN just a little ahead of the 317th who were to lead the flyby, so the 60th TC Group leader began a 360° turn to the right to allow sufficient spacing between the two groups. At this time, I estimate the visibility between 12 and 15 miles, very hazy and scattered clouds at approximately 5800 ft. After we had completed approximately 270° of the 360°, I observed a flight of 12 - 16 jets at 11 o'clock in a slight turn and climb to the left. I was flying at 5300 ft, approximately 1500 yards behind the Group lead. At the same instant I saw the jets I heard over 135.9 mc "Keep cool, break right now". At that time our aircraft heading was approximately 180°.

The jets scattered going over under and through the formation of C-119's with the resulting collision of one jet and two C-119's, the Group lead and his number two man. I saw three (3) chutes open during the following few seconds.

The above statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.


JOE H. CANION
Captain, USAF
AO 692659

STATEMENT

I, 1/Lt Milton E. Chorn, AO 1003202, am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) as a pilot.

I hold a current Instrument Card White (AF Form 8). My original pilot rating is 23 December 1944. Total flying time 1, 021 hours.

The crews assigned to this mission were briefed at Group Briefing Room at 1300 hours. We were to fly to Ladenberg Beacon at 5000 ft to join the 317th Troop Carrier Group (M) for a flyover at Landstuhl. We were told other formations would also fly over.

Take-off was made and we proceeded to Ladenberg Beacon at 5000 ft. Arriving there we heard the lead ship call the lead ship of 317th formation and a turn was made in a let down to join them for the fly over. This was approx. 1645. I was performing duty as co-pilot of a C-119 # 51-8245, which was Blue Charlie lead of the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron. We were in a haze layer below scattered clouds which appeared to base about 6000 ft. Visibility approx. 5 to 6 miles in haze. I don't remember the heading at the time of the accident but we had just started descending in the turn from 5000 ft.

At first sighting the jets appeared out of the haze, level with our formation coming head on. I saw them approx. 1 to 2 seconds prior to the accident.

The jets flared to right, left and up. Then one lit to lead ship of the 10th Squadron, then into # 2. The lead ship rolled over to down in a spin, straightened out and crashed, exploding. I saw 3 chutes from this ship and only 2 appeared to blossom.

2 ship of the C-119's exploded in mid air and I saw one chute appear which turned out to be the jet pilot.

Milton E. Chorn
MILTON E. CHORN, AO 1003202
1/Lt USAF

S T A T E M E N T

I, Orville Froese, A/1C, AF 18358568, am assigned to the 10th Troop Carrier Squadron as an aerial engineer. I have been in the Air Force 2 1/2 years and have been engineer on C-119C for 4 months.

On 15 May 1953 I was assigned to fly in aircraft 51-8249. After take-off we flew over the base and started south. I started working on my Form 1 and didn't pay much attention to the instrument readings or altitude. After completing my forms Captain Zack, the pilot, told Captain Muller, the co-pilot, to fly a while. We were doing a bit of turning but don't know what direction we were going. Captain Zack took the controls again.

The weather was pretty nice but a little hazy. I don't remember seeing any clouds. I'd guess the visibility was about 6 or 7 miles.

I saw the jets about 3 seconds before they got to us. They seemed to be at the same level. At first I thought they were just going to buzz us. I heard Captain Zack yell "Oh, my God". The first group went above us. They were coming in at about the 9:30 or 10:00 o'clock position. After the first group pulled up the rest of them didn't seem to know where to go. The one that hit the C-119's wanted to go up and then tried to get down.

When I first saw them they were close enough to tell that they were jets. I didn't notice that they came out of any clouds, they just seemed to appear out of nowhere.

After the accident we left the formation and came back to the base.

Orville M. Froese
ORVILLE M. FROESE
A/1C AF 18358568

STATEMENT

The undersigned officer, pilot of aircraft #8264 was flying Alfa 2 position on #8267. The formation was in a right turn. Blue squadron was approximately 1000 ft behind and 500 ft above red lead.

Copilot Captain G. R. Ford was at the controls when I observed formation of jets approaching approximately 45° off our nose. The jet formation immediately broke up in a "bombshell" maneuver reminiscent of the Aqua-Jets demonstration breakup. Consequently with the jet breakup I saw what appeared to be red lead, break up followed by an explosion. Then another aircraft pulled down and to the right followed by another minor explosion. This aircraft lost its right wing and boom, I believe. At the time I thought this aircraft was Red #2. Red #2 started to spiral and I observed two chutes open from this aircraft. I did not see any "streamers".

Red lead disintegrated completely and no chutes were observed.

The time of the accident is approximated at 1552Z.

I assumed control of my aircraft and returned with Blue squadron to Rhein Main in my Alfa two position and landing was normal.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT

Briefing was held at 1300 hrs, 15 May 53. The weather briefed was cumulus at 2000 ft, 3/8 coverage, visibility 8 to 10 miles with some forecast of rain showers.

Other formation was C-119 from 317th TC Group, that was to rendezvous at Ladenberg. No other formations were briefed.

Weather at Scene: No haze layer, clouds at approximately 5500 ft cumulus, 3/8 to 5/8 coverage, visibility at least 10 miles.

At time of accident 60th C-119 were in right turn heading approximately 135°. This turn was started from a heading of 270°, altitude approximately 5000 ft.

Formation of jets appeared at first sighting to be heading West 270° or 290° at same altitude as lead squadron. Jets did not appear to come out of any clouds (the background was green forest area). The time element from first sighting to impact was approximately 5 seconds.

The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.


LOUIS J. DEL DO
1st Lt, USAF
21572A

STATEMENT

I, Captain Francis G. Muller, AO 711782, am assigned to 10th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M), as a pilot (1054B). I hold a current instrument card, White, (AF Form 8). My original pilot rating is 8 February 1944. Total flying time is 1,889 hours.

I was in aircraft 51-8249, Red Baker I position. My first observation of the involved jets was their being in tight formation, executing a left turn while our formation was flying straight ahead. The jets proceeded to separate individually and one jet appeared to be heading directly at us. Before hitting us the jet hit the ship ahead and to the left of us, R Able 2. Debris from the impact damaged the left side of the cockpit, injuring Captain Zack and airman Froese. I relieved Captain Zack at the controls and immediately left formation notifying Red Able I of this fact, stating we had injured aboard. Rhein Main was notified by me on 118.7 to have an ambulance standing by and we landed as soon as possible. Aircraft received extensive damage.

Additional Statement:

I was in aircraft 51-8249 Red Baker I position. The accident occurred at very close to five thousand feet in the near vicinity of Ladenberg Beacon at approximately 1650 hours. Visibility 10 miles or more at time of accident was good and the ceiling was well above us, at least another five thousand feet. I believe the ceiling was broken. The formation of jets was sighted by me at 1130 o'clock coming at our formation on a north heading in a slight left turn. The jets appeared at first sighting to be a little lower than our formation. The distance separating the jet formation and our formation appeared to be approximately one half mile. Background of jets it seemed to me was not conducive to an early sighting, although I believe they could have been seen at distances greater than $\frac{1}{2}$ mile. The heading of our formation was south inasmuch as it was necessary for me to turn approx. 180° to return to Rhein Main APB. After my first sighting of jets, one or two seconds the jet formation commenced to break apart, most ships turning right, passing our formation on our left side. The involved jet that was demolished was sighted by me turning left and its nose was heading directly at our aircraft, however its track did not conform to the direction it was heading, due to the natural skidding tendency of aircraft. My recollection of it hitting Red Able I is lacking but I saw the jet strike Red Able II. I do remember a ball of flame at impact, not necessarily at the impact of the jet and Red Able II.

Francis G. Muller
FRANCIS G. MULLER, AO 711782
Captain USAF

STATEMENT


15 May 1953

I, 1st Lt David P. Sullivan, AO 1910348 am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron, 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) as a pilot.

I hold a current instrument Card White (AF Form 8). My original pilot rating is 12 May 1950. Total flying time is 1,380 hours.

I was the pilot of Aircraft No. 8259 flying position Red Brave 2. The accident happened just ahead and to the left of my aircraft. We were in a right turn and I saw the jets a few seconds before they broke. They were on a collision course coming in at 1100 level. They scattered in all directions. One near the back hit our formation leader as he started a climbing turn to the left toward me. There was a flash of fire and I saw no more of the jet except the pieces that came into my aircraft. I think the lead ship made one roll to the left but was level as he passed under me. His flight deck seemed completely gone. His number two man fell off to the left under us with several feet of his left wing gone. I left the formation as soon as possible to check my damage and then returned to the field.

The accident happened so fast that it is hard to make a definite statement of all incidents. After the first impact I saw no more of my element lead.


DAVID P. SULLIVAN
1st Lt, USAF
AO 1910348

S T A T E M E N T

The following facts, true and correct to the best of my knowledge, are submitted concerning participation in the aerial review over Landstuhl AB, Germany on 15 May 1953:

1. On the 15th of May 1953, I was designated alternate lead for 16 F84's from Chaumont, which was to rendezvous with 16 F84's from the 36th Ftr-Bar Wg. Rendezvous was designated at 15000' but due to cloud cover it was not advisable to climb through the clouds with 16 aircraft and attempt a letdown with 32 A/C in show formation, with other aircraft in the area.

2. Briefing for the mission was conducted in accordance with 48th Ftr-Bar Op S.O.P.'s. The take-off and route to the IP/RVP was uneventful. Gallahad leader (483rd FBS) contacted "Cousin leader" (36th FBW) informing him that we were 7 minutes from the RVP and receiving an answer that Cousin squadron was also 7 minutes from the RVP. We arrived over the RVP at 16:43 local and when we started an orbit to the left we started to descend at which time I observed a formation of G-119 aircraft at the same altitude. After passing under the G-119's Gallahad leader informed Cousin leader that the rendezvous altitude would be 4000' MSL and Cousin leader acknowledged. After approx 450 degree turn I observed an air explosion North of our position and an R/T call "I've been hit" with an immediate answer "hit the silk, bail out of it." I observed 3 trails of smoke and fire going down to the north of our position, and hit the ground with an explosion and fire. About 3 seconds later the largest of the ground explosions occurred. With a delay of about 2 or 3 seconds the explosion to the right (East) of the biggest occurred. There were R/T transmissions about who was hit and the number of chutes observed etc.

3. We departed the IP at 16:57 local with Cousin squadron reforming in trail of us. TOT was made at 17:04 local.

4. At the time of the accident I estimate the ceiling in the area at 5500' to 6000' broken with a hole immediately over the IP that extended to

S T A T E M E N T

about 10,000' which was very hazy. The visibility was 4 to 5 miles in smoke and haze below all clouds. North of the RVP where the accident occurred the ceiling and vis appeared to be lower.

James E. Bean
JAMES E. BEAN
Capt, USAF

53RD FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRON
APO 132 US AIR FORCE

16 May 1953

S T A T E M E N T

Briefing was held at 1400Z for the fly-by for General Rich on 15 May 1953. We were briefed by Lt Col Darrell S Cramer to start engines at 1513Z, rendezvous at Ladenberg beacon with a group of sixteen (16) F-84's with call sign Gallahad. There was no mention of any other aircraft to be in the vicinity. The weather was supposed to have been broken around 3500 feet, so we were briefed to go at 3500 or VFR.

Take-off was according to schedule and I was flying Cousin Red two (2). We made contact with Gallahad about seven (7) minutes from rendezvous. Gallahad said that he was approximately the same distance out. About fifteen or twenty miles northwest of Mannheim Cousin leader again called his position and Gallahad leader said that he was in a left orbit at 5000 feet over the Ladenberg beacon. We climbed to 6300 feet and from a heading of 120° started a left turn, we hit a scattered layer and descended to around 5700 feet after about 90° of turn. We continued our turn with sixteen (16) aircraft in flights in trail formation and after 90° to 110° we shallowed the turn and bogies were called out 12 o'clock our level. Cousin momentarily leveled out and called "break right". I saw a formation of C-119's or C-82's coming head on and broke with cousin leader. We were at approximately 5200-5400 feet when we broke. We broke hard right and up to about 8000 and started a left turn I saw two (2) aircraft crash at a 8:30 position, I also saw four (4) parachutes.

The VIS at the time and the altitude was about 5 to 7 miles.

The radio channel was 135.9.

We rejoined and continued the flight as briefed making T.O.T. of 1605Z.

ROBERT M DRANEY
Captain, USAF
AO-812394

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

STATEMENT

I, F. Paul Gibson, Sfc, RA 14294095, am assigned to the 53d Ord Gp located at Spinelli Barracks, Feudenheim-Mannheim, Germany, APO 403-A.

On 15 May 1953, I was standing in the Office of the Group Commander observing the dry runs being made with the various weapons to be used in the Armed Forces Day demonstrations to be held the following day. While standing there looking out the windows, which are located on the east side of the building, my attention was attracted by the roar of jet planes in the distance. Several formations of jets had flown directly over the depot prior to this time. Upon looking up I also saw a formation of C-119's approaching in the direction of flight of the jets.

At this point my attention was distracted by the ringing of a telephone in the Group Commanders office which I answered. Evidently the party calling had the wrong number because they hung up just as I lifted the receiver off the hook. Upon returning the phone receiver to the cradle I turned back to the window to look at the planes flying in formation. Upon locating them I saw a jet plane collide with two C-119's. Momentarily they hung together and then fell apart. A C-119 plunging immediately to the ground and the other two planes following immediately. There was an explosion and a huge pillar of smoke appeared in the sky. My location from the scenes of the accident was approximately 7 to 8 miles. The jet planes were flying in a somewhat circuitous route. They had come out of the southeast about 4 o'clock and made a circle and were flying back south east when I looked away to answer the phone. The C-119's were approaching from that direction.

The sky was clear, no clouds sailing about to obstruct one's vision. The sky was somewhat hazy but visibility was good. As previously stated, I was approximately 7 to 8 miles from the scene of the accident. The planes were clearly visible and detectable at that distance. They were flying at approximately 4,000 feet.

F. PAUL GIBSON, RA 14294095
Sfc US ARMY

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

BOARD PROCEEDINGS

List of witnesses in order of appearance

Lt Colonel W. H. Joyner	1 - 6 and 100 - 106
Major A. P. Hahn	6 - 12
Lt Colonel D. S. Glover	12 - 16
Lt Colonel D. S. Cramer	16 - 29
1/Lt E. G. Peck	29 - 33
Colonel L. N. Powell	34 - 39
1/Lt J. W. Chilton	39 - 45
Major W. S. Meyer	45 - 48
1/Lt J. C. Holley	48 - 52
Lt Colonel A. Thomas	52 - 57
Lt Colonel H. W. Jensen	57 - 64
Captain J. E. Bean	64 - 68
Lt Colonel C. R. Norton	69 - 70
Captain A. H. Zack	70 - 74
Captain F. G. Muller	74 - 77
Colonel C. G. Peterson	77 - 83
Captain S. M. Pool	83 - 95
1/Lt E. K. Lee	95 - 100
1/Lt McNeal	106 - 110

Rhein Main Air Base
APO 57, USAF
20 May 1952, 0900 hours.

PRESIDENT

COLONEL	CLARENCE L. SCHMID, President
LT COLONEL	HARMON E. BURNS
LT COLONEL	JOSEPH T. EHLINGER
LT COLONEL	LEONARD M. MCMAHUS
MAJOR	HAROLD D. FEIL
MAJOR	LEO FLORICK
MAJOR	JOHN T. LOGAN
MAJOR	ROBERT H. SIMPSON
CAPTAIN	THOMAS B. KRIEGER
CAPTAIN	JOHN H. FREEMAN, Recorder

PRESIDENT: The Board will come to order.

RECORDER: Let the record show that the Board convened at 0900 hours, 20 May 1953, at Rhein/Main Air Base, Germany, to determine the cause of an aircraft accident and to make recommendations to avoid future accidents.

Mr. Henry A. Paolucci will act as reporter.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM H. JOYNER was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

PRESIDENT: Will you give the reporter your name?

WITNESS: Lieutenant Colonel William H. Joyner, 11403A, Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force.

RECORDER: Sir, you are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident, and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence; further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission, or removal from the active list.

Questions by the president:

- Q Colonel Joyner, we have Twelfth Air Force Operations Order 156-53, dated 12 May 1953, and we would like to ask you some questions pertaining to the original order. One question I would like to ask: In enforcing the order, which is actually paragraph 3x(2)(c), "Troop carrier wings to marshal at 5000 feet with 317 Wing leading flight. F-84 wings to marshal at 15000 ft with 48th Wing leading. Direct communications authorized between wings to

coordinate details of these flights", what was your interpretation of what could be authorized in direct communications between wings?

A Colonel Schmid, the idea doing that was if there were any details which might arise which I was not familiar with from the Troop Carrier aspect and the F-84 aspect, they might deal with each other.

Q In your opinion, would it authorize them to change altitudes?

A No, sir.

Q Colonel Joyner, did you write the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order?

A Yes, sir.

Q In regards to the practice mission on the 14th, did you issue a recall for that mission?

A I did.

Q And what was the basis for recalling the practice mission?

A Well, as I remember--I am not quite clear, but I think that it was 3000 feet; I thought that was rather low, and it was lowering. There was supposed to be a forecast for 1500 hours; at 1400 hours local, I called some of the wings and I had some of the boys in the office call the other wings, and we recalled them.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

Q Now, as to the 15th, were you to be the person to issue a recall in the event of bad weather?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was the weather at the time that a recall would have been given?

A Well, if I might go back just to clarify the actions I took and Twelfth Air Force took, earlier that morning we started checking the weather; at that time it was 3500 feet to 4000 feet, going from broken to scattered with good visibility, ten miles, with forecast for it to improve. As the afternoon went on, we checked through the day--not only myself, but the people in the 86th. I went personally at ten o'clock to the weather office and checked; at that time the weather was starting to break. We had a pilot's report who had flown up in the area, and he said it was good up to the Ladenberg beacon with scattered stuff--the weather was scattered.

Q That was over Landstuhl?

A Yes.

- Q What was it over the Ladenberg beacon or Rhein/Main?
- A You can't get a report from Mannheim, but from reading the accident reports and everything else, I understand it was 5000 feet broken.
- Q You didn't have the weather report at the time of recall at Rhein/Main; did you check your Rhein/Main weather?
- A Yes, sir, I checked it from early in the morning. All the bases that were involved, Chaumont, Laon, Neubiberg, Rhein/Main, were all good.
- Q In reference to the 15000 feet for the fighter assembly point, this overcast that was at 5000 feet, in your estimation, had no bearing on this going up and coming down?
- A If you ask me that from a personal point of view, I would say no. I would say they can marshal over radio fix at 15000 feet, knowing the weather at Landstuhl was good. I would like to add that at the time I felt that could be slightly controlled from the tower. I was in the tower at the time, and we thought we could control it, but as fate would have it, the frequency transmitter went out just about twenty minutes before; 129.9 and 116.1, they are both on the same set.
- Q But the fact that you knew an overcast existed of approximately five- or six-tenths at 5000 feet--you felt that couldn't stop the mission?
- A May I clarify that? I did not know at the time of the flyby over the beacon itself that there was no overcast, there was no weather reporting in that area. I talked to someone in an 86 that had flown that morning and they said the weather was good then.

Questions by Major Simpson:

- Q May I get your connotation of "good" there, "clear", or what?
- A They indicated the visibility was good. They didn't give me any ceiling over Ladenberg at all; they said the visibility was good and the weather was okay for the mission to be run, and in checking the weather myself, from the terminal that the aircraft had taken off was good and the weather at Landstuhl was good. The weather in the vicinity, from what I could gather, was good, and the weatherman in Landstuhl also informed me that the weather was good. At that time when I checked at one o'clock it was going from 3500 scattered to broken, but he thought it would probably break up during the day, and it did break up in the afternoon. In discussing it with the people in my office, it was decided not to call it off until the very last minute, hoping that it would break, and as it was shown, it finally did break up over the base.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

- Q One question with reference to the 26's in your operations order. You gave them no marshalling point, were there to be more than one unit of B-26's?
- A No, sir.
- Q They were just to be over targets?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q At no designated rendezvous point from the run from the beacon to the Landstuhl tower?
- A That's right.
- Q Do you have any idea as to what altitude they had hit the outer beacon, the Ladenberg beacon?
- A No, I don't. I talked to Colonel McLaughlin, and it was decided in discussions with him, for him to fly a little above the F-84's, and fly almost parallel with them, and as he came over the field, come down and overfly the 84's. That was the way the show was set up. I didn't put that in there because I discussed that with Colonel McLaughlin.
- Q What time was the B-26 formation to be over the target?
- A 1604, I believe.
- Q And the troop carrier was supposed to be at what time?
- A 1602 for the Light Bomber Wing and 1600 for the troop carrier.
- Q What is the cruising speed of 26's in formation?
- A I was told that they were probably cruising at 240 miles per hour. I worked that out and it was eleven minutes from the beacon to the review stand.
- Q The troop carrier was letting down from 5000 feet to 1900 feet and there was no prearranged altitude in which the B-26's would approach the target other than their elevation over the target?
- A No, sir.
- Q They were not instructed to fly any route prior to the crossing of the beacon for the run to the target?
- A No.
- Q If they happened to be a few minutes early, they would have been milling around the Ladenberg beacon at any altitude?

- A Of course, we all understand that you can't go down to a wing and tell them everything they have to do; we told them where one group of aircraft, the B-26's would sandwich in between them. That was the feeling when we wrote the "ops" order. We didn't want to give them an altitude to come over the target because we felt that by separating the TOT's and the difference in speed, it would preclude any aircraft jamming up at the approach run itself. We felt that was pretty well clarified; it may not have been.
- Q Colonel Joyner, in the marshalling over the area, did you say in the event they couldn't marshal at the proper altitude it was your intention to control a remarshalling by the tower?
- A The idea was that the weather was at an altitude where they couldn't come in--I mean if the weather was at an altitude where they couldn't come in, we would attempt to bring them in, separate them probably five minutes apart, if contact had been good. That was discussed only, but as it turned out we saw that the weather was going to improve and be okay for the show we didn't even think of that any more.
- Q Did Weather give you any idea as to any basis of any clouds that may have been in the area, even scattered?
- A 3500 and going to 42. At that time we could look out and it was breaking out beautifully over the field.

Questions by Colonel Burns:

- Q When a formation leader finds that he cannot follow the predetermined plan and he knows this before taking off for the mission, what is the proper procedure that he should follow; should he call the project officer at 12th Air Force and advise him of any contemplated changes?
- A That would be my contention. That is the reason we put the two phone numbers here, so we can work out any details of the last minute if we have to.

Questions by Major Simpson:

- Q As to the exact weather report, you had an aircraft down at weather reconnaissance, or you got an aircraft report?
- A Yes.
- Q What time was this?
- A Approximately two o'clock--between one-thirty and two.
- Q And what was his report, other than "good" as far as the overcast was concerned?

A Major, honestly, I don't believe he gave me a ceiling on that; he said the weather was good and you could almost see the field from the Ladenberg beacon. In checking the weather, the ceiling was such that it was not in a five-thousand altitude zone or fifteen-thousand altitude zone.

Q Your idea was for the jets to stay at 15000 feet and the 119's to stay at 5000 feet, is that right?

A That's right.

PRESIDENT: No further questions. Thank you.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

PRESIDENT: We shall now call Major Hahn.

ALBERT P. HAHN, Jr., MAJOR, USAF, was called as a witness, was sworn, and testified as follows:

PRESIDENT: Will you give the reporter your name, please?

WITNESS: Albert P. Hahn, Jr., Major, USAF, 36th Fighter Bomber Wing.

RECORDER: Sir, you are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident, and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence; further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from the active list as covered by AFR 36-2.

Questions by the president:

Q Major Hahn, we will, in turn, ask you questions. Is there anything in your statement you wish to change?

A No, Sir.

Q In this telephone call that you have reported in paragraph four of your statement, do you know whether or not the information contained in there "Rendezvous will be underneath the base of the lower clouds approximately between 4,000 and 5,000 feet over the Ladenberg Beacon at 15432"---whether anybody in your headquarters or the headquarters of the 48th gave that information to higher headquarters?

A No, sir, I do not. The phone connection at the time was poor and that's all I could get out of the conversation.

Q In maneuvers of this type, previously, has it been customary, in telephonic conversations, to change altitudes of marshalling and so forth on a verbal basis?

A Not that I recall; we had changes very seldom.

Questions by Lt Colonel McManus:

Q Major Hahn, did you disseminate to the Group operations officer the entire information contained in the Twelfth Air Force operations order?

A No, I didn't.

Q You did write a 36th Wing operations order?

A No, sir, I did not.

Q Did you brief the Group operations officer on the units participating in the fly-by?

A No, sir, I did not.

Q Then the Group, as far as they knew, was the only unit to fly in the fly-by?

A Well, there were four of us at Ramstein at the time, and I think we knew that other Twelfth Air Force units would be in review but where about, we did not know--Colonel Burns, Colonel Childs, Colonel Glover, and myself.

Q What were their respective positions in the 36th?

A Colonel Childs is Group commander, Colonel Burns is of the 22nd Squadron, Colonel Glover has the Group operations.

Q And were you called to Ramstein in reference to this fly-by?

A No, sir, we were there on another maneuver.

Q What was the conversation at Ramstein as pertains to the fly-by?

A It was rather general. After the maneuver briefing we were told to stop by and get the notes on the coming fly-by on Friday.

Q But you did receive a TWX from Twelfth Air Force, which was their operations order?

A I received it after the group operations order had been written.

Q The group did write an operations order?

A Yes, sir, they did, from my notes.

Q Would you look at this operations order? It is a copy of the Twelfth Air Force TWX.

A Yes, sir, I have seen that.

Questions by Captain Krieger:

Q I am not exactly clear on this. You were the wing operations officer?

A Assistant director of wing operations.

Q And all the notes that went to the group itself was on a verbal basis from your scratch-pad notes that you received at Ramstein?

A Right. I came back from Ramstein to the operations and briefed them from those notes.

Q I see. Was the group operations officer there with you--did he receive the same briefing at Ramstein that you received?

A I don't think so. I think he was in the office but not in that conversation.

Q This operations order, was it sent to the group?

A No, sir, it was not. At the time I received it the group operations order had already been written; I saw no reason to change it.

Q Do we have a copy of the group operations order?

A Captain Pitman does have a copy of our group operations order. (Order is handed to witness). Yes, sir, that is the fighter group operations order.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

Q You saw this operations order yourself before the mission?

A Yes, sir.

Q You considered it an adequate operations order?

A From what I knew at the time, yes, sir.

Q You had the Twelfth Air Force operations order before you saw this order?

A No, sir. I did not, myself. I didn't.

Q Further information contained in the Twelfth ops order you thought was not necessary to be relayed to the group ops to include it in their operations order?

A Right, sir.

Q This does not indicate to this group that there were other type aircraft, P-84's--other than F-84's?

A That's right.

- Q In other words, they could assume from this operations order that the 84's were the only type aircraft to be in that flight?
- A I think they should assume that they were following the 48th anyway. They were the second element in this F-84 fly-by. We had direct communications authorized in the operations order; I assumed there would be several minor changes before the mission was flown.

Questions by Captain Krieger:

- Q Do you remember specifically who was called in the 36th Fighter Bomber Group as to a change in the marshalling altitude?
- A I am not sure. It was Colonel Glover or Captain Clure; I talked to both of them later on, but I am not sure who took the call at the time. I talked to both of them prior to the mission, though.

Questions by Lt. Colonel Ehlinger:

- Q Major Hahn, they held a briefing at 1400 hours; did anyone from wing operations attend the briefing?
- A No, sir. I was there at the time when we were in the process of setting up this combat group operations; I was in the building but I did not attend the briefing.

Questions by Lt. Colonel Burns:

- Q Was there some delay from the time the Twelfth Air Force operations order arrived on the base until you received it?
- A Yes, sir, quite a bit.
- Q Could you give it the time it arrived and the time you received it in your office?
- A I found the staff duty officer signed for the Twelfth Air Force operations order at approximately 7:30 on the 13th; however, I did not receive that until the afternoon of the 14th.
- Q Did the fact that you received it at this late time influence your decision not to pass the information down, amending the information given previously?
- A Not exactly. I looked through the operations order and saw no changes insofar as our fly-by--at the time there was 10,000 feet separation between the two units. I saw no reason to assume that it was not adequate margin of safety.
- Q If the 36th Group was leading a formation of jets involving more than one group, what would be the normal procedure from your office to effect a change in the rendezvous point altitude?
- A I definitely think we would have tried to get more information and verified with everyone else.

Q Would you have contacted Twelfth Air Force?
A Yes, sir, I would have.

Questions by Major Simpson:

Q I understand this: you put out your operations order before you got the Twelfth Air Force operations order?
A Sir, I briefed the group operations order and okayed the operations order from the group that went out prior to the time I received the Twelfth Air Force operations order.

Q Then in the afternoon, Friday afternoon at 12, you took a call from the 48th, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.

Q Later established to be Lieutenant Colonel Jensen?
A Right.

Q And had you seen the Twelfth Air Force operations order at this time?
A I had seen it the evening before.

Q Did the fact that the 60th was to be at 5000 feet and Colonel Jensen said that the rendezvous would be between 4000 and 5000 feet over the same beacon—did that occur to you?
A Not at the time. However, I had no reason to believe that the troop carrier had not been changed also.

Q You didn't question the facts at all regarding the change of the rendezvous altitudes?
A No sir, it was pretty hard to get any information on the phone and I took it for granted they were leading the F-84's and would coordinate all the details of the mission and furnish us with instructions they wanted us to fly.

Q You did know, though, before the 36th took off that they would be rendezvousing over the same point at the same altitude as the 60th, is that correct?
A Well, I would say I knew the ops order said 5000 feet, 15,000 feet—the 15,000 feet was changed; as far as I knew, the 5000 had been changed also from what information I had.

Q The lead of the 36th, did you pass that information on to him?
A I passed it to the group operations who passed it on to him.

Q To Colonel Cramer?
A That's right.

- Q Did Colonel Cramer know that the 60th would be at 5,000?
- A No, I don't think he did.
- Q Did you feel it was necessary that he knew that the 60th might be at 5,000 feet?
- A At the time I don't think I even thought about it particularly.
- Q You were following the 48th after the rendezvous?
- A We would rendezvous with them over a beacon, right, the usual SOP is to start calling a few minutes out and make the last minute changes.
- Q Don't you feel that it was necessary that Colonel Cramer should know that there would be other ships in the area, even though he would follow the other ships in from Ladenberg?
- A Yes, I would say it would help. We didn't know where the F-86's would be, or the B-26's.
- Q You know, though, that the 60th might be at 5,000 feet?
- A Possibly I did, sir.

Questions by Lt. Colonel Burns:

- Q When you received the call from the 48th, did you know at that time that they were electing to change the altitude and it had not been changed by Twelfth Air Force?
- A I assumed that they had coordinated all details. They were leading and we were following.
- Q Is the communications normally as poor as it was on that day?
- A Normally, a call from Bitberg to Chaumont is very poor always.
- Q Would that be a detriment in carrying out your operations?
- A Definitely. We could have had a conversation over the telephone if there had been a good connection.

Questions by Colonel Ehlinger:

- Q This was the only telephone call between you and the 48th?
- A Yes, sir.

Questions by Captain Freeman:

- Q Do you have any other means of communications other than the telephone?
- A I suppose there would be another line that would be better-we have teletypes, so if a telephone call is difficult you can confirm it

with a TWX, although at that time it wouldn't have made any difference. The call came through at lunch hour and the briefing was at 2 o'clock; I don't think it would have made any difference--the time in sending out a teletype and getting an answer back.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

Q The 48th changed the altitude of assembly prior to becoming airborne?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you think anything of the change that far in advance as to where they might have gotten their weather information or why they made the change? Did you check Weather after they notified you of the change?

A No, sir, I didn't. I think in the leading part of the conversation over the telephone there was something about weather, but I couldn't get what he was trying to tell me. I imagine I did assume that the weather was the reason for the change in altitude.

Q How is the communication between your base and Ramstein?

A Very good.

Q Between Chaumont and Ramstein?

A I don't know, sir.

PRESIDENT: That will be all; thank you.

(The witness withdrew from the room).

PRESIDENT: We shall now call Lieutenant Colonel Glover.

DONALD S. GLOVER, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, was called as a witness, was sworn, and testified as follows:

PRESIDENT: Will you give the reporter your name, please?

WITNESS: Donald S. Glover, Lieutenant Colonel, Fighter Group Operations, 36th Fighter Bomber Group.

RECORDER: Sir, you are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident, and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence; further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from the active list as covered by AFR 36-2.

Questions by the president:

- Q We have the 36th Group operations order here; we would like to have you look at it and identify it. (Handing document to witness).
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Is that genuine?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q In writing this operations order, what information did you have--did you have a Twelfth Air Force order or did you have a verbal briefing prior to writing this order?
- A I had some notes on a piece of scratch paper.
- Q However, you did not have a Twelfth Air Force ops order which is this one here, 156-53?
- A No, sir.
- Q We have had in the previous testimony and statements that there was a change of altitude at the marshalling point, and we would like to know whether you had knowledge of that fact?
- A Yes, sir, I did.
- Q Did you have that before the flight took off?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Did it occur to you to check whether or not that had been coordinated with any other headquarters? That is, in this case, Twelfth Air Force?
- A No. As I recall, we received the word from Chaumont down to our wing; they were leading the mission--I didn't think anything more about it.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

- Q Who briefed the 36th Fighter Bomber Group?
- A Colonel Cramer.
- Q Colonel Cramer briefed them on the information contained in your operations order?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q At the time that you wrote this operations order, were you aware that there were other type aircraft in the rendezvous?
- A I knew the 86th was taking part in it.

Q The 86th Fighter Bomber Wing?
A Yes, sir.

Q What type of aircraft do they fly?
A F-86's.

Q You had no knowledge, then, of B-26's or C-119's to be in the review?
A No, sir.

Q Where along the succession of events did you learn that there other type aircraft?
A I, with some other officers, attended a briefing at Ramstein; I think it was Tuesday. Major Thompson, 86th Fighter Group, was driving us around the base--I believe that he mentioned that they were taking part in this show.

Q What time did you receive the first knowledge that there were C-119's to also participate in the review?
A After the accident.

Q Then, following along that line, Colonel Cramer had no knowledge of any other aircraft being in the review?
A Not to my knowledge; I didn't give it to him.

Q Did you attend the briefing conducted by Colonel Cramer?
A Yes, I did.

Q There was nothing mentioned at his briefing as to any other type aircraft being involved?
A As I recall, no.

Q When did you see the Twelfth Air Force operations order?
A Saturday morning, the date was the 16th.

Q Were you notified by Major Hahn that that operation order had come in from Twelfth Air Force?
A Friday morning Major Hahn called fighter group operations and talked with Captain Cude, my assistant. Captain Cude told me that a Twelfth Air Force ops order had arrived and it confirmed the rendezvous point as Ladenberg beacon. I saw the Twelfth ops order in a TWX form Saturday morning at Wing Operations. Major Ellrod, Assistant Wing A-3, had it on his desk.

Q You made no attempt, then, to read this operations order to double check your operations order?
A No, I didn't.

Q It was available to you all day Friday to read, was it not?
A Yes, sir.

Q All day?
A I would say noon Friday, I don't recall--I would say around noon it came.

Questions by Major Feil:

Q Colonel, do you often publish a group order before you see a Twelfth Air Force ops order; is that a usual occurrence?
A It is not a usual occurrence; it does happen. We receive directives by telephone from which we normally pass on to our squadrons by telephone. We publish an ops order, normally, after we receive the formal ops order. At this particular time, as far as I knew, all we had were these notes we had got from the Twelfth.

Questions by Captain Krieger:

Q Were those your personal notes; did you compile the notes or were they second-hand notes received from someone else?
A Second-hand. I believe Major Hahn got them from--I don't recall his name, but he is a Captain in Twelfth Air Force.
Q And you in turn received them from Major Hahn, is that right?
A Yes.

Questions by Major Simpson:

Q Did I understand you to say that you were at Twelfth Air Force also with Major Hahn?
A Yes, sir.
Q You attended the briefing at Twelfth?
A This briefing I attended had nothing to do with the fly-by.
Q You had no information at all about the fly-by?
A I heard there was going to be one.
Q Did you hear at that time the units participating?
A No, sir.

Questions by Captain Freeman:

Q Do you happen to know if Major Hahn's notes mentioned the other aircraft or were his notes concerned only with your own station?
A I have the notes back in my office; they specify the 48th would have sixteen F-84's and we had sixteen.

Q No other mention of other aircraft?
A No, sir.

Q Do you happen to know who it was the briefed Major Hahn at Twelfth?
A I am not aware that Major Hahn received a briefing; we were around there talking with people we knew. He was talking with Colonel Joyner and I don't know whether he talked with this Captain or not.

PRESIDENT: No further questions. Thank you.

(The witness withdrew from the room).

PRESIDENT: We will now call Lt. Colonel Cramer.

DARRELL S. CRAMER, Lt. Colonel, USAF, was called as a witness, was sworn, and testified as follows:

PRESIDENT: Will you give the reporter your name, please?

WITNESS: Darrell S. Cramer, Lt. Colonel, USAF, 53rd Fighter Bomber Squadron.

RECORDER: Sir, you are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident, and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence; further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from the active list as covered by AFR 36-2.

Questions by the president:

Q We have a statement that you wrote concerning the accident. Are there any changes you wish to make in it?
A No, sir.

Q We also have a copy of the 36th Group order, 50-53. We would like to have you confirm that that is the operations order that you had (Handing document to witness).
A Yes, sir, this is it.

Q We understand that you conducted the briefing, is that correct?
A That is correct.

Q In conducting this briefing, as far as complying with this ops order completely, did you do that?
A I believe there were two exceptions there. one, the ops stated the 53rd would furnish four aircraft and be the second flight,

because I was on the first flight, and the other exception to that was a telephone call that I got in the early afternoon of this day of the mission saying that the rendezvous altitude would be below the overcast or at 3500 feet.

Q That telephone call was between what people?

A Between the 36th Fighter Bomber Group operations, Colonel Glover, and myself.

Q In other words, you, at no time, had direct communications prior to take-off with the 48th?

A No, sir.

Q As far as the actual accident, you said you saw the C-119's below: do you recall the altitude at the time--I know it's difficult, but you don't state any altitude right at that time, we would have to assume that you were at 5,000 feet.

A That is correct, yes, sir.

Q As far as you know, you were on 5,000?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you saw the C-119's, you were still a little high--I mean your particular flight?

A Higher than the C-119's?

Q Yes. As in your statement, "...until from below the nose of my airplane..."

A Yes, sir, we were in a turn, banked up, and looking out in this direction. It looked to me as though they were just a little bit low. I mean that they were back in the direction where--in looking out at a bank, they were below the nose of the airplane, not necessarily in altitude.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

Q When did you receive your copy of the group operations order?

A The exact time, I don't know. It came into the squadron, it didn't come to me; it came in through our regular courier service. What time it was received there, I don't know. Later, when I found I was to lead the mission I immediately got the operations directive and got other information that would be necessary for the briefing.

Q You, at the time, were at Squadron Operations when you started the pre-briefing work?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you have occasion to talk to the group operations officer during your planning period in reference to other information?

A Yes, that telephone call when he called to say that the rendezvous altitude would be below the overcast.

Q Did he state at that time that there would be a Twelfth Air Force operations order on the field?

A No, sir.

Q You had no knowledge of an operations order from Twelfth Air Force?

A No, sir; I didn't even ask if there was an operations directive from Twelfth Air Force.

Q All you knew, then, that the review was for the retirement of General Rich and that the 48th and 36th would put the fly-by on?

A That's correct.

Q Had you heard that there would be any other type aircraft in the review?

A No, sir.

Q Then when you were told that the assembly point was to be at 5,000 feet, or below the overcast, it had no significance to you as far as anybody else was concerned; you thought that was clear?

A That's correct, with the exception that I heard at first 15,000 feet, I thought in my mind "That's a pretty steep descent"; 15,000 feet is quite high, but before I had time to question or think of it, I had information that I would go below the overcast.

Q Do you know who determined that the altitude for the rendezvous would be 15,000 feet?

A The ops directive.

Q You thought, then, that was set up by your group; that altitude?

A I assumed it was set up by whoever put on the mission.

Q But you had no idea that there was any other directive other than your group operations order?

A I don't understand the question correctly--I assume that it was a directed mission from Twelfth Air Force.

Q I will ask you again. All you saw prior to your take-off, then, was this group operations order?

A That's correct.

Q And you had no knowledge of any other operations order being on the base?

A No. I didn't question whether there was another operations directive on the base.

- Q When you first read 15,000 feet and you questioned it in your mind, did you question group operations?
- A No, because we had already been changed to below the overcast. It was no longer a point of interest.
- Q The change of altitude was at what time? What time did you receive it?
- A Around noon.
- Q What was the time interval between the time you received the group operations order and the time you had the change?
- A Perhaps several hours.
- Q And this 15,000 struck you immediately when you read the group operations?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q But you did not check with Group?
- A I intended to do that. Those points, I thought, would be discussed at the group briefing.
- Q When did you assume the group lead?
- A Shortly before the lunch hour; I am not positive.
- Q And you intended to clarify this altitude before you briefed?
- A That is correct.
- Q What time were you scheduled for briefing?
- A Three o'clock.
- Q Did you check the weather in the assembly point yourself? Prior to take off.
- A Only on weather sequence; only in the regular weather forecaster's report.
- Q What was the weather given to you?
- A Broken sky condition around 3,000 or 4,000 feet in the Mannheim area--Heidelberg, Rhein/Main weather, Landstuhl weather, and I believe those were the only ones they gave me.
- Q Did you think anything more about the assembly altitude after you read that weather sequence?
- A No, because at the time I was told we would rendezvous below the weather--they had determined that we would rendezvous below the overcast. My interest in the weather then was just academic, just to see how low it would be.

- Q Would you describe the type of formation the fighters got?
- A We call it the finger-tip formation; it resembles the way your fingers are laid out on your hand. This was drawn by a draftsman to give position by name (indicating chart). They are stacked down in strings.

Questions by Major Feil:

- Q Did you receive first your notification that you were going to be the group leader or the notification of the change of altitude at the rendezvous; do you recall?
- A The notification that I was going to lead.
- Q You received that first?
- A As best I can remember, both of them were during the lunch hour.
- Q You briefed the pilots solely, then, on the group ops order?
- A That's correct.
- Q Do you remember who gave you the information of a rendezvous being at 3500 feet?
- A Colonel Glover.

Questions by Major Simpson:

- Q Colonel Cramer, did you have any other information, hearsay or anything, to the effect that there would be other ships besides the two fighter groups in the fly-by formation?
- A No, I didn't. Several days previous to that date I heard we would have a fly-by in a general conversation and rendezvous at Mannheim at 15,000 feet. The 15,000 feet seemed quite steep at that time.
- Q But you didn't know what groups were participating or how many or anything?
- A No, sir. I was given a rendezvous time at the same time they said we would rendezvous below the overcast. The time is not on the directive.
- Q What time was that?
- A Forty-three minutes past the hour. I arranged to arrive at the IP at forty-three minutes past the hour; the rest of the briefing was concerned as to how we would fly, the route--the regular and usual briefing information. I believed that we would fly at 3500 feet or 4,000 feet, depending upon the turbulence as we came over the hills. The formation was all regular SUP. Well, this is in the statement; we were seven minutes out from the beacon when I changed frequencies to 135.9 and the squadron went over at my signal; we had radio check in the squadron. The flight leaders checked in and Gallahad called me and I told him I was approximately seven minutes from the beacon and he told me he was ten

minutes from the beacon and then changed to seven minutes to the beacon and flying at 5,000 feet and said if it were possible he would hold 5,000 feet in the rendezvous area. So we proceeded right on course and I should say here that I became aware that there would be other airplanes flying because I heard a great number of radio communications on 135.9. I was climbing up to 5,000 feet on into the IF; shortly before we got into the Mannheim area I got approximately 4,000--4800 to 6,000 feet, and I was coming into the area. Gallahad called and said he was 5,000 feet over the rendezvous turning left, and then he said, "I have you in sight. You are slightly lower than I am." He said he would descend, and as soon as he finished transmitting somebody said, "Negative, those are 119's". At that time I was coming up to the rendezvous point. I think we passed just slightly south of it and I started to turn to the left and I didn't have him in sight, Gallahad, and I continued around the turn to the left and I turned to heading just a little south of west, or west, rather, when someone said "Boggie" and the transmission was jammed in with all the other transmissions. I was searching out at the time and I couldn't see anything, boggies or anything else, and then from below, and I say below because in my relative position it came from under the nose of the airplane, I saw a couple C-119's coming, and they got in my field of vision. At that time I couldn't see whether they were coming toward us or going away, but I saw we were coming on a collision course on in front, and I called the squadron and said we would break to the right. At the time I saw them I started to turn up and to the right; I continued the climb. As soon as I saw that in the pulling up there was no danger of collision I continued to turn up and away. To me, it appeared that I cleared the 119's with a pretty good; I guess a minimum of 150 feet; I thought probably the whole squadron cleared, but as soon as I got up to where I could see, this big ball of fire go down I knew somebody had been hit. The air, as I said, was loaded with transmissions and it was impossible to find out who or what had happened. So at the first break I got the squadron switched over to our frequency and tried to make a check. The time was approaching for set-course time; I tried to make a check as to whether we struck something or the 119's had struck together, or what. The different flight leaders, I told them where I was; I went above the scene of the accident. I made a turn around the field and the rest of the squadron was joining the formation at the time. Then I saw this one ball of fire going down. By that time I was pretty confident we had lost an 84. I told the squadron to go back to 135.9; I could see that they were going into formation again. By this time I had Gallahad in sight and I called and asked him if he was setting course and he said yes. He pulled around and we pulled in behind him and we continued the fly-by. At this time, the whole squadron was together and I could get a radio check and they said we had one aircraft missing.

Questions by the president:

- Q When you first observed the C-119's, would you say that was about the distance--about one mile?
- A It is impossible to tell accurately. I put a mile because I figured a mile would be the best guess I could make. It could have been half a mile or three-quarters.
- Q At any time during that turn, do you recall going through any clouds that would have obscured your visibility?
- A During the turn?
- Q Yes.
- A No, sir.

Questions by Captain Freeman:

- Q Colonel Cramer, I have here a statement from one of the pilots in your formation. I will extract the pertinent parts: "We executed a steep turn to the left from our previous heading of 100-120 degrees. During this turn I remember passing through and near some very small cloud formations. The visibility below us was slightly restricted by haze". Do you have any comment to make on that statement?
- A The only time I was aware--in the first place, we didn't go through any clouds; there were puffs of scud there. The only time we came close to these puffs of scud was at the time we were proceeding into the initial point at about 6,000 feet and that was at the time--I wanted to make certain that Gallahad was at 5,000 feet; I wanted to be above him, and as we were coming into the IP area--if you have seen them, they are just these little puffy hunks of scud.
- Q Then you state you did not fly through any of these puffs of scud after passing the IP and starting this turn to the left?
- A No.
- Q Another statement from a pilot--you are welcome to examine the whole statement if you wish--"After the take-off we joined up and proceeded to the beacon. After passing over the beacon we started a left turn. During the left turn we passed through two clouds at 5,000 feet. Shortly after passing through the second cloud the leader abruptly leveled his wings and then called a right "break". Do you wish to make any comment on that one? I realize you may not remember having passed these; it is also possible that you were stepped down.
- A No. To start with, the clouds, if there were clouds there, and the type of clouds they were, they weren't physically, bodily, clouds; just puffs of scud. As we approached the beacon I requested that they would be sitting, watching us pass the beacon. At that time, as I said before, as we came into the beacon area we passed through this area shortly past Mannheim approaching Ladenberg where these

puffs were, and it was ten or fifteen seconds after that or longer that we started our turn to the left. After I started our turn to the left, I remember passing no clouds.

Q In order to make this a matter of record, I would like to read three more extracts, and if you like, you can make a comment on all three or five at the same time or make no comment at all, as you desire: "As we approached the IP, 'Gallahad' leader called 'Cousin' leader and said that he was circling the IP to the left at 5,000 feet, just underneath the scattered cloud layer. Upon reaching the IP we started a turn to the left and flew through a small thin cloud. After approximately 180 degree turn 'Cousin' leader called 'Cousin Break Right Now'". The fourth statement from a pilot in your formation: "We crossed the IP (Ladenberg Beacon) on an approximate heading of east in the vicinity of 4,000 feet. We started a left climbing turn, passing thru scattered light cumulus in the process. After completing about 180 degrees of turn, we rolled out and emerged from the scattered deck at about 5,000 feet. The visibility I would estimate to have been 3-4 miles at that level in that position." The fifth statement, also from a pilot in your formation: "I recall seeing a relative bearing of about 190 degrees on my R. C. to the Ladenberg beacon and we started a turn to the left. Cousin leader called us to 'stack it up' and we started a rather steep left turn. We passed thru some scattered clouds and then eased off the bank. Cousin leader called suddenly 'Cousin gang, break right now'." I read those to make them a matter of record for any comment you wish to make.

A I realize that everyone has their own impressions of what happened there at a minute's interval where you place these things; everyone has, perhaps, their own idea. I did not make any radio call for Cousin to stack it up. Cousin was still stacked down as we went into the turn and as we completed the turn they were still stacked down. I think every pilot in the mission, including that one, if you will talk to him, will realize that he was stacked down. The other pilot said 2,000 feet when we passed the beacon; we were 5500 or 5800 feet.

Q That is confirmed by other pilots.

A Each one is giving his impression of what happened. My impression of what happened, the highest point we got was just before we got into the beacon area and it was then that we passed through these wisps of denser haze than the haze in which we were flying. We were approaching the bottom of the build-ups; we descended at 5,000 feet but we were not in a descending turn. We were at 5,000 feet before they called "boggies". Until the time the collision came about we did not pass any puffs.

Q Could you draw on this overlay your approximate course and the turn that you made.

A All right (indicating on overlay).

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

Q Just one question. When you order a break right, how do your wing men out to the right execute that break?

A He has to turn to the right.

Q Isn't there a good possibility of a collision?

A There is a very good possibility of a collision.

Q You had no choice but to break right in the position you were in?

A In my opinion, and the course it was based on, I knew that we had to break. The airplanes were coming in front, and if I had continued my orbit we would have hit them head-on, so I called a break right and in a break, when you start it, you break to the right and up in this direction, knowing full well that the extra man is on the right wing and it is dangerous.

Q When was your radio check prior to approaching the beacon; the last time that everybody had checked in to you on the same frequency?

A Well, it was about seven minutes out.

Q From that point until after the accident, had you changed your group to any other frequency?

A No, sir.

Q You were on 135.9?

A Yes.

Q There is not a possibility, is there, that Lieutenant Holley or Chilton might have been on a different frequency?

A There is a possibility. I think it was Lt. Holley who called the boggies.

Q But there is a possibility that Lt. Chilton may have been on a different frequency than you; he would have had to change on his own initiative and not on order from you?

A He would have done it on my order to 135.9.

Q Did you get anything from 135.9?

A From the flight leaders.

Q Do the flight leaders get a radio check?

A No, sir.

Questions by Major Feil:

- Q Do you remember, by any chance, what position you were in when Gallahad leader called you and said he was descending to 4,000 feet?
- A We were right near Mannheim, slightly crossing the south edge of Mannheim.
- Q At what altitude were you at the time?
- A 5600 or 5800 feet.
- Q How far would you estimate you were from the beacon?
- A About forty seconds.
- Q Did you immediately start your let-down at that time?
- A That's right; however, I did not get a confirmation from Gallahad that he was going to let-down at that particular time because he was told those weren't 84's, those were 119's.

MAJOR SIMPSON: You might read paragraph 4 of Gallahad Leader's statement.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: Paragraph 4 of the statement submitted by Lt. Colonel Jensen: "When about three (3) miles directly South of the Ladenburg Beacon (at approx 1643L), and about to start an orbit to the left, I observed a formation of C-119 aircraft (initially mistaken for Cousin formation until closer in) approaching from the southeast and slightly above our altitude. I immediately descended to 4000 feet MSL and continued my orbit to the left, informing Cousin Leader that I was descending to and would orbit close in over the Beacon at 4000 feet in order to stay below the C-119 aircraft in the area; Cousin Leader acknowledged this call. Other formations of twin-engined aircraft were observed in the area, all at higher altitude -- the exact number and positions not now remembered."

A Are you asking me for comment on that?

Q It was along that same line.

A I think, as I stated, it was almost verbatim the way the radio transmission was made; he said, "I am over the Ladenburg beacon--three miles". To start with, he wouldn't go right straight across so that if you are going to orbit the turn, the radius of the turn is six or seven miles across; he would go south, and he would make a position report as I would. If you were at the beacon you would consider that you are at the rendezvous point. When you say you are over the beacon it doesn't mean you are right here, it means you are

approximately about two miles off or around that. I think the expression in the statement that I have made there that he called and said, "I am over the Ladenburg beacon and I am turning left" and continued by saying "I have you in sight, you are below me and coming toward me"--just as soon as he got through transmitting somebody called and said "Negative Gallahad, those are 119's" and that was the end of the transmission. We were twenty or thirty seconds from the beacon ourselves and I had not even seen it.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

- Q That was the first indication that you had that there were going to be other airplanes in the area?
- A No. After we had got in from Landstuhl area and into the beacon, which is about five or four minutes flying time, or from the Sembach area, the radio was loaded with other transmissions; I knew that there were other formations. As we were approaching the area I saw other aircraft. I was looking for Gallahad and I could see these other formations, so I knew there were other aircraft in the general area there; at the rendezvous point I didn't know.

Questions by Major Feil:

- Q Approximately how long after this radio transmission--what was the time interval between the transmission and the collision?
- A I would estimate from the first transmission to the actual collision about two minutes.
- Q Is that the transmission that Gallahad leader gave when he said he was going down to 4,000 feet to avoid the others?
- A I didn't hear him say that; he said I was below him and he would descend.
- Q When you heard that transmission you were at 5500 or 5800?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q At the time of the collision you were at 5,000 feet?
- A Yes, sir.

Questions by Captain Krieger:

- Q What would you estimate the visibility in the area was at the time?
- A I believe I estimated six to eight miles. That is a rather hard thing to say; it depends largely on the direction in which you were looking.
- Q Into the sun what would you say it was?
- A Nil, almost.

- Q At the time of the collision you were heading approximately west, is that correct?
- A That is right.
- Q What was the visibility then, at the time of the collision, looking into the C-119 formation?
- A Six to eight miles.
- Q And was there the typical Rhein haze layer?
- A The same type of clouds that you have around field today and the type you had over Wiesbaden this morning.
- Q What was the base of that stuff, approximately, could you differentiate the base on that haze?
- A I can answer that by saying that when we had formed up and going back in, by the time we went below 4,000 or slightly lower than 4,000 in our course towards Landstuhl. The visibility under there was, I would guess, a good twelve or fifteen miles. We could see the construction area at Kaiserslautern shortly after we passed the mountains here going toward Kaiserslautern.

Captain Freeman:

- Q What was your indicated air speed between the time you passed Ladenburg beacon and the collision?
- A Three hundred to 380 miles per hour.
- Q They are calibrated in miles per hour?
- A That's right.
- Q What is the distance between elements? In other words, would the white flight be at liberty to pull up and pass you, or once you are in you are pretty well there?
- A You could do it, but it would be a pretty dangerous maneuver. It is possible but very dangerous, plus the fact that you have the jet wash ahead. When you fly at 380 miles per hour you get a pretty good bang out of it.
- Q Could you estimate the approximate angle between the C-119 formation and your formation?
- A They were about one o'clock.
- Q That would be their eleven o'clock?
- A Depending on the relative position. Perhaps I could illustrate that with the models. I didn't see the whole formation, just the first units of the formation. When I first saw the airplanes we

were in approximately a thirty degree bank approximately like that (illustrating). They were under here flying a course that was bringing them out in front of me in this manner and I figured that if I continued my turn I would be turning right into them, and I attempted to pull up in the right so that they would be in front of me, and I attempted to pass behind.

Q Could you fly that one in your hand and indicate that?

A The relative distance here is not accurate.

Q You were above them to start with?

A I was almost level. The first time I saw them, they were on that side of the airplane, they were almost level. Continuing the turn, if we had continued around here--we were on a collision course then. I thought turning in this direction--their arc was in this direction--that we could get to the outside of their arc and over them as we turned in this way.

Q How close did you pass this lead ship?

A About 150 feet.

Q About where your model is right now, then?

A As soon as I started to roll I lost sight of them because the arc of the nose of my aircraft was something like this. Then I could see in this direction only.

Questions by the president:

Q There is one question I would like to ask. Is this about normal as far as your take-off time with relation to your rendezvous time--in other words, your statement and also other statements say you had about 13 minutes there before setting course. Is that about standard or is that an unusual time to be circling a point?

A I thought we had eight minutes for taxi and eight minutes for set course, or a total of eighteen minutes.

Q You state here that you were actually at the rendezvous point one minute ahead of set-course time. Is that standard or an early arrival?

A That was about standard.

PRESIDENT: Any further questions by any member?

You are excused. Thank you.

(The witness withdrew from the room).

PRESIDENT: We will now call Lieutenant Peck.

EARL G. PECK, 1st Lieutenant, USAF, was called as a witness, was sworn, and testified as follows:

PRESIDENT: Will you give the reporter your name, please?

WITNESS: Earl G. Peck, 1st Lieutenant, USAF.

RECORDER: You are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident, and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence; further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from the active list as covered by AFR 36-2.

Questions by the president:

Q Lt. Peck, we have a diagram on the board there; will you confirm that that was your position in the formation? The distances aren't right.

A Yes, sir, that's right.

Q We have your statement here that was written May 16th. Do you want to change that in any way?

A No, sir, I believe that is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Q We can see by your statement that you were pretty busy about then. Is there anything you can add---you were the one who went under the C-119 formation---as to how violent a maneuver you had to make to get underneath?

A It was an extremely violent maneuver. When Cousin Leader called "break right", I, of course, had to hesitate because of my position, and I saw the right wingman start off to the right and the white leader start up. I was under red element and they had not moved yet. I glanced through the wind screen and saw 119's very close at 12 o'clock and I ducked the stick and snapped left and back up again to rejoin the formation.

Q You narrowly averted a collision. Could you put that in feet?

A No, sir. It is pretty difficult. Of course, all I had was a fleeting impression of the situation; perhaps one of the crew members of the 119's could give a better description of how close the 84's came.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

Q In that split-second vision, you only saw one airplane?

A Yes, sir, at the instant; I had seen more before that. Of course, when you are flying in formation you are not looking ahead all the time. I saw a group of 119's and it seemed low enough at 12 o'clock that we could clear them. Then, a few seconds later, Cousin Leader called "break". I glanced ahead and saw a 119 filling the wind screen.

Q Do you happen to know what Lt. Cass did?

A Yes, sir, I do. I understand his wingman started to break right and then saw that he was going to run into a C-119 in the process and rolled out and snapped underneath, and Lt. Cass tried to follow as much as he could.

Q Cass went underneath also?

A I believe so; I couldn't be sure, but that is what I understand. I understand that Blue Leader went over.

LT. COLONEL BURNS: I believe Cass stated here that he barely went over the C-119 and the wingman went under.

Questions by Lt. Colonel McManus:

Q Which way did your White Leader go?

A He went up, sir. Red Leader pulled up and the element a little behind him, and I couldn't pull up because I wasn't clear of Red element flying in close trail stacked underneath. I didn't feel that I could break right safely because my wingman was right there. It was a snap decision to do what I did.

Questions by Captain Krieger:

Q I was wondering here. You say after you passed the beacon you were heading roughly east after you passed the beacon?

A Yes, sir, we approached the beacon. After beacon passage we started a left turn. I believe that is correct, but most of my preoccupation was flying the formation.

Q You stated that was a climbing turn. Was that a sensation or do you believe you were in a climbing turn?

A I believe I was in a climbing turn, yes, sir.

Q What would you estimate the visibility would be in the area?

A Well, it varied. As is typical of the Rhein valley, there were patches of haze. It seemed to me we passed through a little

scattered deck of cumulus. We passed through a light scattered deck of cumulus, and upon emerging from the deck the visibility seemed to be three or four miles in that immediate area.

Q You say after emerging?

A We passed through a scattered deck.

Q Did it restrict your visibility any?

A If it did, it was only momentarily.

Questions by Captain Freeman:

Q Your statement says "...passing thru scattered light cumulus...". As I read that I understand that you actually flew through the clouds.

A I did in my position. Of course, they were so small and light that it is possible that the leader never lost the three miles visibility.

Q But you actually flew through some small clouds in this process?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long would you say you were in any one small cloud; one second, two seconds?

A Not more than one second, I would say, sir---very light cumulus.

Q One second as far as any one cloud is concerned?

A Yes, sir.

Q But you said "...thru scattered light cumulus..."; does that mean more than one?

A As I remember, I remember clouds passing my windshield, and I had the impression of seeing scattered cumulus at our level.

Q Not more than one second in any one cloud?

A That's just an estimate, sir. One second can seem like a very long time at times.

Q What was your indicated air speed at the vicinity of the beacon?

A I would say just under 400.

Q Would 380 to 400 sound right?

A Yes, sir.

Questions by Captain Krieger:

Q Did you personally experience any restriction of visibility because of flying through this scuddiness?

A Well, sir, as you undoubtedly realize, flying White 3, your concentration is almost entirely on the leader. I wasn't looking particularly to see objects outside the aircraft except my leader, and I couldn't say whether my visibility was restricted or not. Actually, the first time when I saw the 119's, they were at 12 o'clock, and I glanced out and saw them, and I wouldn't estimate the distance, but they seemed far away and low enough that we could clear them. The next thing, Cousin Leader called a break and I hesitated enough to look and I saw a C-119 immediately in front of me.

Questions by Lt. Colonel Burns:

Q Assuming these are the lead airplanes, where, approximately, did your airplane pass?

A I can't be sure. It was just a fleeting glimpse of a bunch of airplanes in front of you--it seemed as if I passed somewhat in this manner (indicating).

Q In speaking of this light cumulus, would you say that your passing there occurred close enough to the time of the collision to have anything to do with the collision?

A No, sir, I think we were out of the clouds--what clouds there were--long enough to have seen them at sufficient distance to clear them without any difficulty.

Questions by Major Simpson:

Q Do you have an instrument which measures "G" force?

A Yes, sir.

Q Does it retain that record?

A Some do and some don't. We have some G meters which has a needle that stays at the highest indication.

Q Negative G's?

A Yes, sir. One that fluctuates and that remains at the highest registered point, but the meter that I had at that time was not that type.

Q You can't tell much when you are in a tight turn or something?

A You can glance down and get an idea, sir. If you pulled many G's, you wouldn't know how many you pulled, sir.

Q Could you estimate how many negative G's you pulled to go under this aircraft?

A That's difficult because the negative G forces weren't applied for

Sufficient lengths of time to cause the red-out condition. I think my snap to the left was more violent than any negative G force to duck under.

Q The flight behind you was lower?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you think they could have gone under also?

A Yes, sir, but as you undoubtedly realize, it is pretty difficult to make a decision right at that instant in that short time.

PRESIDENT: No further questions. Thank you.

(The witness withdrew from the room).

PRESIDENT: We shall now adjourn until 1 o'clock.

(The hearing adjourned at 1125 hours, 21 May 1953).

20 May 1953
1400 hours

PRESIDENT: The Board will come to order.

RECORDER: All members of the Board who were present at the time of the recess are again present.

Let the record show that we have a change of reporters. Mr. Bernard W. Nycz will substitute for Mr. Henry F. Paolucci.

COLONEL LUCION NELSON POWELL was called as a witness, was sworn, and testified as follows:

PRESIDENT: Give the reporter your name.

WITNESS: Lucion Nelson Powell, Colonel, USAF, AO339768, Headquarters, 317th Troop Carrier Group.

RECORDER: Do you wish paragraph 35 to be read?

PRESIDENT: I think so.

RECORDER: Sir, you are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident, and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence; further, that this board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from the active list.

Questions by the President:

Q Colonel Powell, we have a previous statement that you made to us at our request, both on the weather and on your radio logs. Is there anything here that you wish to change at this time?

A Nothing.

Q Are you familiar with this operations order? This is a copy of the TWA Operations Order we received here and I would like to know if you received that down in your headquarters.

A I received an Operations Order from the 317th Wing--not in such detail or in the exact form as this. However, it gave the 317th Wing Mission, the 60th Wing Mission, the frequencies, rendezvous point and altitude, target time and stated that B-26's would participate, gave a target time and an altitude over the target for the B-26's; That F-84's would participate, giving a rendezvous altitude of 15,000 feet and a target time; that F-86's would participate, giving a target time. My order gave target times and altitude over the target for all participating units; it gave the Ladenberg Beacon as

the place of rendezvous; it gave altitudes of rendezvous for the 60th and the 317th, the altitudes for the F-84's--no other altitudes. It didn't specify any routes to be flown other than the IP to the target which is generally on the east-to-west heading. This is the copy of the order I received from the wing. (Handing paper to the president).

Q Did you subsequently put out a group order?
A Here is a copy (handing paper to the president).

Q Were you present at the briefing?
A I was. The group order is written to alert the squadrons, to set up the mission. The details are given out at the briefing.

Q At the time, did you know how many aircraft would be in the area? In other words, you indicated before that you were aware that a lot of F-84's and F-86's would participate.
A Right.

Q In other words, your briefing officers had access to this prior to this briefing.
A That's right. Our pilots were briefed as to the number of aircraft we expected in the flyby. We didn't know exactly the area in which they would be at the rendezvous point.

Q Colonel Powell,--

PRESIDENT (to Board): Did anybody want to ask any more questions on planning here?

MEMBERS: No.

Q We would like to have you briefly describe what you heard, both on the radio right in the vicinity of the Beacon and just sort of tell the story in your own words of what you did hear of what was going on from about the time when you first sighted the 60th or had radio contact with it.

A I first made radio contact with the 60th at thirty minutes past the hour, to advise them of the change in IP time. We had agreed upon an IP time of forty-five minutes past the hour to make good our target time at a specified air speed. The winds were lighter than anticipated. Our ground speed was greater than anticipated. We changed the time of IP from forty-five minutes past the hour to forty-six minutes past the hour, which would allow us to make the target time at the pre-agreed upon air speeds. The 60th leader was advised of this at 1530 Zebra, given time back and the altimeter setting, our altitude, our magnetic heading. The 60th leader okayed receipt

of the transmission, gave me his heading of 231 degrees, and advised me that he would be over the target one and a half minutes ahead of us. Approximately eight minutes later, I sighted the 60th formation.

Q At what altitude?

A They were at 5,000 feet. I was at 4,500 feet, the altitude separation for join-up. He obviously was doing nothing to change his IP estimate. I was very much concerned about the join-up, inasmuch as he was ahead of us and was supposed to join on to our formation. As we approached the IP, he changed his heading to a course paralleling ours, approximately five miles to the right of our formation, and he was approximately four miles--three to four miles ahead of my formation, but he had me in sight all the time. As we approached the IP, approximately three or four miles from the IP, I saw a flight of what I think were F-84's. I estimated about twelve in number. They were flying up the Rhein Valley on a northerly heading, at approximately an altitude of 3,500 feet. They were talking back and forth. I don't know whether they were talking within their own formation or to another flight, but I heard them say:

"Do you see the 119's?" "Yes, sir, I have the 119's in sight". I don't know who was talking, but someone had us in sight, and as I got to the IP, I asked the 60th if they thought they would be able to make the join-up, and they replied in the affirmative, that they would make a right turn to join on to the rear of our formation. It was obvious that if they did that, they would never be able to get in position by the time we reached Landstuhl, unless I reduced my air speed. So, I advised him I would descend at 150 knots, rather than the 165 which we agreed to. That was the last transmission I had with the 60th concerning the formation join-up. I lost sight of all of them because they were in their turn and I would pass them, going to Landstuhl on the course. The next I heard, the conversation that I could remember, was there was a lot of chatter on the air but the conversation I remember was that someone said, "Break right, break left," then there was a lot of chatter and the next thing that sticks in my mind, because I was concentrating on trying to raise Landstuhl tower, the first indication I had of difficulty was someone said, "Three chutes came out of a 119" and then someone said, "An airplane blew up" and there was considerable chatter from the 60th. The channel was flooded with conversation. Someone asked about Red Lead and someone replied that he is dead. Then there was talk of aborting. It seemed that everyone was trying to transmit at the same time and I was trying to raise Landstuhl Tower to give them our IP time.

Q That was all on 135.9?

A All on 135.9. I was still descending. After reaching the altitude of 1900, which is our altitude over the target, I called the 60th--

"Lakeside" was his call sign, and asked him if he was aborting. The reply came in the affirmative that they were aborting. So, I assumed an air speed of 155, got on to Landstuhl, arriving at about forty-five seconds later.

PRESIDENT: Does anyone want to ask questions?

A Oh, just as I passed the IP, a flight of four F-84's passed under my formation on an easterly heading.

LT COLONEL MCMANUS: You didn't see the flight of F-84's that hit the flight of 119's?

A I don't think so; I don't believe it could have been the first one because due to their position when I saw them and the position of the formation coming around, because as the formation was turning, they would certainly have been north of them or else would have turned to the east. I don't think it was the first twelve that I saw.

LT COLONEL MCMANUS: You had no knowledge that the F-84's had changed their assembly altitude from 15,000 to 5,000?

A No knowledge at all. I was very surprised to see them there because I thought they would be there approximately ten to twelve minutes after I passed the IP.

Questions by LT COLONEL BURNS:

Q Colonel Powell, you stated that you were at 4,500 feet and the 60th were at 5,000?

A Right.

Q The 60th were going to join you. Did you intend for them to use that separation until they saw you and then drop down and join on you, or were you going to pull up to their altitude? How do you work your join-up's?

A Within my organization, we always work it with a 500 foot separation for join-up and inasmuch as we were going to descend from the IP into an altitude of 1,900 feet, I intended to start descending at the IP and have him use his extra altitude to get into position.

Q I have one other question. Did your group briefing within your group include anything about the other participating units in this fly-by?

A Other than the fact that there would be other participating units, B-26's, F-84's and F-86's, we had no information as to what route they would fly coming into the IP or how they intended to rendezvous at the

IP or as to what time they would be over the IP. The only thing that was given was their target time.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q What about the weather? Can you describe the extent of cloud coverage and visibility?

A Yes, you have a certificate there.

PRESIDENT: Yes, who has that?

A It started out as scattered to broken clouds from Neuberg to the Nordlingen area at an altitude estimated at 5,200 to 5,500 feet. That was the reason I stated 4,500, and as we continued westward, the sky coverage diminished. By the time we had reached the Rhein Valley, after that point on west, it was scattered clouds, thin scattered cumulus, hardly big enough to call it a cumulus, but just slight puffs of clouds.

Q Colonel, do you feel that those puffs of clouds would constitute an obstruction to vision of aircraft flying at that altitude?

A Flying at that altitude, of high speed aircraft, yes.

Q What about visibility in that area right at Ladenberg Beacon?

A I would say in excess of fifteen miles.

Q Was that in all directions?

A In all directions.

Q Forward and along the ground?

A Excellent visibility.

Q You were at 45?

A 4500, right.

Q Were you in a haze layer at that altitude?

A No. Not enough that you could call it haze. I would say visibility was from 15 to 18 miles. There was no obstructions other than what you--sure, there is bound to be a little haze of some kind to hold visibility to fifteen to eighteen miles--not enough to call it a haze.

Q So that all the clouds were above your formation?

A Well above it.

PRESIDENT: Colonel Powell, do you have any recommendation for the Board that might help prevent anything like this in the future?

- A Well, of course, I haven't seen the wing order, but any time more than two units are participating at a mission, they certainly should have clear, definite tracks laid out over the ground which they will fly and if they are going to rendezvous, that they rendezvous on a given heading, at a given altitude, at a specified time, instead of giving a target time and an IP for a rendezvous point.

PRESIDENT: Do you think it is perfectly in order, even with those precautions, where it is possible to have the same assembly point for jet aircraft and reciprocating?

- A I can see no difficulty in assembling any number of airplanes over a given point as long as you have altitude separation and time separation, and a controlled approach to the point. In other words, that each unit will come in at a given heading to the point of rendezvous.

PRESIDENT: What do you personally feel as far as a show formation of this type of having a slower aircraft in front?

- A If you are going to have a slower aircraft in the show at all, they would have to be in front, but I can't see any danger in having them up there, as long as you have a time separation or an altitude separation for rendezvous. I do feel that you should have a given time to depart the initial point and not a given time to point over target, because you have got to go at a set speed once you leave the initial point. You can't juggle any more.

PRESIDENT: What do you think of fly-by's of this type, generally speaking?

- A I think they are good training exercises.

PRESIDENT: Does anybody have anything else? Thank you. You are excused and free to go on back.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

1ST LIEUTENANT JAMES W. CHILTON was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Lieutenant, you are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. Further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or revoke commission or remove from the active list under 36-2.

Questions by the President:

- Q Lieutenant Chilton, we have your statement that you wrote a couple of days ago. Is there anything in there that you wish to change at all?
- A No, sir, there isn't.
- Q I think you have given us a very good statement here and there is not too much that we are going to ask you. Do you want to go ahead, Mac? I haven't had a chance to read this.

Questions by Lt. COLONEL MCMANUS:

- Q Were you briefed that you would be at 15,000 feet?
- A No, sir.
- Q What altitude were you to assemble?
- A We weren't given an assembly altitude. We were told to go over or under 3,500 feet.
- Q Under the overcast?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Were you briefed that there would be any other airplanes in the formation-any other type of aircraft in the show?
- A No, sir, other than we were aware that Gallahad would be there. We would join up on him. We understood that Gallahad would have 16.

LT. COLONEL MCMANUS: That's all I have.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

- Q In your statement, you state: "During this turn, I remember passing through and near some very small cloud formations." Could you describe what you mean by these "cloud formations" and whether or not you passed through them at a time that could have influenced the accident? In other words, could the clouds have restricted your visibility and helped cause the accident?
- A Well, we were on an easterly heading and Gallahad had called us and informed us that he was at 8:00 o'clock. We made a rather steep turn to the left and I believe I was flying formation but I believe that during the turn we gained a little altitude and it was during that time, while we were in the turn, that we passed through some very small fluffy clouds. I won't say "through" -- close to in flying formation; I saw them go by. It was all. They were very small and it was during the turn after we passed through them, we rolled out

level and we were level for some seconds before they called "Bogies" ahead of us. I imagine there was forty-five seconds to a minute lapse from the time I saw a couple of small clouds go by on a turn before we started to break.

Q That would be roughly six miles distance you travelled after you saw the clouds go by. Do you think the clouds did have something to do with this accident?

A That would be hard for me to say because I wasn't looking straight ahead. I know there was at least a minute's lapse from the time I saw the small ones go by before we called a break--the colonel called a break.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMANUS:

Q Were you in a left bank when he called for the break?

A No, sir, we just rolled out. We were nearly level.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

Q As soon as you saw the 119, you went from a right bank into a sharp left, is that right?

A When the Colonel called "break right", the formation was rather unwieldy; of course, we started a right break and in the center portion of the back, you can't just break immediately. You have to wait momentarily to see what the fellow is going to do in front of you to keep from running into him. I started a right-hand turn. That's when I saw the 119; I had to break left and it was him. I just began a right-hand turn. I wasn't over a ten degree bank to right.

Q Do you remember how many 119's you saw at that particular time?

A I saw only one which I broke left to avoid. I broke hard left and partially rolled out, keeping back pressure to the stick to gain altitude and clear them. I assume they were under me, and at that time, out of the corner of my right eye, I saw approximately six of them and it was just an instant later that I hit one that I did not see.

MAJOR SIMPSON: I have no further questions.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMANUS:

Q Did you make any RT transmissions after you hit?

A No, sir.

- Q How did you get out of your airplane?
A With the ejection seat. I jettisoned the canopy.
- Q Is that two distinct movements?
A It is two levers with two movements.
- Q Both by the same hand?
A Yes, sir.
- Q Did you do that instantly after you hit the first airplane?
A I was only aware of hitting one object and I did it instantly after that.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Do you have any recollection or impression of hitting the right wing tip of the lead airplane?
A I had the impression that I hit something that wasn't too solid--a single piece of metal, I thought. There was no jolt but it was just a single loud klank of metal and for some reason, it flashed through my mind--I hit a vertical stabilizer which stuck up high because it was just a single noise.
- Q And instantly after that, you hit the other aircraft, is that it?
A I wasn't aware of hitting any other aircraft.
- Q You have the impression that you hit only one aircraft?
A That was the impression I had--that I hit a single piece of metal that wasn't too sturdy, because it didn't seem to jolt me or anything, but, of course, right after the noise of the hitting, I snapped out of control to the left and everything exploded. It was simultaneous, the explosion and the snap.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: May I ask Major Simpson what would be the approximate distance between the right wing-tip of the lead ship and the center wing section of the second aircraft? How far apart do they fly?

MAJOR SIMPSON: Do you mean this way (indicating)?

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: Well, on a diagonal, how far from the right wing-tip of the lead ship and the center wing section of the second aircraft would it be?

MAJOR SIMPSON: The aircraft is ten feet between wing-tips and nose to tail.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: Ten feet from wing-tips and ten feet from nose to tail?

MAJOR SIMPSON: Right.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: Do they follow that position fairly religiously?

MAJOR SIMPSON: It is not a hard position to hold.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: So, it is probably a little more than one-hundred feet from the right tip of the lead aircraft to the center of the wing man?

MAJOR SIMPSON: Well, the airplane is approximately eighty-four feet long.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: Well, this aircraft that Lieutenant Chilton was flying was probably flying in the neighborhood of 600 feet per second--slightly over that. So that you could easily get the impression of one collision and actually have hit both.

A Like I say, my impressions could have been erroneous.

Q This whole thing must have happened in about one-sixth of a second, according to the distance and the rate of travel in feet per second.

A But the only impression I had was that I didn't hit anything very large because it didn't seem to stop me and actually, if my aircraft hadn't been enveloped in flames, I would expect to fly afterwards. It didn't seem to hit hard.

Q You say as this happened, you snapped violently to the left?

A Yes.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: It was very likely then that your left wing or left wing root was what made the solid contact with the second aircraft that took your left wing right off, probably.

PRESIDENT: Did you see a picture of what is left of your airplane?

WITNESS: No, sir, I didn't.

(President handing picture to witness)

Questions by MAJOR FEIL:

Q Lieutenant Chilton, what frequency were you on during this time, do you remember?

A I don't recall changing. We were supposed to have been on 135.9. I was on with the rest of them. I believe it was 135.9. I may be in error.

Q Do you remember a transmission--you state that you believe it was Cousin Green Leader calling out the 119 at 12:00 o'clock.

A Yes, sir.

Q And did Cousin Leader acknowledge that right away?

A Yes, sir, he did.

Q And how long in seconds would you say the time was that Cousin Leader acknowledged the 119 and the time that he called for the break?

A I had thought about that quite a lot, sir, and I would say it was just a matter of a very few seconds.

Q Five, six, or three or four?

A Four to eight seconds.

Q Four to eight seconds?

A It was a very short time. He acknowledged as though he had him in sight and we were all right and a few seconds later, he called for us to break.

Q Were you descending or climbing at the time? Do you remember off-hand the formation?

A The formation?

Q Yes.

A I would say we were going nearly level--neither climb nor descent.

PRESIDENT: Does anybody have anything else?

Questions by the President:

Q Could you just give us an approximation of your formation time in an F-84?

A I have got approximately eight-hundred hours in an F-84 of which, undoubtedly, one-fourth of it was in formation, or probably one-third of it was in formation or dealt with formation.

PRESIDENT: That's close enough.

Questions by CAPTAIN PITMAN:

Q Lieutenant Chilton, during your ejection, what protective clothing were you wearing?

A I had on a wool summer flying suit, an L-2 jacket and a P-1-A helmet with an oxygen mask, sun glasses and leather gloves, with German boots.

- Q Had your P-1-A helmet been modified to include the lock screws and the spring clip?
- A Yes, sir, they had.
- Q Did you have nothing else in addition to your sunglasses?
- A No, sir.
- Q During ejection, did you lose your helmet and oxygen mask?
- A I lost my helmet, oxygen mask and sun glasses.
- Q Was your mask and helmet fitted rather snugly and was the chin strap fastened?
- A My mask and helmet were very snug and I like to wear them that way. I never fasten the chin strap.
- Q Do you feel that a P-3 helmet with the attached visor would have not only stayed with you during ejection but prevented burns around your face?
- A I couldn't say. I have never worn one.
- Q Well, you are familiar--
- A I am familiar with the mechanism on them. It is very possible that it might because the wind blast under the helmet is what tore it off and with the visor, it might keep the wind out.

CAPTAIN PITMAN: That's all.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: Major Meyer, sir.

MAJOR WILLIAM S. MEYER was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

PRESIDENT: If you will repeat your full name to the court reporter--

WITNESS: Willi S. Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: Major, you are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or to revoke a commission or to remove from active list under 36-2.

- Q Major Meyer, we understand that you were the briefing officer for the 60th Group briefing?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q We have the order here. Prior to making up your group order, did you have access to this Operations Order from the 12th Headquarters, 156-53, which is a mimeographed copy of the one that came in with the TWX?
- A Yes, sir, I had the TWX. I went through that.
- Q In briefing the group, did you have any additional information over the TWX, that is telephone or other that would indicate that any other aircraft in this order had changed altitudes?
- A No, sir, I didn't.
- Q Do you recall whether or not in the briefing you did again mention the other aircraft involved by numbers or was this about what you gave them?
- A That's what I gave there, Colonel. I didn't mention any numbers.
- Q Were you on the flight?
- A No, sir, if I would have been, I wouldn't have been here. I would have been in the lead ship.

PRESIDENT: That's all I have.

Questions by LT COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q When we authorized you, the 60th Troop Carrier Wing authorized you to deal directly with the 317th Wing, how far in your opinion could you go in coordination? What would you handle in a direct coordination between the 317th Group and your group without telling the Wing or the Air Force?
- A (No reply)
- Q Do you follow what I mean? We have authorized you direct coordination with the 317th Group.
- A Well, as far as I would go on that would be, to give an example: Colonel Reaver called me and gave me some air speeds and times which did not conflict with the Ops Order. As a matter of fact, to give you a rough idea, if I may use my notes here, upon contact with the 317th we were to slow down to 155 and to tack on to the 317th. This is what I received, as a matter of fact, concerning a part of the Ops Order. He again confirmed to me the time at Ladenberg, or Ladenberg was 1545 Zebra and after join-up the lead squadron was to start to descend at 165 knots. Now, those are the items that we

talked over the phone which coincided fairly well with the Ops Order. As far as taking up upon myself to change anything from an Operations Order, no, I would not do that unless I had instructions from higher headquarters. Any time there is a discussion on an Ops Order, I usually get in touch with Wing Operations.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

Q Major Meyer, I believe there is one mistake in the Operations Order which I myself know that you took up prior to that.

A The only mistake in there, Major, was the fact that the boy that typed the stencil took the word "miles" for "minutes".

Q The one I am referring to is the Troop Carrier Marshalling--

A The only mistake you will find in the Ops Order is the "minutes" in place of "miles".

Q You gave that as Ladenberg at the briefing.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Major Meyer, do you think it would be helpful if a complete 12th Operations Order were to be forwarded right down to squadron level? Would it be necessary or desirable or helpful?

A Personally, I would say "no". I did read the TWX that came in and I could see no reason why the 12th Air Force Ops Order should be sent to the squadron or to the group.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q Was the Wing Ops Order complete enough for all your information?

A Yes, sir, it always has been. I have never at any time found a Wing Ops Order that didn't give me the information that I needed to write mine.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Isn't it true on this Ops Order, inasmuch as you are not told that the other units are rendezvousing at Ladenberg and at what altitude, if you had bad weather at 5,000 feet, the group leaders would have moved up in altitude or down as the case may be, not knowing if the other units were there, with the information they had? Is there a possibility that they would have done that in order to rendezvous at all?

A The original information that we had from the TWX was that the jets would be at 15,000 feet.

Q Was your group leader briefed that the jets would be at 15,000 feet over the same point?

A That is correct, sir.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q In effect, you received as much information about these other aircraft as we had here in Wing?

A That's right.

LT. COLONEL MEMANUS: As a matter of record here, the officer, Major Ray, who wrote the 60th Wing Operations Order was in the lead aircraft with the group leader.

PRESIDENT: Major Meyer, would you help the Board and give us your opinion of any measures we can take or any recommendations we can make that might prevent a recurrence of a similar type accident?

A The only thing I know is that there was poor planning. Where—I don't know. My group had no knowledge of any other aircraft at that altitude—neither did I when I briefed them. Therefore, the only suggestion that I might have somewhere along the line, somebody slipped up. That's the only conclusion I can come to.

PRESIDENT: Well, now, you are stating what you think is possibly the cause. Do you have something positive that would prevent it? If you can state it just the other way around.

A Well, I feel that possibly a more thorough briefing or possibly a briefing pattern after the type that we use in the troop carrier group might prevent things like this. I am not acquainted with the type of briefing used in other units but I do know in the past ours has been satisfactory. We have made very few changes in it in the last year and a half that I have been in the group as Operations Officer. That's about all—that's the only suggestion I would have. I think the briefing was the key to the whole thing.

PRESIDENT: Does anybody have anything else? If not, that's all then. Thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

1ST LIEUTENANT JOHN C. HOLLEY was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: The purpose of this Board is to determine all the factors relating to this accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or to revoke commission or to remove from active list under 36-2.

Questions by the President:

Questions by the President:

- Q Lieutenant Holley, we have your statement that you furnished us as of the 16th of May. Is there anything in the statement that you wish to change?
- A No, sir.
- Q Is your position in the formation as indicated on that chart correct?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q There is one part of your statement that no other statement seems to bear out. Just for matters of accuracy, you are quite positive that you did hear a transmission, "I have hit one"?
- A I believe that's what the transmission was, yes, sir.
- Q You are the only one I believe that said that. That's all I have.

Questions by Lt COLONEL MCMANUS:

- Q There is one point here in your statement. You say that your altitude was around 6,000 feet when you rolled out and seconds later had heard the call "Bogies". Are you just estimating your altitude?
- A Yes, sir, I was.
- Q You didn't have an exact check of the altimeter?
- A No, sir.
- Q Which way did you break?
- A I started to make a very slow turn to the right, sir, and then I pulled straight ahead.
- Q How close to the 119 formation did that bring you?
- A I didn't see any 119's.
- Q You didn't see any at all?
- A I heard the Bogie call and the only time I did see one was when I glanced over at Lieutenant Chilton, and the 119's seemed to be about 150 feet below us at that time.
- Q You saw the original formation? You are the one that called out "Bogies"?
- A Yes, sir, I called out "Bogies".
- Q How far in front of you or away from you would you estimate them?
- A It seemed to me they were probably a mile or three quarters of a mile.
- Q Upon a head on course?
- A Yes, sir.

Q Were you flying straight-level at the time?

A Yes, sir, I believe so.

Q How long after you had rolled out of the left turn did you fly straight-level before you saw them?

A It seemed maybe half a minute, sir.

LT. COLONEL MCMANUS: That's all.

Questions by MAJOR FEIL:

Q Did you hear Cousin Leader acknowledge your call of Bogies?

A Yes, sir.

Q And how long would you estimate it was between his acknowledgment and the time that he called for a break?

A Possibly five seconds, sir.

Q When he called for the break, did you say you were in a turn or flying straight and level?

A I believe at the time, we were flying straight and level. It appeared to me that way. I was concentrating on the leader.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMANUS:

Q In your position in the 4th flight, do you fly a straight line on the blue leader or do you work your line of vision up and down all the leaders?

A Well, I concentrate more on blue leader, sir, because you have to keep a separation between the two elements there, between the two flights and usually, I do glance ahead and line up.

Q Was it just during one of these glances that you happened to see the 119 formation?

A Yes, sir.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q What about the weather, Lieutenant. How was your visibility in the area over Ladenberg?

A At Ladenberg, sir, I would say the visibility was good. Right after we rolled out of our 180 degree turn over the Ladenberg Beacon--I would say it seemed like it was possibly a half a minute after we did roll out that I spotted the Bogies; I could see the Bogies that far ahead, at least a mile.

Q You could see them plainly?

A Yes, sir.

Q At a range of about one mile?

A Yes, sir.

Q What about the clouds, Lieutenant? Could you describe the extent of the cloud coverage and any haze that might have been present?

A About the time of the accident, I didn't see any clouds at all.

Q You didn't see any?

A They weren't obstructing my view at all.

Q You did see some or did not?

A Well, when we were coming into the beacon, there were some clouds, scattered clouds, I believe, but I don't believe they had any; they didn't impair our vision any.

Q You don't recall flying through any clouds?

A No, sir, not flying through.

Q Or close to any?

A We did climb above some very small clouds, yes, sir.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: I have no further questions.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Were you able to follow blue leader in the break up?

A No, sir, I wasn't.

Q You had to pull up straight ahead?

A I did for a short time and then when the ships in front of us started going every which way, I figured it would be best to start pulling straight ahead.

Questions by CAPTAIN KRUEGER:

Q Lieutenant Holley, after you saw the C-119 and the call for "Break right", was it an assumption by you that you were on a collision course--and did you realize the urgency of the break?

A No, sir, I didn't because when I saw the C-119, I knew that we would be close but I knew that we would miss them. It seemed to me that we would pass over them by a couple of hundred feet.

Q Were you blocked in so a right turn would have--am I to understand that you couldn't turn right?

A No, sir, I couldn't have broke.

Q How far--you pulled up and above the blue flight?

A Yes, sir.

Q You pulled completely above?

A Yes

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q You think that if the entire formation had pulled up, rather than attempting a break, that it might have cleared them?

A Possibly, sir, I couldn't say.

Q Did you notice any difficulty when you pulled up behind the blue flight?

A No, sir, I didn't see any C-119 at that time.

Q What I had meant, did you run into a jet wash?

A No, sir, I didn't.

SENIOR BOARD MEMBER: That's all. Thank you very much. We don't need you any more.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

LT. COLONEL ARTHUR THOMAS was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Colonel, you are informed that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or to revoke a commission or to remove from active list under 36-2.

Questions by the President:

Q Colonel Thomas, will you explain your position in the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing?

A For the last two weeks, I have been working and assigned as Fighter Group Operations Officer. However, prior to that time, for two years, I had been in the 48th Fighter Group. So, I am fully aware of their procedures.

Q We do not have any statement from you. So, we would like to have you tell us what the normal relationship is between Wing and Group in the 48th and what you know about this particular fly-by that was in the Twelfth Air Force as 156-53, if you will go ahead on that.

A All right, sir, the 48th Fighter Wing Operations when a mission is received from the Twelfth Air Force, usually send the 48th Fighter Group Operations Officer a copy of the Twelfth Air Force mission.

The 48th Fighter Group then considers which squadron is best able to perform the mission. This is based on availability of aircraft, pilot availability and 50-8 requirements. In this case, when the operations order was received, I read the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order through, passed it to Captain Pool, the Assistant Operations Officer, for writing up the group operations order. I checked with the group commander, asked for a decision on which squadron would run the mission and told him that I planned on that squadron running the whole mission, which he agreed.

PRESIDENT: Do we have a copy of the Operations Order?

LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS (to witness): Do you have a copy of your Operations Order?

A Yes, sir, I have a copy (handing a copy to the President). That's the only copy I have, sir, since I didn't know that it would be required.

Q If we need any, we will have more made.

A I also have here the information that was a part of the weather briefing and a weather map, if the Board would like to have that.

Q We would like to see that.

A And also, the briefing and critique procedures used by the 48th Fighter.

Q Were you present at the briefing of the actual--prior to the actual flight?

A No, sir. We had a group strike the next morning and I was preparing for that briefing. The briefing the following morning was a full group mission where our Fighter Group actually does the briefing.

Q In this case, who did the briefing, to your knowledge?

A (Pause)

Q Colonel Jensen?

A Colonel Jensen, as stated in the SOP, did the briefing and the Assistant Operations Officer, Captain Pool, attended the briefing on my order.

Q We note that in the Group Operations Order that it states marshalling shall be at 15,000 feet of the F-84 aircraft. Can you add anything to what actually--well, I would like to know whether you were cognizant of a change in marshalling altitudes?

A Colonel Jensen asked permission to fly a ground and weather reconnaissance of the mission prior to the mission, since the regularly planned practice had been cancelled. I told him, "Yes", to go ahead and also,

the Deputy Flight Commander, Captain Bean, went to a reconnaissance early in the morning. I checked the weather myself and when Colonel Jensen came back, he told me that it looked like 15,000 feet would be difficult to rendezvous at, and he requested my permission to call the 36th and I told him to go ahead. He made that call in a different office and I was not aware of the conversation.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q In other words, when your fighters took off, you were unaware that they were not going to assemble at 15,000 feet?
- A No, sir, I did not. I was under the understanding that they would assemble at 15,000 feet, weather permitting. I knew of no other assembly altitude.
- Q Did you know that there were other type aircraft going to be in the review?
- A Certainly, yes, sir.
- Q Did Colonel Jensen have that information?
- A Colonel Jensen had the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order, along with the Fighter Group Operations Order.
- Q Did you read the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order yourself?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q And then you knew that there would be C-119's assembling at 5,000 feet?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Colonel Jensen did not relay to Twelfth Air Force, to your knowledge, his change in flight plan?
- A To my knowledge, he did not.
- Q Is that the normal procedure of your wing to invest authority like that to a squadron?
- A If the effort required for the mission can be handled by one squadron, that squadron performs the mission and the briefing. If two squadrons of the group are involved, the Fighter Group supervises and does the complete briefing, as stated in our SOP.
- Q In the case of one squadron completing a mission, you have no further authority or anything to do with that squadron, either in the group or the wing?

- A Well, that isn't quite so. Even when one squadron is to perform the mission and do the briefing, there is still quite a bit of supervision which comes from the Group Operations Officer, such as arranging ahead of time for the weather briefing, making arrangements for that squadron to have first priority on fuel, set up a weather "recce", and if the squadron commander desires a group briefing room, we make arrangements for that and monitor the whole thing, by either attending the briefing or one of the personnel in Group attending the briefing.
- Q You stated that a captain from your office attended the briefing.
- A Yes, sir, I did.
- Q And when did he return to your office after the briefing--directly after the briefing?
- A I couldn't be sure.
- Q Prior to the take-off time?
- A Oh, yes, sir.
- Q And was he aware of the change of altitude?
- A I don't know.
- Q Was the change of altitude given to the rest of the pilots in the formation?
- A I couldn't say, since I wasn't at the briefing.
- Q No, but what was the captain's name from your office who attended the briefing?
- A Captain Pool.
- Q Did he report to you any facts or statements that were made at the squadron briefing?
- A No, sir, he did not.
- Q Did he converse with you about anything that happened at the squadron briefing?
- A No, I went out to watch the take-off, out on the air strip and I did not see him after that.
- Q Had Captain Pool read the Operations Order from Twelfth Air Force?
- A Yes, sir, because he drafted the Group Operations Order.
- Q Then he was well aware of the other aircraft in the area at 5,000 feet over the Ladenberg Beacon?
- A He certainly must have been.

- Q Were the crews told anything of any other aircraft in the fly-by?
A I did not attend the briefing.
- Q You did not hear Captain Pool call Twelfth Air Force of a change of rendezvous elevation--altitude?
A No, sir, and I am almost sure that he didn't because the call would have had to have been cleared through us.

LT COLONEL MCMANUS: That's all I can think of.

PRESIDENT: Any other questions?

Questions by MAJOR FLORICK:

- Q Colonel Thomas, when you gave Colonel Jensen permission to call the 36th, did he say what he was going to discuss with them?
A No, sir, except that he had just returned from the weather "recce" and I presumed it was about the weather.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Did he indicate to you at that time, Colonel, that the weather at 15,000 feet was unsuitable?
A No, sir, however, I was aware that there was weather because I called prior to that time myself, through "Passport", to ask if the mission were going to be scrubbed and they stated in the negative.

Questions by LT COLONEL MCMANUS:

- Q Whom did you talk to when you called?
A Just the "Passport" operator.
- Q "Passport" is the code name for what?
A TACC, and he could be just anyone up there who answers the telephone.
- Q On Twelfth Air Force Operations Order, did you note in paragraph 3, the Twelfth Air Force Project Officer's name, Lieutenant Colonel Joyner, the telephone number, Ramstein 7569 for fly-by?
A Yes, sir, however, I would never call Ramstein for something unless it was of great importance because it is very difficult to telephone Twelfth Air Force, and if you do telephone them and get them on the phone, the majority of the time they cannot be understood. So, in this case, I just picked up the hot line to TACC, asked them if the fly-by was going to be scrubbed; they said "No".
- Q Where is that located?
A He is--TACC--it's not Kaiserslautern--

LT. COLONEL EHLINGER: It's Kaiserslautern.

A They usually have all the information on about everything; if you want to know anything, you would call them and ask. It is our only connection with Twelfth Air Force.

PRESIDENT: Does anybody have any other questions? If not, that's all.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

LT. COLONEL HOWARD W. JENSEN was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Colonel Jensen, you are informed that the purpose of this Board is to determine all the factors relating to this accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or to revoke commission or remove from active list as covered by 36-2.

Questions by the President:

Q Colonel Jensen, we have your statement that was written about the 15th of May, which you wrote. Is this the statement that you wrote (handing paper to witness)?

A Yes, sir.

Q What I want to ask you is whether you desire to make any changes at all.

A No, sir.

Q The first three pages, I believe, I think you signed those?

A Yes, sir.

Q We would like to have you explain to us particularly with regard to this mission of the 15th what your relationship with the 48th Wing and Group Operations personnel was. We have a copy of the Ops Order, the Group Ops Order. This was furnished you, wasn't it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you have any other information available?

A Yes, sir, I had available to me the Basic Operations Order from Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force.

- Q To your knowledge, this is a mimeographed copy. Will you check that briefly and see if that's the same information?
- A Yes, sir, that appears to be the same. It was in the form when I saw it, when it was available to me.
- Q The TWX form?
- A It was in a long yellow TWX form. I might clarify that when I say it was available to me, it was not sent through the squadron. I was told it was at Group Operations and I saw it there without reading it completely. I did see it at Group Operations, however.
- Q You say you did or you did not read it?
- A I did not read the Operations Order in its entirety. I read the portion that had been picked out and underlined as pertaining to the 84th in that copy, and I received the Group one then at the squadron.
- Q Will you just indicate if this is the same one, similar operations to the one that you received?
- A This is the Operations Order and the change that I received--or similar to the one I received from Group.
- Q You have quite a complete statement here. In connection with the change of altitude, will you go into your conversation with any other people relative to that? In other words, you state here, "The pre-mission briefing for myself and the pilots involved by Captain Shay, Base Weather Station, bore out the improbability of being able to make a rendezvous at the specified altitude (15,000) feet. As a result, I contacted Major Hahn, 36th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations by telephone and asked him to inform the Squadron Leader of that unit that, as the same cloud condition were forecast to prevail during the time of the review, we would rendezvous below the overcast between 3000 and 4000 feet MSL, with a more specific altitude to be given over the R/T upon making radio contact." Can you go further into the type of telephone conversation--whether it was a good contact? Did you understand Major Hahn? Could he understand you, you believe?
- A Yes, sir, through the meat of the message--I mean, the meat of the message was that we would rendezvous below the clouds and I had, a very short time before that, just completed a weather reading of the area; I knew what that was and I had specified to him or telephoned 3-4,000 feet. Now, even if he had misjudged or missed the exact figure there, we had a poor connection, but I got the repeat back from him verifying that he knew that we would rendezvous below the clouds; so, the meat of the conversation got to him all right, although it was a very poor connection. I could hear him fairly well, and he had me repeat several times. So, I assumed that his end of it was pretty bad.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

- Q Before you made that telephone call, Colonel Jensen, did you inform anybody that you were going to call?
- A Yes, sir, Colonel Peterson, my Group Commander and Group Operations were aware of the fact that we would have to rendezvous below the clouds; they were aware that I was going to call. In fact, one of the Assistant Group Operations Officers, Captain Pool, heard my conversation with Major Hahn. Now, I doubt if he would remember the exact words of it, but he knew--heard me talking to Major Hahn.
- Q He heard you say that you were changing the rendezvous point to below the clouds?
- A He knew what I was calling for. So did Colonel Peterson, and he heard me make the call. Whether he would be able to state the words or not, I do not know.

LT. COLONEL EHLINGER: That's the only conversation that you had with the 36th on this fly/by?

A Yes, sir.

Questions by the President:

- Q To your knowledge, did anyone in the 48th convey the information that there was an altitude change, to Twelfth?
- A Could you repeat that, sir?
- Q As far as you are concerned, do you know of anyone in the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing that conveyed the change in altitude information to Twelfth Air Force?
- A No, sir, I am aware of no such information being sent to Twelfth. As a matter of fact, I am quite confident that it wasn't, as I was the specified Project Leader from there on out. That was up to me.

PRESIDENT: That's all I have.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MEMANUS:

- Q You were assigned the entire mission in your squadron?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q You were to be the Flight Leader and the Briefing Officer?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q And you had access to the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order.
- A Yes, sir.

- Q And you stated previously that the only part of the Twelfth Operations Order that you read was that underlined which pertained to the 48th Wing?
- A Yes, sir, I might clarify that, extend that slightly. It is normal procedure when we receive an Operations Order like that, either a Group or a Wing or whoever gets it, because an Operations Order is so long, he is to go through it and find the portion of it that pertains to your particular unit, underline it or make a check, at least under the first sentence and you can check back to it and find it easy. That had been done for this Operations Order and when I saw the Operations Order, I was told and I knew from past experience about the system, that I would get an Operations Order as I did from Group which they were preparing from the basic at the time. So, when I read that portion of the Operations Order, it was only to go down and see what it said, as far as I was concerned.
- Q So, when you briefed your squadron, you made no mention of any other aircraft in the fly-by?
- A No, sir, my Operations Officer normally conducts the Operational part of the briefing. However, I was there and had a portion of the briefing as to the mission and there was no mention made of other aircraft, except the F-86, F-84's.
- Q And your briefing officer stated that you would rendezvous between 4 and 5,000 feet.
- A We would rendezvous below the clouds, yes, sir.
- Q At the time that statement was made, was there a Captain Pool from Groups Operations present?
- A Yes, sir, that is the normal procedure on missions of this sort, that a representative of the group attend those briefings. We notify the group at the time of the briefing and they normally have a representative there. Captain Pool was there.
- Q Do you know if Captain Pool read the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order?
- A I do not know, sir.
- Q When you decided to change altitude, did you have any thought of checking your new altitude against any other formation at that altitude?
- A No, sir, because of the weather check that I had just completed and the forecast of slightly improved conditions in the area, the visibility was such that there was no problem in my mind at that time which would make me think to check that more carefully as to any problem in entering an area like that.

- Q Did you read in the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order the line which designated 15,000 feet for your assembly altitude?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Is it your practice to deviate from an altitude assigned from the Twelfth Air Force without notifying them?
- A Sir, my next chain of command is the Group. The Group was aware of my intentions.
- Q Did you notify the group operations officer that you were changing from 15,000 feet to below the clouds?
- A Yes, sir, and Colonel Peterson was aware of the fact.
- Q Who was the Group Operations Officer you notified?
- A I am not certain that Colonel Thomas was there. I know that Captain Pool was aware of it. I believe Colonel Thomas was talking with Colonel Peterson at the time that I made this arrangement.
- Q What is Colonel Peterson's capacity?
- A He is the Fighter Commander.
- Q The Group Commander?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Had Colonel Peterson read the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order?
- A That I do not know, sir.
- Q Were you aware through the chatter on the 135.9 that there was other aircraft in the area?
- A Yes, sir, after I got in the area.
- Q You didn't at any time state your altitude in the clear to anybody concerned?
- A Not until I called the change of altitude to 4,000 feet.
- Q When you saw a formation flying of 119's?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Was that formation above or below?
- A In my estimation, it was a slight bit high. I was at 5,000 feet, and it seemed to me a slight bit high in relation to me. I was nearly on a level, slightly high.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

- Q Did the chatter on the radio, 135.9, prevent you and Cousin Leader from getting and receiving clear-cut transmissions on rendezvous, altitude and so on, as you were in the rendezvous area?

A No, sir, there was not too much chatter when we first entered the area and there was no--we had a clear-cut connection and contact when this change of altitude was made and I got a clear acknowledgment of that change, even other members of the flight heard the acknowledgments of the contacts fairly well. Shortly after that, just before the accident and then after the accident, the radio was pretty well jammed. From there on, it was pretty hard to get decent contact.

Q What do you estimate the time interval to be between the time that you transmitted that you were going to 4,000 feet and the time that the accident occurred?

A I would estimate approximately four minutes--four minutes from the time that I received the acknowledgment. In other words, from the time that the transmissions were through and the contact was made and acknowledged and the time that I observed the flashes.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

Q I understand that you were not aware until after take-off of any other aircraft, is that right?

A Sir?

Q I was a little bit hazy there. You were not aware until after take-off that there would be other aircraft in the area?

A That's right, sir. However, I think my statement shows that, and I have stated here that that information was available to me. I did not glean it myself.

Q You mean in the form of an Operations Order?

A From Twelfth Air Force, yes, sir, I was told that it was available to me. It was available.

Q And you read only the part that pertained to the 48th?

A Yes, sir.

Q Don't you believe that it behooves you in a position of this sort to make yourself aware of all the contingencies that might exist, that is the other altitudes, before you make a change?

A Yes, sir, hindsight points that out. At the time, there seemed to be no reason for any problem as I just air "recce'd" the area myself. When I fly, I keep my eyes open.

MAJOR SIMPSON: No further questions.

Questions by the President:

- Q Colonel Jensen, could you help the Board out and give us any more information you can on how to prevent a future occurrence such as this?
- A Yes, sir, again I say, hindsight is better than no sight. This is all very distressing for everybody.
- Q As you realize, we have to come up with positive recommendations and that's where we want as much help as we can get.
- A There is a system being set up right now for combined operations centers within each unit and the Twelfth Air Force. I believe that that would be the biggest step in straightening out, keeping something from happening in the future. Operations Orders which are sent right now, we have to send them by teletype. I understand the only other means is to courier them, write them out in an easy reading form and courier them to the proper people. I think that would be better than a teletype system. In the meantime, this combined operations center, even with the teletype being delivered to them, they have one place that a teletype or an operations order will go to on a base; they have one place that they know where that came from and they have direct communications. Any questions that arise can be clarified immediately through those two channels. I do think too that without casting any reflections on anybody, that the planning for this maneuver, before it got to my unit where the fault lies and myself, that rendezvousing several formations of different type of aircraft over one rendezvous point doesn't seem too proper. In my estimation, it would be much better to select different rendezvous points for different types of aircraft and then have an IP with speed and times over that IP to the target. In that way, the formations of the same type of aircraft could rendezvous at any altitude they wanted to; if the weather or any other reason would dictate a change in altitude for them, they would have no undue concern, excepting from the other formations of their own type aircraft putting aircraft in a stack. The weather factor is the first thing that caused a change here. All the other errors are resultant from that. I think that would have been alleviated if we had different rendezvous points. It is a very fairly simple matter to hit an IP almost on time for the normal pilot and flight leader. So, rendezvousing from almost any point, he could hit that IP and proceed on to the target.

MAJOR SIMPSON: I have one more question, if I might ask it.

Questions by Major Simpson:

- Q Captain Pool heard your change of altitude, is that right, at your briefing? He was there present and he heard the change that you made in the altitude and he didn't contact you in regards to that?
- A No, sir.

- Q Before taking off. Is he here today?
A No, sir.

MAJOR SIMPSON: That is all I have

PRESIDENT: I think you have given us some good recommendations here and that will be all for now.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

Captain JAMES E. BEAN was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Captain Bean, you are informed that the purpose of this Board is to determine all the factors relating to this accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or to revoke commission or remove from active list as covered by 36-2.

Questions by the President:

- Q Captain Bean, we have your statement that you prepared for us. We would like to check to see if that's your signature and whether or not you want to make any changes to your written statement.
A That is mine.
Q Now, you have given us about the information that we wanted from you here in the statement. Is there anything you wish to add?
A Nothing that I can think of, sir, unless there are questions brought out.

LT. COLONEL MCMANUS: I have one question here.

PRESIDENT: Okay.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMANUS:

- Q You state in your first paragraph that it would not be advisable to climb through an overcast with sixteen aircraft and let down with thirty-two aircraft in show formation with other aircraft in the area. What other aircraft were to be in the area?
A That I don't know. Only after the mission did I know about it.
Q Well, from this statement, I would be led to believe that you knew about them before the mission.
A No, sir, I didn't.

Q Because you say it would be inadvisable to climb up through an overcast and let down through an overcast with other aircraft in the area, and that's why you changed from 15,000 feet to below the cloud formation.

A Well, it is normally SOP for us in show formation to stay below all the clouds.

Q Well, that may be normal, but what I am driving at is this one specific statement that you made. Why did you make that statement?

A Well, I knew there were other aircraft in the area, after I got back on the ground.

Q But you didn't know at the time you changed from 15,000 feet to 5,000 feet?

A No, sir.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q. Were you referring to the 36th in this statement or the other F-84's?

LT COLONEL MCMAHUS: No, he says thirty-two. (ie: total aircraft in both F-84 formations.-Recorder)

Q Was this statement made in retrospect after you got back?

A Yes.

PRESIDENT: We should have a statement to change this to the fact that prior, he did not know. He could amend it just like that. Do you think it would be advisable?

LT. COLONEL EHRLINGER: The way I read it that you knew that there were other aircraft.

A No, sir, I didn't know.

PRESIDENT: We can have you amend it. We can get a statement from him, Captain Freeman.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

Q Why wasn't it advisable to let down at 15,000?

A You don't do it without an AATC clearance with that many aircraft in close formation.

Q You are talking about IFR.

LT COLONEL MCMAHUS: We have clarified the whole thing. He is going to attach a statement to his statement that this was made after the mission

was completed, that he did not know that at the time he was briefed and the change of altitude was made, that there was aircraft in the area.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q At the time that you were briefed, did anyone mention that you were going to 15,000? This is at the time you were briefed, before the take-off?

A Yes, 15,000 feet was mentioned, in that if we could get there in the clear, we would go; if we couldn't, we would stay down below the clouds.

Q The briefing officer expressed some doubt as to getting to 15,000?

A Yes, sir, I flew the route approximately 10:30 that morning, and all weather information that we had after that and what we had seen up there, it was that the cloud level was going to force us down.

Q At the time of the briefing, you did not know that there would be other formations at other altitudes?

A Only the formation with us, with the 36th.

Questions by MAJOR FIORICK:

Q What was your primary altitude? Was it 15,000 or 5,000?

A Below the clouds.

Q In other words, that's what you were shooting for first?

A We were shooting for 15,000, but we had to stay below the clouds.

Q Would it have been possible, then, for one group to go to 15,000, if it was clear there and the other one below the clouds where there were clouds in between--to have two groups at two different altitudes--two squadrons?

A I don't quite understand what you mean there.

Q You state that they could have used either altitude, 15,000 or the altitude below the clouds which was in the neighborhood of 3-4,000 feet. Is that what you stated?

A I still don't understand what you want. We don't fly F-84's in show formation in clouds. We join up with our flights below the clouds, coming through individual flights, going on top and reforming on top; the same thing on let-downs.

Q What I am trying to state is--you were shooting for an altitude below the clouds somewhere.

A Yes, sir.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q That's before you got off the ground?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you also stated that had the weather been clear at 15,000, they would have gone at 15,000, is that correct?

A No, sir.

MAJOR FLOHICK: That's what I wanted to clear up.

Questions by CAPTAIN KRIEGER:

Q Captain Bean, you mention here that you arrived--you made contact with Cousin Leader and then you arrived over the beacon there and you started a left orbit, and then you say you observed a formation of C-119 aircraft and then the altitude was changed to 4,000 feet and Cousin Leader was informed of this change, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was the time interval on that information? In other words, from the time he was informed that you were descending to 4,000 feet and the crash, can you give me a rough estimate?

A Roughly, a minute and a half to two minutes, I couldn't say exactly on that.

Questions by MAJOR FEIL:

Q Captain Bean, when you first contacted Cousin Leader coming in, do you remember your altitude? Did you notice it by any chance? That's when you were seven minutes out--the first contact.

A I could give you an estimate. I couldn't say exactly.

Q Could you give me an estimate?

A I will give you an estimate of between four and five thousand.

Q Between four and five thousand. Did Cousin Leader give you his altitude?

A No, sir, not that I recall.

Q Do you remember your altitude over the rendezvous point?

A Our mission altitude over rendezvous point was roughly 5,000 feet.

Q You started an orbit to the left and then you started to descend?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that's when you observed the C-119's?

A That's right, sir.

Q Immediately after that you made a call to Cousin Leader and informed him that the rendezvous altitude would be 4,000 MSL?

A A call was made to him.

Q Was there any mention made of C-119's being in the area at the same altitude? or was there any reason given for the lower change of altitude?

A That I do not recall.

Q Do you have any idea how steep a turn you were making? The reason I ask you that question is---you make a statement here, "After approximately 450 degree turn, I observed an air explosion north of our position..."

A That was from the time we entered the orbit area.

Q From the time you entered the orbit area?

A Yes, sir.

Q That was also after the time that Cousin Leader acknowledged the change of altitude, was it not?

A Yes, sir, very shortly after that.

Q In other words, after he acknowledged a change of altitude, you made a 450 degree turn?

A No, sir, we made about a little less than a 360 degree turn.

Q Well, I suggest that the statement be changed, but it so states that after passing under the C-119, Callahan had informed Cousin Leader that the rendezvous altitude would be 4,000 MSL and Cousin Leader acknowledged. "After approximately 450 degree turn, I observed an air explosion..."

A From entering the orbit.

PRESIDENT: Are there any more questions? If not, I want to thank you for coming. That's all.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: I was about to suggest that this whole change has been made a matter of record and will appear in the minutes more completely perhaps than it would in any revised statement.

PRESIDENT: It is okay with me. That will save you the trouble.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

LT. COLONEL NORTON was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Colonel, you are informed that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence and further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission, or removal from the active list.

Questions by the President:

Q Will you state to the reporter your full name, please?

A Carl R. Norton, Lieutenant Colonel, 9334-A.

Q And your position?

A Director of Operations, 38th Bomber Wing.

Q Colonel Norton, this is a mimeographed copy of a Twelfth Air Force Operations Order, 156-53. Will you look at it and see if it is a copy of the same that you received?

A Yes sir.

Q Did you bring a copy of your group order with you?

A No, sir. We didn't cut Operations Orders. We take the Air Force Operations Orders and the group plans the mission and briefs the mission.

Q You do not actually publish a Group Operations Order?

A At times, they publish fragments of the orders which says the number of the orders and briefing times.

Q In this case, they did not publish a written order?

A They did not.

Q Were you present at the briefing?

A I briefed.

Q Just for our information, how much altitude information did you give during the briefing? Did you give about all that is in the order here?

A Yes, sir. I gave our altitude as 2400; troop carrier altitude at 1900 I believe and I did give the rendezvous altitude.

Q In other words, read the whole order that was pertinent in your case?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about the other aircraft due to be in the area, did you mention that in your briefing?

A Yes, sir.

Q We notice here that unless I am mistaken here, you weren't given any specific altitude over the marshalling point, is that right?

A No, not specifically.

Q Did you specify a particular altitude in the briefing then?

A Yes, I briefed 2400 feet over Ladenberg Beacon and a flat approach to the reviewing stand.

Q And that's the way you did it? Were you on the flight also?

A Yes, sir, I led it.

Q And that's what you did? I mean, substantially.

A We went 2400 feet over Ladenberg but we did climb to 3400 towards the reviewing stand. We were too close to the Troop Carrier Flight and I had to gain altitude to stay above them.

Q Would you just briefly tell us what experience you had in the area, in the vicinity of the Ladenberg Beacon?

A I went over the beacon at about 1646 hours and turned to the left, got on course when I picked up the first Troop Carrier. There was a Troop Carrier Unit proceeding towards the reviewing stand. I started to "S" behind them, to get in behind them. I noticed for the first time the Troop Carrier Unit which was high in and on our right; at about the same time, we noticed a mid-air collision. I didn't actually see the collision. I just saw the aircraft coming down. I was too involved at that time to pay much attention to the details of it. We proceeded right on in over the reviewing stand, behind the first Troop Carrier Unit.

Q Colonel Norton, could you help the Board out by giving us any opinions you may have, recommendations, that would help to prevent an accident of this type in the future?

A The only recommendation that I might make would be rendezvous different units over different points.

Q Do you believe that an order written as this one was, with the time over target as the only time is satisfactory?

A It was, so far as we were concerned, in that all we had to do was to back up the target time to be over the Ladenberg Beacon. It would be difficult to give a specific time over the beacon for each unit since we were all coming at different speeds.

PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

CAPTAIN ANTHONY H. ZACK was called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Captain, the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from active list.

Questions by the President:

Q Captain Zack, we have a statement that you made on the 18th of May. It isn't signed. I would like to have you look it over to see if it is your original statement and you might as well sign it. You can do it later on. Do you want to do it now?

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: There are ten that are not signed. We had better do it later.

PRESIDENT: All right.

A That's correct, sir.

Q Is there anything you wish to change in it?

A No, sir.

Q You state in here that you saw more than one jet in your formation. Are you quite sure of that? You are in about as good a position to see as anyone.

A You mean before it all happened?

Q

Q Well, tell us what you can about it. It happened awfully fast, didn't it?

A Well, like I say there in the statement, I saw them at approximately four miles distance. I judged the 317th at 5; I saw them first. They were larger ships. I saw them further out. They (the jets) looked to be coming about between 12:00 and 1:00 o'clock my position; as they got a little closer, I started to give a warning. I thought they were going to make a pass over us first. They kept right on bearing into us and all of a sudden, their lead gave a command to break to the right, and his voice seemed in a tense command. That's my impression of it. The first half of the formation broke right, all in formation, but from there on out, they seemed to waver. Their wings would drop one way and maybe they would break in another direction. Two of them definitely broke to the left. The first one, he just passed us. I don't know if he was below us or above us. He was about our level, but he was to the right of us, as he went by us and the second one, why, he was headed straight for us. You could see down the in-take of it. I thought he was going to hit us, but then, since he had dipped his right wing first and then changed directions to the left,

he was travelling with the momentum straight forward and he crashed into the ship ahead of us, which was Able No. 2. He may have grazed Able No. 1. I couldn't tell. It looked like he may have grazed it a little since he was coming in from our left; pieces of the plane were flying back towards us. The biggest piece that I saw of the plane coming was the wing tank, with about a foot of the wing root on to it. And all the other pieces were smaller. There was at least 25 to 50 pieces I could see coming towards us, in our direction, and after that, I can't say what happened.

- Q Do you feel that they were pieces of the F-84?
- A All I identified was the one piece and that was the wing tank of it, with about a foot of the wing root attached to it, and the piece out of the plane that came into the cockpit was an F-84 piece.
- Q The No. 2 airplane in the Able flight, did you observe an explosion right at the time?
- A Yes, there was a flash and then pieces, and that's all. I didn't see any ship go down or anything. I was half out after that. I wouldn't say what took place after that.

PRESIDENT: That is all I have.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMANUS:

- Q Were you flying at the time? Were you on the controls?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q And then your vision was right across the Able No. 2 on to the leader?
- A We had come out, just come out of the turn from the left and we were just levelling out, so we were back. Naturally, I was back at the Able flight and I could see up ahead too and I saw them coming.

Questions by LT. COLONEL FURNS:

- Q What was your position in the flight?
- A Baker No. 1.

PRESIDENT: That would be the second.

- Q Did anybody in your unit, like yourself, who saw these airplanes, call them out?
- A Nobody that I heard over the air gave any order at all that they saw them. The only thing I heard was their lead say, "Break to the right".

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Captain, you saw you were in a right turn or a left turn?
A Left turn, at the time. We had been in a turn in the right and we rolled in a turn to the left and we just rolled out of it. We just got level.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q Did you have the 317th in sight at the time?
A I had seen them before, as we come in towards Ladenberg Beacon, but I didn't have them in sight when this happened, and I don't know what track we were hitting at the time.

Questions by the President:

- Q You sure had a close one.
A Close enough.
Q In your personal opinion, do you think the lead airplane saw them?
A I had no way of knowing because I thought they were actually making a pass over at us. They were coming straight in. I thought they surely saw us. We are bigger than they are, and I could see them. I thought they must have seen us and were going to make a pass over us, but as they come up closer, about the time I started to give a warning, he did give the command to break to the right, and then things happened pretty quick.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Colonel, one of our problems will be to try to determine just why the lead aircraft went down out of control. From the statements we have--there are two or three pilots in the 60th who state that the right wing of the lead aircraft, about four or five feet of the tip was bent straight up and from that and from other evidence we have here, I am assuming that the same aircraft struck the right wing of the lead aircraft. We are going to have a problem of stating exactly why that plane went down completely out of control with what you might call moderate damage. I am wondering if there is anything we could ask Captain Zack which could help us along those lines. To me, that's one of the unexplained things.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

- Q Perhaps he could show us here with the aircraft here how the F-84 appeared to go past those airplanes or into them.
A They were flying about here (indicating). (The witness then demonstrated and explained the angle of collision.)

PRESIDENT: We had statements that two of them went underneath.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

- Q Lieutenant Peck was one. He said that he went under the lead ship and in front of this one. That's probably the one.
- A He was ahead of this one that hit. I saw him coming at first, and I saw that he was going to miss it. So, I was watching the second one, but he seemed to start to break right, and almost instantaneously, he went down the other way in a steep bank as if he saw the other man there. I don't know if he did or not.

MAJOR SIMPSON: Lieutenant Chilton stated that he did.

PRESIDENT: Anything else that anybody would like to ask at this time? If not, then that's all for now and thank you very much for coming.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

CAPTAIN FRANCIS G. MULLER was then called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Captain Muller, the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from the active list.

Questions by the President:

- Q Captain Muller, this is the statement that you prepared (handing paper to witness). However, it isn't signed. Would you like to check it and see if that's the way you wrote it originally?
- A Yes, sir, that's the one.
- Q We will have you sign it later. Are there any changes or additions you wish to make at this time?
- A No, sir.
- Q Did you actually see the jet aircraft hit any of the Troop Carrier airplanes?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Could you just tell us briefly what you saw there as the airplane came in? You might use this little F-84 in this formation; if you would get up and sort of show what you saw as it was coming in.
- A (The witness demonstrated and explained the angle of collision).

Q And you saw the explosion also?

A Yes, sir.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Did you get the impression that he went in at about the left engine or between the left engine and the fuselage of the second ship, or could you remember?

A My impression is that he went in more or less with his belly about like that (indicating). That's my impression and there was a slight climb.

Questions by the President:

Q Did you happen to see any pieces flying about that time that you could identify?

A No, sir, that I don't recollect. The pieces, I know they were flying, but I don't recollect seeing them.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q You didn't see the canopy of the jet pilot plane prior to the impact with the No. 2 aircraft?

A No, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q When did you realize that Captain Zack was incapacitated? I mean, did you notice that immediately and take right over?

A No, sir, because I thought that we were definitely the ones that were hit. I mean, he was coming right at us, and I couldn't visualize how we could get out of it. As soon as I felt the shudder, I started releasing my safety belt. I noticed it (the airplane) was still going along. I looked over and I knew that I had to take over.

Q Was he unconscious at that time? Do you believe?

A I don't believe he was unconscious because I think he said, "You got it", in a weak sort of a voice, but he was very hazy.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q Did you make any transmission to the effect that "I have been hit" or "I hit one"?

A No, sir, I called up on 135.9. I called up Red Able 1, whom I did not know was hit and told him I had injured aboard and I was leaving his frequency for 118.7. Somebody acknowledged that transmission and I transferred to 118.7 and told them that we had injured

aboard and my feeling was that everybody knew, that everybody in the world knew what had happened. I didn't realize that Rhein/Main was not aware of what happened. I told him that we had injured aboard and we would be in there in about ten minutes.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Prior to impact, did you notice whether or not this ship that received the major impact swerved or attempted to swerve up or down or move in any way, to indicate that he saw the jet?

A I don't believe he moved.

Q Did your formation move--your "V"?

A We were leading the "V" and we stayed right in formation.

Q Is the SOP in your organization to call out aircraft positions as you are flying?

A If we see aircraft?

Q Yes.

A I have only been in the organization three weeks, but I, myself, if I see something, I would ordinarily call it out, if I think it would endanger anybody anyway.

Q You don't recall anybody calling the jets out in this instance, though, is that right?

A No, sir, I don't recall anybody.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Were you under the impression that jets were pulling a "buzz" job or anything like that?

A No, sir, I wasn't under that impression.

Q Tell me when this formation was in progress, was the second ship keeping a fairly steady formation the lead aircraft?

A By the "second ship", you mean the Red Able 2?

Q Major Wells'.

A I know he was keeping a very good formation because I had remarked just previously that that Wells really keeps it in tight.

Q We had an interview with a former Luftwaffe test pilot who was an observer from the ground and in a very close position. He stated that after the No. 2 aircraft was hit, it wobbled once or twice and slid into the lead ship and locked momentarily with the lead aircraft before they both fell. Do you recall whether Major Wells' aircraft

A had slid into the lead aircraft after it was hit?
No, I don't recall that.

Q What was your impression of the visibility in the area of the Ladenberg Beacon at your flight altitude?

A General visibility, I thought it was good, although in my statement I stated that the background was not conducive to sighting the jets earlier, or sighting anything earlier, in that direction because of the mountains behind them.

PRESIDENT: Do we have anything else? If not, that is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

PRESIDENT: I suggest that we adjourn unless we have some discussion we want right now.

The Board adjourned at 1900 hours, 20 May 1953.

The Board reconvened at 0900 hours, all the members who were present at the time of recess being present.

PRESIDENT: The Board will come to order.

COLONEL CHESLEY G. PETERSON WAS Called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: The Board wishes to advise you, sir, that this Board is here for the purpose of investigating the cause of the aircraft accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or to revoke commission or remove from the active list under 36-2.

Questions by the President:

Q State to the reporter your full name.

A Colonel Chesley G. Peterson, 9383A.

Q Colonel Peterson, we have called you up here not only for some expert advice, but to clarify a couple of previous witness's statements. I might ask you first if this is the Operations Order that the 48th prepared and that you knew about it?

A That is correct.

- Q In the previous statements, we are not sure how many people within the 48th Group were cognizant of the change of altitude. Now, there was a statement made that you were cognizant of the change of altitude as well as several other people. In other words, your Group Order here says rendezvous 15,000 over Landstuhl, and we wanted to clarify how many people were cognizant of that change.
- A To the best of my knowledge, I remember I was flying a mission at noon prior to the briefing of the squadron on Siegenberg Gunnery Range. I landed about 2:00 o'clock-2:30. I came in to my Operations to check some targets that we were going to use the next day on Siegenberg for a group mission. The squadron briefing had already been done, some time between 2:30 and 3:30, at which time I was in my operations room for about five minutes, checking on this target. I do remember Colonel Jensen coming into the room and saying that he had made a weather check, that he was going to run the mission underneath the clouds, and that's all that was said. He had run a weather check previously that he had just landed, had briefed and was going to run the mission underneath the clouds.
- Q As far as you are concerned, would it be normal SOP, a change like that, for somebody within the group to coordinate that with higher headquarters?
- A Negative; in the Ops Order it has been stated that it has been run before, direct communications between Wing Leaders or Squadron Leaders and in this Operation, there was no commander to coordinate with; our coordination was with the 36th Wing.
- Q That's okay. There is also a little confusion existing there. Did you actually see this 12th Air Force Ops Order?
- A Negative. I did not.
- Q It does state--it is the last paragraph on the other page--both the ground and flying coordination officer--it is about the last paragraph there.
- A The only Operations Order that we have is a TWX Communications Order.
- Q That is supposed to be a mimeographed copy, but the exact form, you made a little more readable than that one.
- LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS: Yes.
- A I didn't see this.
- PRESIDENT: That's all I have.
- A I was asked the minute the Operations Order came in when I desired to lead the formation. I said it would be the 493rd Squadron, Colonel Jensen.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q The TWX you referred to--did you read the TWX?
A No, I did not.
- Q The only Operations Order you read then was your own Group Operations Order?
A My Group Operations Order, yes, sir.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Colonel, you do not ordinarily read the Twelfth Operations Orders that come in?
A Yes, ordinarily, I do. I see every one, on this basis, that they come into Wing Operations and are processed in Wing Operations and made into a Wing Operations Order, at which time, a copy is immediately put on my desk and then it is taken over to my operations section and in this case, the TWX came in, a big, long yellow form and Wing Operations sent it right directly down to my Group Operations, presumably on the basis of a time element, and I did not see it.
- Q Do you know who it was in your Operations Office who read the Twelfth Operations Order, if anyone?
A Yes, my Assistant Operations Officer, Captain Pool and Lieutenant Meyer, who is my Personal Equipment Officer, but is in the same room as the Operations Section and works under Operations.
- Q Captain Pool, then, would read the Twelfth Operations Order and read the Group Operations Order?
A He did in this case. Normally, it has always been before that the Twelfth Operations Order was processed at Wing. We had just started to get a Combined Operations Center going. I had one man from Wing who had been sent down there; he was away on a flight. Evidently they just sent the TWX right straight down for our processing, which Captain Pool and Lieutenant Meyer did the processing.
- Q Sir, were you present when Lieutenant Colonel Jensen called Major Hahn, the 36th?
A No, I wasn't present but I was aware that he had. That was the conversation, as I remember, that he had called Major Hahn of the 36th and said that he was going to go beneath the clouds because he had just run a weather check and that was the only way they could run the mission.
- Q And, sir, your understanding is that a change in altitude is permissible provided a coordination is made with the other unit, in this case the 36th?

- A Certainly, certainly, insofar as they keep it under VFR conditions. It is a lot more dangerous to run a show if you are going to rendezvous in the stuff or on top of the stuff and start letting down through it. That's not good.
- Q Do you feel then, Colonel, that this phrase in the Operations Order which permits direct communications between wings involved, includes permission to change altitudes?
- A It should be, if it is well coordinated. Yes, sir. However, there should be an over-all commander on an air show of all units. Somebody should be responsible who would be coordinated with.
- Q In this case, the Twelfth Operations Order states that Lieutenant Colonel Joyner was the coordinating officer, was the project officer.
- A The project officer, yes, sir. I am not exactly quite sure of the time element, insofar as I said, I had just landed from my flight. My squadron had already been briefed. I was under the impression that everything was just going on an even keel. The communications from Chaumont to a project officer at Twelfth Air Force is a pretty hard thing to get through in a short space of time. Now, if his timing were such that he could only get through to Hahn and still go on out and make his take-off, that may have been the problem. I do not know. I don't remember the time element there.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

- Q Colonel Peterson, were you aware of any other aircraft in fly-by besides the 48th and the 36th Group?
- A Negative. I was aware of the fact that 86's were going to fly their acrobatic team, but I did not know of anything else. I had turned the mission completely over to my Group Operations Section, and the leader of my element, my squadron.
- Q And your Group Operations Section did not inform you of any other aircraft?
- A It was not mentioned to me, no.
- Q How is the communications between your headquarters and Twelfth Air Force?
- A Damn poor, on both telephone and point to point and land line and the TWX, you cannot depend on any, but you have a hot line, with the TACC.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q Do they in turn have a hot line to Ramstein?
- A You are not supposed to use it. It is an Operations Line; TACC is an Operations Line.

- Q This would have been an operational requirement.
A Yes, that is correct.
- Q If the facilities are not there to be used, it shouldn't be there.
A I do not know if TACC goes straight through to Twelfth Operations Office. I haven't tried it. Normally, if it is anything to Twelfth Operations as such, there is a land-line.
- Q Who is in command of TACC?
A I don't know.
- Q Where do they get their information, their orders?
A Twelfth Air Force Operations.
- Q And then isn't it logical to assume if you called TACC and asked a question, they would call Twelfth Air Force Operations and get the answer or relay the information?
A That's right.
- Q And the hot-line, TACC goes good from your base?
A Comparatively. It is pretty hard to hear, but at least it is a direct ring.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Sir, could you state briefly to the Board what you know of Captain Pool with respect to his qualifications and experience as a Group Operations Officer?
A Yes, I can. Captain Pool was acting Operations Officer in the 493rd Squadron for nearly two years, where he did a superior job. When I lost my Assistant Operations Officer--he was released from active duty six weeks to two months ago--I chose Captain Pool to come up as my Assistant Operations Officer.
- Q Then Captain Pool has had six weeks to two months experience in Group Operations?
A That's right.
- Q During that time, about how many missions would you say that he has handled that have come from higher headquarters, just roughly?
A I should judge that we handle from higher headquarters at least ten operations orders or five orders every day.
- Q Well, then, in your opinion, Captain Pool is now thoroughly familiar and qualified to handle matters of this nature?
A That is correct.

Questions by the President:

Q Colonel Peterson, the principal reason we have you here, we think that with your flying experience, you may be able to help the Board in their recommendations on what can be done to prevent accidents of this nature in the future. Now, you just briefly touched on that in one of your other statements, but could you give us your idea of what you think could help to prevent an accident of this type?

A Yes, sir, I think at any time when there are dissimilar type aircraft or large numbers of even the same type of aircraft, that separate rendezvous points for one wing or maybe two wings at one point--never more, and then all those wings feed into an IP at their specific time, and the IP is 10, 15 miles from the target, and they come from either right or left, but in a converging path and it works just like clock work. The main thing is that you cannot stack these damn fighters up high because when we jerk the throttle back and come down, it is a pretty hard maneuver; if there is any weather involved, and you are in a large formation your recovery is not too good, and your maneuverability is bad because you have got your throttle all the way back, the boys are having a hard time stayin in formation. So, everything should be done on as good a level and as easy a rendezvous-marshalling area as possible. The main thing is to feed them into an IP on a time schedule.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q You would recommend a time schedule over an IP instead of over the target?

A Yes, sir.

Questions by the President;

Q How about the type of formation you fly for these shows. Do you think in itself that is inherently dangerous? Would you have any recommendations as far as that is concerned?

A A show formation is purely a VFR formation. It is the only thing that you can fly and it is VFR. If there is any weather involved and you only have one choice, that's either to break up your formation or get on top of the stuff. You cannot descend with it and you cannot make a penetration nor an ascent in a show formation.

PRESIDENT: Does anybody else have any questions? If not, that's all, thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

CAPTAIN S. M. POOL was then called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Captain, you are informed that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, line of duty status, revocation of commission or removal from the active list under 36-2. Will you please speak slowly, clearly and distinctly?

A Yes, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q Will you give the reporter your full name?

A Sam J. Pool.

Q Captain Pool, previous statements by witnesses have confused us slightly as to the exact relationship of Wing and Group within the 48th and also with particular reference to the change of altitude which we now know is agreed upon between the 48th and 36th, that is not included in your Group Ops Order. This is a copy that we have. Would you like to check and see if that is a Group Ops Order that was put out?

A Yes, sir, this is the Ops Order put out.

Q We have statements that you were present at the briefing by Colonel Jensen and were cognizant of the changes and from then on, we cannot find where there was any communication with higher headquarters as to that change. Could you enlighten us on that?

A I was present at the briefing. However, I wasn't involved in the flight. Therefore, I paid no particular attention to the particulars of the flight, the altitudes, the air speeds, items like that. I was mainly interested in their briefing procedure, their outline, see how comprehensive--not comprehensive, but see if they had weather briefing and briefing by the mission leader and items like that. I paid no attention whatsoever to the marshalling on the runway, power settings, or things like that.

Q Do you recall what was said regarding altitudes en route to the target or to the marshalling area?

A No, sir, I do not. I do know there was some discussion after the weather briefing as to staying VFR and below the cloud layer.

Q You heard no statements in the briefing specifically?

A No, sir, it was decided, I believe, prior to the briefing being over that they would stay below the cloud layer.

- Q Did you hear any telephone calls in any of the headquarters you were in relative to that between the 36th and the 48th?
- A I heard a phone call being placed to the 36th at Bitberg and I didn't pay too much attention to the conversation. It was in another room. I did know the contact was made.
- Q But you did not personally hear the results of that telephone call?
- A No, sir. My desk is outside the room the call was made from and I heard snatches of the conversation. I didn't hear enough to make a statement as to what was said exactly.

PRESIDENT: That's all I have.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMANUS:

- Q In writing your Ops Order, where did you take your information?
- A I took it from a TWX form that was forwarded to me from Wing--48 Wing C. & T. That TWX Form was from Twelfth Air Force.
- Q Did you read that TWX in its entirety?
- A Yes, sir, I did.
- Q And from that information, you wrote your Ops Order?
- A That is correct.
- Q And then, you were cognizant that there were to be other type aircraft in the flyby?
- A Yes, sir, I was. However, I didn't pay too much attention as to what units they were from or type aircraft. I was interested mainly in the F-84 effort.
- Q When you write group operations orders, is it your normal SOP just to put in their operations order the information that pertains to them?
- A You mean where one or more units are involved, from different physical locations?
- Q Yes.
- A Colonel, this is the third time that I know of in the history of the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing that there has been a mission such as this with other aircraft units from other--aircraft from other units involved. I have been in this job approximately six weeks. This is the first time I have ever been involved with an Ops Order involving aircraft from other units. Does that answer the question you wanted there? I don't know if it was SOP or not.

Q Who instructed you in the proper method of writing an Ops Order?
A We have been in a sort of a period of reorganization. I believe that has been brought out before. We are combining or attempting to combine Wing and Group operations. At that time, I requested or attempted to get the correct form for writing Operations Orders which I did obtain. I believe there was one copy of the regulation on the base and I extracted the main paragraphs and parts from those for my guide, just as it is in this form here.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q The phone call has been designated as approximately 1200Z that was made to Major Hahn. What time was the briefing?

A The briefing was 1300 local time; 1200 Zebra.

Q And you were aware that the altitude had been changed from 15,000 feet to below the clouds prior to briefing?

A I was aware that it had been discussed and that it had been changed. I was not aware that it had been coordinated with any other unit.

Q You say that you weren't aware that it was coordinated with the 36th.
A That's right, I knew of no conclusive coordination. I knew an attempt was made, the phone call was placed.

Q At the briefing, you did not hear the briefing officer state that they would rendezvous underneath the cloud coverage?

A Yes, sir, I did. As I say, it was discussed at the briefing and it was determined prior to the briefing breaking up that they would VFR below the cloud layer.

Q And yet, you were aware that other aircraft were to be marshalling for this review?

A Yes, sir, I was.

Q Did it appear in your mind to check the altitude that they were marshalling at?

A It did not. I did not pay any attention whatsoever to the marshalling rendezvous point of the aircraft. I was not leading the mission. The full information was available to the flight leader, the mission leader and it was not for me to question the mission leader as to his method of flying a mission.

Q But you were aware that the Twelfth Air Force had ordered you to rendezvous at 15,000 feet, is that correct?

A That's correct, I wrote that in my Ops Order.

Q And you were aware that the flight leader was changing the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order?

A That's correct.

Q After the briefing, when you returned to your office, did you notify the group operations officer of the change?

A I did not.

Q Did you call the Twelfth Air Force and notify them of the change?

A I did not. There was no request made to us, Colonel, for an authorization to change rendezvous altitude.

Q But you heard the change made?

A I heard it discussed. I say, I heard nothing conclusive on the change in altitudes between the two fighter wings.

Q But you were in the briefing room when the change was made?

A For the 48th, yes, sir.

Q The 48th was leading the mission?

A That's correct.

Q You could logically assume, then, that the 36th would have to change in order to join any formation under 48th?

A Colonel, there were a few more things going on in that office besides this one mission. We had a practice ORT going on. We were writing Ops orders for that. We had a whole schedule board full of Twelfth Air Force Operations Orders. The thing had been written up and as far as I was concerned, the mission leader had all the information required for the mission. I had wiped my part of it completely out. It was up to the mission leader. I paid no particular attention to what he did or what he changed. There was nothing requested from us as to authorization for any changes.

Q Let me ask this question: You feel once that the squadron has received a mission, that the group has no more responsibility for the mission?

A Sure, they are responsible. However, we can't anticipate their needs or listen to discussion and anticipate and run and get them authority. If we are approached with a request to change or make some change from our Ops Order, then I think it is our part to coordinate that change for them.

Q What is your object then in attending a squadron briefing?

A As I stated before, it was not for the completeness of the briefing-- it was for the manner in which the briefing was conducted. Originally we possibly have a copy of our briefing SOP. I wanted to see if they

hit the different items there. I wasn't particularly concerned; it was no concern of mine--marshalling, power settings, rendezvous, call signs, frequencies, or anything like that. I wanted to see if they had a weather officer there. I wasn't even particularly concerned about what kind of weather briefing he gave. I wanted to see if they had a weather officer there, if the mission leader briefed the mission--items that were followed in our Ops Order.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

- Q You were there more or less to see that the items more or less necessary for the conducting of the briefing were provided, the facilities, weather officer and things like that?
- A That's correct. I didn't care--I wasn't flying on the mission. I didn't care about anything else.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q If the weather officer hadn't shown up, would you have taken any action?
- A No, sir, I would not.
- Q If the flight leader hadn't shown up, would you have taken any action?
- A No, sir.
- Q Or the briefing officer?
- A I would have possibly gone back to my Operations Officer and told him that the unit did not brief because the flight leader or the mission leader did not show up.
- Q Would you do anything about getting the mission completed?
- A Other than telling my Operations Officer, no, sir.

LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS: That's all I have.

Questions by MAJOR FLORICK:

- Q If you turned the mission over to the mission commander and you stated that once you turned it over to him, you wiped your hands clean of it, then again, what would be your object in attending that thing, if, like you say, you wiped your hands clean? Don't you think that the mission commander would have taken care of it then, possibly, or was he under the impression that you were assisting him?
- A He didn't even know I was attending the meeting. I walked in and took a seat in the back. He knew I was present, but he had no previous announcement of my being there or anticipating that I would be there. If we, at Group or Wing, took each unit by the hand on each Operations Order, we couldn't possibly hope to accomplish our mission.

- Q In this particular instance, then, it appears then that the mission commander on this particular mission, you might say, was not fully trusted then to carry out all the phases of his responsibility in seeing that there were weather briefings and every other briefing that is involved in a mission of this sort?
- A Definitely not. That wasn't the intent of my visit to the briefing.

Questions by MAJOR PHIL:

- Q Your intent, then, was just to observe the procedure and you didn't care what the contents of the briefing contained?
- A That's correct.
- Q In other words, the mission commander could have changed the target, the time, the take-off, everything about the mission, as long as he had the briefing officer there and as long as he had the weather officer, and as long as he followed this little form?
- A That's correct.
- Q Out of your office?
- A That's correct.
- Q You were under that impression even after having read the Twelfth Air Force Ops Order on that, calling for a specific time, place, mention of other aircraft being over the marshalling area, the time over targets?
- A As far as I was concerned, the mission leader, as I stated before, had all the information available to him that was necessary to complete the mission. It had been turned over to the squadron and I was attending the briefing merely as I stated before, to see that the order--whether or not they conducted the meeting.
- Q Is that the only reason this group officer attends the briefing?
- A As far as I know, no one from group has attended a meeting like that other than very large briefings where we have held it in a group briefing room and briefed by group.
- Q As I understand, your group at times appoints a squadron to handle a complete mission?
- A That's correct.
- Q And this is the first time that the group has ever monitored a briefing?
- A That's correct. Major, I said I have been in that job six weeks. I am attempting to learn that job. I am attempting to find out what goes on in the other units. I have been in a squadron level for quite some years. I am learning--I am trying to find out what goes on in the other units. All I know is the way that one particular squadron was being operated.

- Q Well, I am just trying to determine the SOP of the group, as far as the briefing is concerned.
- A As far as I know, there is no SOP published by group that anyone in group will monitor briefings. I did it purely on my own.
- Q Do you have any idea as to their SOP concerning a request for different altitudes or something like that? You stated a while ago that before a group would take action, it would have to be in a form of a request from a squadron.
- A Major, having been in the military a short time myself, it is only logical that if a lower echelon wants to change some part of an order, they should go to their next higher echelon to get that change. I see no reason for it having to be written down. If we publish an Ops order to a squadron, we tell them to fly on their back at 30,000 feet, and if they want to change that, they should come to us and ask for a change, as I see it.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q By the same token, then, if the 48th Bomber Wing got an order from Twelfth to fly at 15,000 at Ladenburg and they wanted to change it, shouldn't they go to Twelfth Air Force to get a decision?
- A The squadron--
- Q I am talking about the Wing.
- A That's correct. I wouldn't have changed this myself. I would have contacted Wing Operations and Training, saying the squadron has requested a change of altitude, and you get the change for us.

Questions by MAJOR FLORICK:

- Q You were aware of that change, however?
- A As I say, I was aware of an attempt at a change.
- Q Was there any attempt on your part to find out why the change was being made or if there was any coordination or if the change had been made?
- A Not a bit. It never entered my mind. I wasn't sitting out there worried about this one particular mission when I had thirty to fifty other orders, some of them carrying as much or more priority possibly.
- Q Do you feel that you should have some assistance?
- A What?
- Q Some assistance?
- A Definitely.

Questions by MAJOR FELL:

Q As far as a request for change, it doesn't appear to me that it would make any difference if the squadron requested the change because in this case, you went ahead and made the squadron change and no action was taken.

A I see no reason for me to question the mission leader's integrity. He is the mission leader by virtue of his capability. If he fails down on that, it is not for me to remove him.

Q Were you not attending the briefing in the capacity of a monitor?

A I was not. I attended the briefing due to my own curiosity.

Questions by CAPTAIN KUNIGER:

Q Captain Pool, I am still a little confused. You are under reorganization now, is that correct, in the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing whereby Group Operations and Wing Operations will be a combined effort, is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q I see. Now, when an order is published then at Group Level, it goes directly to the squadron?

A That's correct.

Q Now, has there been a SOP written on this procedure? In other words, is the authority as well as the responsibility for direct communication with higher echelons authorized in that case--straight to the Wing for instance?

A By the squadron?

Q Yes.

A No, sir.

Q What is your interpretation of this Twelfth Air Force Order whereby direct communications are authorized between Wings?

A For just such a matter as this, if there is something I wanted or needed to be changed or coordinated between Wings, the request should have to come from someone concerned with such as the mission leader to us, we would ask the Wing to coordinate it with the other Wing, to get approval or fight the thing out, or Wing might say, "Okay, we do not know the particulars. Let the mission leader call the other Wing concerned."

Q I see. Then, it is actually an open case depending upon the particular incident as to who does the coordinating. In other words, it can revert back to the mission commander itself, providing it is authorized by you?

A Not by me, by Wing, that authorized direct communications between Wings.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q When the mission leader made this change in the altitude, did anybody think to advise him that there were other units at this same altitude, rendezvousing over the same point?

A As I have stated before, the mission leader had all the information that had been available to me.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q When an order comes in from Twelfth Air Force under this new TO set up that you have, does it come directly to the Group Operations Officer?

A No, sir, it comes to Wing. Wing logs it in and out to us.

Questions by the President:

Q Is there a Wing Operations Officer?

A There is.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q What is his responsibility in reference to an operational order from Twelfth Air Force?

A He is to see that it is given to us, as fast as possible, and to coordinate any matters that we need, on this particular Ops Order. It comes in from Twelfth Air Force with no frequencies for the mission, without the call sign of the 36th. I didn't call Twelfth Air Force direct and ask them what those were. I called Wing Operations and Training. I said they have deleted or failed to put in the frequencies to be used on this mission and the call sign of Cousin Leader, or I didn't say Cousin Leader, I didn't know what it was--of the 36th. "Can you find those out for me"? They did.

Q Does he write an Operations Order from the Twelfth Operations Order from the Group to carry out?

A Not under the new set up.

Q How large a staff does the Wing Operations and Training Section contain?

A I can't answer that. There are two officers and several clerks there.

LT. COLONEL ENLINGER: Two officers in the 48th.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q He is more administrative than operational in his capacity?
- A I can't say. I don't know what the new set up will be. I think the organization will be this: They will end up with one officer and one clerk and he will be in strictly an administrative capacity-- advise the Wing Commander and coordinate matters for us as Ops Orders, like we are discussing for instance.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

- Q Captain Pool, you said you attended the briefing out of curiosity, is that right? Did I understand it correctly?
- A For my own curiosity, yes, sir, and I also said to acquaint myself with the procedures of the other units.
- Q You work for Colonel Thomas, is that correct?
- A That's correct.
- Q Yesterday, Colonel Thomas showed us an SOP that required that a group operations officer be at squadron briefing. Are you aware of that?
- A I am not aware of that.
- Q Were you aware of any SOP's in the group operations section?
- A Yes, sir, very definitely.
- Q But not that particular one?
- A No, sir, I don't rely on memory. If I want to check a certain time, I will go to the Wing SOP or the Group SOP and look up and see if there is an SOP to cover such subject or whatever I want to check and I will read it.
- Q But in this particular instance, you did not?
- A No, sir.
- Q After the weather reconnaissance, I believe it was flown by Colonel Jensen, were you aware of the altitude at the base of the clouds?
- A I wasn't aware of the weather recon flown by Colonel Jensen.
- Q Isn't it customary for the groups to notify, I mean for the squadron to notify the groups when they are going out on any flight whatsoever?
- A Negative.
- Q Colonel Jensen did not obtain permission of the group to fly weather recon?
- A No, sir, it is not necessary.
- Q You read the complete Twelfth Air Force Operations Order?
- A Yes, sir, one time.

Q You were aware, then, that other aircraft were in the fly-by?
A That is correct.

Q Did you pay any attention to the rendezvous point?
A No, sir.

Q Or altitudes?
A Outside of the 84's--

Q Or altitudes?
A No, sir, I did not know that the rendezvous point they gave the 84's was on an airway.

Q Well, it was on an airway, but at your particular altitude, it was above airway control, is that right?
A That is correct.

Q How about when they brought it below the clouds?
A There again, that's not for me to question the mission leader's capabilities. He is as much aware of the rendezvous point as I.

Q Did you mention it to him that he was flying on a controlled airway?
A No, sir, it would be VFR.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

Q Do you feel that it is your rank that prevents you from informing a mission's commander who is of a higher rank of a violation of a flying regulation?
A No, sir, I don't. I would feel free to bring it to his attention or advise him at any time, if I definitely saw a violation of flying regulation.

Q Or a violation of an operations order of a higher headquarters?
A Possibly.

Q Then, you didn't think in your own mind that the flight leader's changing his rendezvous altitude from 15,000 feet to below the clouds was in violation of an operations order of a higher command than his squadron?
A I thought it was a very reasonable change to make, to stay VFR with that many aircraft. It didn't enter my mind that it had not been coordinated or would not be coordinated.

Q You were a direct representative of the office whom he would have to coordinate it with?
A I had no responsibility assigned me to see that this mission was carried out.

Q You are assigned to the Group Operations Office, aren't you?

A That's correct.

Q You wrote the Operations Order?

A That's correct.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

Q You say you were aware that other aircraft were to be in the fly-by-- other type aircraft. Who else in the 48th Fighter Group was aware of that fact?

A I couldn't answer that question. The Ops Order was there in the office. I started to have a typist type it out to write out all abbreviations and due to the time element, I told him not to--I took it over. I believe you have a copy of it. You can see where I have underlined some parts that pertain to the 84's. It was made available to the mission leader. Lieutenant Meyer, the Personal Equipment Officer assigned to the Group was assisting me slightly. He is trying to break in on Operations procedures. He looked at it.

Q Is that your normal means of disseminating information, to leave it in a basket and let somebody read it?

A We are not operating normal, Major.

Q What do you mean by that?

A We are in a period of reorganization--everything we are doing now is strange to us, strange to myself.

Q This Colonel Jensen put himself out by looking in the basket. Could you have read that other aircraft were at other altitudes?

A Colonel Jensen was called to that office.

Q Did you include in your operations order that there would be other aircraft in the fly-by formation?

A I did not.

Q Would it be logical that Colonel Jensen would take your Operations Order and complete the mission from your Operations Order?

A If that had been all the information given to Colonel Jensen, yes, sir.

Q What's an Operations Order for?

A It is to give the task to be performed by subordinate units.

Q Well, he can't perform it if he doesn't have all the information.

A I considered it sufficient information to perform a mission. He was leading two of the 84 wings physically, geographically, one hundred and some miles apart. Had he known other aircraft were in the area, how would he have briefed the other wing?

Q You are asking me a question?

A Maybe there is a fault in the system somewhere. I don't know. But if it was so particular for everyone, so important that everyone concerned have it written down for half of the 84 flight, how about the other half? You have assigned one man as mission leader responsible for two wings of 84's, with no ways whatsoever for that mission leader to brief all pilots in the flight.

Q You feel that it would be necessary for him to brief all the pilots in the flight as long as the other pilot group had the information, the same information that he had?

A There again, I think that would be up to the mission leader, how important he thinks it is. The particular pilot doesn't care. Speaking from my own experience, I don't care how many aircraft there are in the area, as long as I have a competent mission leader. However, I do--would take extra precautions if I knew there were numerous aircraft in the area.

Q The way I understand, that Colonel Jensen was given the complete responsibility for completion of this mission, is that right?

A That's right.

Q Was he authorized direct communications with the 36th Fighter Group and the Twelfth Air Force?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Your group was authorized direct communications?

A Negative. In the Twelfth Air Force Operations Order, it said, "Direct communications are authorized between wings; in the 48th Bomber Group SOP or Operations Order, I will read from that Operations Order: "Direct communications between wings to coordinate details of flight authorized". "Authorized" is not in there. However--

Q Then Colonel Jensen took it upon himself to call the 36th Fighter Group without the permission of your wing?

A Apparently.

PRESIDENT: That's all. Thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

LIEUTENANT EDWIN KENNETH LEE was then called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: Lieutenant Lee, you are informed that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the

interest of flying safety, to prevent a recurrence. This Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action, pecuniary liability, revocation of commission or removal from the active list.

Questions by the President:

Q Please state your name.

A Lieutenant Edwin Kenneth Lee.

Q Lieutenant Lee, did you prepare a statement on the accident?

A Yes, sir, I did. It wasn't one of these legal statements; it was a statement right after the accident that I prepared at the 60th Troop Carrier.

Q The Board doesn't have a copy of it. If you can just briefly tell us what you saw; normally, if you have made a statement, we ask if you want to change it or anything, but if you will just tell us briefly what you saw from the time, say, approaching the Ladenberg Beacon, relative to the accident, we would like to have it as complete as possible.

A All right, sir.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Before you start, what was your position in the formation?

A Able No. 3.

Questions by the President:

Q In other words, to the left of the first formation?

A As we were approaching the beacon, I heard someone transmit over the radio that "we have you in sight at approximately 9:00 o'clock", and I was looking for the formation, trying to get them in sight so that I would know how we would fall in behind them. I couldn't see anybody, and I did see what looked like a C-47, at about 2:00 o'clock to our position three miles. It was the only aircraft I saw, and then I heard somebody say, "We will do a 360 to the right to fall in behind you" and at that time, I saw a few seconds after that a flight of jets below us and going at about across our nose, going in the direction of about 8:00 o'clock to us, and I was looking for the 317th and couldn't find them. I didn't see them at any time and then as we completed, it appeared as if we completed our 360 or approximately completing it, when I heard somebody say "Break" and I looked up and I saw this flight of F-84's suddenly scattered and it looked as if they went completely through us and the one that I had my eye on was the one that was coming for me and at the time

that I saw him, he was up in a 90 degree bank and he went across our nose. I saw the explosion to my right, which was approximately in the position that the Able 2 should have been. As I saw him explode, the rest were already through. I tried to hold on to the leader, maintain my position on the wing when it appeared that he was in trouble, when he slowly banked to the right and more or less did a split "S" and went straight down. By that time, he disappeared. My wing covered his position. I called over the radio, "Did anybody see the lead ship" and somebody replied, "He crashed, going straight down."

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Lieutenant, did you see the right wing tip of the lead aircraft, after this explosion?
- A No, I don't recall that I did. It seemed like it was intact from my position.
- Q You know of no reason why that airplane peeled off and went down, as far as your remembrance of what it looked like?
- A No, as far as what I saw, it appeared as if it was a whole ship.
- Q Did you wonder at the time why he had peeled off like that and gone straight down?
- A I surmised that his wing was hit because of the explosion, or the way that the aircraft was coming at me and he was in a 90 degree bank; he was turning and he hit Able No. 2. He would have to just about pass the position of the lead ship's wing.
- Q But you didn't actually see any damage to the wing of the lead ship?
- A No.

Questions by LT. COLONEL ENLINGER:

- Q Approximately how far were you away from the lead ship?
- A Just approximately 10 feet between wing tips and 10 feet between nose to tail.
- Q When you first saw the fighter, what range was it when you first saw any fighter?
- A I would say about maybe anywhere from a half second--the distance it takes to travel.
- Q The first time when you say they were coming from 8:00 o'clock?
- A You mean at what time I saw them.

Q Did anybody report Bogies from your flight?

A No, sir.

Q No one reported other aircraft?

A No, sir, I heard over the radio someone saying "Cousin, this is flight so and so" It appeared then it was kind of jumbled. I don't recall the conversation that went on, but it appeared that they had trouble joining up.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q After the collision, did you notice whether Able No. 1 and No. 2 ever got into close proximity of each other?

A No, sir, it seemed from where I was sitting at the time of the explosion, there was an aircraft there and after the explosion there was no aircraft. It seemed to disappear.

Q You don't think that Able No. 2 interfered in any way with Able No. 1?

A No, sir.

Questions by the President:

Q In talking to your co-pilot, did he see any more than you did?

A I don't recall, sir. It doesn't appear as if he did. He was flying at the time I was. I was going to take over the controls from him when this happened. So, I was watching instruments. I was sitting in the right seat and he was flying cross-cockpit.

Questions by CAPTAIN KRIEGER:

Q Lieutenant Lee, for clarification, you say you maintained your position on Able No. 1. Was Able No. 1 after the explosion still in his position? In other words, when you saw the explosion, was Able No. 1 still in his position and maintaining that position and how long after the explosion did he start this slow turning?

A I would say that it was just a matter of a couple of seconds, and actually, I did not make any physical effort to get into the position. It was all in my mind, I presume. I thought I should get back into formation on the leader and about that time, he did peel off. It happened so fast--what to me at the time appeared like hours were only seconds.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Did you see any other F-34 aircraft go by your formation beside the one that hit?

A Yes, sir.

- Q Were they over, under, through or close to it?
A It appeared as if one did, vaguely. I do recall that one did veer off to my left; one went under. In other words, the one that veered off to my left would have interfered with Charlie's flight. They went right through the formation.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

- Q Did you see any chutes come out of Able No. 1?
A I didn't.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

- Q Did you notice your leader or anybody else in the formation make an attempt to go up or down to avoid the F-84's?
A No, sir.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q What would you think the visibility was in the Ladenberg area at the time?
A I would say visibility was approximately six to seven miles and even with that visibility, it would be hard to see any aircraft in the vicinity because of the darkening skies in the background. It looked like rain showers.
- Q What was the cloud condition, the density, altitude and types of clouds?
A It appeared like it was about 6/8 coverage in the areas surrounding us, but in our position where we happened to be at the time, there seemed to be a break over us and it was then a stratus-type cloud, and around the area surrounding us, it appeared to be a few baby cumulus around but it was pretty well covered.
- Q How high above you were these clouds that you speak of in this area?
A I would say about 1,000 feet.
- Q 1,000 feet above you?
A Yes, sir.
- Q At any time did your formation pass through or close to any of these small clouds that you mentioned?
A No, it appeared as if they were 500 feet above us as we were climbing out on course; they were about 5500 feet, when we got to 5,000, they were approximately 500 feet above and the ceiling was about 6,000 feet over that area.

PRESIDENT: That's all. Thank you.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

COLONEL JOYNER was recalled as a witness and after being reminded that he was still under oath, testified as follows:

Questions by the president:

Q Colonel Joyner, from your previous testimony, the Board is still not certain about the radio difficulty at the tower at Landstuhl. You made a previous statement that it went out approximately 15 minutes--
A 15-20 minutes.

Q Was that ever repaired or did you get word to go to another frequency. Would you go on and tell us what you had as a control?

A We went up in the tower at 4:30, and the first flight was off the ground at approximately 4:30. This flight had been directed to give us a radio check on the two frequencies that we were to use for the show--135.9 and 116.1. We could hear him call on both frequencies but indications were that the tower transmitter was out. This was verified by tower personnel and they said they thought they could get it back in prior to the show. They worked on this frequency, on the transmitter, but the transmitter did not come in until approximately two to three minutes after five o'clock. The first aircraft were overhead at 5:00 o'clock. Therefore, we had to relay all messages through the Landstuhl GCA all on 135.9. I think that's just about the way it worked. For all intents and purposes, then, we had no direct communications from the tower to the aircraft.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMANUS:

Q One thing, Colonel Joyner, did you know when you were in the tower that the jets had changed their altitude?

A I did not.

Q There was no conversation between the jets which you might have picked up which would convey to you the change?

A I did not, no. I would like to add, excuse me, Colonel, we also directed this flight which is the acrobatic team, to have a pilot stand by at 135.9 to relay but then as I said, the accident came in and the air was jammed and he couldn't relay. So, it didn't do us any good. No, Colonel McManus, I heard nothing at all and the other people in the tower didn't either.

Q Then the fact that your transmitter went out could have no bearing on the accident at all?

A None at all.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Sir, this entire operation is based on VFR conditions, is that correct?

A Absolutely.

Q And as I understand from your previous testimony, that on the morning of this accident, you were in the process of checking the weather almost continuously, up until the two hours before, which was the recall time in the event weather was unsatisfactory?

A That is true, I would like to modify that somewhat, though. In discussing it in the office with my boss, it was decided that the aircraft would take off. The trend through the day was for improvement. We felt that even though the aircraft took off, the weather broke after that two hour period, we could still fly the mission, as the weather finally did.

Q As a VFR operation, that would mean VFR at all of the air fields involved and at all of the geographic points involved, is that correct?

A That is right.

Q In other words, the entire operation was to be VFR and not only the portion of it over Landstuhl--the whole thing had to be VFR.

A That was my contention when I wrote the Ops Order, it would have to be a VFR and I think it is understandable.

Q And it would have to be VFR at the various altitudes specified over Ladenberg?

A Yes, sir.

Q As well as the airfields they departed from?

A Yes.

Q Now, you state that you had been checking the weather from these fields and did I understand correctly, you were getting weather sequences from Heidelberg or Mannheim?

A I checked the bases that the aircraft were taking off from, they were good; they were 3500 feet most of the time, VFR. So, indications were that they would be able to get in. The forecast at Landstuhl was 3500 scattered to broken. I went up at 1:00 o'clock and talked to the weather officer--either 1:00 or 1:30; in that time period and talked to the weather officer and he said that the area would hold about 3500 foot scattered to broken and that in my estimation, scattered would be VFR.

Q What did you understand by "area" in that sense--Landstuhl area?

A True, and at the same time, I talked to him, I got the weather for Rhein Main, Neubiberg, Bitburg, Landstuhl, Chaumont and Laon, and

that's a pretty good coverage of the area. I did not get the Heidelberg weather.

Q Even if you had the Heidelberg weather, it probably would have been a surface observation, is that correct?

A Yes, I assume it would be a visual observation.

Q Here is what I am driving at, Colonel: That there was a responsibility to recall this mission in the event that the weather was unsuitable and it seems to me that in an operation of this sort, it would have to be VFR throughout all of the points in which the flight was to be conducted and at all of the assigned altitudes. Therefore, I would like to ask you, Colonel, if there isn't some way in the future that we can run an even more careful check on the weather to insure that these operations are being conducted under VFR at all points and at all altitudes?

A Let me predicate my statement with this: By VFR, I mean at the altitude the mission is run which includes 500 feet on top. I would say that the weather from what I could determine didn't seem to be too large of a factor. It is a personal opinion. Of course, but I would say that you cannot check any further than going to a weather office and checking the observations that are presented there on the chart which we did and at the same time, taking the opinion of a weather officer which we did, and in addition, we did have flights up that day from the 86 Fighter Bomber Wing and also one from the Headquarters which said the area was good. Now, as brought up in my first testimony, the exact level of the clouds was not determined at this time but they said the weather was good and the visibility as good in the complete area which included the Mannheim area marshalling.

Q And yet, on the other hand, Colonel Jensen went out and ran his own weather reconnaissance at the level his aircraft was supposed to fly and found it was not suitable and that this was a key factor, the cause of this accident; I would like to know whether or not it would be possible to send out weather reconnaissance aircraft from whatever stations are appropriate and have those aircraft report directly into the project officer for the fly-over rather than have two or three right hands going out and the left hands not knowing what they are doing?

A Let me clarify something in my own mind. Colonel Jensen said there was weather at 15,000 feet.

Q Yes.

A Well, we didn't have that information.

Q You see, Colonel, that's what I am driving at. It seems to me that the project officer on this whole project should have had the complete

information. If it were possible for the 48th to send out a weather reconnaissance at the altitudes they were interested in, I am wondering in the future if we couldn't have someone, perhaps Twelfth, send out a weather reconnaissance ship and check all of the altitudes that are involved to insure that this entire operation will be conducted VFR.

- A It is a possibility, of course. We had our weather reconnaissance aircraft up. They were up looking at the area. The F-86's were rendezvousing above 15,000 feet, although it is not stated in the Ops Order. We discussed it with the 86th Wing at Landstuhl and they agreed to a rendezvous above the F-84. Therefore, we could determine that the weather shouldn't have been good at that area, at that altitude. Now, Colonel Jensen, if he said it wasn't, as I said before, it was unknown to me. I would like to have Colonel Jensen's statement.

Questions by MAJOR FLORICK:

- Q Did you have a conversation with Colonel Jensen in reference to the weather prior to any take-off's or anything?
- A No, sir, just yesterday.

Questions by LT. COLONEL MCMAHUS:

- Q You work fairly close with the 86th, don't you, being on the same base?
- A Yes, sir.
- Q Did you see their operations order prior?
- A No, sir.
- Q Do you know if they had written one prior to the mission?
- A No, I don't know.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

- Q Colonel Joyner, did you at any time talk to Major Hahn?
- A Yes.
- Q On that day, that is Friday the 15th?
- A I believe I did, in the morning. I gave him a recall the day before and told him that if the weather was bad, that I would give him another recall at 1400, the day of the show.
- Q And the day of the show, what time did you talk to him?
- A Major, I am not sure. I am not even positive that I talked to him that day.
- Q You recall Major Hahn telling you anything about a change of altitude of the F-84's?

A Not before the show, no--afterwards, yes.

Q Would it be the standard procedure if they wanted to change altitudes in this type of a show, to notify you?

A I don't quite follow what you mean--standard procedure--it would be a good procedure, let me put it that way.

Q You would expect to be notified of any change of altitudes that these different groups had made?

A I would certainly think so.

Q Another point here, each of the group leaders in the questioning that has come before the Board here, stated that it would be a very good idea to have different rendezvous points even though the aircraft had different altitudes. Would you go along with that?

A Normally, I would. In this one case, the weather was, became a factor. We checked the prog. for the weather and the weather people said there was a possibility of a front coming in on Friday, the same as we experienced the day before. So, we thought when we wrote the Ops Order, that if we could keep them at one altitude and if we could obtain communications with them, we could change it on the last minute basis, and have them come in at the same altitude and separate their TOT's in such a manner as there would be no possibility of them overrunning each other and that was one of the reasons we tried to marshal them in one centralized area by splitting them in altitudes, taking care of what we thought would be a safety factor.

Q You mean you were going to extend the actual fly-by and have them come over greater intervals?

A If the weather was solid below a certain level, we knew far enough in advance, we could direct them--the units--to hit the beacon out-bound to the target at approximately the same altitude but with a much greater spread than their TOT times. The reason we decided on having a centralized marshalling point was in the event the weather became a solid overcast, at not below 4,000 feet, it would be possible to bring the flights in at adjusted altitudes and TOT's, to stay under this overcast and still have proper separation for flying safety purposes.

Questions by MAJOR SIMPSON:

Q In your planning, then, Colonel Joyner, you had planned on possibly changing the altitudes if the aircraft, if the overcast was such that you couldn't get them down through it?

A Yes.

MAJOR SIMPSON: I don't have any other questions.

Questions by the President:

- Q You have covered briefly some answers to this question but could you help the board any in giving us any of your recommendations you may have in addition that would serve to prevent an accident of this type in the future?
- A Colonel Schmid, I thought about this quite a bit, as we have all. It is a very serious thing to happen and I know we all want to preclude it happening again, I think if we run like this again, we can marshal different aircraft at different locations, although I don't think the way the Ops Order read, that that was a contributing factor, but to be sure that we don't have different type aircraft in the same areas, in the future we can possibly do that and have them in or over the TOT outbound to the target at RM marshal to hit the IP--outbound to the target.

Questions by MAJOR FLORICK:

- Q Colonel, what do you think about subordinate units changing any portion of an order without notifying the originator of the order?
- A I would like to think about that a little before. The circumstances, of course, would have a lot to do with that, I think--if there was no other aircraft and one unit was flying a show, once they had contact with the other flight, I would think it would be proper for the pilot to use his own discretion to bring a flight down, if he were sure he didn't endanger anybody else to come in a more suitable altitude. The time element was a consideration. It is possible for a pilot to get over a target and for the weather momentarily to change and he will have to make a spot decision. The feeling in the Air Force has always been that the final prerogative is always on the pilot and he must be given that much flexibility. If it is something that he has determined beforehand, I would say that it should be the procedure, probably, to let the supervising directing organization know.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

- Q Colonel, after giving this accident some thought, as you have stated, what do you feel is the primary fundamental cause for this accident in this mid-air collision?
- A I don't have the information you gentlemen have.
- Q From what you do know of it, Colonel?
- A You are putting me rather on the spot. The primary cause of the accident definitely is aircraft running together in VFR weather, which can only be placed on the pilots themselves, regardless whether there was poor planning or whether the direction of the mission was

a problem or not; I still think the basic cause was aircraft running together in VFR weather, but there are no doubts-- there are some other contributing factors, which I am not in a position to go into.

CAPTAIN FREEMAN: That is all I have.

PRESIDENT: Anybody else have anything more? That is all. Thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

The Board recessed at 1200 hours, 22 May 1953.
The Board reconvened at 1300 hours, 22 May 1953.

PRESIDENT: The Board will come to order.

RECORDER: All the members of the Board who were present when the Board recessed are again present.

LIEUTENANT MCNEAL was then called as a witness, was sworn and testified as follows:

RECORDER: You are advised that the purpose of this Board is to determine all factors relating to the accident and in the interest of flying safety to try to prevent a recurrence, and further, that this Board is not to obtain evidence for disciplinary action to determine pecuniary liability or line of duty status or to revoke commission or to remove from active list under 36-2.

Questions by the President:

Q Lieutenant McNeal, will you take a brief look at this statement. It doesn't have your name typed out. I understand it is the same statement you submitted and we subsequently put into type.

A I believe this is the statement I made.

Q We didn't wish to interrupt your flight today, but the Board wanted to ask you a couple of questions. It won't be very long. Are there any additions you want to make to this?

A No, sir. I believe I wrote everything I know about the accident.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Could you give the approximate distance you were from the F-84's at the time you first saw them?

A I really couldn't say how near they were. My only guess is knowing their wing span and how far away they looked from gunnery training, that they were very near.

Q At the time you first spotted them?

A Yes, well, within 2,000 feet, when I first saw them.

Q They were too close to add anything to this line of reasoning that I was assuming.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Were they about level with your formation--above--or below?

A They were about level with us. They were stacked low and so, I don't know if they were in a slight climb or whether the illusion of the elements stacked low behind the lead led me to believe that.

Q Did anybody in your formation call them out as being in front of you and coming head on?

A Not that I remember.

Q Did you see any evidence that the lead aircraft of your formation made any attempts to turn right or left or up or down to avoid the collision?

A After I saw the jets, I didn't even look over to the other side any more. My eyes were going between them and the plane that I was flying wing on, and I didn't even look over to see what action he was taking.

Q Your flight leader didn't deviate his course at that moment?

A No, my flight leader did not.

Q He held a straight formation on the group leader?

A Yes, I don't know if he was on the group leader, but he was straight and level and kept the same heading.

Q Have you ever been intercepted in flight by jet aircraft over here before?

A Do you mean in the sense that they made practice gunnery runs or passes?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q By more than one jet at a time?

A Yes.

Q Were you in formation during those passes or were you a single ship?

A Both ways.

Q Both?

A Yes, I have been in single ship and in formation.

Questions by Lt. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Could you elaborate a little and give a couple of specific instances? How many fighters involved and how many of your--

A I have been over here some time and it has happened a number of times. I don't care if they do it, in my own opinion; all kinds have done it from Vampires, Meteors, from the Four Nations, from our own, from F-84's--I don't think anything of it when they do it.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Now, at a time like that, when they are making a pass, you realize that they are doing it just for gunnery practice or just for the heck of it?

A Sometimes I wonder if they are doing that or whether Corned-beef or someone is vectoring them for practice--I don't know.

Q As they approach you on such a pass, what do you feel is the proper action for you to take if you are flying the aircraft?

A I maintain, I realize that is breaking regulations because they are not supposed to come within that close of you unless they are in a maneuver, in training of some sort but all I do is stay straight and level.

Q Why do you stay straight and level?

A Then they know where I am going to be, I figure. It is my line of thought, anyway.

Q You figure they are making the pass and they know to which way they are going to break, to one side or the other?

A Yes.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q What is the largest formation of jets that you have been subject to attack by? At any one time.

A Do you mean these attacks flying alone or in maneuvering operations?

Q Not in maneuvering operations, but speaking of maneuvering operations?

A No, one or two or three small ones, and they are not really passes.

LT. COLONEL BURNS: For the information of the Board, the fighters are not allowed to go up and make gunnery passes on any transport ship or any other kind. They are not authorized to do that and I assume that

most of these passes that he is talking about are interceptions to identify his aircraft and they usually come in elements of two aircraft.

A Yes.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Now, when these aircraft in the past have made passes at your aircraft, have you ever had a feeling of apprehension that they might hit your aircraft by coming too close?

A No.

Q And you say you hold straight and level so that they will know where you are going to be and they can take their own--make their own change in flight path to avoid hitting you?

A Yes.

Questions by LT. COLONEL BURNS:

Q Would you have called out this formation of jet fighters on the day of the accident had you had more time to do it?

A (No reply)

Q Is that your normal procedure to call them out to your formation leader?

A No, if I would have seen them out away, say, three or five miles it looked like, I wouldn't have said anything until they got very close. Even if I would, I would have suspected that someone else, the lead would know that they are there, and that's it.

Questions by CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

Q Would you also have figured that they were just making another pass such as these other passes that they have been making?

A No, I didn't see them, but I would have realized that that was a rendezvous for this flyby and that's where they were. I wouldn't have thought anything more of it.

Q Would you have assumed that they were headed toward you--that they were going to make a pass as in other cases?

A I wouldn't have assumed that. I would have assumed that they were orbiting and as they came closer, they would vary their altitudes or direction so as to avoid hitting us.

Questions by LT. COLONEL ENLINGER:

Q Have any of these passes in the past been head-on passes?

A No.

Q Just the old pursuit curve?

A Pursuit curve or pull-up alongside, but not head-on. That I don't consider a pass.

LT. COLONEL BURNS: I have no more questions.

PRESIDENT: Does anybody else have any question? If not, that will be all. Thank you very much.

(The witness withdrew from the room)

PRESIDENT: The Board will be adjourned.

(The Board adjourned at 2130 hours, 22 May 1993.)

AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE

(DELIVER DUPLICATE TO BASE OPERATIONS AT DESTINATION)

DATE

15 May 1953

OPERATIONS OFFICE Bitburg AFB, APO 132		AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO. AF Jet 49-2316	
B OCCUPANTS (State whether crew or passenger. List additional passengers on separate sheet and attach.)			
DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERIAL NO.
PILOT	CRAMER, D. S., Lt Col		22758A
			53rd FBS
			Bitburg
See attached list.			

C WEATHER			
CEILINGS AND VISIBILITIES	EXISTING	SEQUENCE TIME	FORECAST FOR ETE + 2 HOURS
	DESTINATION 3500	12 Vis	DESTINATION Improve
	ALTERNATE		ALTERNATE
BRIEFING VOID AFTER (Time)		(WEATHER CONDITIONS INDICATE THAT THIS FLIGHT MAY BE CONDUCTED AS PLANNED)	SIGNATURE OF FORECASTER OR CLEARANCE AUTH. D. S. Cramer, Lt Col

D. Cousin Red		FLIGHT PLAN	
RADIO CALL AF Jet 2316	AIRCRAFT TYPE F-84 (17)	PILOT'S LAST NAME Cramer	POINT OF DEPARTURE Bitburg
ALT. VFR	ALT. VFR	ALT. VFR	ALT.
ROUTE Direct	ROUTE Direct	ROUTE Direct	ROUTE
TO Ladenberg	TO Landstuhl	TO Bitburg	TO
DESTINATION Bitburg	ALTERNATE N/E	NORMAL TRANSMITTING FREQ'S (Frequencies to be used in making position reports. Number or letter designations will be used for VHF frequencies.)	WEIGHT AND BALANCE FORM F FILED AT
MILEAGE 160 N	USAF RATINGS (The number)	116.1 135.9	LOCATION N/R
EST 1513Z	PILOT 21	132.48 122.1	DATE
EST 1:30	NAVY INSTRUMENT RATINGS (Check one)	135.54 118.1	
	☐ RESTRICTED ☐ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL	122.1 140.58	

(NAVY ONLY) PLANE INSTRUMENT QUALIFICATIONS ☐ RESTRICTED ☐ STANDARD ☐ SPECIALREMARKS
Flt Briefed in Accordance with
par. 47 - AFReg 60-16

D. S. Cramer, Lt Col

PILOT'S SIGNATURE

E FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION			
SUBMITTED TO	TIME	BY	SIGNATURE OF CLEARING AUTHORITY
INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL		ACTUAL T.O. TIME	SIGNATURE OF CLEARING OFFICER
TRANS. TO TORON ON PILOT BY			
ARRIVED AT	TIME	NAME	GRADE OR POSITION
			D. S. Cramer, Lt Col

<u>PILOTS NAME</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT NO</u>
CLARK, S.S.	1st Lt	AO 1911081	22 FBS	1577
OLSEN, E.B.	1st Lt	AO 2222154	22 FBS	1647
CASS, R.L.	1st Lt	AO 2222312	22 FBS	1620
PORTER, I.A.	1st Lt	AO 1910536	22 FBS	2225
HOLLEY, J.C.	1st Lt	AO 1911994	22 FBS	2250
LIMER, T.W.	1st Lt	AO 2221734	22 FBS	1632
CHILTON, J.W.	1st Lt	20878A	22 FBS	1628
TRACY, F.L.	1st Lt	AO 2222688	22 FBS	2231
LONEY, E.A.	Captain	14339A	23 FBS	1875
FALLS, H.	1st Lt	20871A	23 FBS	49-2171
PEGK, E.G.	1st Lt	20876A	23 FBS	49-2170
HAYNES, W.E.	1st Lt	AO 2084297	23 FBS	51-872
D'ANEY, R.N.	Captain	AO 812394	53 FBS	1575
BROWN, W.G.	1st Lt	AO 753603	53 FBS	2146
HUFFMAN, J.E.	1st Lt	AO 1909158	53 FBS	2198
<u>SPARE:</u>				
MILLER, J.R.	1st Lt	AO 2222330	23 FBS	49-2293

AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE

(DELIVER DUPLICATE TO BASE OPERATIONS AT DESTINATION)

DATE

15 May 1953

AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.

51-8235

OPERATIONS OFFICE

B OCCUPANTS (State whether crew or passenger. List additional passengers on separate sheet and attach.)

DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERIAL NO.	ORGANIZATION	HOME STATION
I PILOT	Osborn, J.W.	Lt Col	AO 371862	60th TC Gp	Rhein Main
P	Clement, W.Y.	Capt	AO 800472	60th TC Gp	Rhein Main
CP	Ray, J. H.	Maj	AO 442232	60th TC Wg	Rhein Main
N	Thompson, C.	Capt	AO 723208	10th TC Sq	Rhein Main
CE	Biggs, T.W.	S/Sgt	AF 18315337	10th TC Sq	Rhein Main

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

John H. Freeman
JOHN H. FREEMAN
Captain, USAF

Aircraft Accident Investigation Officer

C WEATHER

CEILINGS AND VISIBILITIES	EXISTING	SEQUENCE TIME	FORECAST FOR ETE + 2 HOURS
	DESTINATION		DESTINATION
	ALTERNATE		ALTERNATE
weather checked by pilots			
BRIEFING VOID AFTER (Time)	WEATHER CONDITIONS INDICATE THAT THIS FLIGHT MAY BE CONDUCTED AS PLANNED		SIGNATURE OF FORECASTER OR CLEARANCE AUTH.

D FLIGHT PLAN

RADIO CALL		AIRCRAFT TYPE	PILOT'S LAST NAME	POINT OF DEPARTURE
AF 8235		C-119	Osborn	Rhein Main
ALT	VFR	ALT	VFR	ALT
ROUTE	Michelstadt	ROUTE	Dret	ROUTE
TO	Landstuhl	TO	Rhein Main	TO
DESTINATION	ALTERNATE	MILEAGE FROM DEST.	NORMAL TRANSMITTING FREQ'S	
Rhein Main	N.R.		(Frequencies to be used in making position reports. Number or letter designations will be used for FMF frequencies.)	
MILEAGE	145 N	PILOT	INSTRUMENT	WEIGHT AND BALANCE FORM F FILED AT
1510Z	150	18 Nov 53		Rhein Main
EYE	FUEL IN HOURS	NAVY INSTRUMENT RATINGS (Check one)		DATE
1 / 10	8 / 0	☐ RESTRICTED ☐ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL		10 April 1953

(NAVF ONLY) PLANE INSTRUMENT QUALIFICATIONS ☐ RESTRICTED ☐ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL

REMARKS

As req by ICAO
Mission # A-119 B-6
Formation of 18 ships - PAR. 48 complied with

s/J. W. OSBORN

PILOT'S SIGNATURE

E FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION

SUBMITTED TO	TIME	BY	SIGNATURE OF CLEARING AUTHORITY
CL/AS	1520	KE	s/J. W. OSBORN
INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL	ACTUAL T.O. TIME	SIGNATURE OF CLEARING OFFICER	
TRANS. TO TOWER OR PILOT BY:	1517		
ARRIVED AT	1627		
STATION	TIME	NAME	GRADE OR POSITION
DEHM	1626	HEDE	Disp

NME FORM 175

1 MAR 49

REPLACES AF FORM 21, 15 AUG 49 AND NAVY FORM 611 WHICH MAY BE USED.

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F
 - TRANSPORT AND CARGO -
 (USE REVERSE FOR TACTICAL MISSIONS)
FOR USE IN
AN 01-18-40

DATE 5 March 1953		AIRPLANE C-119C		FROM APG-57	
MISSION 0		SERIAL NUMBER 51-8235		TO Local	
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE		WEIGHT		ITEM	
ALLOWABLE GROSS WEIGHT		68,000			
TOTAL AIRPLANE & FUEL WT. (Ref. 12)		56,626		1 BASIC AIRPLANE (From Chart C)	
ALLOWABLE LOAD (Ref. 12)		11,374		2 OIL (100 Gals)	
LIMITS				3 CREW (No.) (5)	
1/ GROSS WT. TAKE OFF (lbs)		2/ GROSS WT. LANDING (lbs)		4 CREW'S BAGGAGE	
68,000		68,000		5 STEWARD'S EQUIPMENT	
3/ PERMISSIBLE C.G. TAKE OFF		FROM 20 TO 30 (% M.A.C.)		6 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT	
4/ PERMISSIBLE C.G. LANDING		FROM 20 TO 30 (% M.A.C.)		7 EXTRA EQUIPMENT	
2/ Enter constant used.				8 OPERATING WEIGHT	
3/ Enter values from current applicable TO.				9 TAKE-OFF FUEL (2000 Gals)	
3/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 15).				10 WATER INJ. FLUID (Gals)	
4/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 16).				11 TOTAL AIRPLANE & FUEL WEIGHT	
				56,626	
				60 0	
REMARKS		12 DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWABLE LOAD			
		UPPER COMPARTMENTS		LOWER COMPARTMENTS	
		PASSENGERS		PASSENGERS	
		NO. WEIGHT CARGO		NO. WEIGHT CARGO	
This is a certified true copy.					
<i>Lyons R. Lewis</i>					
THOMAS R. LEWIS					
1/Lt USAF					
Weight and Balance Officer					
E-956B					
COMPUTER PLATE NUMBER (If used)					
CORRECTIONS (Ref. 14)		CHANGES (+ or -)		13 TAKE OFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)	
				56,626	
				60 0	
				14 CORRECTIONS (If required)	
				15 TAKE OFF CONDITION (Corrected)	
				16 TAKE OFF C.G. IN % M.A.C.	
				23.75	
				17 LESS FUEL 600 Gals	
				53,026	
				55 5	
				18 ESTIMATED LANDING CONDITION	
				53,026	
				55 5	
				19 ESTIMATED LANDING C.G. IN % M.A.C.	
				22.45	
				COMPUTED BY	
TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED		-		WEIGHT & BALANCE TECHNICIAN	
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED		+		<i>Lyons R. Lewis</i> 1/Lt.	
NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 14)		-		PILOT	

RESTRICTED (When Filled In)

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F
- TRANSPORT AND CARGO -
(USE REVERSE FOR TACTICAL MISSIONS)

FOR USE IN
AN 01-1B-40

DATE 21 February 1953		AIRPLANE C-119C		FROM APO-57	
MISSION 0		SERIAL NUMBER 51-8241		TO Local	
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE		WEIGHT		ITEM	
ALLOWABLE GROSS WEIGHT		68,000		WEIGHT	
TOTAL AIRPLANE & FUEL WT. (Ref. 11)		56,626		INDEX OR MOM	
MAXIMUM LOAD (Ref. 12)		11,374			
LIMITS					
GROSS WT. TAKE OFF (lbs)		GROSS WT. LANDING (lbs)			
68,000		68,000			
3/ PERMISSIBLE C.G. TAKE OFF		FROM 20 TO 30 M.A.C.			
4/ PERMISSIBLE C.G. LANDING		FROM 20 TO 30 M.A.C.			
1/ Enter constant used.					
2/ Enter values from current applicable TO.					
3/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 15).					
4/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 16).					
REMARKS		12 DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWABLE LOAD			
		UPPER COMPARTMENTS		LOWER COMPARTMENTS	
COMPT		PASSENGERS		PASSENGERS	
		CARGO		CARGO	
This is a certified true copy.		NO. WEIGHT		NO. WEIGHT	
Eugene R. Lewis					
1/Lt USAP					
Weight and Balance Officer					
E-956B					
COMPUTER PLATE NUMBER (if used)					
CORRECTIONS (Ref. 14)		13 TAKE OFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)		56,626 60,0	
CHANGES (+ or -)		14 CORRECTIONS (if required)			
WEIGHT		15 TAKE OFF CONDITION (Corrected)			
INDEX OR MOM		16 TAKE OFF C.G. IN % M.A.C.		23.7%	
		17 LESS FUEL 600		56,026 56,5	
		18 ESTIMATED LANDING CONDITION		53,026 56,5	
		19 ESTIMATED LANDING C.G. IN % M.A.C.		22.4%	
		COMPUTED BY			
TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED -		WEIGHT & BALANCE TECHNICIAN			
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED +		Eugene R. Lewis 1/Lt.			
NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 24)		PILOT			

RESTRICTED (When filled in)				WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F - TRANSPORT AND CARGO - (USE REVERSE FOR TACTICAL MISSIONS)				FOR USE IN AN 01-1B-40			
DATE 10 April 1953		AIRPLANE C-119C		FROM APC-57							
MISSION 0		SERIAL NUMBER 51-8249		TO Local							
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE		WEIGHT		ITEM		WEIGHT		INDEX OR MOM/			
ALLOWABLE GROSS WEIGHT		68,000									
TOTAL AIRPLANE & FUEL WT. (Ref. 11)		56,196		1 BASIC AIRPLANE (From Chart C)		42,846		63 6			
ALLOWABLE LOAD (Ref. 12)		11,804		2 OIL (100 Gals)		750		63 6			
LIMITS				3 CREW (No.) (3)		6000		54 2			
2 GROSS WT. TAKE OFF (lbs)		3 GROSS WT. LANDING (lbs)		4 CREW'S BAGGAGE							
68,000		68,000		5 STEWARD'S EQUIPMENT							
3 PERMISSIBLE C.G. TAKE OFF		FROM 20 TO (% M.A.C.) 30		6 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT							
4 PERMISSIBLE C.G. LANDING		FROM 20 TO (% M.A.C.) 30		7 EXTRA EQUIPMENT							
1 Enter constant used.				8 OPERATING WEIGHT		44,196		54 2			
2 Enter values from current applicable TO.				9 TAKE-OFF FUEL (2000 Gals)		12,000		65 7			
3 Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 18).				10 WATER INJ. FLUID (Gals)							
4 Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 18).				11 TOTAL AIRPLANE & FUEL WEIGHT		56,196		65 7			
REMARKS		12 DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWABLE LOAD									
		UPPER COMPARTMENTS		LOWER COMPARTMENTS							
		PASSENGERS		PASSENGERS							
		CARGO		CARGO							
		NO. WEIGHT		NO. WEIGHT							
This is a certified, true copy.											
Eugene R. Lewis.											
EUGENE R. LEWIS											
1/Lt USAF											
Weight and Balance Officer											
E-956B											
COMPUTER PLATE NUMBER (if used)											
CORRECTIONS (Ref. 14)		13 TAKE OFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)		56,196		65 7					
CHANGES (+ or -)		14 CORRECTIONS (if required)									
WEIGHT		15 TAKE OFF CONDITION (Corrected)									
INDEX OR MOM/		16 TAKE OFF C.G. IN % M.A.C.		24.8%							
		17 LESS FUEL		600 Gals		3,600		62 1			
		18 ESTIMATED LANDING CONDITION		52,596		62 1					
		19 ESTIMATED LANDING C.G. IN % M.A.C.		23.8%							
		COMPUTED BY									
TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED		-		WEIGHT & BALANCE TECHNICIAN							
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED		+		Eugene R. Lewis, 1/Lt.							
NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 14)		-		PILOT							

FOR USE IN
AN 01-1B-40

DATE	AIRPLANE	FROM
10 April 1953	C-119C	AFJ-57
MISSION	SERIAL NUMBER	TO
0	51-8249	Local

PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE	WEIGHT	R Z F	ITEM	WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM.
ALLOWABLE GROSS WEIGHT	68,000				
TOTAL AIRPLANE & FUEL WT. (Ref. 11)	56,196	1	BASIC AIRPLANE (From Chart C)	42,846	63.6
ALLOWABLE LOAD (Ref. 12)	11,804	2	OIL (100 Gal.)	750	6.6

LIMITS		3	CREW (No.)	(3)	6000	54	2
2/GROSS WT. TAKE OFF (lbs)	3/GROSS WT. LANDING (lbs)	4	CREW'S BAGGAGE				
68,000	68,000	5	STEWARD'S EQUIPMENT				

2. PERMISSIBLE C.G. TAKE OFF	FROM 20	TO (N.A.C.) 30	6. EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT		
4. PERMISSIBLE C.G. LANDING	FROM 20	TO (N.A.C.) 30	7. EXTRA EQUIPMENT		
1/ Enter constant used.			8. OPERATING WEIGHT	44 196	54 2
3/ Enter values from current applicable TO.			9. TAKE-OFF FUEL (2000 Gals)	12 000	65 7
3/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 18).			10. WATER INJ. FLUID (Gals)		
4/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 18).			11. TOTAL AIRPLANE & FUEL WEIGHT	56 196	65 7

REMARKS	DISTRIBUTION OF ALLOWABLE LOAD									
	12					12				
	UPPER COMPARTMENTS					LOWER COMPARTMENTS				
	PASSENGERS		CARGO	COMPT	PASSENGERS		CARGO	COMPT		
NO.	WEIGHT	NO.			WEIGHT					
This is a certified, true copy. <i>By</i> THURUS R. LEWIS 1/Lt USAF Weight and Balance Officer										
	E-956B									
COMPUTER PLATE NUMBER (If used)										

CORRECTIONS (Ref. 14)				13	TAKE OFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)		56	196	65	7
COMPT	ITEM	CHANGES (+ or -)		14	CORRECTIONS (if required)					
		WEIGHT	% INDEX OR MOM/	15	TAKE OFF CONDITION (Corrected)					
				16	TAKE OFF C.G. IN % M.A.C.		24.8%			
				17	LESS FUEL 600 Gal		3	600	62	1
				18	ESTIMATED LANDING CONDITION		52	596	62	1
				19	ESTIMATED LANDING C.G. IN % M.A.C.		23.8%			
				COMPUTED BY						

TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED	-	-	WEIGHT & BALANCE TECHNICIAN
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED	+	+	PILOT <i>Byron R. Lewis, 1st.</i>
NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 54)			

RESTRICTED (When filled in)

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F
- TACTICAL -
(USE REVERSE FOR TRANSPORT AND CARGO MISSIONS)

FOR USE IN
AN 01-12-40

DATE		AIRPLANE		FROM						
MISSION		SERIAL NUMBER		TO						
REMARKS	REF	ITEM			WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM.				
	1	BASIC AIRPLANE (From Chart C)								
	2	OIL (Ga/s)								
	DISTRIBUTION OF LOAD									
	COMPT.	CREW		BAGGAGE	CARGO AND MISC.					
		NO.	WEIGHT							
COMPUTER PLATE NUMBER (if used)										
Pertinent instructions in the pilot for shifting load and crew during take off and landing should be noted above.										
CORRECTIONS (Ref. 11)										
COMPT	ITEM	CHANGES (+ or -)		AMMUNITION	4	COMPT	ROUNDS	CALIBER		
		WEIGHT	INDEX OR MOM.							
TOTAL WEIGHT REMOVED				BOMBS ROCKETS, ETC.	5	OPERATING WEIGHT				
TOTAL WEIGHT ADDED					6	FORWARD				
NET DIFFERENCE (Ref. 11)						AFT				
						EXTERNAL				
				FUEL	7	BUILT IN (Ga/s)				
						BOMB BAY (Ga/s)				
						EXTERNAL (Ga/s)				
				8	WATER INJ. FLUID (Ga/s)					
				9	JATO ON RATE					
				10	TAKE OFF CONDITION (Uncorrected)					
				11	CORRECTIONS (if required)					
				12	TAKE OFF CONDITION (Corrected)					
				13	TAKE OFF C.G. IN % M.A.C.					
				14	JATO ON RATE ()					
LIMITS				LESS EXPENDABLES	15	ESTIMATED LANDING CONDITION				
1/ GROSS WT. TAKE OFF (lbs)		2/ GROSS WT. LANDING (lbs)				16 ESTIMATED LANDING C.G. IN % M.A.C.				
3/ PERMISSIBLE C.G. TAKE OFF		FROM	TO (% M.A.C.)							
4/ PERMISSIBLE C.G. LANDING		FROM	TO (% M.A.C.)							
5/ Enter constant speed.						COMPUTED BY				
6/ Enter values from current applicable TO.						WEIGHT & BALANCE TECHNICIAN				
7/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 11).						PILOT				
8/ Applicable to gross weight (Ref. 11).										

WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE FORM F
- TACTICAL -
(USE REVERSE FOR TRANSPORT AND CARGO MISSIONS)

FOR USE IN
AN 01-1B-40

[illegible]

RESTRICTED (When filled in)

16 May 1953

S T A T E M E N T

I was directed to brief and lead elements of the 36th Fighter-Bomber Group on a formation flight as part of the retirement review in honor of retiring General Clyde Rich.

I briefed the pilots on the information contained in 36th Fighter-Bomber Group Operations Order Number 50-53, dated 14 May 1953, and added the information just received that Callahad Leader would be at 3500 feet or below the clouds which were reported to be in the rendezvous area.

The flight was flown as planned. Radio contact was established with Callahad Leader approximately seven (7) minutes from the rendezvous point. Callahad informed me that he was at 5000 feet and would remain there if possible.

Cousin squadron climbed to 5000 feet on course toward the rendezvous point, and about one (1) minute before arriving there Callahad Leader reported over the rendezvous point turning left. He continued saying that he had us in sight a little low coming toward him, and he would descend. At that time someone told Callahad that those airplanes were C-119's.

The visibility was deteriorating as we crossed the Rhine River and approached the rendezvous point. There seemed to be a belt of haze at our altitude that got progressively more dense toward the mountains east of Heidelberg. I would estimate the average visibility was six to eight miles.


I had not yet seen Callahad Squadron as I passed the rendezvous point so I began an orbit to the left. By radio I determined that Callahad was to set course at fifty seven past the hour which was in thirteen minutes but I was unable to determine his position because a number of radio transmissions were blocking the air.

We had completed about 200° of our orbit when through the haze of radio transmissions I heard someone say boggies. I peered into the haze, made bright by the sun, and saw nothing until from below the nose of my airplane, in such a position that I could see only part of it, came a formation of C-52's or C-119's at a range of about one mile. For an instant it was difficult to determine whether they were coming toward us or going away and whether they were turning right or left, however, I believed they were turning right. It was instantly clear that the arcs of their orbit and our orbit were on a collision course, and I started a turn to the right as rapidly as possible without hitting my element leader or his wingman. At the same time I called a break to the right.

B/L, 53rd Ftr-Bmr Sq, APO 132, USAF, Statement by Lt Colonel Darrell S Cramer,
dated 16 May 1953 (Cont'd)

I cleared the C-119's by a good margin and for a moment I believed that everyone was clear, but when I looked back and down I could see two balls of fire falling toward the earth. Parachutes began coming from both balls of fire and I watched three of them open.

After the collision the squadron re-formed and it was determined that one of our aircraft was missing. A rendezvous with Gallahad was made and the mission was completed as scheduled.



DARRELL S CRAMER
Lt Col, USAF
22758A

S T A T E M E N T

The following facts, true and correct to the best of my knowledge, are submitted concerning participation in the aerial review over Landstuhl AF, Germany, on 15 May 1953:

1. On 14 May 1953 I, Commanding Officer of the 493rd Fighter Bomber Squadron, received an operations order from Fighter Group designating me as leader of sixteen (16) F-84 aircraft of the 48th Fighter Bomber Group and sixteen (16) F-84 aircraft of the 36th Fighter Bomber Group which were to participate in an aerial review over Landstuhl AB, Germany, on the following day - 15 May. Rendezvous for the F-84 Formation was designated as 15,000 feet MSL over the Ladenburg Beacon, 5 miles north-northwest of Heidelberg, Germany. A practice for this review on the afternoon of the 14th was called off by Headquarters 12th AF due to adverse weather in the rendezvous and target area.

2. At approximately 1100 hours local time on 15 May I made a practice flight - alone - from the rendezvous point to Landstuhl Air Base and found a broken to overcast cloud condition with bases at 4500 to 5000 feet MSL in that area - visibility estimated at .5 to 6 miles -- with several cloud layers above, overall tops about 16,000 feet. The pre-mission briefing for myself and the pilots involved by Captain Shay, Base Weather Station, bore out the improbability of being able to make a rendezvous at the specified altitude (15,000 feet). As a result, I contacted Major Hahn, 36th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations, by telephone and asked him to inform the Squadron Leader of that unit that, as the same cloud conditions were forecast to prevail during the time of the review, we would rendezvous below the overcast between 3000 and 4000 feet MSL, with a more specific altitude to be given over the R/T upon making radio contact. I was not aware at that time that other aircraft were to rendezvous at 5000 feet over the IP/RVP and would precede the F-84 formations in the review.

(However, I should point out here that, although the operations order I received contained no mention of aircraft to participate other than the F-84's of the 48th and 36th FBG's, I was informed by Fighter Group operations that the complete order from Headquarters 12th Air Force which set up this review was available to me at Fighter Group Operations, and a subsequent check revealed that this information was contained therein).

3. Enroute to the rendezvous point with the squadron, when about seven (7) minutes out, I made contact by radio with "Cousin" Leader (36th FBG formation), and informed him that I was then flying at 5000 feet MSL directly beneath an overcast, and as it appeared that condition would prevail over the RV point, we would remain at 5000 feet for rendezvous. Upon approaching the Ladenburg Beacon, the lower cloud cover dissipated to a scattered condition, with a clear area in the immediate vicinity up to about 10,000 feet, where higher layers were formed/constituting almost an overcast condition above that altitude. Forward visibility over the Beacon and to the South and East was good, lowering to an estimated 3 to 4 miles to the North.

4. When about three (3) miles directly South of the Ladenburg Beacon (at approx 1643L), and about to start an orbit to the left, I observed a formation of C-119 aircraft (initially mistaken for Cousin formation until closer in) approaching from the southeast and slightly above our altitude. I immediately descended to 4000 feet MSL and continued my orbit to the left, informing Cousin Leader that I was descending to and would orbit close in over the Beacon at 4000 feet in order to stay below the C-119 aircraft in the area; Cousin Leader acknowledged this call. Other formations of twin-engined aircraft were observed in the area, all at higher altitude -- the exact number and positions not now remembered.

5. At about 1648L, turning through a heading of north-northeast on my second orbit of the R/V point, still waiting for Cousin Leader to make rendezvous, I heard a call over the R/T: "Cousin, Break right!" Almost immediately, at an estimated 8 to 10 miles north of Ladenburg, I observed a bright red and yellow flash in the air, followed a few seconds later by a very large red and yellow flash on the ground directly below. Two, or possibly three, smaller white puffs or explosions were observed near this last big one on the ground. During this time no aircraft were discernable, looking into the reduced visibility to the north.

6. The R/T at once became jammed with transmissions, and Cousin Leader called his formation to switch to "B" channel. I continued my orbit, passing about 3 to 4 miles north of the R/V point, and upon heading towards South, climbed to 9500 feet MSL, leveling off just below the first broken layer of clouds. At this time Cousin Leader returned to the mission frequency and I informed him of my present altitude and of being in an orbit just to the South of the Beacon. Cousin Leader stated that he had us in sight and could close into position enroute to Landstuhl AB; I departed the IP for Landstuhl AB at 1657L. When about three to four (3-4) minutes from the target, a squadron of F-86 A/C approached from the left at an angle of about 15- 20 degrees, at our altitude (about 3000 feet MSL), and passed directly behind our squadron. I immediately called Cousin Leader and asked him if he was in position. He replied in the negative and stated that he was behind a formation of F-86 aircraft which was crossing his path. I informed him I was directly in front of the F-86's, who apparently got out of the way, as Cousin Leader closed in and the two F-84 squadrons passed over Landstuhl AB in position at 1704L.

Howard W. Jensen
Lt. Colonel, USAF

certified True Copy
John H. Jensen
USAF

STATEMENT

I, 1st Lt Robert L. Mc Neal, AO 1910395, assigned to 10th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) as a pilot (1054B). I hold a current instrument card, White, (AF Form 8). My original pilot rating is 23 June 1950. Total flying time is 1,438 hours.

I was pilot of aircraft 51-8256 flying Red Charlie Two Position. At the time I first saw the jets, my copilot, Lt. Rutter, was at the controls. I saw them first at a position of 12 o'clock level and coming straight at the formation. There was some chatter on the radio but I heard one of the jets say - their position then was nearly on us - "break up and too the right". At this command the jets went every which way and I saw a plane explode off our right wing. My copilot pulled up to miss a plane I didn't see and I immediately pushed down to miss another plane. By that time the jets were past us and I concentrated on holding my position in the formation.

I did not see anything to denote the crash except a big ball of fire and pieces flying.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT

Briefing was given at 1200Z on the day of the accident. The weather at the time of the briefing appeared to be overcast here at Rhein Main and I wondered at this time how we were expecting to go to 5000 ft, our cruising altitude. It was mentioned though, the weather was forecast to "break" by our take off time and that we would be able to rendezvous with 18 aircraft from the 317th at 5000 ft over Ladenburg BCN at 45 past the hour.

As forecast the weather broke and we were VFR all the way to Ladenburg and during our orbits over the beacon. I had been flying until just before we reached Ladenburg so at about 1635 L, my copilot took the controls. I immediately got a map and tried to pinpoint our position. This action, looking the countryside over for navigation, stands out in my mind and I know then that the visibility from air to ground at 5000 ft was at least 10 miles. There was a cloud layer of about 2/10 stratus at approximately 6000 ft over the mountains east of Heidelberg, but over the valley the cloud condition was nil. Although there was some haze, flying conditions were better than VFR at all times.

At the time of the accident we were on a South Easterly heading at approximately 4800 ft indicated. The jets as I first saw them, which was very close to our formation, were at the same altitude and seemed to be in a slight left turn. In the short while they were in front of us they seemed to pass from about a 12:30 to a 11:30 o'clock position relative to our formation.

The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

ROBERT L. McNEAL
1st Lt, USAF
AO 1910395

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt USAF

STATEMENT

15 May 1953

I, 1st Lt James F. Wand, AO 761219, am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Sq, (M), as a pilot (1054B). I am a holder of current Instrument card (AF Form 8, White). My original pilot rating is 5 December 1943. My total flying time is eight hundred and two (802) hours.

The following was observed while flying formation in Aircraft 51-8269 near Heidelberg on 15 May 1953. I was flying co-pilot position in Blue Baker 3 position at approximately 5000 ft. Without warning of any kind, a group of what appeared to be F-84 Jets came head on into the lead elements of the squadron leading the formation. This was approximately at 16.50 hours. After an explosion there was one C-119 spiraling down into the ground. Apparently the jet was demolished. One other C-119 appeared to have its whole cockpit sheared off which also spun in. Two parachutes were observed landing near the burning debris. Wreckage was flying through the whole formation which temporarily broke up. The formation of jets broke upwards and some downwards. It seemed as though one of the last jets in the formation was the one that collided.

Additional statement:

We were flying just under the base of some small scattered cumulus clouds (5100 ft).

We had just completed a turn to the right when the accident happened.

The jets appeared to be coming head on level with us. I sighted them several seconds before the impact.

James F. Wand
JAMES F. WAND, AO 761219
1/Lt USAF

STATEMENT


I, Keith L. Johnston, Captain, AO 807734, 12th TC Squadron pilot of aircraft 51-8247, C-119, flying Baker-2 Position on 15 May 1953.

Briefed to fly to Michelstad to Ladensberg beacon where we were to join up behind 317th TC Group at 5000 ft to fly to Landstuhl AB for flyby. We're briefed that at Ladensberg the visibility might be as low as two miles in haze.

12th TC Squadron was 2nd squadron in 60th formation. We leveled off about 5,200 feet flying just below a broken layer of clouds (400 to 500 above my plane) and the visibility was approximately 3 to 4 miles horizontally in haze. Our Group was making a gentle turn to the left (10 - 15° bank) on a North Easterly heading. At about 1653 I saw about 12 jets peeling in all directions from head on position to our group. They were about level to our group as it appeared that some peeled up and some down. There was at this time a big orange colored explosion in our lead squadron and it appeared to be in "able Flight" and a split second later I saw what appeared to be an intact C-119 going straight down. I saw nothing else of the accident.

Our squadron formation began a turn to the left at time of the accident and spread out about double our normal interval. Baker 3 of 12th Squadron left formation and a plane left Charlie Flight.

Our squadron returned to Rhein Main and landed. The above statement is to the best of my knowledge true and correct.



KEITH L. JOHNSTON
Captain, USAF
AO 807734

STATEMENT

15 May 1953

I, Captain Warren A. DeLatte, AO 803162, am assigned to the 12th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M) as a pilot.

I hold a current Instrument Card, Green (AF Form 84). My original pilot rating is 28 May 1943. Total flying time, 2,357 hours.

At about 1647, while flying No. 3 position in aircraft 51-8240, second Squadron Lead, I glanced forward and noticed a flock of birds scattering. These turned out to be F-84's. Two narrowly missed our flight. I saw this fire ball which I took for one of the 84's. I noticed one C-119 in a flat spin, the right boom and most of the cargo compartment were missing. One other C-119 started a downward turn to the right which ended up with the nose pointed straight down. It passed from my view headed straight down and I saw the reflection of the explosion in the front window. Some body called out, "One chute open", and then #2. It seemed that the F-84's were below and pulled up through our formation. Parts were all over the sky.

Additional statement:

At the briefing held at 1300 L, the weather was given with cloud cover. The actual height of clouds were between 5800 and 6000 feet coverage of about 2 to 3/8. Forwarded visibility in the IP area was 10 to 15 miles. We were to cruise at 5000 feet over IP letting down to 1900 feet in target area.

The jets were to be 4 minutes ahead of us at 15,000 feet. When I first saw them, they were scattering. It appeared that they were below our altitude and climbed through our formation. They first appeared at 11 O'clock. My first sighting was as the first jets went over our group lead. We were about 1000 to 1500 yards back. It was a matter of seconds and it was all over with.

Warren A. DeLatte
WARREN A. DELATTE
Captain, AO 803162

STATEMENT


I, 1st Lt. Lorenzo D. Lafferty Jr., AO 1911167, am assigned to the 10th Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 60th Troop Carrier Group (M), as a pilot. I hold a current instrument card, White (AF Form 8), the date of my original pilot rating is 4 August 50, and my total flying time is 1420 hours. I was aircraft commander of aircraft #2607, (Red Charlie Three) at the time of the accident.

At the pre-flight briefing, I made note, among other things, that our altitude at Ladenberg Beacon was to be 5000 ft Indicated and that we were to be joined there by another formation of eighteen C-119's. The weather given I remember only as being very good for this mission. At the scene of the accident, I noticed a high stratus layer and a visibility of approximately five miles, restricted only by a light haze.

At the time of the collision my ship was at an indicated altitude of 4,900 ft on a heading of approximately 160 degrees. I never saw the jets. I was checking the instrument panel when I heard or felt something outside and looked up to see one C-119 disintegrating and burning at 3 o'clock level and another on the other side with about three feet of the right wing tip turned nearly vertical and crumpled. The burning ship fell straight to the ground in a very slow spin.

The second ship with the bent wingtip rolled slowly into a dive to the right and continued rolling slowly as it dived straight into the ground.

I was able to see both ships almost until they hit the ground, but saw only two open chutes at the last. Since my element, Red Charlie, was not hit, we remained in formation and returned directly to Rhein Main Air Base.


LORENZO D. LAFFERTY
1st Lt, USAF
AO 1911167

-S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T-

16 May 1953

I was flying number 4, position in the second flight. My flight leader briefed me on take-off times, route, place and time of rendezvous, weather conditions expected, etc. We were to meet over the Ladenberg beacon so I tuned my radio compass to 355 kc. while we were flying down and in loose combat formation. The 16 aircraft in our formation joined up in close formation west of the Rhine. After this my only position check was the radio compass. We were flying eastward when Galahad leader called and reported clouds at 5,000 feet. He said to stay below the clouds and rendezvous at the beacon. Cousin leader acknowledged this.

I recall seeing a relative bearing of about 190 degrees on my R.C. to the Ladenberg beacon and we started a turn to the left. Cousin leader called us to "stack it up" and we started a rather steep left turn. We passed thru some scattered clouds and then eased off the bank. Cousin leader called suddenly "Cousin gang, break right now". At this time we were heading north-westerly and flying somewhere around 5,500 feet, at about 400 mph. indicated air speed. I glanced ahead to clear the plane in front of me and then broke right and up. I leveled off almost immediately and saw my flight leader and the number 2 man about a half mile to my left and at the same altitude. I saw a large flight of C-119's pass about 300 feet below me and in the opposite direction.

Immediately thereafter there was a red glare to my left. I glanced back below my left horizontal stabilizer and saw a huge fire about 1,000 feet below me and then another right next to it.

I rejoined my flight leader, we climbed to 8,000 feet and joined up again as a group and completed the mission.

WILLIAM E. HAYNES
1st Lt., USAF

Certified True Copy
John H. Green
Capt. USAF

53RD FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRON
APO 132 US AIR FORCE

16 May 1953

S T A T E M E N T

I, 1st Lt Warren G Brown, on 15 May 1953 was scheduled to participate in a group mission. The purpose of this mission was to stage a fly-by. My position in the group formation was Cousin Red three, Cousin Red being the lead flight of the sixteen (16) ship formation.

Briefing was held by Lt Col Cramer, who was to lead the formation, all pilots that were to participate were present. The briefing was thorough and contained all necessary information for a successful mission. Take-off, join-up and setting course were normal. Nearing the Ladenberg Beacon, the rendezvous point, the formation was reformed into flights in trail with flights in finger tip show formation.

My observation of the weather condition over the rendezvous point, was handicapped by my attention being directed to maintaining my position in the flight. But it did appear to be haze with a scattered cloud condition above, of about three (3) to four (4) tenths coverages.

After passing the beacon, a easterly heading, Cousin Red lead started a turn to the port, during the first portion of the turn it appeared to me that we were slightly above the base of the existing clouds. In this turn we were maintaining a bank of approximately 30 degrees. After completing 180° of turn Cousin Red leader suddenly rolled out on a level plane. Immediately transmitting for the formation to break right. At this time I saw that we were meeting another formation at our level and head on. Breaking right and up enabled me to miss the oncoming aircraft. It was then that I heard the transmission that there had been a mid-air collision and later noticed the burning wreckage on the ground.

Cousin Red leader then reformed the formation and we proceeded on our assigned mission with no further incidents.

The above statement is true to the best of my knowledge.

WARREN G BROWN
1st Lt, USAF
AO-753603

Certified True Copy
John H. Green
Capt. USAF

STATEMENT

16 May 1953

I was flying Cousin spare on the fly-by mission on 15 May 1953. I was briefed to take off last and follow the group to the IP at which point I was supposed to return to Bittsburg and land if I had not filled in. Times, routes, and beacons were covered in the briefing. The only other A/C mentioned in the briefing were those of the 48th Group.

The Take-off was as briefed and the group proceeded to the IP, VFR. The weather at the time was scattered at six thousand and the visibility was three to four miles.

As the group approached the IP, Galahad leader called Cousin leader and told him to join under the clouds at 5000 feet. He further stated that he was in a left orbit.

As we started to turn left onto the IP, flights of G-119's, F-84's and F-86's were observed to be in the immediate area.

About 180 degrees through the turn I started to pull away from the rest of the formation. At the time the heading was approximately 360°. I was a thousand to two thousand feet high. A few seconds later a break right was called. I broke up and to the right to avoid other Cousin A/C. I saw a large explosion, observed two parachutes, and three fires on the ground. I then attempted to rejoin the formation, but was unable to get in position before passing over the target. I returned to the field and landed.

JOHN R MILLER
1st Lt., USAF

Certified True Copy
John R. Miller
Capt. USAF

S T A T E M E N T

16 May 1953

I was flying lead position in the second flight. We passed over the Ladenberg Beacon at approximately 5,000 feet. "Cousin Red Leader" had received a transmission from "Galahad Leader" that he was circling left over the Ladenberg Beacon at 5,000 feet. Cousin Leader was to join Galahad leader for the flyby.

Cousin Leader began a left orbit to pick up Galahad Leader who was not in sight at the time. After approximately 180 degrees of the orbit had been completed a squadron of C-119's were seen directly ahead, approximately 1 mile.

The instant I saw them Cousin Leader called to break right. I broke right an up, narrowly averting a collision with number 2 of Cousin Leaders Flight.

The squadron was then rejoined and completed the mission.

The weather at this time was thin scattered clouds at approximately 5,000 feet, visibility approximately 3 miles.

GEORGE A. LONEY
Captain, USAF

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

STATEMENT

16 May 1953

I was flying "Cousin White 2" in a 16 ship formation. We were briefed by the Group Leader as to start engine time, IP, target and type of formation to be flown. Take-off and join-up were accomplished in the normal manner. As we approached the IP, "Gallahad" leader called "Cousin" leader and said that he was circling the IP to the left at 5,000 feet, just underneath the scattered cloud layer. Upon reaching the IP we started a turn to the left and flew through a small thin cloud. After approximately 180 degree turn "Cousin" leader called "Cousin Break Right Now". I stayed on "Cousin White Leader's" wing in close formation throughout the break to the right. When "Cousin White Leader" abruptly reversed his turn to the left I slid under and back about 150 feet. At this time I saw the formation of C-119's under us and to the left. I immediately rejoined "Cousin White Leader" and completed the mission.

HARRY FALIS JR.
1st Lt., USAF

Certified True Copy
John H. Greenman
Capt. USAF

15 May 1953

-S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T-

I was briefed as Cousin Blue #3 in a Group Flight of sixteen (16) F-84's with one (1) Airborne Spare. Start Engines time 1513Z, take-off 1621Z, Initial Point 1543Z, time over target 1604Z.

Briefed to proceed to Ladbury RHH (DDL 355) at 3500 feet, to burn out fuel and to stay under a cloud layer of approximately 4/8 with 5 miles visibility. Rendezvous was to be at 1543Z with 48th Group, Call Sign Gallahad. There was no mention of any other Groups participating in the "Fly by". Other briefing was SOP.

We were seven (7) minutes out from Ladbury when we contacted Gallahad on 135.90. He stated he was at four thousand (4000) feet. Later he sighted us and said he was below us on our left wing. Cousin Leader spotted Gallahad Group and tightened up a left hand orbit, climbing slightly. "Bogies" were called out at 12 o'clock and Cousin leader acknowledged. We rolled out straight and level at five thousand (5000) feet. At this point Cousin leader said, "Cousin Gang break right." I had to wait for my wingman to get out of my way and then I saw a C-119 coming right for me. I pulled up hard and to the right. I went over the C-119. My wingman, Cousin Blue 4, went under him. I then heard someone say there had been a collision so I looked and spotted the flaming C-119 and F-84. I spotted three (3) parachutes from the C-119 and one (1) from the F-84. This, in effect, is the only accident I saw.

ROBERT L. CASS
1st Lt., USAF

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

53RD FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRON
APO 132 US AIR FORCE

16 May 1953

S T A T E M E N T

On 15 May 1953, I, 1st Lt James E Huffman, was flying #4 position in the lead flight of a sixteen (16) ship formation. The briefing was held by Lt Col Cramer in the Group Briefing Room. We were given our start engine time, take-off time, and time over target. Col Cramer said that we were to rendezvous with another outfit over the Landenburg Beacon but no other mention was made concerning other aircraft in the fly-by or the field we were going to fly over.

After the take-off we joined up and proceeded to the beacon. After passing over the beacon we started a left turn. During the left turn we passed through two (2) clouds at 5000 feet. Shortly after passing through the second cloud the leader abruptly leveled his wings and then called a right "break". I was stacked high and after the leader leveled his wings I was well above the other three planes in my flight. After the leader called the break the only way I could turn was to the right and up. After breaking I looked over my right shoulder to see if I was close to any planes. Evidently a F-84 had just collided since there was a huge ball of flame and debris was flying through the air. I counted three (3) parachutes but I could not tell what airplanes they were from. I continued circling to the right until the leader called for another join up. After the group was reassembled the fly-by was accomplished and the return to the base was normal.

JAMES E HUFFMAN
1st Lt, USAF
AO-1909158

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

16 May 1953

-S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T-

I was briefed as Cousin Blue #2 in a Group Flight of sixteen (16) F-84's with one (1) airborne spare. Start engine time 1513Z, take-off 1621Z, Initial Point 1543Z, T.O.T. 1604Z.

We had just passed the Beacon in a left hand orbit at five thousand (5000) feet. We were straight and level when the group leader called to break right. At that instant I looked forward and saw the C-119's and also saw that I could not break right because of the other F-84's. I pulled up and went over all C-119's. I remained with my flight leader and leveled off at eight thousand (8000) feet. I did not observe the actual collision or any of the parachutes as I was occupied in clearing other aircraft.

EINAR B. OLSEN
1st Lt., USAF


Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

16 May 1953

~~-S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T-~~

On 15 May 1953, I was flying the number two (2) position in the last flight of a sixteen (16) ship formation of F-84's. We were briefed to rendezvous over Ladenburg Beacon with a group of E-84's from Chamault. Before take-off we were briefed that we would fly to and join up over Ladenburg at thirty-five hundred (3500) feet MSL.

After reaching the target area, contact was made with the other group of F-84's and it was decided that we would join at four thousand (4000) feet MSL. We crossed the beacon on a heading of east and started a twenty (20) degree bank to the left. When approximately one hundred-eighty (180) degrees of this turn was completed I heard someone call out, "Bogies at 12 O'clock level". A few seconds later my group leader called a break right. At that time I looked the situation over and made a split decision to go down. It is still my belief that there was no other way for me to miss the flight of C-119's that we were meeting head on. With a four (4) "G" negative pressure I barely skimmed under the lead C-119. The weather in the target area was variable. There was a scattered deck of cumulus at approximately five thousand (5000) feet MSL with the visibility varying from two (2) or three (3) miles to the west to six (6) or seven (7) miles to the east. During the breakup I heard someone call that, "I hit one" and someone else called, "bail out". I did not see any aircraft or parachutes go down. After this I rejoined with my flight leader and continued the mission without incident.



THOMAS W. LINER
1st Lt., USAF

16 May 1953

~~-S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T-~~

On 15 May 1953 I flew Cousin Green Four (4) for the Group formation. We took off and flew combat formation until we joined up over the Initial Point. We flew under the clouds and the visibility was about five (5) miles over the Initial Point. At our Initial Point, at approximately 1547Z, a formation of U-119's came head on at us at the same altitude. Green leader called the bogies out and shortly thereafter Cousin leader called break right. I broke right and down and did not see the accident. The transmission of, "I've hit one.", was heard followed by transmissions of, "Get out! ".

We rejoined the flights over the Initial Point and proceeded with the review. We returned to Bitburg and landed after the review.

Fred L. Tracy
FRED L. TRACY
1st Lt., USAF

16 May 1953

STATEMENT

On 15 May 1953, I was flying as Cousin Blue Leader on a fly by at Leudstuhl AB. We were to rendezvous over the Ladentberg beacon with another group of F-84s (Galahad). We passed over the beacon at approximately 1545Z and started a turn to the left which would have brought us in at six o'clock to Galahad. On a heading of approximately two-hundred seventy (270°) degrees at five-thousand five hundred (5,500) feet Cousin Green Leader called out "Bogies at twelve o'clock level". I saw the formation and it appeared that we would go well over them, at this time Cousin Leader called out a right break. At this time we were in close formation flights in trail. When I was clear I pulled straight up, shortly after I heard someone call that he had hit one. Then someone called that they had four (4) parachutes in sight. I did not see any of the C-119's after I broke up. After we reformed it was determined that Cousin Green Three (3) was missing. We then reformed and flew by, after which we returned to Bithurg AB and landed.

Stanley S. Clark
STANLEY S. CLARK
1st Lt., USAF
22d Ftr-Bmr Sqdn

STATEMENT

16 May 1953

I, 1st Lt Ira M. Porter, AO-1910536, was briefed to fly Blue Four (4) in a Group Fly By - 36th Fighter Bomber Wing - 15 May 1953.

We took off and joined up, then proceeded to Ladenburg Beacon. We flew down at approximately thirty-five hundred (3500) feet MSL. At the beacon, we began a left orbit and Galahad Leader called for join up at five thousand (5,000) feet. As we turned west our altitude was about five thousand (5,000) feet. We rolled out and were heading about due west. I heard someone transmit, "Bogies". Then I heard our group lead transmit, "Alright Cousin Gang, let's break right". The whole formation was very slow to scatter, due to the fact that we were all in close. I was watching Number Three (3) and trying to stay out of his way. To do this I had to execute a hard break to the right. When I realized I was clear I looked forward, there were three (3) C-119's dead ahead at my level. I was too close to go over, so I went under. We rejoined and completed the mission.

IRA M. PORTER
1st Lt. USAF

Certified True Copy
Johnny H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

S T A T E M E N T

16 May 1953

I was flying "Cousin White 3" in the sixteen ship formation and had been thoroughly briefed as to times, IP, rendezvous and target. I did not realize that all of the aircraft involved (C-119's, F-84's, F-86's) were to rendezvous over the same point at apparently indefinite altitudes. We crossed the IP (Landenburg Beacon) on an approximate heading of east in the vicinity of 4,000 feet. We started a left climbing turn, passing thru scattered light cumulus in the process. After completing about 180 degrees of turn, we rolled out and emerged from the scattered deck at about 5,000 feet. The visibility I would estimate to have been 3-4 miles at that level in that position. Someone in Green Flight called out C-119's at 12 o'clock. I glanced up and saw a group of C-119's, 12 o'clock, range 1 mile. Cousin Leader called for a right break which I found impossible to accomplish because I was hemmed in by my wingman on the right and Red Element above me. I ducked my nose and narrowly averted a collision by passing just to the left (my left) of the C-119 leader and down in front of his right wingman. I then glanced over my shoulder to see a large orange-colored ball of flame and pieces of falling, flaming wreckage. I then rejoined my leader. The rest of the mission proceeded without incident.

EARL. G. PECK
1st Lt., USAF

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

16 May 1953

S T A T E M E N T

I was leading the last four (4) aircraft in the formation of sixteen (16) which had taken off at 1525Z on 15 May 1953 for and aerial review.

After takeoff, and after having joined up in close formation and on course, the leader signalled the formation to spread out in combat, or spread formation.

Shortly before reaching the IP the sixteen (16) aircraft resumed the show formation, flights in fingertip, flights in trail.

After passing the IP, a turn of approximately one-hundred eighty (180°) degrees to the left was made. Our altitude was around six thousand (6,000) feet. After rolling out or while rolling out of this turn, a group of "Bogies" were called at twelve o'clock position. I only had a short glimpse of the formation and in my opinion, and being the lowest flight in the formation, it seemed as though there was sufficient clearance.

It seemed about five (5) seconds had passed when the leader called a break to the right. The front of the formation started a turn to the right and then completely split up. I pulled up straight ahead. This was at 1548Z.

During this split up I noticed my Number Three (3) man roll to the right and away from me. While noticing this, the C-119's were directly below us, and very close.

I then heard the transmission "I've hit cue", and then someone else transmit, "Bail Out". I did not see the collision.

The formation then rejoined and proceeded with the fly by and landing at home base.

John C. Holley
JOHN C. HOLLEY
1st Lt., USAF
22d Ftr-Bar Sqdn

S T A T E M E N T


18 May 1953

I, George B Simler, Colonel USAF, 9236A was leading a squadron of 12 F-86 aircraft on 15 May 1953. We reached our rendezvous point at approximately 1635 local time, altitude 17,000 feet, weather 2 to 3/8's thin layer of scattered clouds. Visibility above cloud deck was better than 10 miles but was restricted due to smoke below the clouds.

At approximately 1640 local a flight of four (4) F-84's was sighted at approximately 3000 to 5000 feet crossing the Rhine north of Speyer and south of Mannheim heading approximately 060°. About a minute later a flight of C-119's was sighted in vicinity of Heidelberg at 3000 to 5000 feet heading approximately 090°.

At approximately 1645 Lt Benitez who was flying in my formation called out a collision "There goes one down in flames", at the same time I saw a smoke plume and sent spare F-86 piloted by Lt Trautman to investigate.

At 1650 I made a left orbit and picked up first group of 16 F-84 at approximately 8000 feet. F-84's were in flights of four in trail and in good formation. We picked up second group of F-84's vicinity of Bad Dunkheim at approximately 5000 feet while inbound to Landstuhl Air Base.


GEORGE B SIMLER
Colonel, USAF
Commanding
86th Ftr-Bar Gp

STATEMENT

I, Marion E. Schertz, Captain, Ord. Corps, 01553730, am assigned to the 7841 Ord. Procurement Group, Colman Barracks, APO 403-A.

On 15 May 1953 at approximately 1645 hours. I saw a flight of 18 C-119 planes approaching Colman Barracks, Mannheim, Sandhafen, from almost straight East. They were flying at an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 ft. When the planes got to a distance of about 3 miles from Colman Barracks they turned north and then back East. When the planes were about 6 miles away I observed a flash of fire and then two (2) separate masses of fire went down and I could see one C-119 plunge straight down into the ground. The flight turned back west toward Colman Barracks and I saw that there were only 16 planes returning. At the same time there were 2 more flights of C-119's in sight, south of the flight involved in the accident. I saw a flash of what looked like a jet momentarily before the crash but could not say as to the direction of flight.

To the best of my knowledge there were no clouds in the sky and visibility from the ground was exceptionally good. Planes in the air could be seen for an unlimited distance. The sun was out and very bright.

MARION E. SCHERTZ
Captain Ord. Corps

Certified True Copy
John H. Freeman
Capt. USAF

STATEMENT

19 May 1953

We were flying from Vilseck, Germany to Sullivan Barracks near Mannheim. We were approximately 10 minutes away from Mannheim, and we saw a flash to our right front and a spiral of smoke going down. I would judge to be about four (4) minutes flying time in an L-19 from the time we saw the flash until arriving at the scene of the wreckage.


We flew to this scene and as we flew over we recognized and we were sure it was an airplane crash. As we flew over we saw a man laying by a parachute and there was approximately 10 Germans waving for us to come down. There was one jet circling over the area, and we counted six or seven, not sure, planes flying to our left which would be to the southeast of the accident. These planes were in no particular formation.

We landed our plane and came up to the scene where this one boy was laying, which was approximately 100 yards away from the burning plane. This man did not seem to be very badly hurt. I asked him what happened and he said he didn't know, they must have touched wings. There was no other Americans in the area.

Lt. Conners left me and went to the other plane which was about 1000 yards away to see if he could give any aid to that spot. I stayed at the first wreckage. Approximately five (5) minutes after we got to the first man, three (3) German CG's arrived in a two and one-half ton truck. I asked one of the soldiers to instruct the Germans to stay away from the burning wreckage. I assumed the C-119's were going in a southerly direction. I have no idea what direction the jets were going.

The weather was clear with at least 10 miles visibility with practically no clouds in the area. We were flying about 3500 feet altitude, on a course of 270°.

The foregoing statement was taken in an interview on 19 May 1953 with Jessie R. Ward, Major, O1166203, 594th Field Artillery and Bird G. Conners, 1st Lt., O1171097, Hq Btry, 594th Field Artillery.


JOHN H. FREEMAN
Captain, USAF

STATEMENT

1. Operations Order 156-53 from Ramstein, laid on the Retirement Review for General Rich at Landstuhl Air Base. The 48th Fighter Bomber Wing was the lead flight in the F-84 Fighter Bomber participation of the Review. The Operations Order gave the rendezvous as 15,000 feet over the Ladenberg Beacon. Direct communication between the 48th and 36th was authorized for details of the F-84 fly by.

2. The practice Review on Thursday, 14 May, was cancelled by Twelfth Air Force due to inclement weather.

3. This Wing contacted Combat Operations, Ramstein, Friday morning, 15 May as to whether the Fly By would be flown or cancelled, and was informed that the weather was marginal at that time, but that we would be notified at least two (2) hours prior to TOT (1604Z) as to whether the mission was to be cancelled.

4. Approximately 1200Z, Friday morning, 15 May, we received a call from the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing. The telephone connection was poor and we are not sure as to the Officer making the call. However, the information was repeated three (3) times between Officer calling and Major Hahn, this Headquarters, as follows:

Rendezvous will be underneath the base of the lower clouds approximately between 4,000 and 5,000 feet over the Ladenberg Beacon at 1543Z.

5. This information was directed to the 36th Fighter Bomber Group and was confirmed five (5) minutes after takeoff by Galahad Leader, when he instructed Cousin Leader to rendezvous at 5,000 feet over the Ladenburg Beacon.

ALBERT P. HAHN, JR.
Major USAF

In reference to Paragraph 4, later communication with the 48th Fighter Bomber Wing confirmed the Officer making the call to be Lt. Colonel Jensen.

Certified True Copy
John H. Jensen
Capt. USAF

22D FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRON
36th Fighter-Bomber Group
APO 132 US Air Force

ENG

16 May 1953

SUBJECT: Tech Orders Not Complied with on Aircraft Serial Number
51-628A.

TO: Commanding Officer
36th Fighter-Bomber Group
APO 132, US Air Force

The following is a list of Tech Orders not complied with on Aircraft
F-84E-30RE, Serial Number 51-628A.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REASON</u>
01-1-476	Inspected, replacement, and exchange type B-8 stick grip to prevent operational failure, all series.	26 May 1953	Awaiting parts, Issue Slip No. 3-1489, 2 March 1953
01-65BJ-66	Replacement elevator control rod end Assy. F-84E & G.	5 Sep 1953	Awaiting kit.
01-65BJ-71	Installed rotary canopy jettison switch F-84E & G.	10 Jun 1953	Awaiting kit.
01-65BJ-90	Safety of stern bomb sway brace Assy. F-84E & G.	6 Feb 1953	Awaiting Inspection
01-65BJ-103	Inspected and replacement retracting arm, part No. 7485, right and left.	6 Oct 1952	Issue Slip 1-1352, 26 January 1953.
01-65BJ-104	Rework main landing gear retracting arm, part No. B-7485, right and left.	29 Oct 1952	Issue Slip 1-1352, 26 January 1953.
01-65BJ-134	Rework idle stop adjustment	30 Mar 1953	Awaiting parts Issue Slip 5-2193 14 May 1953.
01-65BJC-52	Reinforcement pilots seat F-84E.	12 Mar 1953	Awaiting kit.
01-65BJC-59	Installed radar wave guide disconnect	12 Mar 1953	Awaiting kit.

ING

SUBJECT: Tech Orders Not Complied with on Aircraft Serial Number
51-628A. (cont'd)

01-65BJC-72	Structural reinforcement fuselage frame 40.	6 Feb 1953	Awaiting parts, Issue Slip 5-2133, 5 May 1953.
01-65BJC-76	Reinforcement spire No. 2 lower cap F-84E.	30 Dec 1953	Awaiting depot schedule.
01-65BJC-80	Installed fiber glass shield for fire detector terminal strip.	11 Feb 1953	Awaiting kit
02B-105CC-27	Reduction of maximum engine R.P.M. to 99%	4 Nov 1952	Awaiting calibrated instrument.

WILLIAM F. VOIGT
1st Lt., USAF
Ass't Maintenance Officer

Certified True Copy
John H. Greenman
Capt. USAF

HEADQUARTERS
10TH TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
60TH TROOP CARRIER GROUP (MEDIUM)
APO 57, US AIR FORCE

18 May 1953

SUBJECT: List of Technical Orders Not Complied With

TO: Whom It May Concern

The following listed Technical Orders are not complied with on the following aircraft:

A/C 51-3235A

T.O. 01-1-515
01-11500-55
01-11500-75
03-200AD-6
03-2000-64
19-45B-4

Robert B. Stony Capt
for M. MICHAEL BONNER
Captain, USAF
Maintenance Officer

HEADQUARTERS
10TH TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
60TH TROOP CARRIER GROUP (MEDIUM)
APO 57, US AIR FORCE

18 May 1953

SUBJECT: List of Technical Orders Not Complied With

TO: Whom It May Concern

The following listed Technical Orders are not complied with on
the following aircraft:

A/C 51-8241A

T.O. 01-1-515
01-115CC-55
01-115CC-75
03-20CAD-6
03-20CC-64
16-50ARC-2
19-45B-4

Edward P. Stoney Col
for N. MICHAEL BONNER
Captain, USAF
Maintenance Officer

HEADQUARTERS
10TH TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON
60TH TROOP CARRIER GROUP (MEDIUM)
APO 57, US AIR FORCE

18 May 1953


SUBJECT: List of Technical Orders Not Complied With

TO: Whom It May Concern

The following listed Technical Orders are not complied with on the following aircraft:

A/C 51-8249A

T.O. 01-1-515
01-115CC-55
01-115CC-74
03-20CAD-6
03-20CC-64
16-30ARC-2
19-45B-4



M. MICHAEL BONNER
Captain, USAF
Maintenance Officer

12TH TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON (M)
60TH TROOP CARRIER GROUP (M)
APO 57 US AIR FORCE

16 May 1953

SUBJECT: T.O.'s n/c/w on Aircraft C-119C 51-8259A

TO: Flying Safety Officer
60th Trp Carr Wg
APO 57, US Air Force

The following T.O.'s are not complied with on aircraft C-119C 51-8259A:

19-45B-4 and 03-20CAD-6

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Virgil W. Ruffert
VIRGIL W. RUFFERT
Captain, USAF
Maintenance Officer

OP 121700Z

FM CG TWELFTH AF RAMSTEIN GER

TO JFPRK/CO 36 FTR BMR WG BITBURG AB GER

JFPQF/CO 38 BB WG (L) LAON AB FR

JFPQM/CO 48 FTR BMR WG CHAUMONT AB FR

JFPAK/CO 60 TRP CARR WG RHEIN MAIN AB GER

ZEN/CO 86 FTR BMR WG LANDSTUHL AB GER

JFPDB/CO 317 TRP CARR WG NEUBERG AB GER

ZEN/CO 7030 HQ SPT GP RAMSTEIN AB GER

12-00TO 23206 X OPS ORDER 156-53. ALL TIMES ZULU.

1. RETIREMENT REVIEW FOR BRIG GEN RICH AT LANDSTUHL AB.
2. TWELFTH AF WILL SPT THIS REVIEW BY FURN TRPS AND AACFT ON 15 MAY 53.
3. a. 36 FTR BMR WG WILL (MSN 3629) FURN 16 F-84's FOR REVIEW. TIME OVER TARGET 1604 OVER LANDSTUHL AB AT 2900 FT MSL.
b. 38 BB WG (L) WILL (MSN 3807) FURN 27 B-26 ACFT TIME OVER TARGET 1602 OVER LANDSTUHL AB AT 2400 FT MSL.
c. 48 FTR BMR WG (MSN 4841) FURN 16 F-84 ACFT TIME OVER TARGET 1604 OVER LANDSTUHL AB AT 2900 FT MSL .
d. 60 TCW (MSN 1119) FURN 18 C-119 ACFT. TIME OVER TARGET 1600 OVER LANDSTUHL AT 1900 MSL.
e. 86 FTR BMR WG WILL (1) MSN 8605 FURNISH 16 F-86 ACFT TIME OVER TARGET 1605 LANDSTUHL AB AT 3400 FT MSL.
(2) PROV F-84 ACROBATIC TM . (3) 1 F-86 FOR SPEED RUN.
(4) F-84 ACROBATIC AND SPEED RUN ACFT WILL FOL FLY WITH TIME OVER TARGET PROV BY LANDSTUHL TOWER. (5) PROV TRPS

TO PARTICIPATE IN REVIEW. (6) DESIGNATE A COMDR OF TRPS.

(7) FURN COLORS AND COLOR GUARDS. (8) PROV SUFFICIENT AIR POLICE TO DIR TRAFFIC TO REVIEW AREA. (9) EST PARKING AREAS FOR PRIVATE AND GOVT VEH.

f. 317 TRP CARR WG WILL (MSG 897) FURN 18 C-119's TIME OVER TARGET 1600 LANDSTUHL AB AT 1900 FT MSL.

g. 7030 HQ SPT GP WILL (1) PROV TRPS TO PARTICIPATE IN REVIEW. (2) PROV ALL AVAL HUSSES TO BE IN PLACE AT HQ TWELFTH AF AT 1600 5 MAY 53.

h. HQ SEC TWELFTH AF WILL PROV TRPS TO PARTICIPATE IN REVIEW.

x. (1) GND REVIEW. (a) ALL TRPS WILL FORM ON THE PARKING APRON, HANGAR B, LANDSTUHL AB NOT LATER THAN 1640 ON 15 MAY AND WILL BE IN PLACE BY 1545. (b) UNITS TO FORM IN FOL ORDER: 686 AF BAND, 86 FTR BMR WG, 7030 SPT GP, AND HQ SEC TWELFTH AF. (c) UNIFORM WILL BE CLASS A WINTER BLOUSE WITH SERVICE CAP. (d) TRPS WILL BE MARCHED TO AND FROM PARADE AREA. (e) PRACTICE REVIEW WILL BE HELD AT 0900 HRS 15 MAY 53 AND WILL CONSIST OF COMDR OF TRPS. ADJUTANT. UNIT COMDRS. GUIDON BEARERS. COLOR BEARERS. AND COLOR GUARDS. (2) AERIAL FLYBY (a) PRACTICE FLYBY WITH EACH UNIT PROV 2 ACFT WILL BE HELD ON 14 MAY AT THE SAME TIMES. ALT AND MANNER AS SPECIFIED FOR 15 MAY 53. (b) IF WEA DOES NOT PERMIT FLYBY. REDALL WILL BE FURN UNITS TWO HRS PRIOR TO FLYBY. (c) TRP CARR WGS TO MARSHAL AT 5000 FT WITH 317 WG LEADING FLT. F-84 WGS TO MARSHAL AT 15000 FT WITH 48 WG LEADING. DIR COMM AUTH BTN WGS TO COORDINATE DETAILS OF

THESE FLTS. (d) MARSHALLING AREA FOR ACFT WILL BE OVER LANDSTUHL
OUTER BEACON. (e) LINE OF FLT FOR OUTER BEACON TO LANDSTUHL AB
TO OFFSET TO THE RIGHT OF THE TOWER SO THAT LEAD ACFT FLY DOWN
THAT PART OF AUTOBAHN THAT CONSTITUTES TAXI STRIP FOR THE BASE.
(f) ALL FLTS WILL CALL LANDSTUHL TOWER WHEN ON COURSE FROM OUTER
BEACON AND WILL STAND BY ON MSN FREQ FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.
(g) ALL ACFT WILL HOLD SPECIFIED ALT AFTER PASSING LANDSTUHL AB
FOR 5 MILES WITH RECIPROCATING ACFT MAKING A RIGHT TURN AND CLIMB
AND JET ACFT A LEFT TURN AND CLIMB. (3) TWELFTH AF PROJ OFF:
COL EISSLER, TP RAMSTEIN 7462 FOR GND CEREMONIES AND LT COL JOYNER
TP RAMSTEIN 7569 FOR FLYBY. PAR 5. GP CALL SIGNS AS INDICATED IN
TWELFTH AF COI 10-4. WILL BE USED.

RESTRICTED

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED

OPERATIONS ORDER)

NUMBER 11-53)

HEADQUARTERS, 60TH TRP CARR WG (M)
APO 57, US AIR FORCE
13 May 1953

MAPS AND CHART REFERENCES: UTM LV 978788, GS GS 4416
Germany Sheet U-2 Kaiserlautern

TASK ORGANIZATIONS: 60th Troop Carrier Group, Lt. Col. Osborn
60th Air Base Group, Col. Bing

1. GENERAL SITUATION: Omitted

2. MISSION:

a. To participate in aerial retirement review for Brigadier General C. K. Rich at Landstuhl Air Base, Germany.

b. Target: Closed autobahn which constitutes taxi strip for Landstuhl Air Base. Time over target, 1600Z, 15 May 1953.

c. Routes: At discretion of mission commander.

d. Effective dates: 14 and 15 May 1953.

e. Time: All times ZULU.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. 60th Troop Carrier Group will:

(1) Provide 18 operational aircraft, plus spares, to participate in review 15 May 1953.

(2) Provide two operational C-119 aircraft to participate in practice review 14 May 1953.

b. 60th Air Base Group will:

(1) Insure priority for take-off and landing of aircraft flying this mission.

x. Special Instructions:

(1) This is a joint effort between F-84, F-86, B-26 and C-119 aircraft wings.

(2) Practice flyby of two C-119 aircraft on 14 May 1953, will use same location, times and altitudes as indicated for the review on 15 May 1953.

(3) Line of flight for the review will be from outer beacon to Landstuhl Air Base, offset to the right of the tower so that lead aircraft will fly down that part of the autobahn that constitutes a taxi strip for the Air Base.

(4) 317th Troop Carrier Wing will provide 18 C-119 for the review, 60th Troop Carrier Wing aircraft will fly in formation with 317th Wing leading.

RESTRICTED

- (5) Troop Carrier Wings to marshal at 5,000 ft over Landstuhl outer beacon.
- (6) Altitude and time over target for lead aircraft of Troop Carrier aircraft is 1900 feet MSL at 1600Z.
- (7) Other participating aircraft will follow with two minute intervals and 500 feet upward separation between lead aircraft.
- (8) All aircraft will hold specified altitude after passing Landstuhl Air Base for five miles with reciprocating aircraft making a right turn and climb, and jet aircraft making a left turn and climb.
- (9) All lead aircraft will call Landstuhl tower when on course from outer beacon and will stand by on mission frequency for further information.
- (10) In advent of adverse weather, recall will be furnished two hours prior to flying review.
- (11) Direct communication is authorized with 317th Troop Carrier Group (Lt. Col. Weaver)

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

- a. Mission Number is A-119 Training.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL MATTERS:

- a. Group call signs as indicated in Twelfth Air Force COI 10-4 will be used.
- b. Mission Commander will be appointed by 60th Troop Carrier Group.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL KELLEY:

OFFICIAL:

LEONARD M. McMANUS
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

Joseph H. Ray
JOSEPH H. RAY
Major, USAF
Operations Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

- 6 - 60th TC Gp
- 10 - Wing Opns
- 5 - 60th AB Gp
- 1 - Dir/Materiel
- 1 - Dir/Personnel

RESTRICTED
UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

OPERATION ORDER)

NUMBER 4-53)

CLASSIFICATION: RESTRICTED

MAPS AND CHART REFERENCES: UTM LV 978788, GS GS 4416
Germany Sheet U-2 Kaiserlautern

HEADQUARTERS
60th Troop Carrier Group
APO 57, US Air Force
1300, 13 May 1953

W9 operation

TASK ORGANIZATION:

10th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium Lt Col Charles F Quinette
12th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium Lt Col Dwain A Rockie

1. GENERAL SITUATION: Omitted

2. MISSION:

a. To participate in serial retirement review for Brigadier General C. K. Rich at Landstuhl Air Base, Germany.

b. Target: Closed autobahn which constitutes taxi strip for Landstuhl Air Base. Time over target, 1600Z 15 May 1953.

c. Routes: At discretion of mission Commander.

d. Effective dates: 14 and 15 May 1953.

e. Time: All times ZULU.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. 10th Troop Carrier Squadron will provide nine aircraft and one Spare.
12th Troop Carrier Squadron will provide nine aircraft and one Spare.

(1) Provide 18 operational aircraft, plus spares, to participate in review, 15 May 1953.

10th Troop Carrier Squadron will provide two (2) aircraft to participate in practice review 14 May 1953. In conjunction with two C-119 from the 317th Troop Carrier Wing.

x. Special Instructions:

(1) This is a joint effort between F-84, F-86, B-26 and C-119 aircraft Wing.

(2) Practice fly by of two C-119 aircraft on 14 May 1953, will use same location, times and altitudes as indicated for the review on 15 May 1953.

(3) Line of flight for the review will be from outer beacon to Landstuhl Air Base, off set to the right of the tower so that lead aircraft will fly down that part of the autobahn that constitutes a taxi-strip for the Air Base.

Ops Order
4-53 Con't

- (4) 317th Troop Carrier Wing will provide 18 C-119 for the review. 60th Troop Carrier Wing aircraft will fly in formation with 317th Wing leading.
- (5) Troop Carrier Wings to marshal at 5,000 Ft over Landstuhl outer beacon.
- (6) Altitude and time over target for lead aircraft of Troop Carrier aircraft is 1900 feet MSL at 1600Z.
- (7) Other participating aircraft will follow with two minute intervals and 500 feet upward separation between lead aircraft.
- (8) All aircraft will hold specified altitude after passing Landstuhl Air Base for five miles with reciprocating aircraft making a right turn and climb and jet aircraft making a left turn and climb.
- (9) All lead aircraft will call Landstuhl tower when on course from outer beacon and will stand by on mission frequency for further information.
- (10) In advent of adverse weather, recall will be furnished two hours prior to flying review.
- (11) Direct communication is authorized with 317th Troop Carrier Group. (Lt Col Reaver).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:


- a. Mission Number is A-119 Training.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL MATTERS:

- a. Group call signs as indicated in 12th Air Force COI 10-4 will be used.
- b. Mission Commander — Lt Colonel John W. Osborn
Deputy Mission Commander — Major Williston G. Wells.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 5 - 10th TC Sq
- 5 - 11th TC Sq
- 5 - 12th TC Sq
- 5 - 60th TC Gp
- 1 - 60th TC Wg


JOHN W. OSBORN
Lt Col USAF
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS, 86TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING
APO 65, US AIR FORCE
13 May 1953

OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE: 42-53 (12th AF Ops Order 156-53)

MAP AND CHART REFERENCES: As Required.

ALL TIMES ZULU

TASK ORGANIZATIONS:

86th Fighter Bomber Group Colonel George B Simler
86th Air Base Group Colonel Clyde M Burwell

1. GENERAL SITUATION: Retirement review for Brig. General Clyde K. Rich at Landstuhl Air Base, 1600 hours, 15 May 1953.

2. MISSION: The 86th Fighter Bomber Wing will provide ~~parachute units~~ and eighteen (18) F-86F aircraft to participate in the aerial review.

a. Following units will furnish aircraft as indicated below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO AND TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TOT</u>	<u>ALTITUDE OVER TGT</u>
60th Troop Carrier	18, C-119	1600	1900 ft. MSL
317th Troop Carrier	18, C-119	1600	1900 ft. MSL
38th Bomb Wing	27, B-26	1602	2400 ft. MSL
48th Ftr-Bmr Wg	16, F-84	1604	2900 ft. MSL
36th Ftr-Bmr Wg	16, F-84	1604	2900 ft. MSL

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. The 527th Fighter Bomber Squadron will furnish fourteen (14) F-86F aircraft, two (2) of which will be spares.

b. The 526th Fighter Bomber Squadron will furnish four (4) F-86F aircraft.

c. The 86th Air Base Group will close the air base to all traffic from 1550 to 1630, and will insure that no local aircraft traffic interferes with the aerial review.

x. General Instructions:

- (1) F-86 aircraft will make a 1605 TOT at 3400 ft. MSL following F-84 aircraft.
- (2) Marshalling area for aircraft will be over Ladenburg Beacon.
- (3) Troop Carrier Wings are to Marshal at 5000 ft with 317th Wing leading flight.
- (4) F-84 Wings are to Marshal at 15,000 ft with 48th Wing leading.
- (5) F-86 aircraft will marshal at 17,000 ft over Ladenburg Beacon. Standard show formation.
- (6) Line of flight will be from Ladenburg Beacon to Landstuhl Beacon to air base.

1 W CC

Ops Directive 42-53, this Hqs, dated 13 May 53, Cont'd

- (7) All Wing leaders will be in contact with Landstuhl tower when on course from Ladenburg Beacon to air base.
- (8) All aircraft will hold specified altitude after passing Landstuhl for five (5) miles. Reciprocating aircraft will then make a right turn and jet aircraft a left turn.
- (9) The 527th Fighter Bomber Squadron will be lead squadron of the 86th Fighter Bomber Group. Red, white, and blue flights plus two (2) spares will be furnished by the 527th. Green flights will be furnished by the 526th.
- (10) Disposition of spares to be at discretion of Group Leader.
- (11) All guns will be cold.
- (12) Fuel load: full drops.
- (13) Practice fly-by with each unit providing two (2) aircraft will be held on 14 May 1953 with times, altitudes, and manner as specified for 15 May 1953.
- (14) If weather prevents aerial review units will be notified two (2) hours in advance.

4. ADMINISTRATIONS AND LOGISTICS: Normal.

5. COMMUNICATION:

- a. Group Call signs - 12th AF COI 10-4.
- b. Primary frequency - all aircraft with VHF - 135.9.
Primary frequency - all aircraft with UHF - 275.8.

OFFICIAL:

GEORGE R BICKELL
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

George W. McLaughlin
GEORGE W. MCLAUGHLIN
Lt Col., USAF
Director of Operations

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, 12th AF - 1
CO, 86th Ftr-Bmr Wg - 1
CO, 86th Ftr-Bmr Gp - 1
CO, 86th Air Base Gp - 7
CO, 525th Ftr-Bmr Sq - 2
CO, 526th Ftr-Bmr Sq - 2
CO, 527th Ftr-Bmr Sq - 2
Intelligence Officer - 1
Group Materiel - 1
Wing, D/O&T - 1
Instrument School - 1

OPERATIONS ORDER)
NUMBER 5-18)

(Reference 12th Air Force Operations Order Number 156-53)

TASK ORGANIZATIONS:

492nd Fighter Bomber Squadron
493rd Fighter Bomber Squadron

Lt. Colonel W. A. Norris
Lt. Colonel H. W. Jensen

1. GENERAL SITUATION: A retirement review for General Rich at Landstuhl Air Force Base, Germany, 15 May 1953.

2. MISSION: The 48th Fighter Bomber Group will provide (Mission 4841) sixteen (16) aircraft, 15 May 1953, TOT 1604Z, target Landstuhl Air Force Base, altitude 2900 MSL. F-84 wings Marshall at 15,000 feet over Landstuhl outer beacon. Direct communication between wings to coordinate details of flights.

Take-off: Mission leaders discretion.

Group Assembly: Mission Leaders discretion.

IP: Landstuhl outer beacon.

Method of attack: Line of flight from outer beacon to LAFB to offset to the right of the tower so that lead aircraft fly down that part of the Autobahn that constitutes taxi strip for base. Mission leader will call LAFB tower when on course from outer beacon and stand by on mission frequency for further information. All aircraft hold specified altitude after passing LAFB for five miles making left turn and climb out.

Rendezvous Point: 15,000 feet over Landstuhl outer beacon, 1543Z.

Route Back: Mission leaders discretion.

De-briefing: Mission leaders discretion.

3. TASKS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

492nd FBS - 8 aircraft.

493rd FBS - 8 aircraft (Note: 493rd FBS leading F-84 wings.)

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC MATTERS: Mission report will be submitted.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL MATTERS:

a. Call signs: As indicated in 12th AF COI 10-4 will be used.

(1) 40 FBG Gallahad

(2) 36 FBG *Pack Alpha Gold Cousin*

b. Frequencies:

Primary 135.9

Secondary 116.1

c. Command: This operation under the command of Lt. Colonel H. W. Jensen.

Distribution:

48 FBW Ops 1 cy

48 FBG Ops 1 cy

48 FBG Intell 1cy

492nd FBS 1 cy

493rd FBS 1 cy

494th FBS 1 cy

CHESLEY G. PETERSON

Colonel, USAF

Commanding

OFFICIAL

A. D. Thomas

A. D. THOMAS

Lt. Col, USAF

S-3

48th Fighter Bomber Group
CHAUMONT, FRANCE
14 May 1953

OPERATIONS ORDER NO: 5-18A

2. MISSION: * * * * * F-84 Kings Marshall at 15,000 feet over
Ladensburg beacon. * * * * *

Distribution:

48 FBW Ops 1 cy
48 FBG Ops 1 cy
48 FBG In 1 cy
492 FBS 1 cy
493 FBS 1 cy
494 FBS 1 cy

C. G. PETERSON
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

OFFICIAL:


A. D. THOMAS
Lt Col, USAF
S-3

OPERATIONS ORDER

NUMBER 50-53

MAPS AND CHARTS: As required.

ALL TIMES ZULU

HQ, 36TH FTR BMR GP
APO 132, US AIR FORCE
14 May 1953

1. Retirement Review will be flown for General Rich on 15 May 1953 at Landstuhl Air Base, Germany.

2. a. The 48th Fighter-Bomber Group will provide 16 F-84 aircraft for this review and be lead squadron. Call sign, GALLARAD.

b. The 36th Fighter-Bomber Group will provide 16 F-84 aircraft for review and be second flight. Call sign, COUSEIN.

3. a. The 23rd Fighter-Bomber Squadron will provide 4 F-84 aircraft and be lead flight.

b. The 53rd Fighter-Bomber Squadron will provide 4 F-84 aircraft and be second flight.

c. The 22nd Fighter-Bomber Squadron will provide 8 F-84 aircraft and be the third and fourth flights.

x. (1) Assembly point for squadrons, Ladenburg Beacon, Mannheim (NKEE 2830) Altitude 15,000 feet. Time as briefed.

(2) Assembly will be column of squadrons, column of flights, 300 yard interval between squadrons.

(3) TOT 1604 over Landstuhl Air Base 2900 feet indicated.

(4) Guns will be uncharged, circuit breakers pulled.

(5) Practice review will be flown with 2 F-84 aircraft as above on 14 May 1953. (Colonel Childs, 23rd Ftr Bmr Sq).

(6) Briefing will be conducted in Group Briefing Room at 1400 hours, 15 May 1953.

4. Normal.

5. a. Communications

Mission frequency: 135.9

Secondary frequency: 116.1

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CHILDS:

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Richard V. Oude
Captain, Ass't S-3

DONALD S. FLOWER
Lt Col., USAF
Operations Officer

DISTRIBUTION: "X"

CO, 22nd Ftr Bmr Sq
CO, 23rd Ftr Bmr Sq
CO, 53rd Ftr Bmr Sq
Adj Sec, Hq 36th Ftr Bmr Gp
S-2, Hq 36th Ftr Bmr Gp
S-3, Hq 36th Ftr Bmr Gp
A-3, Hq 36th Ftr Bmr Gp

(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)

"A TRUE CERTIFIED COPY"

Albert P. Hahn, Jr.
ALBERT P. HAHN, JR.
Major, USAF
Ass't Ops Officer

AMENDMENT # 1
OPERATIONS ORDER
NUMBER 50-53

HQ, 36TH FTR BWR GP
APO 152, US AIR FORCE
16 May 1953

Operations Order 50-53, this headquarters, dtd 14 May 1953, is amended as follows:

* * * * *

x. (7) MISREP required by this headquarters.

* * * * *

BY ORDER OF COLONEL CHILDS:

OFFICIAL:


/s/ Richard V. Cude
Captain, Ass't S-3

DONALD S GLOVER
Lt Col., USAF
Operations Officer

DISTRIBUTION: "X"

CO, 22nd Ftr Bwr Sq	(1)
CO, 23rd Ftr Bwr Sq	(1)
CO, 53rd Ftr Bwr Sq	(1)
Adj Sec, Hq 36th Ftr Bwr Gp	(1)
S-3, Hq 36th Ftr Bwr Gp	(1)
S-2, Hq 36th Ftr Bwr Gp	(1)
A-3, Hq 36th Ftr Bwr Wg	(1)

"A TRUE CERTIFIED COPY"


ALBERT P HAHN, JR.
Major, USAF
Ass't Ops Officer

RESTRICTED 15 May 1953

- 15:30 (Exact) First contact with Lakeside. Advised that our IP time was 15:46, our altitude 4500', altimeter setting 30.08, heading 290 degrees. A time check was made at 15:31. Lakeside acknowledged, rogered the time hack, gave his altitude as 5000', and advised that he was 1 1/2 minutes ahead of us.
- 15:38 (Approx) Advised Lakeside his formation was in sight at approximately 3 o'clock to us.
- 15:40 (Approx) Lakeside advised we were in sight at approximately 9 o'clock to him.
- 15:44 (Exact) Asked Lakeside if he could make joinup as he was coming into the IP ahead of us. After a 20 second pause he advised that his formation would make a 360 degree turn to the right (they were approaching the IP on approximate 250 heading). Advised Lakeside we would be over IP at 15:46, would turn on course, and would start letdown at 150K rather than the 165K for which we were briefed. This would permit some additional time for joinup.
- 15:46 (Exact) Turned on IP and started descent at 300' per minute at 150K IAS. Shortly after the turn on course a flight of four F-84's passed about 500' below and to the right of our formation going in the opposite direction. Our heading was 265 degrees. The call sign Galahad was being used on VHF.
- 15:48 (Approx) Crash reported on VHF, plane reported doing split S from formation and three chutes reported from a C-119.
- 15:53 1/2 (Exact) Levelled off at briefed review altitude. Asked Lakeside if he was aborting his formation. Lakeside gave an immediate affirmative reply. Advised HI-JIM formation to increase IAS to 155K. Arrived over review stands 45 seconds late due to the effort to effect proper joinup with Lakeside.

The above information is from the lead crew of Hi Jim formation 15 May 1953 participating in the Landstuhl Fly by A/C 50-119

Lucion N. Powell
LUCION N. POWELL - Pilot
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

Ray E. Miller
RAY E. MILLER - Navigator
Captain, USAF
Group Navigator

SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED

Norman Urban
NORMAN URBAN - Co Pilot
Captain, USAF
Asst. Operations Officer

DETACHMENT 25
18TH WEATHER SQUADRON
AFO 57 US AIR FORCE

26 May 1953

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Flying Safety Officer
60th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium

The following is a summary of the weather conditions within the area between Darmstadt and Heidelberg, Germany at 1500 to 1700Z on 15 May 1953. This opinion is a statement of the weather as compiled in this station by professional weather personnel.

a. Synoptic situation: A deep low of 970 millibars was located at 1500Z at 53.7 degrees North 15.9 degrees west. This low was moving at approximately nineteen (19) knots per hour in a North Northeast direction. Associated with this low was a fairly strong southwest wind flow pattern across Great Britain, Northern France and the southern North Sea. To the southeast of this flow pattern and over the interested area was a comparatively weak southwest flow just above the friction layer and a southwest flow aloft. A ridge line was located from central Baltic Sea to Vienna, Austria. A weak frontal surface was moving in the southwesterly circulation through the low countries and north central France.

b. Weather: Within the subject area, there was scattered weak cumulus and stratocumulus activity based at 4000 to 5000 feet MSL with tops variable between 5500 to 6500 feet MSL. The overrunning clouds were reported as broken at 9000 to 10000 feet MSL. However, the upper air soundings showed that the clouds appeared to be based at 11000 to 12000 feet MSL. The surface visibility at Rhein Main, Wiesbaden, Heidelberg and Darmstadt was reported to be ten (10) statute miles or greater and was reported better than 25 statute miles at Rhein Main Air Base. Visibility aloft is a difficult factor to determine due to the fact that no controlled official observations are on record. It is believed, however, that there was some haze aloft which had been sent aloft by the heat of the day, and would have caused a restriction to visibility in the up sun direction. There was no precipitation reported in the area.

Quentin Woods
CIB RT WOODS
Major, USAF

HEADQUARTERS
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57, US AIR FORCE
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

SJA 150

SUBJECT: Initial Report of Survey of Damages to Property at Hemsbach

TO: Recorder Air Crash Accident Investigation Board
60th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium
APO 57, US Air Force

1. On 16 and 21 May 1953, personnel of this section visited the scene of the three-way plane crash which occurred near Hemsbach on 15 May 1953.

2. The purpose of the aforementioned visit was to ascertain the damage to private property, caused by the crash.

3. One half of one of the C-119's fell on property utilized as a garden plot by the residents of the city of Hemsbach; each resident was assigned a small plot, approximately 5 meters wide and 30 meters long. Some of the residents were assigned more than one plot. The following plots owned by residents, as indicated, sustained damage as the result of the crash, or by personnel, trucks, heavy equipment, etc. engaged in clearing the debris subsequent to the accident.

<u>Name of Plot Owner</u>	<u>Crop Planted</u>
Silmer	Onions and tomatoes
Prachsl	Potatoes, tomatoes and beets
Wallewine	Potatoes, corn
Schneider, Joseph	Potatoes, various vegetables
Englehart	Potatoes
Bender	Beans and Potatoes
Striffler	Mixed vegetables
Bauer	Potatoes and various vegetables
Schneider, Joachim	Corn, beets, mixed vegetables - Plot 30 x 15 meters

4. The other half of the C-119 fell in a beet patch belonging to a farmer named Karl Jung. As a result of the incident, an area of 50 x 20 meters was totally damaged and an area of about 80 x 100 meters containing potatoes was partially damaged.

Hq, 60th Trp Carr Wg (H), APO 57, USAF, Subj: "Initial Report of Survey of Damages to Property at Hemsbach"

5. The other C-119 fell approximately a mile and a half from the other airplane. Although extensive damage was done to the land, including a large hole, the land had only grass growing on it. Adjacent to the grass alkalis or some other animal feed was planted. Behind the hole was a best patch; the damage estimated is approximately 25 meters wide and 50 meters long.


6. About three miles from the hole made by the C-119, the jet plane landed in two best patches (in two pieces). It appeared that the damaged area was, in each case, an area about 30 x 30 yards. In addition to the acreage mentioned, there will be a few extra acres where trucks drove several hundred yards through the field to remove the aircraft.


7. Measure of Damages: It is impossible at this time to ascertain a correct measure of the damages. The final figure can only be determined when it is established whether or not it is possible for the civilian farmers to replant their crops.


It should be noted that, in addition to the aforementioned damages, additional claims will be filed. This arises from the fact that the damage was spread over an approximate ten miles area and that for a period of several days trucks, bulldozers and jeeps traversed this area. It is therefore impossible to correctly survey the complete area for damage.

To date no claim has been received for medical expenses. A conservative estimate for damage cost as the result of the incident is approximately from 4,000.- to 4,500.- Deutsche Marks.

Tp: 9160


HERBERT J. SCHEINBERG
Captain USAF
Claims Officer






60th Troop Carrier Wing Formation
 C-119C 51-8235 and others
 Mannheim, Germany
 15 May 1953

FORMATION POSITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:


WING MEN FLY ON FLIGHT LEADERS 10 FEET BETWEEN WING TIPS, 10 FEET BETWEEN NOSE & TAIL AND 10 FEET HIGH. FLIGHT LEADERS FLY 130 FEET BETWEEN WING TIPS OF FLIGHT LEADER & WING TIP OF RESPECTIVE ABLE FLIGHT WING MAN & 100 FEET BETWEEN NOSE OF FLIGHT LEADER & TAIL OF RESPECTIVE ABLE FLIGHT WING MAN. BAKER FLIGHT FLYS 80 FEET HIGH & CHARLIE FLIGHT 80 FEET LOW. SQUADRONS FLY 1000 FEET BETWEEN SQUADRON LEADERS.




CAPT. DRANEY



LT. COL. CRAMER
RED




LT. BROWN




LT. HUFFMAN




LT. FALLS



CAPT. LONEY
WHITE



LT. PECK




LT. HAYNES




LT. OLSEN



LT. CLARK
BLUE



LT. CASS




LT. PORTER




LT. LINER



LT. HOLLEY
GREEN




LT. CHILTON



LT. TRACY

36th Fighter Bomber Wing Formation
C-1190 51-8235 and others
Mannheim, Germany
15 May 1953



1076-G - 60AB6-16MAY53 - SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

1076-G - 60A86-16MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

1076-G - 60AB6-16MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

024 6 60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



024 G 60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



024 6 60486 15MAY53 - SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



F-84E 51-628A

Right wing, engine, tail
pipe, portion of cockpit

Nose section and major portion
of fuselage


2
Right wing, engine, tail
pipe, portion of cockpit

An aerial photograph showing a large, irregularly shaped, light-colored area in the center of a dark, textured field. This area appears to be the site of a crash, with some debris or wreckage visible. The surrounding field is dark and has a grainy texture. In the bottom right corner, there is a dark, angular shape that might be part of a vehicle or structure. The overall image is in black and white and has a grainy, historical quality.


1081 G - 60AB6 16MAY53 SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH




1081 G - 80AB6 - 16 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 NC CRASH

An aerial photograph showing a crash site in a field. A light-colored, irregularly shaped area, possibly a crater or the wreckage of an aircraft, is visible in the upper right portion of the image. The surrounding terrain is dark and appears to be a field or forest. A road or path runs diagonally across the lower part of the image.


1081 G - 60A86 - 16 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH

An aerial photograph showing a dark, textured landscape, likely a field or forest. A grid of light-colored lines is overlaid on the image, forming a series of rectangular blocks. The grid lines are slightly irregular and appear to be hand-drawn or printed on a film. The overall tone is dark and grainy, typical of an old aerial photograph.

1078-G - 60AB6-16MAY53- SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

An aerial photograph of a crash site, likely a military aircraft, showing a grid of rectangular areas. The image is grainy and has a high-contrast, black-and-white appearance. The grid is composed of dark and light rectangular blocks, possibly representing different types of terrain or debris. The overall scene is dark, with some lighter areas that might be the crash site or surrounding ground.

1078-G - 60AB6-16MAY53- SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

An aerial photograph of a crash site, likely a military aircraft, with a grid overlay. The grid consists of alternating light and dark rectangular blocks, creating a perspective effect. The crash site is visible as a dark, irregular shape in the lower-left quadrant of the grid. The image is grainy and has a high-contrast, black-and-white appearance.

1078-G - 60AB6-16MAY53- SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



1075-G - 40AB6-16MAY53 - SCENE OF 15MAY53



1075-G - 40A86-16MAY53 - SCENE OF 15MAY53 AIR CRASH



1075-G - 40A86-16MAY53 - SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC 1075-G

C-119C 51-8235

Impact point

3

C-119C 51-8241

Left boom, left wing,
left engine, major portion
of fuselage

4

C-119C 51-8241

Right wing, boom and
engine

5



1057-G 60ABG-16 MAY 53-SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



357-G-60AB6-16 MAY 53-SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



1057-G-60AB6-16 MAY 53-SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



254-G-60AB6-16 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



054 G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH




054-G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



1018-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH.



1018-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH.



1018-G-60ABG-15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH.

G-119C 51-8241

Left boom, left wing, left
engine and major portion of
fuselage

6

7

Nose and major portion of
cockpit

8

Left fin and rudder



1032 G 60AB6-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C119#51-B249



032 G 60ABG-16MAY53 DAMAGE TO C119 #51-8249




1032 G 60AB6 16MAY53 DAMAGE TO C119 #51-8249

039 0604BG 16 MAY 53, DAMAGE TO C119-57-8249





39-60ABG 16 MAY 53, DAMAGE TO C119-51 8249

39 060ABG 16 MAY 53, DAMAGE TO C-119 31 8242



6 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119*51-8249






9

10

Pilots seat and windows

11

F-84 fragment lodged
in control cables,
forward end of cargo
compartment ceiling



1038-6-60A36-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO CH 9 51-8249



1038-6-60A36-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO CH19 51-8249



1038-6-60A36-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C/19⁴ 51-B249



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

1033-5-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119-51-8249


UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

1033-5-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119-51-8249




UNITED STATES AIR FORCE


1033-5-60ABG-16MAY53 DAMAGE TO C-119⁵¹⁻⁸²⁴⁹



1035-G-60AB6 16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119#51-8249



1035-G-60AB6-16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119#51-8249



1035-G-60AB6 16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119#51-8249

C-119C 51-8249

Bottom center of fuselage


12


Fuselage, left side


13

Left wing, fuel stains
on lower surface

14











1037-6-60AB6-16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-8249



1037-6-60AB6-16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-0249



1037-6-60AB6-14 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-0349



1041-G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 51-8249



1041-G-60A86-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-117 51-8249



1041-G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119-51-8249

C-119C 51-8249

Left wing

15

Left engine

✓ 18

Left wing

19




WING 6 60ABG - 16ABG - DAMAGE TO CVR # 51-8259




WAB G 60ABG 16ABG - DAMAGE TO CVR # 51-8259




OKG G 60ABG-16ABG - DAMAGE TO, C-119 # 51-8259




1049-6-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119#51-8259




1049-G-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119#51-8259




1049-G-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO CH19#51-8259



60A86 18 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 51-8259



60A36 18 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 51-8259



C-119 51-8259

Damage caused by VHF and UHF
radios from 51-8241


18

19


Penetration of UHF radio set
below entrance to cockpit

20


Radio set struck center posts
of clam shell doors, right
paratroop door, and came to
rest as shown




1005-5 1005-5 1005-5 - DAMAGE TO C-119 # 51-8259.



1045-5 1016-11 1116-11 - DAMAGE TO C-119 # 51-8259.




1045-6 50256-101150 - DAMAGE TO C-119 # 51-8859.



046-G-60ABG 18 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119* 51-8259



046-G-60ABG 18 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119* 51-8259



046-G-60ABG 18 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119* 51-8259

044-6-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 # 51-8259

44 G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-8259

44-6-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 # 51-8259

C-119C 51-H259

Left side, left boom

21

Right side, left boom

22

23

Left wing

RESTRICTED

I N D E X

<u>EXHIBIT</u>	<u>TAB NUMBER</u>
AF Form 14 & Attachments, F-84 51-628A	1
Routes of Formations	2
50th Troop Carrier Wing Formation	3
36th Fighter Bomber Wing Formation	4
Statement, 1st Lt. J. W. Chilton	5
Statement, Lt. Colonel D. S. Cramer.	6
Statement, Lt. Colonel H. W. Jensen.	7
Statement, Captain A. A. Zack.	8
Statements, Other Personnel.	9
Proceedings, Accident Investigation Board.	10
Operations Orders	11
Radio Log, 317th Troop Carrier Wing (H).	12
AF Form 14 & Attachments, C-119C 51-8235	13
AF Form 14 & Attachments, C-119C 51-8241	14
AF Form 14 & Attachments, C-119C 51-8249	15
AF Form 14 & Attachments, C-119C 51-8259	16
Statement of Weather Officer	17
Statement of Wing Legal Claims Officer	18
DD Forms 175, Aircraft Clearances.	19
Diagram, Wreckage Distribution	20

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57, US AIR FORCE

319.1

SEP 4 1953

SUBJECT: Report of Major Aircraft Accident

TO: The Inspector General USAF
Directorate of Flight Safety Research
Norton Air Force Base, California

1. Forwarded in compliance with paragraph 41 a(1), Air Force Regulation 62-14, dated 14 January 1953, is one (1) copy of the Report of Major Aircraft Accident concerning the mid-air collision which occurred near Mannheim, Germany, 15 May 1953.


2. This report includes AF Forms 14 and attachments for the following aircraft:

F-84E	51-628A	36th Fighter Bomber Wing
C-119C	51-8235	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)
C-119C	51-8241	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)
C-119C	51-8249	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)
C-119C	51-8259	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)

3. I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.

4. Corrective action to be taken by this organization will be indicated in the correspondence to be forwarded in accordance with paragraph 41 b, AFR 62-14, 14 January 1953.

1 Incl
a/s


L. B. KELLEY
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

0264

R77. 40832

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

F-84

FORM 14 SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

ROUTING SLIP

ACCIDENT NO

53-5-15-1

TO	DATE	INITIAL	DATE
☒ REVIEW & ANALYSIS	8/28	P.K.	8/31/53
☒ MEDICAL SAFETY	8/26	AST	8/26/53
ENGINEERING BRANCH			
BOMBER BRANCH			
CARGO BRANCH			
FIGHTER BRANCH			
TRAINER BRANCH			
FACILITIES BRANCH			
SAFETY EDUCATION			

SUBJECT

REMARKS:

62-14 Letter
Supplemental Accident Information
Supplemental Accident Report
AMC Letter
Unsatisfactory Report
Rebuttal
Disassembly Inspection Report
Medical Report
Engineering Report
Emergency Parachute Jump Report
Answer to Correspondence

File 62-14
 Correspondence from
 AMC & medical
 Form 14

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57, US AIR FORCE

1 AUG 1953

OFS 310.33

SUBJECT: Supplemental Information, Aircraft Accident

TO: Commander-in-Chief
United States Air Forces in Europe
APO 633, US Air Force

53-5-15-5
AC

1. Reference is made to the report of major aircraft accident concerning F-34 51-628A and C-119's 51-8235, 51-8241, 51-8249, and 51-8259, which collided near Mannheim, Germany on 15 May 1953.

2. In accordance with paragraph 42, AFR 62-14, you are informed that A/1C Michael (NMI) Battiste, AF 13 379 557, died on 25 July 1953 at the 495th Medical Group Hospital, Wiesbaden, Germany. Cause of death was infection and other complications resulting from injuries received in the accident.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Tp: R/M AB 716

James E. Madden
JAMES E. MADDEN
1st Lt USAF
Asst. Adjutant

5706

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED

Hq 60th TC Wg, Medium, File: CFS 360,33, Subject: (Uncl) Supplemental Information, Aircraft Accident

ECOTF 360.33

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633, C/O POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

10 AUG 1953

TO: Office of the Inspector General, USAF, Norton Air Force Base, California

Information cited in basic letter is forwarded so that the Aircraft Accident Report on file in your headquarters may be corrected to reflect the casualty sustained in cited accident.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

John Sunnenberg
JOHN SUNNENBERG
1st Lt. USAF
ASST. ADJUTANT

RESTRICTED

SECURITY
INFORMATION

FORM 14 SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

ROUTING SLIP

ACCIDENT NO 53-5-15-5

TO	DATE	INITIAL	DATE
✓ REVIEW & ANALYSIS	8/17	P.R.	8/18/53
MEDICAL SAFETY			
ENGINEERING BRANCH			
BOMBER BRANCH			
✓ CARGO BRANCH			
FIGHTER BRANCH			
TRAINER BRANCH			
FACILITIES BRANCH			
SAFETY EDUCATION			

SUBJECT

REMARKS:

62-14 Letter
Supplemental Accident Information
Supplemental Accident Report
AMC Letter
Unsatisfactory Report
Rebuttal
Disassembly Inspection Report
Medical Report
Engineering Report
Emergency Parachute Jump Report
Answer to Correspondence

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57, US AIR FORCE

319.1

JUN 4 1953

SUBJECT: Report of Major Aircraft Accident

TO: Commanding Officer
60th Troop Carrier Group (M)
APO 57, US Air Force

1. Forwarded in compliance with paragraph 41 a(1), AFR 62-14, dated 14 January 1953, are two (2) copies of the Report of Major Aircraft Accident concerning the mid-air collision which occurred near Mannheim, Germany, 15 May 1953.

2. This report includes AF Forms 14 and attachments for the following aircraft:

F-84E	51-628A	36th Fighter Bomber Wing
C-119C	51-8235	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)
C-119C	51-8241	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)
C-119C	51-8249	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)
C-119C	51-8259	60th Troop Carrier Wing (M)

3. Reference paragraph 41 b of the cited regulation, the report will be returned to this headquarters within five (5) working days after receipt. The indorsement will be signed by the Group Commander and will include:

a. Concurrence or non-concurrence in the findings and recommendations.

b. If non-concurrence is indicated, the reasons for non-concurrence.

c. Any action taken by the 60th Troop Carrier Group to prevent similar accidents in the future.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL KELLEY:

1 Incl.
a/s (dup)

Edward J. Davies

EDWARD J. DAVIES
Capt

Asst Adj

USAF

RESTRICTED 0260

SECURITY INFORMATION

2492

D/17

RESTRICTED

B/Ltr fr Hq, 60th TC Wg to CO, 60th TC Gp. SUBJ: Report of Major Aircraft Accident.

OPN 3/41 (4 Jun 53)

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, 60TH TROOP CARRIER GROUP MEDIUM, APO 57, US AIR FORCE

TO: Commanding Officer, 60th Troop Carrier Wing (M), APO 57, USAF

1. Concur in the findings and recommendations.
2. Continual emphasis is being placed on the coordination of air missions with all units involved, as well as the dissemination of all pertinent information relative to these missions.
3. This group is utilizing crew members with the primary responsibility as scanners, on all formations involving two or more flights.

1 Incl
n/c

Tp: R/M AB 9113

Lorris W. Moomaw
LORRIS W. MOOMAW
Colonel USAF
Commanding

W 950337

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SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED

Hq 60th TC Wing, 319.1, Subject: Report of Major Aircraft Accident

2nd Ind


13 JUN 1953

360.33
HEADQUARTERS, 60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM, APO 57, US AIR FORCE

TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Air Force, APO 12, US Air Force

1. I concur in the findings and recommendations of the Accident Investigation Board and the action indicated in the 1st Indorsement.

2. Details of this accident were brought to the attention of all 60th Troop Carrier Group pilots at a special aircraft accident prevention meeting on 11 June 1953. Mid air collisions in general have been discussed at past flight safety meetings and will be given additional emphasis in the future.


L. B. KELLEY
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

W 950337

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Radio Ltr. Jm Ho, 60th Tp Carr Bg, M, APO 57, File 319.1, Subj: "Rpt of Maj Acft Acct", dtd 4 Jun 53

OPS 319.1 (4 Jun 53)

3rd Ind

23 JUL 1953

HEADQUARTERS, TWELFTH AIR FORCE, APO 12, US AIR FORCE

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe, APO 633, US Air Force

1. After careful review of the Form 14 and attached papers pertaining to this accident, this headquarters concurs in the findings and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board with the exception of recommendation "f" to the effect that each participating unit make a weather reconnaissance report. In combat or a combined exercise such a procedure would be necessary only in exceptional circumstances. Normally one aircraft is sufficient to determine enroute and target weather.

2. Concur with action taken by unit commanders to prevent recurrence of this type of accident.

3. So much of Section N-2 of the Form 14 as reads "formation leader" etc, is changed to read "formation leaders" etc. Subordinate commanders have been notified of this change in accordance with paragraph 41d, AFR 62-14.

4. This headquarters has taken the following action to prevent similar accidents:

a. Operations procedures have been carefully reviewed to insure no compromise with maximum flight safety standards.

b. A policy has been established to insure that operations orders published by this headquarters contain all information necessary to safely conduct the assigned mission.

c. A joint briefing will be held on future missions involving several units and different types of aircraft.

d. Units of the Twelfth Air Force have been directed to insure that subordinate echelons participating in missions are adequately informed of the content of the over-all operations order, and that such subordinate units are directed not to deviate from published operations orders without proper authority.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Basic Ltr Cm Hq, 60th Tp Carr Wg, H, APO 57, File 319.9, Subj: "Rpt of Maj Acit Acit", dtd 4 Jun 53

e. All pilots of this command will be briefed on this accident.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
w/d

Tp: Ramstein 7213

M. G. Brown
M. G. BROWN
Lt Col. USAF
Asst Adjutant

BOOFP 360.33

4th Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633, c/o POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

4 AUG 1953

TO: Office of the Inspector General, USAF, Norton Air Force Base, California

1. This correspondence pertains to a major aircraft accident which occurred ten (10) miles northeast of Mannheim, Germany on 15 May 1953, and is submitted in accordance with paragraph 11c, AFR 62-11, dated 11 January 1953. The aircraft involved were F-84E, No. 51-628, piloted by 1st Lt. James W. Chilton; C-119C, No. 51-8215, piloted by Captain Wesley Y. Clement; C-119C, No. 51-8211, piloted by Major Williston G. Wells, Sr.; C-119C, No. 51-8259, piloted by 1st Lt. David P. Sullivan.

2. This headquarters concurs in the findings and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Investigating Board as corrected by paragraph 3 of the preceding 3rd Indorsement.

3. As indicated in the preceding correspondence, the necessary corrective action has been taken to preclude recurrence of accidents of a similar type. No further action is contemplated by this headquarters at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

John C. Hadley
JOHN C. HADLEY
Col. USAF
Asst Adj.

5
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SECRET

FORM 14, SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

ROUTING SLIP

ACCIDENT NO

Immediatly
53-5-15-5

TO	DATE	INITIAL	DATE
☒ REVIEW & ANALYSIS	8/12/54	P.K.	8/13/54
☒ MEDICAL SAFETY	8/12	SS	
ENGINEERING BRANCH			
BOMBER BRANCH			
CARGO BRANCH			
FIGHTER BRANCH			
TRAINER BRANCH			
FACILITIES BRANCH			
SAFETY EDUCATION			

SUBJECT

REMARKS:

62-1A Letter
Supplemental Accident Information
Supplemental Accident Report
AMC Letter
Unsatisfactory Report
Rebuttal
Disassembly Inspection Report
Medical Report (5) ✓
Engineering Report
Emergency Parachute Jump Report
Answer to Correspondence

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

Office of The Inspector General, USAF
Norton Air Force Base
San Bernardino, California

APCFS-4A
53-5-15-5

17 JUL 1953

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Aircraft Accident Involving C-119, No. 51-8235

TO: Commander
60th Troop Carrier Wing
APO 57, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

1. Reference is made to a major aircraft accident which occurred on 15 May 1953, involving C-119, No. 51-8235.

2. The Report of Aircraft Accident Investigation was received without AF Forms 14B concerning the following:

Captain Wesley I. Clement
Lt Colonel John W. Osborn
Major Joseph H. Ray
Captain Carl J. Thompson
S/Sgt Dean O. Sohns

It is requested the above mentioned attachments be submitted in accordance with paragraph 40a(6), AF Regulation 62-14.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Henry C. Hughes
HENRY C. HUGHES
Lt Colonel, U. S. Air Force
Chief, Records and Statistics Division

cc: CINC USAF, Wiesbaden, Germany

4880494

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED

R/L: DAF, Hq USAF, Washington, Off IG USAF, Norton AFB, Calif, AFMPS-4A
53-5-15-5, SUBJ: (Uncl) Aircraft Accident Involving C-119, No. 51-8235,
17 Jul 53

OPS 762-33 (17 Jul 53)

1st Ind

28 Jul 1953

HEADQUARTERS, 60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, M, APO 57, C/O POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

TO: Office of the Inspector General, USAF, Norton Air Force Base, San Bernardino, California

1. Attached are Forms 14B as requested in basic letter.
2. The forms were not submitted with the accident report since the remains of the personnel concerned were not identified. A statement to this effect was signed by the medical officer and attached to the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

5 Incls:
a/s

Cortland P. Auser
CORTLAND P. AUER
Major Adjutant
USAF

W 880494

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.


Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Oeborn		FIRST NAME John		MIDDLE NAME W	2. SERIAL NO. A0371862	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Senior Pilot	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 19 Nov 1916	7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: NO. 1054-B SER.		8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO		DATE GRANTED —	FOR WHAT DEFECT? —		
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 20 Oct 1952			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL — ESTIMATED — EXPLAIN: —					
11. HOSPITALIZED: IN QUARTERS: —		ACTUAL DAYS —		DET. —		12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: 1700, 15 May 1953		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Body unidentified.							15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: Unidentified	

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.





Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

Body unidentified.



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Body unidentified.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE
24 July 1953

GRADE
DAVID C. RIDEN, 1/Lt, USAF (MC),
Actg. Flight Surgeon

SIGNATURE

David C. Riden

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 69-14 and AF Manual 43-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet (s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Ray	FIRST NAME Joseph	MIDDLE NAME Harold	2. SERIAL NO. AO 442 232	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DUTY Senior Pilot	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Passenger
6. DATE OF BIRTH 7 Feb 1920	7. FLIGHT'S PRIMARY DUTY MOB. 1054mB ESB.	8. WAS PILOT OR PAYING STATUS WITH INVARIANT ☐ YES ☒ NO		9. WAS GRANTED FOR WHAT DEFECT?		
10. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 5 Jan 1953			11. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL _____ ESTIMATED _____ EXPLAIN: _____			
12. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS _____ EST. _____		13. IF FATAL, TIME / 100 HOURS OF DEATH 15 May 1953, 1700		14. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION 7.		
15. QUARTERS: ACTUAL DAYS _____ EST. _____		16. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Body unidentified.		17. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: Unidentified		

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.



Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.

Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

Body unidentified.



REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL

Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Body unidentified.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE
24 July 1953

GRADE
DAVID G. RIMER, 1/Lt, USAF(MO), AM
Agc. Flight Surgeon

FLIGHT SURGEON OR AME

SIGNATURE

David G. Rimer

Section 8.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

Body unidentified.

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Glenon		FIRST NAME Wesley		MIDDLE NAME E.	2. SERIAL NO. AO 500 472	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Gr. Pilot	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Co-pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH 12 Jan 1919		7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: NOS. 1054-B SEN.			8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WINGS? ☐ YES ☒ NO		9. GRANTED FOR WHAT DEFECT? —	
10. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 17 November 1952					11. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL — ESTIMATED — EXPLAIN: —			
12. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS — EST. —		13. IF FATAL, TIME AND NAME OF DEATH: 1700, 15 May 1953		14. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.				
15. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Body unidentified.					16. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: Unidentified.			

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.



Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.

Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

Body unidentified.



WEDNESDAY REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL

Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Body unidentified.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE

26 July 1953

NAME, GRADE, FLIGHT SURGEON OR AIDE
DAVID G. RIVER, 1/12, USAF(MC), AMB
Actg. Flight Surgeon

SIGNATURE

David G. River

Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

Body unidentified.

BODY UNIDENTIFIED

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.


Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Thompson	2. FIRST NAME Carl	3. MIDDLE NAME J.	4. SERVICE NO. AO 723208	5. DATE OF INCIDENT 15 May 1953	6. CURRENT RATING AND DUTY Navigator	7. RATING DUTY AT TIME OF INCIDENT Navigator
8. DATE OF BIRTH 5 Sept 1920	9. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY WOL 1534	10. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☒ NO	11. DATE GRANTED --	12. FOR WHAT DEFECT? --		
13. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. (ON FLYING) 21 July 1952		14. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL -- ESTIMATED -- EXPLAIN: --				
15. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS -- EST. --	16. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH: 1700, 15 May 1953		17. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.			
18. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Body unidentified.			19. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: Unidentified.			

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.

Officer was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.





Section C—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns or area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

Body unidentified.



Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Body unidentified.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Body unidentified.

DATE
24 July 1953

GRADE
DAVID G RIDGE, 1/Lt, USAF(MC), AME
Actg. Flight Surgeon

SIGNATURE

David G. Ridge

Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

Body unidentified.

Body unidentified.

MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL Involved in AF Aircraft Accident

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 42-5, "Aircraft Accident Investigators' Handbook." If additional space is needed, use section F hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary, identifying by proper section letter.

Section A.—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Sohns		FIRST NAME Dean		MIDDLE NAME O	2. SERIAL NO. AF3221529	3. DATE OF INCIDENT 15 May 1953	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Non-Rated	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Radio Operator
6. DATE OF BIRTH 11 Sept 1921		7. PILOT'S PRIMARY DUTY: HQS. ☐ -- BSN. ☐ --			8. WAS PILOT OR FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? ☐ YES ☐ NO		9. GRANTED FOR WHAT DEFECT? --	
10. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING 5 February 1953					11. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT: ACTUAL -- ESTIMATED -- EXPLAIN: --			
12. HOSPITALIZED: ACTUAL DAYS -- EST. --		13. IF FATAL, TIME AND PLACE OF DEATH: 1700, 15 May 1953		14. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ NO ☐ YES IF YES, REPORT FULLY IN SECTION F.				
15. IN QUARTERS: ACTUAL DAYS -- EST. --		16. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH: Body unidentified.					17. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY: Unidentified.	

Section B.—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in all available detail an account of factors in this individual's physical and mental condition which might have contributed to the accident, with particular emphasis on the preceding 48 hours. Include any indicated recommendations for changes in AF personnel policy.



Airman was in good mental & physical condition at time of accident.

Section C.—FRACTURES, BURNS, AND AMPUTATIONS

Use figures below to mark site of fractures, burns, and amputations. List all injuries according to existing regulations. Indicate exact location of fractures, using arrows to most convenient side of manikin, and specify type, as Simple, Simple Comminuted, Compound, Compound Comminuted.

Outline area of burns on manikin and identify degree of burns on area as follows: 1st degree ①; 2d degree ②; 3d degree ③.

Body unidentified.



REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL

Section D.—DIAGNOSIS

Describe in detail, according to existing regulations, all injuries or abnormal conditions NOT identified in section C hereof. Include comment on psychic or emotional effects, shock, etc., apparent at time of this report.

Body unidentified.

Section E.—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all plane structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

DATE
24 July 1953

DAVID G. KIMER, 1/1X, USAP(MG) AME
Actg. Flight Surgeon

SIGNATURE
David G. Kimer

Section F.—Use this space for Report of Autopsy or for any extensions of preceding sections.

Body unidentified.

FORM 14, SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

ROUTING SLIP

ACCIDENT NO

62-8-15-5

TO	DATE	INITIAL	DATE
✓ REVIEW & ANALYSIS	8/11	P.K.	8/11/53
MEDICAL SAFETY			
ENGINEERING BRANCH			
BOMBER BRANCH			
CARGO BRANCH			
FIGHTER BRANCH			
TRAINER BRANCH			
FACILITIES BRANCH			
SAFETY EDUCATION			

SUBJECT

REMARKS:

62-14 Letter
Supplemental Accident Information
Supplemental Accident Report
AMC Letter
Unsatisfactory Report
Rebuttal
Disassembly Inspection Report
Medical Report
Engineering Report
Emergency Parachute Jump Report
Answer to Correspondence

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57, C/O POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N. Y.

OFS 360,73

1 AUG 1953

SUBJECT: Supplemental Information, Aircraft Accident

TO: The Inspector General USAF
Directorate of Flight Safety Research
Norton Air Force Base
San Bernardino, California

1. Reference is made to the report of major aircraft accident concerning F-84 51-628A and C-119's 51-8235, 51-8241, 51-8249, and 51-8259, which collided near Mannheim, Germany on 15 May 1953.

2. In accordance with paragraph 4.2, AFR 62-14, you are informed that A/1C Michael (NMI) Battiste, AF 13 379 557, died on 25 July 1953 at the 495th Medical Group Hospital, Wiesbaden, Germany. Cause of death was infection and other complications resulting from injuries received in the accident.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James E. Madden
JAMES E. MADDEN
1st Lt USAF
Asst. Adjutant

5714

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM 14 SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

ROUTING SLIP

ACCIDENT NO

Immediately
53-5-15-5

TO	DATE	<i>Initials</i>	<i>54465</i> DATE
☒ REVIEW & ANALYSIS	<i>8/4</i>	<i>P.K.</i>	<i>8/4/53</i>
MEDICAL SAFETY			
☒ ENGINEERING BRANCH			
BOMBER BRANCH	<i>8/6</i>		
CARGO BRANCH			
FIGHTER BRANCH			
TRAINER BRANCH			
FACILITIES BRANCH			
SAFETY EDUCATION			

SUBJECT

REMARKS:

62-14 Letter	☒
Supplemental Accident Information	
Supplemental Accident Report	
AMC Letter	
Unsatisfactory Report	
Rebuttal	
Disassembly Inspection Report	
Medical Report	
Engineering Report	
Emergency Parachute Jump Report	
Answer to Correspondence	

*File Clerk: Correct**Form 14 as per par 2.**Attn Mr. Manning**Note correction*

R+S
Form 14 has not been corrected as per instructions. Please note how corrections should be made and conform in the future.

R+S

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57, C/O POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

CPS 360.33

22 JUL 1953

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Change in Report of Aircraft Accident
Investigation

TO: The Inspector General USAF
Directorate of Flight Safety Research
Norton Air Force Base, California

1. Attention is invited to AF Form 14 pertaining to major aircraft accident involving one (1) F-84, No. 51-628A and four (4) C-119's, Nos. 51-8235, 51-8241, 51-8249 and 51-8359 which occurred near Mannheim, Germany on 15 May 1953.

2. A typographical error was made in Section N 2 of this form. You are hereby notified that so much of Section N 2 as reads, "Formation leader, etc", is changed to read "Formation leaders, etc".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Jemadden 1st Lt USAF
CORTLAND P. AUER
Major USAF

Adjutant

5421

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS
60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, MEDIUM
APO 57, C/O POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.

3 JUL 1953

OFS 360.33

SUBJECT: Rebuttal to Findings, Aircraft Accident Board

TO: The Inspector General USAF
Directorate of Flight Safety Research
Morton Air Force Base, California

53-5-15-5

1. Forwarded in compliance with paragraph 47, Air Force Regulation 62-14, are five (5) statements of rebuttal to the findings of the aircraft accident investigation board which convened at this station on 20 May 1953. The board was convened to determine the cause of a mid air collision which occurred on 15 May 1953 between F-84 51-628A, 36th Fighter Bomber Wing, and two (2) C-119 aircraft assigned to this headquarters.

2. Copies of the statements of rebuttal have been forwarded to each headquarters which received copies of the report of major aircraft accident.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

5 Incls:
a/s

Edward J. Davies
EDWARD J. DAVIES
Capt. USAF

Asst Adl

4893

HEADQUARTERS
48TH FIGHTER BOMBER GROUP
APO 119 US AIR FORCE

24 June 1953


SUBJECT: Rebuttal

TO: Commanding Officer
60th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium
APO 57, US Air Force

1. In accordance with provisions of paragraph 47, AFR 62-14, dated 14 January 1953, the following comments are submitted in rebuttal to the findings:

a. Paragraph 1, Primary Cause, I concur.

b. Sub paragraphs 1a, 1b, 1c, secondary causes, I do not concur. It is believed that the statements contained in these sub paragraphs are true facts only and should not be listed as causes. Sound tactical doctrine and practices during the past and for at least the immediate future is predicated on the rendezvous of both small and very large formations of aircraft for mutual support and combat effectiveness. Such formations are joined and assembled by the formation leaders searching out their respective associates and joining them in their correct positions for the route flight to target. It is also normal procedure for Fighter Squadrons to fly relatively large formations into air congested areas where pre-briefing for all concerned aircraft is not practical, since much of the air traffic is transient. During such flights, chief reliance to avoid air collision is placed on the formation leaders experience, alertness and proven capabilities.



ARTHUR D. THOMAS
Lt Colonel, USAF

HEADQUARTERS
49TH FIGHTER BOMBER SQUADRON
APO 119 US AIR FORCE

24 June 1953

SUBJECT: Rebuttal

TO: Commanding Officer
60th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium
APO 57, US Air Force

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 47, AFR 62-14, dated 14 January 1953, the following comments are submitted in rebuttal to the findings set forth in the AF Form 14 on a major accident which occurred 15 May 1953 in the vicinity of Mannheim, Germany, involving C-119 and F-84G type aircraft:

a. Concur with the findings as to primary cause as stated in paragraph 1 of those findings.

b. Paragraphs 1a, 1b, and 1c therein contain statements of fact. However, it is not believed that these items constitute "Secondary causes" of this accident. It has always been considered normal practice in fighter operations for squadron leaders to bring their formations, in VFR conditions, into areas where other traffic can be expected at or near the same altitude, with the responsibility for avoiding collision resting with the squadron leaders concerned. One simple example of this is approach to and entry into traffic for landing at an airbase, with other aircraft and formations at the same altitude, where the formation leader clears his formation by visual alertness.


c. It should be noted that, lest the picture presented by the findings as set forth be misleading, the actual collision occurred over eight (8) miles north of the designated rendezvous point, before rendezvous had been made between the two (2) fighter formations, and with the lead fighter squadron ("Callahan" - 48th Fighter Bomber Group) orbiting in a normal three to four (3-4) mile radius of that rendezvous point. Further, a change to an altitude lower than that of the C-119 formation had been called to "Cousin" leader (36th Fighter Bomber Group) and acknowledged by him approximately four (4) minutes before the collision.

d. It is believed that more appropriate secondary causes would be that:

INCL #2

Ltr, Hq, 493rd Ftr Bar Sq, APO 119, US Air Force, Subj: Rebuttal

- (1) "Cousin" leader failed to make the altitude correction as acknowledged by him approximately four (4) minutes prior to the collision.
- (2) The formation leaders involved in the collision were orbiting an abnormally great distance from the designated rendezvous point.
- (3) The G-119 formation involved was orbiting to the right, opposite to the normally expected left hand orbit, thereby creating a blind spot to both formations involved while approaching each other.
- (4) Both formations involved in the accident were flying in an area of restricted visibility, while conditions at the designated rendezvous point were adequate for safe operations of formations of aircraft.


HOWARD W. JENSEN
Lt Colonel, USAF

HEADQUARTERS
48TH FIGHTER BOMBER GROUP
APO 119 US AIR FORCE

24 June 1953


SUBJECT: Rebuttal

TO: Commanding Officer
60th Troop Carrier Wing, Medium
APO 57, US Air Force

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 47, AFR 62-14, dated 14 January 1953, the following comments are submitted in rebuttal to the findings of the accident investigation board in regard to the major accident involving C-119 and F-84 type aircraft in the vicinity of Nanheim, Germany.

a. I concur with the findings contained in paragraph 1 as to primary cause of the accident.

b. I do not concur with findings contained in paragraphs 1a, 1b and 1c, as to the secondary causes. Large formations of fighter type aircraft are frequently required to fly in congested areas where pre-briefing of all aircraft in the area is impossible. Separation of aircraft and flights rest solely with the individual pilot and flight leaders. Established tactical procedures often require the rendezvous of aircraft formations to effect mutual support and increased combat effectiveness. Such rendezvous is accomplished visually and entirely dependent upon the flight leader to avoid collision even though several flights are at the same altitude and area. Aircraft involved in subject accident collided some distance from, and at a different altitude than briefed. Therefore, it is felt that pre-briefing as to other aircraft altitudes and rendezvous point would not have prevented this accident.


SAM J. POOL
Capt., USAF

Encl #3

22D FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRON
36th Fighter-Bomber Group
APO 132 US Air Force

17 June 1953

SUBJECT: Rebuttal To Aircraft Accident Report

TO : Commanding Officer
36th Fighter-Bomber Group
APO 132, US Air Force

1. This letter is written in rebuttal to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board's report of the aircraft accident which occurred on 15 May 1953, at Mannheim, Germany in which C-119 aircraft numbers 51-8235A, 51-8241A, 51-8259A, and 51-8249A, and F-84E number 51-628, were involved.

2. Section "O" of the Air Force Form 14, Report of Aircraft Accident, states, "the primary cause of the accident was failure of the formation leaders to observe each other in sufficient time to take effective evasive action". Under Section "O", Recommendation a., it is recommended that commanders insure that formation leaders are fully aware of their responsibilities while leading formations. This recommendation and the use of the word "failed" in stating the primary cause factor infers that I erred because I could have or should have seen the other formation sooner than I did. It is to this inference that I offer rebuttal.

3. I did not see the C-119 formation because we were making a left orbit and they were making an unorthodox right orbit. Their location prior to the time that I sighted them was behind the nose of my aircraft in a position where it was impossible for me to see them. I could not see them until the arcs of our orbits brought them forward into an area where my vision was not obstructed. At that time I did everything humanly possible to avert a collision.

4. I have reviewed the Accident Investigation Board's report, and could find no evidence or opinion expressed by any of the witnesses to indicate that I did not understand my responsibilities as formation leader or to support the inference that I could have or should have seen the C-119 formation sooner than I did.

Lawrence S. Cramer
DARRELL S. CRAMER
Lt Col., USAF

Incl A

19 June 1953

S T A T E M E N T

I, Major Albert P. Hahn, Jr., 7200A, concur with the findings and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board and have no cause for rebuttal.


ALBERT P. HAHN, JR.
Major, USAF
7200A

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

Klos Moulton/ms/5149
Typed 17 July 53

AFMPS-42
53-5-15-5

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Aircraft Accident Involving C-119, No. 51-4235

TO: Commander
60th Troop Carrier Wing
APO 57, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

1. Reference is made to a major aircraft accident which occurred on 15 May 1953, involving C-119, No. 51-4235.

2. The Report of Aircraft Accident Investigation was received without AF Form 142 concerning the following:

Captain Wesley T. Clement
Lt Colonel John E. Osborn
Major Joseph H. Ray
Captain Carl J. Thompson
S/Lt Dean G. Schme

It is requested the above mentioned attachments be submitted in accordance with paragraph 40a(6), AF Regulation 62-14.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

HENRY C. HUGHES
Lt Colonel, U. S. Air Force
Chief, Records and Statistics Division

cc: CDR PLATE, Wiesbaden, Germany

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE REPORT										REPORTS OF PILOT SYMBOL NUMBER 12-72																																		
1. REPORTING INSTALLATION Chenai/Mala Air Base APO 57										1. REPORT NUMBER 0-50-11					2. REPLY DATE 26 May 1955																													
										3. COMMAND USMC III Air Force					4. J. J.																													
2. LOCATION Chenai/Mala Air Base										5. ☒ ON ☐ OFF } DATE					7. DISTANCE FROM APPARATUS 50'																													
8. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1955										9. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1640					10. TIME ALARM RECEIVED 1705					11. TIME APPARATUS ARRIVED 1705					12. TIME UNDER CONTROL 1705																			
13. DELAY IN RESPONSE ☐ YES ☒ NO (If YES, state delay)																																												
14. GENERAL cloudy										15. WIND DIRECTION SW					16. WIND VELOCITY (KPH) 3 mph					17. TEMPERATURE (°F) 60°					18. HUMIDITY (%) 45																			
19. FIRE INVOLVED										20. TYPE EMERGENCY					21. TYPE OF PILOT					22. LANDING																								
23. AFTER IMPACT										24. TYPE OF PILOT					25. TYPE OF PILOT					26. TYPE OF PILOT																								
27. DESCRIBE PRE-ACCIDENT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT Formation flying																																												
28. LOCATION OF FIRE																																												
29. INITIAL None										30. ON ARRIVAL None					31. ULTIMATE None																													
32. NOTIFICATION BY (Specify radio or number in appropriate box)										33. STATUS OF CRASH CREW AT TIME OF ALARM																																		
34. A. RADIO-ALERT										35. B. RADIO-TOUCH					36. C. IN STATION					37. D. LINE ALERT					38. E. HONOR STATION																			
39. C. TELE-TALK										40. D. CRASH-PHONE					41. F. OTHER					42. Remarks: Verbal from operations officer at base on parking ramp.																								
43. DESCRIBE DELAYS OR DEFICIENCIES None																																												
44. TYPE C-119										45. MODEL C					46. SERIAL NUMBER 51-18249					47. NO. OF ENGINES ☒ JET ☐ CONVENTIONAL					48. UTILIZATION cargo																			
49. FUEL ON BOARD 1,760 gals										50. FUEL INVOLVED None					51. OTHER HAZARDOUS CARGO None																													
52. TYPE (Check as many multiple boxes as appropriate)										53. DESCRIBE IF PERTINENT																																		
54. A. NIGHT										55. B. TAILWIND					56. C. SPRING					57. D. WINDSTAND					58. E. REVERENT																			
59. F. AIRFIELD										60. G. OPEN FIELD					61. H. WOODS					62. I. OVERSHOOT					63. J. KITCHEN																			
64. K. SNOW										65. L. WATERS					66. M. OPEN WATER					67. N. MOUNTAIN					68. O. OTHER																			
69. CONDITION ☒ A. DRY										70. B. WET					71. C. DRY					72. D. WET					73. E. DRY					74. F. WET					75. G. DRY					76. H. WET				
77. CAUSE OF ACCIDENT Flying debris from other aircraft involved in mid air collision										78. CAUSE OF FIRE No fire																																		
79. PHYSICAL EXTENT OF DAMAGE										80. MONETARY LOSS																																		
81. A. IMPACT										82. B. FIRE					83. C. RESCUE EFFORT					84. D. LOSS TO CONTENTS					85. E. LOSS TO INCIDENT PROPERTY					86. F. LOSS TO AIRCRAFT \$4,750.00														
87. MAJOR Major										88. NONE					89. NONE					90. NONE					91. NONE																			
92. TOTAL NUMBER INVOLVED 6										93. A. CREW 3					94. B. PASSENGERS 3					95. TOTAL NUMBER OTHER THAN OCCUPANTS INVOLVED																								
96. TYPE OF INJURY										97. A. NUMBER OF PERSONS					98. B. NUMBER OF PHYSICAL INJURIES					99. C. NUMBER OF PHYSICAL INJURIES					100. D. NUMBER OF PHYSICAL INJURIES																			
101. MAJOR										102. MINOR					103. NONE					104. MAJOR					105. MINOR					106. NONE														
107. (1) DEATHS										108. 6					109. 2					110. 4					111. 0					112. 0					113. 0									
114. (2) DEATHS										115. 0					116. 0					117. 0					118. 0					119. 0					120. 0									
121. (3) DEATHS										122. 0					123. 0					124. 0					125. 0					126. 0					127. 0									
128. (4) DEATHS										129. 0					130. 0					131. 0					132. 0					133. 0					134. 0									
135. TYPE AND REGISTRATION NUMBER OF ALL EQUIPMENT RESPONDING (List in order of arrival)										136. TYPE AND REGISTRATION NUMBER OF ALL EQUIPMENT RESPONDING (List in order of arrival)																																		
137. TYPE AND REGISTRATION NUMBER OF ALL EQUIPMENT RESPONDING (List in order of arrival)										138. TYPE AND REGISTRATION NUMBER OF ALL EQUIPMENT RESPONDING (List in order of arrival)																																		
139. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL RESPONDING										140. SUPERVISORY CAPACITY IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS																																		
141. A. CIVILIAN 5										142. B. MILITARY 1d					143. C. SGT. James D. Allen																													
144. EQUIPMENT REMAINING IN SERVICE 1 Sp 05, 1 Sp 04, 4 Sp 03, 1 Sp 02, 1 Sp 01										145. PERSONNEL REMAINING IN SERVICE 30																																		
146. METHOD OF FIRE CONTROL (General) No fire control needed										147. METHOD OF RESCUE (General) No rescue needed																																		
148. EXTINGUISHING MATERIALS USED																																												
149. A. WATER (GALLONS)										150. B. FOAM (GALLONS)					151. C. FOAM (GALLONS)					152. D. FOAM (GALLONS)					153. E. FOAM (GALLONS)					154. F. OTHER														
155. NONE										156. NONE					157. NONE					158. NONE					159. NONE					160. NONE														

NAVY REPORT

(Elaborate on pertinent facts in appropriate spaces; include statement of unusual conditions, obstacles, deficiencies, variations, actions, etc.; identify condition of personnel involved at the time (reasons and affected); enter appropriate comments and recommendations involving organization, equipment, personnel, methods, training, etc., as developed by the incident and as may relate to improved efficiency.)

FIRE ACCIDENT STATUS

SEND TO UNIT
MAIL & MESSAGE
CENTER

No fire involved.

ALARM RESPONSE

While following aircraft 51-18249 to parking area Base Operations Officer notified crew to stand by on aircraft 51-18249 which was also damaged in mid air collision.

ACCIDENT

Aircraft was in formation flight near Mannheim, Germany when one aircraft in the formation was rammed by a jet fighter. Flying debris damaged aircraft. Aircraft was leaking gasoline from a torn hole in the left wing. Crew equipment stood by until aircraft was defueled.

FIRE CONTROL

No fire control needed.

DEFICIENCIES

None.

RESCUE EFFORT

INDICATE LOCATION IN PLANE, DESCRIBE METHODS, EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING USED, IDENTIFY CAUSE OF DEATHS AND INJURIES, ETC.

No rescue needed.

COMMENT RECOMMENDATION

None.

DIAGRAM

(Show location of aircraft at rest, placement of operator, turret and hand lines operating, location of personnel in aircraft, points of entry and rescue, etc.)

See exhibits "A" thru "C".

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER'S REVIEW

1. REVIEWED BY (Signature)	2. REVIEWED BY (Signature)	3. REVIEWED AND ENTERED BY (Signature)
4. DATE (23 June)	5. DATE (23 June)	6. DATE

39 G 42486 16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C19 51 8249

39 G 40486 16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO CIR 51 8248

39 G 45486 16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C19 51 8248



1032-G-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-8249




1032-G 60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-8249




D32-G 60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-8249

CRASH REPORT K53-N
C II
EXHIBIT - A







1035-G-60AB6-16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119#51-8249




1035-G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119#51-8249



1041-5 60005-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 51-8249



1041-5-50086-16-1153-DAMAGE TO C-119-51-8249




1041-5-62ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119# 51-8249

3

4

CRASH REPORT K53-70
C - II
EXHIBIT - 5'



UNITED STATES AIR FORCE


1033 G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO CH19 51-8249 *

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

1333-6-60ABG-16MAY53 DAMAGE TO C-119*51-8249*

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

1033 G-60AB6-16 MAY 53 DAMAGE TO C-119*51-8249



1038-G-60AB6-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119-51-9349



1038-6-60AB6-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C/119⁸ 51-8349



1038-6-60AB6-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C/119² 51-8249.

CRASH REPORT # 53-10

EXHIBIT "C"

NARRATIVE REPORT

(Elaborate on pertinent prior data in appropriate spaces; include statement of unusual conditions, obstacles, deficiencies, variations, actions, etc.; identify condition of personnel reported at the time rescue was effected; enter appropriate comments and recommendations involving organization, equipment, personnel, methods, training, etc., as developed by the incident and as may relate to improved efficiency.)

FIRE ACCIDENT STATUS **NO FIRE INVOLVED**

MAIL & MESSAGE
CENTER

No fire involved.

ALARM RESPONSE

At 1655 hours 15 May 1953 crash phone rang. Control Tower reporting a B-119 landing runway 25L with nose gear trouble caused from flying debris of other aircraft involved in mid air collision. Requester requested immediately.

ACCIDENT

Aircraft was in formation flight near Mannheim, Germany when one aircraft in the formation was struck by a jet fighter. Flying debris hit this aircraft damaging nose section. Aircraft was able to fly home to Rhein/Main AB and complete a successful landing without further damage.

FIRE CONTROL

No fire control needed.

DEFICIENCIES

None.

RESCUE EFFORT

INDICATE LOCATION IN PLANE, DESCRIBE METHODS, EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING USED. IDENTIFY CAUSE OF DEATHS AND INJURIES, ETC.

No rescue needed.

COMBUSTION RECOMMENDATION

None.


DIAGRAM

(Show location of aircraft at crash, placement of apparatus, barrels and hand lines operating, location of personnel in aircraft, points of entry and rescue, etc.)


See exhibits "A" thru "C".

FOR THE COMMANDER'S REVIEW 1. REVIEWED BY (Signature) DATE 23 May 53		2. REVIEWED AND ENTERED BY (Signature) DATE
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
27 May 53




1049-G-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119# 54-8259




1049-G-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119#54-8259




1049-G-60ABG-16MAY53-DAMAGE TO C-119#54-8259



051-50A36 18 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-8259




05/12/50A39 18 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 #51-8259





7

8

CRASH REPORT 53-10
EXHIBIT A









043 6 60ABG-16ABG DAMAGE TO C-119 51-8259



OKG 6 60ABG-16ABG DAMAGE TO C-119 51-8259




OK3 6 60ABG-16ABG-DAMAGE TO C119 51-8259

9


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
CRASH REPORT 53-D


EXHIBIT B




DAMAGE TO C-119 # 51-8259.







046-G-60ABG-16 MAY 59 - DAMAGE TO C-119* 51-8259



046-G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119 51-8259



046-G-60ABG-16 MAY 53 - DAMAGE TO C-119*51-8259

11

12

CRASH REPORT E 53-10
C
EXHIBIT "C"

AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE REPORT										REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL 14-00-014 AF-22									
1. REPORTING INSTALLATION Waco/Waco Air Base										2. REPORT NUMBER 53-1					3. REPORT DATE 18 May 1953				
4. LOCATION 2 miles West of Waco, Texas										5. COMMENTS USAF III Air Force					6. DISTANCE FROM APPARATUS 42 miles				
7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953										8. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1649					9. TIME ALARM RECEIVED 1720				
10. TIME APPARATUS ARRIVED 1900										11. TIME UNDER CONTROL 1910									
12. DELAY IN RESPONSE ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, give reason) Trucks were out on standby. Incorrect information. Radio control vehicle broke down, stopped to use phone.																			
13. WEATHER cloudy										14. WIND DIRECTION SW					15. WIND VELOCITY (KMPH) 5 knots				
16. TEMPERATURE (°F) 69.8°										17. HUMIDITY (%) 48.25									
18. TYPE INVOLVED ☒ C. WING IMPACT ☐ D. WING UP ☐ E. NO FIRE ☒ F. IN FLAME ☐ G. ON LINE ☐ H. IN PARK ☐ I. TAXIING																			
19. DESCRIBE PRE-ACCIDENT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT Formation flying																			
20. LOCATION OF FIRE A. INITIAL entire plane B. ON ARRIVAL entire plane C. ULTIMATE entire plane																			
21. NOTIFICATION OF (Identify order by number in appropriate box) A. WING-ARMED ☐ B. RADIO-TOWER ☒ C. IN STATION ☐ D. LINE ALERT ☒ E. BUREAU STANDBY ☐																			
22. STATUS OF CRASH CREWS AT TIME OF ALARM A. TALKING ☐ B. CRASH-PROOF ☐ C. OTHER ☐ REMARKS																			
23. DESCRIBE DELAYS OR DEFICIENCIES None																			
24. TYPE C-119										25. MODEL C					26. SERIAL NUMBER 52-8295				
27. NO. OF ENGINES 2 ☐ JET ☒ CONVENTIONAL										28. UTILIZATION cargo									
29. FUEL ON BOARD 2,000 gals										30. FUEL INVOLVED 2,000 gals					31. OTHER HAZARDOUS CARGO None				
32. TYPE (Check as many multiple boxes as appropriate) A. RUNWAY ☐ B. TAXIWAY ☐ C. APRON ☐ D. AIRFIELD ☒ E. OPEN FIELD ☐ F. ROADS ☐ G. OVERGROW ☐ H. MOUNTAIN ☐ I. OTHER ☐										33. DESCRIBE IF PERTINENT									
34. CONDITION ☒ A. CONCRETE ☒ B. ASPHALT ☒ C. GRASS ☒ D. SAND ☐ E. GRAVEL ☐ F. OTHER ☐										35. DESCRIBE IF PERTINENT									
36. CRUISE OF ACCIDENT Collision in flight										37. CAUSE OF FIRE Impact									
38. PHYSICAL EXTENT OF DAMAGE A. IMPACT total B. FIRE total C. RESCUE EFFORT none										39. NONE-ART LOSS A. LOSS TO CONTENTS no cargo B. LOSS TO AIRCRAFT PROPERTY \$ 300.00 C. LOSS TO AIRCRAFT \$ 750,000.00									
40. TOTAL NUMBER INVOLVED 6										41. TOTAL NUMBER OTHER THAN OCCUPANTS INVOLVED none									
42. TYPE AND REGISTRATION NUMBER OF ALL EQUIPMENT RESPONDING (List in order of arrival) Radio WC 2283980, type 03 (al 135) 506316, class 530 4177935																			
43. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL RESPONDING A. CIVILIAN 8 B. MILITARY 9										44. SUPERVISORY CAPACITY IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS W/sgt. E. J. Jackson 95120									
45. EQUIPMENT REMAINING IN SERVICE 1 of 05, 1 of 03, 1 of 02, 4 of 135, 1 of 100, 1 of 100										46. PERSONNEL REMAINING IN SERVICE 40									
47. METHOD OF RESCUE (General) Feet and water										48. METHOD OF RESCUE (General) Search for remains									
49. EXTINGUISHING MATERIALS USED A. WATER (GALS) 1,000 B. FOAM (GALS) none C. FOAM LYS (GALS) 120 D. FOAM PUMP (GALS) none E. DRY POWD (LBS) none F. C. F. C. (GALS) none G. OTHER none																			

NARRATIVE REPORT

1. (Elaborate on pertinent prior data in appropriate spaces; include statement of unusual conditions, observations, participation, participation actions, etc.; identify condition of personnel involved at the time rescue was effected; enter appropriate comments and recommendations involving organization, equipment, personnel, methods, training, etc., as developed by the incident and as per report of personnel officers.)

FIRE ACCIDENT STATUS

From information received plane caught fire after being hit by a jet aircraft in flight and exploded upon hitting ground.

ALARM RESPONSE

At 1720 hours 15 May 1953 a call was received over crash phone stating there was a crash off base near Mannheim, Germany. Trucks were on runway standing for emergency landing. At 1735 hours trucks were dispatched to scene of crash.

ACCIDENT

A formation of C-119's were flying near Mannheim, Germany when a jet aircraft flew into ship, setting plane on fire and causing plane to crash and explode.

FIRE CONTROL

Form from hand line of type O9 was used to control fire and cool debris so search could be made for remains.

DEFICIENCIES

Radio vehicle overheated and would not run. Could not raise tower on AM/VMO 4 installed in Chief's jeep.

RESCUE EFFORT

INDICATE LOCATION IN PLANE, DESCRIBE METHODS, EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING USED, IDENTIFY CAUSE OF DEATHS AND INJURIES, ETC.
Rescue consisted of searching for remains, which were scattered over a large area and probing wreckage.

COMMENT RECOMMENDATION

None

DIAGRAM


(Show location of aircraft at rest; placement of apparatus, ladders and hand lines operating; location of personnel in aircraft, points of entry and egress, etc.)


See diagram and photographs (Exhibits "A" thru "D")

APPROVAL AND REVIEW


1. <i>Robert D. ...</i> FELDER & ... Base Fire Marshal	14. <i>Robert D. ...</i> U. S. ... Colonel USAF	15. <i>John ...</i> REVIEWED BY (NAME) DATE 11 Jun 53	16. REVIEWED AND ENTERED BY (NO USAF) DATE
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19 May 53






1028 6-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



1028 - G-60ABG-15MAY53 - SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



1028 G-60AB6-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



019-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



019-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 75MAY53 AC CRASH




019-G-60ABG 15MAY53 - SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH

13


14

CRASH REPORT F 53-7


EXHIBIT. B'



G 60ABG-15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 AC CRASH




G 60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



G 60ABG-15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 AC CRASH

324-6 60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



324-6 60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



324-6-60ABG-15 MAY 53- SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH




15


16

CRASH REPORT F53-7


EXHIBIT - C




60ABG 15 MAY 53 SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



4JABG 15 MAY 53 SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



60ABG 15 MAY 53 SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



1018 G-60ABG-15MAY53 SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



1018-G-60ABG-15MAY59-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



1018-6-60ABG-15MAY59-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

17

18

6+

CRASH REPORT F50-7

EXHIBIT .D'

AIRCRAFT CRASH FINE AND RESCUE REPORT										REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL / 1-28-114 AP-F2									
1. REPORT NUMBER 53-8										2. REPORT DATE 18 May 1953									
3. REPORTING INSTALLATION Rhein/Main Air Base										4. COMMAND USAF III Air Force									
5. LOCATION 1 1/2 miles West of Bensbach, Germany										6. ☐ ON } BASE ☒ OFF } BASE									
7. DISTANCE FROM APPARATUS 42 miles										8. TIME UNDER CONTROL 1900									
9. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953										10. TIME ALARM RECEIVED 1720									
11. TIME APPARATUS ARRIVED 1900										12. TIME UNDER CONTROL 1900									
13. DELAY IN RESPONSE ☒ YES ☐ NO (if yes, give reason) Trucks were out on standby. Incorrect information. Radio control vehicle broke down, stopped to use phone.																			
14. GENERAL cloudy										15. WIND DIRECTION SSW									
16. WIND VELOCITY (mph) 5 knots										17. TEMPERATURE (°F) 69.8°									
18. HUMIDITY (%) 48.2%																			
19. TYPE INVOLVED ☒ C. AFTER IMPACT										20. TYPE EMERGENCY ☒ C. IN FLIGHT									
21. DISCUSS PRE-ACCIDENT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT Formation flying										22. LOCATION OF FIRE entire plane									
23. NOTIFICATION BY (initials) order to number in appropriate box										24. STATUS OF CRASH CREWS AT TIME OF ALARM									
25. DESCRIBE DELAYS OR DEFICIENCIES None										26. TYPE C-119									
27. MODEL C										28. SERIAL NUMBER 51-18241									
29. NO. OF ENGINES 2										30. UTILIZATION cargo									
31. FUEL ON BOARD 2,000 gals										32. FUEL INVOLVED 2,000 gals									
33. OTHER HAZARDOUS CARGO None																			
34. TYPE (check as many multiple boxes as appropriate)										35. DESCRIBE IF PERTINENT									
36. CAUSE OF ACCIDENT Collision in flight										37. CAUSE OF FIRE Impact									
38. PHYSICAL EXTENT OF DAMAGE										39. MONETARY LOSS									
40. TOTAL NUMBER INVOLVED 3										41. TOTAL NUMBER OTHER THAN OCCUPANTS INVOLVED none									
42. TYPE AND REGISTRATION NUMBER OF ALL EQUIPMENT RESPONDING (list in order of arrival) Radio WC 2283980, type 03 (ol 135) 506316, class 530 4177935										43. SUPERVISORY CAPACITY IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS M/Sgt. E. J. Jackson 95170									
44. METHOD OF FIRE CONTROL (General) None										45. METHOD OF RESCUE (General) None									
46. EQUIPMENT REMAINING IN SERVICE 2 of 05, 1 of 03, 1 of 04, 4 of 325, 1 of 1000, 1 of 1020										47. METHOD OF RESCUE (General) None									
48. EXTINGUISHING MATERIALS USED										49. EXTINGUISHING MATERIALS USED									
50. WATER (gals) none										51. OIL (gals) none									
52. FOAM (gals) none										53. DRY POWD (lbs) none									
54. OTHER none										55. OTHER none									

NARRATIVE REPORT

1. (Elaborate on pertinent prior data in appropriate spaces; include statement of unusual conditions, obstacles, deficiencies, meritorious actions, etc.; identify condition of personnel removed at the time rescue was effected; enter appropriate comments and recommendations involving organization, equipment, personnel, methods, training, etc., as developed by the incident and as may relate to improved efficiency.)

FIRE ACCIDENT STATUS

From information received plane caught fire after being hit by a jet aircraft in the air.

ALARM RESPONSE

At 1720 hours 15 May 1953 a call was received over crash phone stating there was a crash off base near Bensheim, Germany. Trucks were on runway standby for emergency landing. At 1735 hours trucks were dispatched to scene of crash.

ACCIDENT

A formation of C-119's were flying near Mannheim, Germany when a jet aircraft flew into ship, tearing a wing off of the C-119 causing plane to catch fire and crash.

FIRE CONTROL

None. Fire had been extinguished upon arrival.

DEFICIENCIES

Radio vehicle overheated and would not run. Could not raise Tower on AM/VRC installed in Chief's jeep.

RESCUE EFFORT

INDICATE LOCATION IN PLANE, DESCRIBE METHOD, EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING USED, IDENTIFY CAUSE OF DEATHS AND INJURIES, ETC.

None. Personnel had already been removed from scene upon arrival.

COMMENT RECOMMENDATION

None

DIAGRAM

(Show location of aircraft at rest, placement of apparatus, targets and hand lines operating, location of personnel in aircraft, points of entry and rescue, etc.)

See diagram and photographs (Exhibits "A" thru "D").

APPROVAL AND REVIEW


WILLIAM E. NAVIGATOR
Major
Base Fire Marshal

R. B. Bailey
Colonel, USAF
Commanding

REVIEWED BY (Command)
J. H. Johnson
DATE 11 Jun 53

REVIEWED AND ENTERED BY (RM STAFF)
DATE

19 May 53






1028 6-60AB6-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH




1028 6-60AB6-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH




1028 6-60AB6-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



U9-G-60AB6-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH




U9-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH




009-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH

CRASH REPORT F53-8


EXHIBIT B



6 G-60 ABG-15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 AC CRASH




G-60 ABG-15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 AC CRASH




6 G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH

024 6 60ABG-15 MAY 53- SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



024 6 60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



024 6 60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH




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CRASH REPORT F53-8

EXHIBIT 'C'



60AB6 15 MAY 53 SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 AC CRASH



60ABG 15 MAY 53 SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 AC CRASH



60486 15 MAY 53 SCENE OF ISMAYE? AC CRASH



1018-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



1018 G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH




1018 G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

5.


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CRASH REPORT F53-8


EXHIBIT D



1028-6-60AB6-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



1028-6-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



1028-6-60AB6-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



019-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



019-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH




019-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH

7


8

CRASH REPORT F53-9


EXHIBIT, B'



G 60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



6 G 60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 AC CRASH



* G 60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

024-6-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



024 G 60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



024-6-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



7


10

CRASH REPORT F 53-9

EXHIBIT. C'



60ABG 15 MAY 53 - SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 A/C CRASH



S-60ABG 15 MAY 53 SCENE OF 15 MAY 53 AC CRASH





1018-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH



1018-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH




1018-G-60ABG-15MAY53-SCENE OF 15MAY53 A/C CRASH

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CRASH REPORT F 53-9

EXHIBIT . D'



AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE AND RESCUE REPORT										REPORT CONTROL SYMBOL / 47-40-174 / A2-P2									
1. REPORT NUMBER 9-53-9										2. REPORT DATE 13 May 1953									
3. REPORTING INSTALLATION Rhein/Main Air Base										4. COMMAND USAF III Air Force									
5. LOCATION 3 miles West of Hombach, Germany										6. ☐ ON ☒ OFF BASE 42 miles									
7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 15 May 1953										8. TIME OF ACCIDENT 1649									
9. TIME ALARM RECEIVED 1720										10. TIME APPARATUS ARRIVED 1900									
11. TIME UNDER CONTROL 1900										12. TIME APPARATUS DEPARTED 1900									
13. DELAY IN RESPONSE ☒ YES ☐ NO (If yes, give reason) Trucks were out on standby. Incorrect information. Radio control vehicle broke down, stopped to use phone.																			
14. GENERAL cloudy										15. WIND DIRECTION SSW									
16. WIND VELOCITY (kph) 5 knots										17. TEMPERATURE (°F) 69.0°									
18. HUMIDITY (%) 48.25																			
19. FIRE INVOLVED										20. TYPE EMERGENCY									
21. BEFORE ACCIDENT										22. AFTER IMPACT									
23. ON IMPACT										24. NO FIRE									
25. IN FLIGHT										26. ON LINE									
27. IN PASS										28. TAKING									
29. DESCRIBE PRE-ACCIDENT STATUS OF AIRCRAFT Formation flying																			
30. LOCATION OF FIRE																			
31. INITIAL entire plane										32. ON ARRIVAL entire plane									
33. ULTIMATE entire plane																			
34. NOTIFICATION BY (Identify order by number in appropriate box)																			
35. A. RADIO-ALARM										36. B. RADIO-TOUCH									
37. C. TALK-TALK										38. D. CRASH-PHONE									
39. E. OTHER										39. REMARKS									
40. DESCRIBE DELAYS OR DEFICIENCIES None																			
41. TYPE (Check as many multiple boxes as appropriate)																			
42. A. RUNWAY										43. B. TAXIWAY									
44. C. APRON										45. D. HARBOR									
46. E. AIRFIELD										47. F. OPEN FIELD									
48. G. WOODS										49. H. OVERGROWN									
50. I. MOUNTAIN										51. J. OTHER									
52. CONDITION										53. DESCRIBE IF PERTINENT									
54. A. CONCRETE										55. B. MACADAM									
56. C. DIRT										57. D. SAND									
58. E. GRASS										59. F. HARD									
60. G. SOFT										61. H. MUD									
62. I. DRY										63. J. WET									
64. K. LEVEL										65. L. SLOPE									
66. M. DITCH										67. N. OTHER									
68. CAUSE OF ACCIDENT Collision in flight																			
69. CAUSE OF FIRE Impact																			
70. PHYSICAL EXTENT OF DAMAGE																			
71. IMPACT										72. MONETARY LOSS									
73. FIRE										74. LOSS TO CONTENTS									
75. RESCUE EFFORT										76. LOSS TO NEAREST PROPERTY									
77. LOSS TO AIRCRAFT										78. LOSS TO AIRCRAFT									
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7. NARRATIVE REPORT (Elaborate on pertinent prior data in appropriate spaces; include statement of unusual conditions, obstacles, delays, etc.; identify condition of personnel removed at the time rescue was effected; enter appropriate comments and recommendations involving organization, equipment, personnel, methods, training, etc., as developed by the incident and as may relate to future operations.)					
8. FIRE ACCIDENT STATUS Aircraft caught fire after running a formation of C-119 and crashed.					
9. ALARM RESPONSE At 1720 hours 15 May 1953 a call was received over crash phone stating there was a crash off base near Bismarck, Germany. Trucks were on runway standby for emergency landing. At 1735 hours trucks were dispatched to scene of crash.					
10. ACCIDENT Aircraft flew into a formation of C-119. After hitting two C-119's plane caught fire and crashed.					
11. FIRE CONTROL None.					
12. DEFICIENCIES Radio vehicle overhauled and would not run. Could not raise Tower on AM/VHC 4 installed in Chier's jeep.					
13. RESCUE EFFORT INDICATE LOCATION IN PLANE, DESCRIBE METHODS, EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING USED, IDENTIFY CAUSE OF DEATHS AND INJURIES, ETC. None. Pilot parachuted.					
14. COMMENT RECOMMENDATION None.					
15. DIAGRAM (Show location of aircraft at rest, placement of apparatus, turrets and hand lines operating, location of personnel in aircraft, points of entry and rescue, etc.) See diagram and photographs (Exhibits "A" thru "D").					
16. APPROVAL AND REVIEW <table border="1"> <tr> <td> BY <i>[Signature]</i> TALMER E. DAVISON 1st Fire Marshal </td> <td> BY <i>[Signature]</i> D. J. MILLER Commanding </td> <td> NO. REVIEWED BY (Command) <i>[Signature]</i> 11 June 53 </td> <td> NO. REVIEWED AND INTERED BY (HQ USAF) </td> </tr> </table>		BY <i>[Signature]</i> TALMER E. DAVISON 1st Fire Marshal	BY <i>[Signature]</i> D. J. MILLER Commanding	NO. REVIEWED BY (Command) <i>[Signature]</i> 11 June 53	NO. REVIEWED AND INTERED BY (HQ USAF)
BY <i>[Signature]</i> TALMER E. DAVISON 1st Fire Marshal	BY <i>[Signature]</i> D. J. MILLER Commanding	NO. REVIEWED BY (Command) <i>[Signature]</i> 11 June 53	NO. REVIEWED AND INTERED BY (HQ USAF) 		

19 May 53

Operator's Name & Rank

Orlison, James V, 1st Lt

0-119

0-119

0-119

53-4-1299

Dollar Loss

Place of Accident

Wessheim, Germany - 12 mi. SW

Home Station

Wessheim, Germany

Phase of Operation

Type of Accident

Activity or Maneuver Prior to Accident

Conditions Affecting Accident

10	Engines Running	Not Taxing
20	Taxing	
31	To Takeoff	
32	From Landing	
33	Within Other Areas	
30	Takeoff	
31	Run	
32	Climb	
33	Discontinued	
40	In Flight	
41	Normal	
42	Aerobatic	
43	Formation Tactics	
44	Other Maneuver	
50	Landing	
51	Approach	
52	Flareout	
53	Roll	
60	Go Around	
98	Other	
99	Undetermined	

FBI	Sec	Sec
01		Ground or Water Loop
02		Wing Tip Landing
03		Wheels Up Landing
04		Hard Landing
05		Collapse or Retracting of Gear
06		Underfoot
07		Overfoot
08		Not up or Time Over
09		Collision with Other Aircraft
10		Collision with Ground or Water
11		Other Collision
12		Spin or Stall
13		Fire on Ground
14		Fire/Explosion in Air
15		Air Frame Failure in Flight
16		Abandoned Aircraft
17		Prop or Jet Blast
98		NBC
99		Undetermined

A	Steep Bank
B	Aerobatic Maneuver
C	Ground Gunway Pass
D	Aerial Gunway Pass
E	Low Level Flight
F	Normal Flight
G	Under Control With Major Malfunction
H	One
I	Climb
J	Towing
K	Hovering
L	Join Up
M	Cross Over/Cross Under
N	Adopt Dec By Phase
Z	Undetermined

FBI	Sec	Sec
A		Immediate Forced Landing
B		Provisional Landing
C		Fuel Exhaustion
D		Engine Stoppage or Flame Out
E		Last in Navigation Accident
F		Non Compliance with T.O.
G		Simulated Emergency
H		Ditching
I		Water Landing - Other than Ditch
J		Evacuation Decompression
K		Intentional damage to Avoid greater Damage
L		OCA or ILS Approach
Y		Other

Aircraft Damaged

Persons Injured

Destroyed	3	Fatal	1
Substantial	1	Major	1
Minor	1	Minor	1
No		No	4

Flight Reference

1	Control
2	Instrument (Actual)
3	Instrument (Simulated)
4	On Top
5	Transition
9	Undetermined

1	Day
2	Night
3	Dawn
4	Dusk

1	In Formation
2	Not In Formation

Date

EV by

Check by

Date

EV by

Check by

I & SEDiv

Date

EV by

Check by

CAUSE FACTORS

UNSAFE ACTS				UNSAFE CONDITIONS				Cause Age	Risk Cause
Part Duty	MAJOR	Specific	Violation	MAJOR	Specific	Minor	Cross Ref		
37	1	2	0	3				5	1
28	1	5	9	0				5	3
28	1	5	0	9				5	3
28	1	5	0	7				5	3
					1	0	3	5	0

Formation leaders failed to observe each other in sufficient time to take evasive action. Supervisory failed to coordinate change in F-4 rendezvous altitude with the Troop Carrier Wings or the 11th AF Liaison Officer for the maneuver. Operations orders published by the 40th FW and 11th AF did not indicate the presence of other aircraft to be over the maneuvering area. Formation leaders of these organizations were not briefed on this information. None. It is believed that the formation leaders did not see each other due to haze, particularly in the direction of the sun.

C-119's and F-34's were assembling for a fly-by over same point. Weather necessitated altitude change by F-34's. An F-34 flying wing position collided with 2 C-119's. All three aircraft crashed. Haze and small clouds limited visibility. F-34 flight leader failed to see cargo planes in time to guide flight safely by. F-34 altitude change made without coordination with others concerned. A.C.N.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That commanders insure that formation leaders are carefully and completely briefed prior to each mission and are fully aware of their responsibilities while leading formations. Emphasis should be placed on the need for constant vigilance, particularly in areas of reduced visibility and when other aircraft are known or suspected to be in the area. All pilots in formation flights should make a practice of notifying their leaders of the presence of other aircraft approaching the formation.
2. That any proposed deviation from specified altitude provisions of an operations order published by the Higher Headquarters be coordinated with the originator of the order.
3. That all wings review the procedure for transmission of Operations Orders to insure adequate dissemination of information to the most mission commander for planning and briefing purposes. Specifically in this case the lower echelons were not given information regarding the participation of other aircraft.
4. The Board believes that definite altitude separation is necessary in marshalling areas, particularly when diverse types of aircraft are involved. Wherever possible separate marshalling areas should be used for different types of aircraft.
5. That a central control system be established to provide complete control of future operations of this type. Such a control system should include adequate ground to ground, air to ground, and air to air communications.
6. That under marginal weather conditions each unit assigned to fly in combined missions will send one or more aircraft on a weather reconnaissance flight over the route to be followed by the formation at the assigned altitude for that unit. Pilots of these aircraft will report weather along the route, over the assembly point and over the initial point. Weather reports will be transmitted to a central control point and to the mission commander or the unit concerned.
7. That Jet fighter pilots be furnished adequate protection against flash burns and loss of helmet in the form of P-3 helmets with visor.

REMARKS MEDICAL SAFETY DIVISION

No comment.

REMARKS REVIEW & ANALYSIS DIVISION

No comment pending receipt of command letters. A.C.N.

WHEEL, SEAR, PULPHER AND GILSON

1922537

5072

ON 12TH ST. BETWEEN 1ST AND 2ND STS.

THEY, WE WANT, WANT US
JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES, CONGRATULATE

[illegible]

and article activities 6-110 and 7-11, with many individuals, Dec., 13 May 52, cited my indication that the loss of the 10th and 11th regts were not properly briefed. Not following orders. Did the operational direction to units participating in the C-47 attacks allocate provisions for ultimate completion of the initial and alternate plans from received, disseminated, and intended to make for use if adverse weather prevented compliance original direction? If the operational direction is considered adequate, what responsibility is determined for failure to insure that provisions are maintained.

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED CONSULT
CRYPTOC. 100-408515-#005IFYING

SUMMARY

721

1/2 ENCL/3in

(29 May 93)

UNION N. S. SUPPLEMENTAL No. C Sec. 10, 1968

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

RESTF

Deputy Director General

Part 2 R.I. for SECURITY INFORMATION Form 14 Acct AO 33-5-15-5

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION

INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED NOTIFY
CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

FROM: 60TH TRP CARR WG (HEAVY) WIESBADEN GER

TO : CSAP WASH DC FOR: TIG

NR : JOPS 0391

16 May 53

(DTG 161430Z)

Ref AFMPS-2D-5-C-376. Aft collision Heidelberg Ger 15 May 53.

1. Mission was serial review at Landstuhl AB with 2 minute time separation and 500 feet altitude separation over target. 10,000 feet altitude separation provided between F-84 acft and C-119 acft at marshalling area where accident occurred. Preliminary investigation reveals F-84 acft may have changed altitude over marshalling area from 15,000 feet to 5000 feet, which was assigned altitude for C-119 acft. Mission did not involve interception.

2. Aft not under control of GCI at time and place of accident.

3. Weather reported 6/8 stratus in haze layer at 5500 feet, vis 7 miles.

4. Marshalling area not in vicinity of airport. Control of VFR traffic in marshalling area established by mission Operations Order as outlined in 1 above. Control over target area handled by Landstuhl Tower.

NOTE : 376 is not identified in SMD

ACTION: CIS

INFO : GIG, OOP, AWS, CSAP, ODC, CG3, CVC, CAV, OOP-CP, PMP-12-E

CAF IN: 64816 (16 May 53)

ARG/ld

RESTRICTED

C-119A and F-84A were assembling for a fly-by over same point. Weather necessitated altitude change by F-84A. An F-84 flying wing position collided with a C-119A. All three aircraft crashed. Haze and small clouds limited visibility. F-84 flight leader failed to see cargo planes in time to guide flight safely by. F-84 altitude change made without coordination ~~with~~ with others concerned. A.C.M.

RECOMMENDATIONS

REMARKS MEDICAL SAFETY DIVISION

No Comment

REMARKS REVIEW & ANALYSIS DIVISION

No comment pending receipt of Command Ltr
A.C.M.

1661

RECEIVED AT SHAHA CRYPTOCLERK

16 MAY 53

IC

RENO 12-OFS 1353

DATE

OP

CITE NO

DATE TIME ORIGIN

PRECEDENCE

CG 12TH AIR FORCE, WIESBADEN, GERMANY

FROM:

CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF, WASH D.C. ATTN: IG

652

TO:

DCS/OPERATIONS, USAF, WASH D.C.
OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.
CINCUSAF, WIESBADEN, GERMANY

Ref 5/505, 5/71, 5/612, 5/613, 5/632 *noted*

INFORMING ALLIED LAND FORCES, CENTRAL EUROPE, FONTAINEBLEAU, FRANCE.

REF MSG JOFS-0384. JOFS-0385. JOFS-0386. JOFS-0387. JOFS-0388. JOFS-0389 FROM 60TH TRP CARR WG AND CRASH AND PRELIMINARY REPORT FROM 36TH FTR BMR WING, DATED 15 MAY. THE FOLLOWING NARRATIVE REPORT OF REFERENCED AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPRESENTS SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE THUS FAR:

AN AERIAL FLYBY WAS SCHEDULED AT LANDSTUHL AIRBASE. THIS FLYBY CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING: 36TH FTR BMR WG WITH 16 F-84 AIRCRAFT OVER LANDSTUHL AIR BASE AT 1604Z AT 2900 FEET MSL. 38TH BOMB WING (LIGHT) WITH 27 B-26 AIRCRAFT OVER LANDSTUHL 1602Z AT 2400 FEET MSL. 48TH FTR BMR WING WITH 16 F-84 AIRCRAFT OVER LANDSTUHL 1604Z AT 2900 FEET MSL. 60TH TRP CARR WING WITH 18 C-119 AIRCRAFT OVER LANDSTUHL 1600Z AT 1900 FEET MSL. 86TH FTR BMR WING WITH 16 F-86 ACFT OVER LANDSTUHL 1605 AT 3400 FEET MSL. 317TH TRP CARR WING WITH 18 C-119 AIRCRAFT OVER LANDSTUHL 1600Z AT 1900 FEET MSL. TRP CARR WINGS WERE TO MARSHALL AT 5000 FEET WITH THE 317TH WING LEADING FLIGHT. F-84 WINGS WERE TO MARSHALL AT 15000 FEET WITH 48TH WING LEADING FLIGHT. THE MARSHALLING AREA WAS OVER LADENBURG BEACON. THE C-119'S OF THE 317TH TRP CARR WING WERE DEPARTING LADENBURG BEACON ON A WESTERLY HEADING. THE 60TH WING COMING IN FROM THE NORTHEAST MADE A 360 DEGREE TURN TO THE NORTH FOR PROPER SPACING BEHIND THE 317TH WING. THIS TURN HAD JUST BEEN COMPLETED AND 60TH WING WAS APPROACHING LADENBURG BEACON FROM THE NORTHEAST AT 5000 FEET WHEN F-84'S OF THE 36TH FTR BMR WING CAME OUT OF THE SOUTHWEST MAKING A LEFT TURN INTO THE LADENBURG BEACON AT 5000 FEET. THE LEADER OF THE 36TH FTR BMR WING SIGHTED THE C-119'S AND WAS HEARD TO CALL "BOGIES AT 12:00 O'CLOCK BREAK RIGHT". THE FIRST 3 FLIGHTS OF F-84'S SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED THE C-119'S. THE LEADER OF THE 4 FLIGHT WENT OVER THE C-119'S. THE NUMBER 2 MAN UNDER THE 119'S. THE NUMBER 3 MAN COLLIDED WITH THE LEAD SHIP OF THE 119'S. AND THE

NOTE: NO UPDATES NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCLERK BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

D/10	MED S
D/FSH	B & S
D/TI	ATM
D/PROC	SAF PR
I & SE	MEETIN

IC _____ DATE _____
 CITE NR _____ DATE TIME GROUP _____ PRECEDENCE _____
 FROM: _____
 TO: _____ PAGE TWO OF IC 1661

NUMBER 4 MAN WENT ABOVE THE 119'S. THE F-84 PILOT BAILED OUT AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED. 2 C-119'S WITH A TOTAL OF 10 PEOPLE CRASHED AND BURNED. 3 OF THE 10 SUCCESSFULLY BAILED OUT. 1 C-119 SUFFERED MAJOR DAMAGE FROM STRIKING DEBRIS IN THE AIR. LEADER OF F-84 FLIGHTS CHANGED RENDEZVOUS ALTITUDE TO 5000 FEET IN ORDER TO REMAIN UNDER CLOUD COVER. WHEN LEADER SIGHTED 119 FLIGHT AT 5000 HE DECENDED TO 4000 CALLING LEADER OF 36TH FLIGHT TO DO LIKEWISE. ALTHOUGH LEADER SAYS THIS MESSAGE WAS ACKNOWLEDGED, 36TH FLIGHT REMAINED AT 5000 AND ACCIDENT OCCURRED SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INDICATES THAT FLIGHT LEADERS OF 36TH AND 48TH WERE NOT PROPERLY BRIEFED THAT C-119 FLIGHTS WERE MARSHALLING AT 5000 FEET OVER LADENBURG BEACON.

NOTE: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/IG	MED S
D/FSH	H A S
D/II	ADM
D/PROC	SAF ED
I & SE	MEETIN

C-119C

51-82

RESTRICTED-SECURITY INFORMATION

USAF

632

RECEIVED AT SBAMA CRYPTOCLERK

17 MAY 53

10

1644

DATE

OP

QTE NR

JOFS 0386

DATE TIME GROUP

PRECEDENCE

FROM:

CO 60TH TRP CARR WG, HVY, RHEIN-MAIN AB, FRANKFURT, GER

TO:

16 HC USAF, WASH, D.C.
 OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF
 CINC, USAF, WIESBADEN, GER
 CG 12TH AF, RAMSTEIN, GER
 CINC ALLIED AF CEN EUROPE, FONTAINEBLEAU, FR
 ATTN: GEN NORSTADT

1 Destr
 2 Fatal
 2 major

AF-F3. REPT OF MAJ ACFT ACCIDENT.

A. 15 MAY 53, 1553Z, HEIDELBERG, GER, 10 MILE NORTH.

B. C-119C, 51-8211, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF RHEIN-MAIN AB, DESTROYED.

C. PILOT WILLISTON G WELLS, MAJ, AO 764845, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF RHEIN-MAIN AB, UNK.

D. N/A.

E. CO-PILOT EDWIN E DAKSA, 1ST LT, AO 2080333, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, RHEIN-MAIN AB, UNK.
 ENGINEER, MICHAEL BATTISTE, A/1C, AF 13379551, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, RHEIN-MAIN AB, USED PARACHUTE, POSSIBLE AMPUTATION BOTH LEGS.
 RADIO OPERATOR, CHARLES G CASON, A/2C, AF 13405660, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, RHEIN-MAIN AB, USED PARACHUTE, CONDITION FAIR.

F. FLIGHT OF F-84S ACFT FLEW THROUGH FORMATION OF C-119 ACFT. 2 C-119 ACFT AND 1 F-84 CRASHED.

G. UNK.

H. RHEIN-MAIN-LANDSTUHL, ROUND ROBIN.

I. OPERATIONAL TRAINING.

J. 6/8, 4500, VIS 7 MILES.

NOTE: NO AFRANCE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCLERK BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED-SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/18	MED S
D/FSH	H & G
D/11	ADM
D/PROC	SAF F&E
I & SE	MEETING

C-119

51-805

RESTRICTED

SECURITY

INFORMATION

5/18

USAF

RECEIVED AT SHAMA CRYPTOCENTER

10

1552

DATE

15 MAY 53

CITE JR

JOE 0585

DATE TIME ORG

PRECEDENCE

OP

FROM:

60 60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, (HVV), RHEIN-MAIN AB, FRANKFURT, GE

TO:

CHIEF OF STAFF, HQ USAF, WASH D.C. ATTN: IG
 OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.
 CINUSAF, WIESBADEN, GER.
 CG 12TH AIR FORCE, WIESBADEN, GER.

CL 1 Dest
 5 FATAL
 371

INFO: ATTN: GEN. NORSTADT, FONTAINEBLEAU, FRANCE

1 major

AF-F 3. REPT OF MAJ ACFT ACCIDENT. *Phil*

A. 15 MAY 53, 1553Z, HEIDELBERG, GER., 10 MILES NORTH.

B. C-119 C. 51-8235 TO TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF, RHEIN MAIN AB, DESTROYED.

C. INST PLT JOHN W. OSBORN, LT. COL, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF, RHEIN MAIN AB, UNK.

D. N/A.

E. PILOT WESLEY Y. CLEMENT, CAPT, AO 800472, 60 TRP CARR GP, RHEIN MAIN AB, UNK. CO PILOT JOSEPH H. RAY, MAJ, AO 142232, 60 TRP CARR GP, RHEIN MAIN AB, UNK. NAVIGATOR CARL J. THOMPSON, CAPT, AO 723208, TO TRP CARR SQ, RHEIN MAIN, UNK. ENGR T.W. BIGGS 2/2 G AF 18315337, TO TRP CARR SQ, RHEIN MAIN, USE OF PARACHUTE POSSIBLE BROKEN BACK.

F. FLIGHT OF F-84B FLEW THROUGH FORMATION OF C-119 ACFT, 2 C-119 ACFT AND 1 F-84 CRASHED.

G. UNK.

H. RHEIN MAIN-LANDSTUHL, ROUND ROBIN.

I. OPERATIONAL TRAINING.

J. 6/8, 5500, VIS 7 MILES.

K. UNK.

L. NONE.

M. N/A.

NOTE: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/18	MED S
D/FSH	H & S
D/11	ADM
D/PROC	SAF FB
I & SE	MEETIN

F 845
51
RESTRICTED

SECURITY INFORMATION

USAF
614

RECEIVED AT SBAMA CRYPTOCENTER

1642

15 MAY 53

IC _____ DATE _____
NONE _____ OP _____
CITE IN _____ DATE TIME ORIGIN _____ PRECEDENCE _____
FROM: CO 36TH FIGHTER WING, FURSTENFELDBRUCK AB, GERMANY
TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, HQ USAF, WASH D.C. ATTN: IG 1 DEST
OFFICE OF TIG, MORTON AFB, CALIF. 1 minor
CG 12TH AIR FORCE, WIESBADEN, GER.
CG USAF, HQ USAF, WASH D.C. ATTN: DCSO
INFO: CINCSAFE, WIESBADEN, GER.
CG WRIGHT AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER, WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB, OHIO
CRASH AND PRELIMINARY REPT. *cl*

- A. 15 MAY, 1549Z HRS, 3-5 MILES EAST OF WORMS, GER.
B. ~~F-84 E-30RE, 51-628, 22 FTR BMR SQ, 36 FTR BMR GP, 36 FTR BMR WG,~~
~~12 AIR FORCE, USAF, BITBURG, GER. ACFT DESTROYED.~~
C. PLT JAMES W. CHILTON, 20878 A, 1ST LT, 22 FTR BMR SQ, 36 FTR
BMR GP, 36 FTR BMR WG, USAF, PARACHUTE USED. MINOR INJURY.
D. NOT APPLICABLE.
E. NOT APPLICABLE.
F. MID-AIR COLLISION WITH 2 C-119 ACFT.
G. NONE.
H. LOCAL.
I. AERIAL REVIEW.
J. 3600 BROKEN, TEN MILES VISIBILITY.
K. UNKNOWN.
L. NONE.
M. NONE.
- Py TT # 5/613*
One accident
- 53-5-15-5*
5/24

NOTE: PA/OP/MA/SE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED-SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/IG	MED S
D/FSK	H & G
D/II	ADM
D/PROC	SAF ED
I & SE	MEETING

C-119C

5/18

USAF

51-82

RESTRICTED

SECURITY INFORMATION

613

RECEIVED AT SPANA CRYPTOCENTER

TO: 1641
 DATE: 15 MAY 53
 CITE IS JOFS 0388
 DATE TIME ORIGIN: [REDACTED]
 PRECEDENCE: OP
 FROM: CG 60TH TROOP CARRIER WING, (HVV), RHEIN-MAIN AB, FRANKFURT, GER.
 TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, HQ USAF, WASH D.C. ATTN: 1G
 OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.
 CINCSAFE, WIESBADEN, GERMANY
 CG 12TH AIR FORCE, WIESBADEN, GER. *Paul*
 INFO: ATTN: GERN. NORSTADT, FONTAINEBLEAU, FRANCE *1 Sub. 2 minutes*

AF-F 3. REPT OF MAJ ACFT ACCIDENT. *CL*

- A. 15 MAY 1953, 1553Z, HEIDELBERG, GER., 10 MILES NORTH.
- B. G-119 C, 51-8249, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF, RHEIN MAIN AB, EXTENSIVE SHEET METAL DAMAGE, BOTTOM AND SIDE OF FUSELAGE AND LEFT WING.
- C. PILOT ANTHONY H. ZACK, CAPT, AO 705513, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF, RHEIN MAIN AB, CUTS ON FACE AND HEAD, NO USE OF PARACHUTE.
- D. N/A.
- E. CHIEF ENGINEER, ORVILLE M. FROESE, A/1C, AF 18356568, 10 TRP CARR SQ, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF, RHEIN MAIN AB, NO USE OF PARACHUTE, CUTS FROM GLASS FRAGMENTS.
- F. ACFT STRUCK BY FRAGMENTS WHEN FLIGHT OF F-84 ACFT FLEW THROUGH FORMATION OF G-119 ACFT.
- G. UNK.
- H. RHEIN MAIN-LANDSTUHL, ROUND ROBIN.
- I. OPERATIONAL TNG.
- J. 6/8, 5500. VIS 7 MILES.
- K. NONE.
- L. NONE.
- M. N/A.

Ref # 5/612

NOTE: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/18	MED S
D/FSH	H & S
D/11	ADM
D/PROC	SAFED
I & SE	MEETIN

C-119

5/18

USAFB

51-82

RESTRICTED

SECURITY INFORMATION

612

RECEIVED AT SBAMA CRYPTOCENTER

IC 1646 DATE 15 MAY 53

CITE IN JOFS 0387 DATE TIME ORIP [REDACTED] PRECEDENCE OP

FROM: CO 60TH TROOP CARRIER WG (HVV), RHEIN-MAIN AB, FRANKFURT, GER.

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, HQ USAF, WASH D.C. ATTN: IG
 OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.
 CINCSAFE, WIESBADEN, GER.
 CG 12TH AF, WIESBADEN, GER.

1 Sub
 1 none
 CL

INFO: ATTN: GEN. NORSTADT, FONTAINEBLEAU, BRANCE

RCS AF-F 3. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF MAJOR ACFT ACCIDENT.

- A. 15 MAY 53, 1553Z, HEIDELBERG, GER., 10 MILES NORTH.
- B. C-119 C, 51-8250, 10 TRP CARR SQDN, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF, RHEIN MAIN, LARGE HOLE LOWER LEFT SIDE OF FUSELAGE.
- C. PILOT, DAVID P. SULLIVAN, 1ST LT, AO-1910348, 12 TRP CARR SQDN, 60 TRP CARR GP, USAF, RHEIN MAIN, NO USE OF PARACHUTE, NO INJURY.
- D. N/A.
- E. N/A.
- F. ACFT STRUCK BY FRAGMENTS WHEN FLIGHT OF F-84 ACFT FLEW THROUGH FORMATION OF C-119 ACFT.
- G. UNKNOWN.
- H. RHEIN MAIN-LANDSTUHL ROUND ROBIN.
- I. OPERATIONAL TRAINING.
- J. 6/8 COVER 5500 VISIBILITY 7 MILES.
- K. NONE.
- L. NONE.
- M. N/A.

Ref # 571

NOTE: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED-SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/18	MED S
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D/PROC	SAFFD
I & SE	MEETIN

C-119
C-119
F-84

RECEIVED REstricted SECURITY INFORMATION

565

IC 1638 DATE 15 MAY 53
CITE IN DATE TIME ORIGIN PRECEDENCE
JOF 80384

FROM:

CG 60TH TRP CARR WG, (HVV), WIESBADEN, GER.

TO:

CHIEF OF STAFF, HQ USAF, WASH, D.C. ATTN: IG
OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.
CG 12TH AF, WIESBADEN, GER.
CINCUSAFE, WIESBADEN, GER.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CRASH REPORT.

15 MAY 53, 1553Z, WEINHEIM, GER. FORMATION OF C-119, 60TH TRP
CARR WG, 3 MILES NORTH HEIDELBERG, GER, STRUCK BY FLIGHT OF
F-84. 2 C-119 ACFT CRASHED AND BURNED. 1 F-84 BELIEVED CRASHED.
2 C-119 ACFT RETURNED TO RHEINMAIN AB, GER. WITH MINOR DAMAGE.
NUMBER FATALITIES AND INJURIES UNKNOWN. DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
UNKNOWN.

CHIEF OF STAFF, HQ USAF, WASH, D.C.
OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.
CG 12TH AF, WIESBADEN, GER.
CINCUSAFE, WIESBADEN, GER.

NOTE: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCLIPPER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

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D/PROC	SAFED
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1817

RECEIVED AT SBAMA CRYPTOCENTER

29 MAY 53

IC EDOTF 9633

DATE RR

CITE IN CINCUSAFE, WIESBADEN DATE TIME ORIG PRECEDENCE

FROM: COMDR 60TH TRP CARRIER BG, WIESBADEN, GERMANY

1318

INFO: COMOR 12TH AIR FORCE, BAMSTEIN, GERMANY
TO: OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.

REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE FOFS 0410. REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME ON SUBMISSION OF AF FORM 14, PERTAINING TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
WHICH OCCURRED NEAR HEIDELBERG, GERMANY ON 18 MAY 53, INVOLVING
F-84E, NUMBER 51-628 AND C-11918, NUMBERS 51-8241, 51-8235, 51-
8249, AND 51-8259, RESPECTIVELY, GRANTED. REQUEST ORIGINAL COPY
OF AF FORM 14 BE FORWARDED TO THE DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT SAFETY
RESEARCH, NORTON AFB, CALIF, AND DUPLICATE COPY TO THIS HEADQUARTERS
ON OR BEFORE 4 JUNE 53.

No Rec 7 Ref msg

NOTE: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED-SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
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D/PROC	SAFED
I & SE	MEETIN

1666

MAY 17-53

 IC _____ DATE _____
 JOFS 0393 _____

CITE NO _____ DATE TIME ORIGIN _____ PRECEDENCE _____

FROM: CO 60TH TRP CARR WG, (HVV), WIESBADEN, GER.

TO: CH OF STAFF, USAF, WASH, DC. ATTN: IG

CINCUSAFE, WIESBADEN, GER.

CG 12TH AF, WIESBADEN, GER.

GEN NORSTAD, COMDR ALLIED FORCES, FONTAINEBLEAU, FR.

OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.

CO 36TH FTR WG, FURSTENFELDBRUCK AB, GER.

640

SUPPL C-119C, 51-8241, 15 MAY 53.

 C. WELLS, WILLISTON G. MAJOR, AO-764046, FATAL.

 E. PART ONE, DAHL, EDWIN E. 1ST LT, AO-2080333, FATAL.

F. ACFT COLLIDED WITH F-84E, 51-628, FLOWN BY 1ST LT CHILTON, 22 FTR BOMB SQ, 36 FTR BOMB WG, KSC WAS AERL REV AT LANDSTUHL AB, OPR ORDERS ISSUED BY HQS 12 AF ASG ALT OVER MARSHALLING PT, LADENBERG BEACON, MANNHEIM, GER. F-84 ACFT WERE ASG 15000 FEET, C-119 ACFT WERE ASG 5000 FEET. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REVEALS F-84 FORMATION LEADER MAY HAVE CHANGED ALT FROM 15000 TO 5000. MSN DID NOT INVOLVE INTCP. ACFT NOT UNDER CON OF GCI. WEA VARIOUSLY REPT 3/8 TO 5/8 STRAYOR CUMULUS IN HAZE LAYER AT 5500 FEET, VISIBILITY 3 TO 7 MILES. MARSHALLING AREA NOT IN VICINITY OF APRY. CON OF VFR TRAF IN MARSHALLING AREA ESTB BY ALT SEP DSG IN OPR ORDER. CON IN TGT AREA ESTB BY ALT AND TIME SEP AND BY LANDSTUHL TOWER.

G. UNK.

K. EST 300 DOLLARS DAMAGE TO FARM CROPS, CLAIMS MAY BE MADE FOR GERMAN MEMBERS.

NOTE: PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/18	MED S
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D/11	ADM
D/PROC	SAF P.D.
I A SE	MEETIN

RESTRICTED - SECURITY INFO

RECEIVED AT SHANA CRYPTOCENTER

1667

17 MAY 53

IC [REDACTED] DATE [REDACTED]
 JOFS 0392
 CITE NO DATE TIME ORG PRIORITY
 CO 60TH TRP CARR WG. (HVV) WIESBADEN, GER.

FROM: CH OF STAFF, USAF, WASH, DC. ATTN: IG
 CINCUSAFE, WIESBADEN, GER.
 TO: CG 12TH AF, WIESBADEN, GER.
 COMDR ALLIED FORCES, FONTAINEBLEAU, FR.
 ATTN: GEN NORSTAD
 OFFICE OF TIG, NORTON AFB, CALIF.
 CO 36TH FTR WG, FURSTENFELDORF, GER.

639

et

SUPPL C-119C, 51-8235, 15 MAY 53.

- C. OSBORN, JOHN W. LT COL. AO-371862, PRESUMED DEAD, REMAINS RECOVERED WITH OTHERS BUT NOT INDIV IDENTIFIED.
- E. PART 1. CLEMENT, WESLEY Y. CAPT, AO-800472, PRESUMED DEAD, REMAINS RECOVERED WITH OTHERS BUT NOT INDIV IDENTIFIED.
 PART 2. RAY, JOSEPH H. MAJOR, AO-142232, PRESUMED DEAD, REMAINS RECOVERED WITH OTHERS BUT NOT INDIV IDENTIFIED.
 PART 3. THOMPSON, CARL J. CAPTAIN, AO-723208, PRESUMED DEAD, REMAINS RECOVERED WITH OTHERS BUT NOT INDIV IDENTIFIED.
 PART 4. BIGGS, T. W., ANN 1/C, AF 18315337, MAJOR INJURIES.
 PART 5. ADD TO PREVIOUS REPT, SOHNS, DEAN O. 1/SGT, AF 37215294, PRESUMED DEAD, REMAINS RECOVERED WITH OTHERS BUT NOT INDIV IDENTIFIED.
- F. ACFT COLLIDED WITH F-84E, 51-628, FLOWN BY 1ST LT CHILTON, 22 FTR BOM SQ, 36 FTR BOMB WG, MSN WAS AERL REV AT LANDSTUHL AB. OPR ORDERS ISSUED BY HQS 12 AF ASG ALT OVER MARSHALLING PT, LADENBERG BEACON, MANNHEIM, GER. F-84 ACFT WERE ASG 15000 FEET. C-119 ACFT WERE ASG 5000 FEET. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REVEALS F-84 FORMATION LEADER MAY HAVE CHANGED ALT FROM 15000 TO 5000. MSN DID NOT INVOLVE INTOX, ACFT NOT UNDER CON OF GCI. WEA VARIOUSLY REPT 3/8 TO 5/8 STRATO CUMULUS IN HAZE LAYER AT 5500 FEET. VISIBILITY 3 TO 7 MILES, MARSHALLING AREA NOT IN VICINITY OF APRT. CON OF VFR TRAF IN MARSHALLING AREA ESTB BY ALT SEP DSG IN OPR ORDER. CON IN TOT AREA ESTB BY ALT AND TIME SEP AND BY LANDSTUHL TOWER.
- G. UNK.
- K. EST 300 DOLLARS DAMAGE TO FARM CROPS, CLAIMS MAYBE MADE FOR GERMAN MED SV.

NOTE: PA AMPLAGE NOT REQUIRED, CONSULT CRYPTOCENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

RESTRICTED-SECURITY INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION	
D/16	MED S
D/FSH	H A S
D/11	ADM
D/PROC	SAF/PA
I A SE	MEETING